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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Contradictory Soviet views on Poland
- Mixed signals in PRC leadership struggle
- Major changes in Soviet agricultural policy

Declassified
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7 JANUARY 1981
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

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TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

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  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967
- SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
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- SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970
- TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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USSR-POLAND

Moscow has been presenting a mixed picture of the situation in Poland recently, alternating reports of reviving economic activity with sporadic assaults on the alleged influence of radical elements in the workers movement. The reemergence of denunciatory themes does not appear to reflect a change in Soviet policy, which still appears keyed to the belief that the Polish regime is capable of controlling the situation. Polish media, meanwhile, have attested both to the regime's continued commitment to a moderate reform course and to heightened pressures from conservative and radical forces, with several turn-of-the-year commentaries lashing out at extremists on both left and right.

MOSCOW OFFERS CONFLICTING APPRAISALS OF POLISH SITUATION

Two recent Soviet reports on the Polish labor scene present a generally reassuring picture of Polish developments, suggesting that Moscow is still hopeful that the Kania regime can manage its problems itself. A 1 January IZVESTIYA report by the paper's Polish correspondent contained interviews with representatives from various plants who repeatedly stressed that work activity is returning to normal and said that party organizations had become increasingly effective. Similarly, a 4 January Moscow domestic radio report highlighted new production successes at the giant Nowa Huta steel mill and said that promises by the steelworkers to continue production reflected the mood of the "overwhelming majority" of Polish work collectives. The report also implied approval of some Polish economic reform measures, saying that a proposed decentralization plan was intended to improve the effectiveness of management and production.

In contrast to these generally favorable assessments, several other Soviet reports have been couched in much more sober terms, indicating that Soviet tolerance is limited. One example was a yearend roundup of the international situation in the theoretical journal KOMMUNIST, No. 18. The article, available thus far only from a Prague radio summary on 6 January, was written by foreign affairs commentator Vadim Nekrasov and signed to press in mid-December. It contained references to "great obstacles" facing the Polish regime, "chaos" in the economy, irresponsible exploitation of strikes, and "displays of open antisocialist activity by counterrevolutionary groups." Another negative assessment came in a 1 January TASS report, carried by PRAVDA the next day, which voiced concern over efforts by "antisocialist forces" to hinder normalization efforts, turn the Solidarity trade union into a "political" organization, and create chaos in the economy. Similarly, a commentary carried by Moscow foreign language radio broadcasts on the 7th warned that antisocialist forces have "started to call openly for a further destruction of the state structure" and want to contrapose the trade unions to the government and create "anarchy." And a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA article, reported by TANJUG on the 7th, charged that the Solidarity trade union is receiving funds from a Polish emigre "government" in London.

While these latest negative reports are more pessimistic than most Soviet comment during the previous two or three weeks, they are still fairly low level and not as specific as some earlier expressions of concern. For instance, a 1 September A. Petrov PRAVDA commentary claimed that antisocialist forces had already succeeded in penetrating some Polish plants, and an 8 December TASS dispatch said that they were using Solidarity at one plant to dismiss managers and disarm guards and that activists were physically disappearing. The latest reports are also more general and do not cite any specific examples of antisocialist activities or imply that they are succeeding.

WARSAW COMMENT EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER POLITICAL EXTREMISM

In the sharpest reaction yet to hardline pressures to turn back the reform movement, ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 2 January denounced what it described as efforts to "torpedo" the renewal process by those who consider the reforms a threat to their own interests and status. The article was contemptuous toward those who it said oppose any "accounting" that might expose their arrogance and incompetence. While conceding that changing old habits is a difficult process, the article stressed that every Pole had the responsibility to work for the success of the renewal program and to avert "an aftermath that would be irreversible for decades"--presumably referring to possible Soviet intervention. Opponents of economic reform were taken to task also by the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on 29 December in an article citing "vigilant adversaries" who want to halt the reform process in midcourse and gradually revert to the old ways. The paper declared that such a halt would be "fatal," since the country's economy is in such straits that complete implementation of economic reform is the only way out of the crisis.

Representatives from the other end of the spectrum--radical unionists and intellectuals--were also attacked in Warsaw comment at the turn of the year. Thus ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 31 December, while welcoming the establishment of the Solidarity union as providing a basis for a better representation of workers' interests, warned against those who would "sidetrack" the new union into a blind alley of opposition activity. The paper also condemned "absurd concepts" aimed at turning Poland away from the socialist path. TRYBUNA LUDU on 5 January renewed what have become fairly routine attacks on dissident leaders Kuron and Michnik, who are accused of subversive activity. Also on the 5th, the military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, continuing its recently stepped up level of commentary on current issues, scored statements made to an FRG paper by a Solidarity official calling for a multiparty system in Poland. The paper said the interview harmed the Solidarity union's "good name" and belied its assurances that it does not want to be a "political" organization.

TIES WITH USSR

A rare public reference to the existence of anti-Soviet sentiments in Poland appeared in the final resolution of a 6 January meeting in Warsaw of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society. The resolution called for a concerted campaign against forces who it said are trying to turn the Polish renewal into an "anti-Soviet movement." While society chairman Wronski, in his speech to the meeting, did not refer directly to anti-Soviet feelings, he did point to danger signals on this score and warned that friendship between the two countries could not be taken for granted but had to be worked at assiduously. He remarked that the Solidarity union's promise, in its statutes, not to undermine Poland's foreign alliances did not really amount to "unequivocal support" for the alliances or readiness on the part of the union to cooperate with the Friendship Society.

While Warsaw has been outspoken in reaffirming its commitment to Moscow it has also made clear its desire to solve its own problems and carry out its renewal program. Thus a 5 January TRYBUNA LUDU article eulogizing Soviet-Polish military cooperation also noted that the alliance "guarantees" that Poland's "renewal process will continue unhindered." And President Jablonski, in a New Year's address on Warsaw radio on the 31st, also voiced hope that the Poles would be allowed to solve their own problems. Although he stressed loyalty to Poland's alliances and appreciation for Soviet aid and understanding, he declared that "no one can take our place in tidying up our common home" and that "it is we alone who can solve our problems."

CHINA

HUA'S STATUS REMAINS UNCERTAIN AMID MIXED POLITICAL SIGNALS

The conclusion of a major central party work conference at the end of December brought no public clarification of the political standing of CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng. Hua's failure to appear at a top-level leadership turnout for New Year's celebrations in Beijing advertised the uncertainty over his status in the wake of weeks of rumors that he had been forced to step down from his party post. At the same time, however, authoritative press commentary pessimistically appraising China's economic situation and assessing the CCP's political tasks continues to imply setbacks for the party reform wing, led by Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, and to demonstrate the strength of support for economic and political policies unmistakably identified with Hua Guofeng. The annual New Year's editorial in the party paper seems so strikingly suggestive in this regard, in fact, that a major political victory for Hua Guofeng would seem apparent were it not for his continuing failure to appear in public.

CENTRAL PARTY WORK CONFERENCE

The close of a major party meeting during the last week of December was signaled by the reappearance of Central Committee-level provincial party leaders back in their home capitals, beginning with Shaanxi CCP First Secretary Ma Wenrui on the 29th. CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang, speaking at the party New Year's gathering in Beijing on 1 January, confirmed that the meeting had been a central work conference.

Leader statements and Beijing commentary in the months leading up to the work conference had suggested that it was planned as a forum to draft positions on controversial issues in party reform and history for approval at the sixth party plenum, early this year, or at a later 12th party congress. In fact, the conference convened in mid-December in the midst of what appeared to be an intense leadership debate over the political implications of China's economic situation, and Hu Yaobang revealed in his 1 January remarks that the conference had focused on the economy.*

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* The opening of the central work conference in a context of intensified leadership strife is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 December 1980, pages 10-15.

HUA GUOFENG'S STATUS

Hua Guofeng's failure to appear at the 1 January New Year's festivities, a gathering attended by most of the capital-based Politburo and Secretariat members, only drew attention to his uncertain status. The day after the New Year's gathering, foreign journalists in Beijing were reportedly assured by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman that Hua was still chairman. His absence from public view since 27 November suggests that he may nevertheless have lost his active role in party affairs and that he may be formally relieved as chairman at a forthcoming party plenum. At the same time, however, Beijing press comment does not seem to reflect such a major victory for Hua's main antagonist, Deng Xiaoping.

Historically, the failure of Chinese leaders to appear in public has indicated uncertainty over their political position but has not always signaled conclusively they have lost political power. Deng Xiaoping's political difficulties in 1976, for example, were apparent when he stopped appearing in public in January that year. That his status remained unclear thereafter was signaled by Hua Guofeng's appointment as "acting premier" some three weeks after Deng's last appearance, and Deng's eventual political demise emerged only from a party Politburo meeting almost three months thereafter. Similarly, Party Vice Chairman Wang Dongxing, identified by the Hong Kong communist press as a principal leader of the now condemned "two whatevers" faction, stopped appearing in January 1979, soon after the party's Third Plenum had evidently relieved him of active political duties, but reappeared several weeks thereafter when his political antagonists--Deng Xiaoping among them--suffered serious political setbacks. That Hu Yaobang presided over the New Year's festivities as general secretary of the Central Committee reveals nothing of Hua's current status. Last June, at a meeting attended by Hua Guofeng and most of the party's vice chairmen, Hu similarly presided in his capacity as general secretary.

Also absent from the New Year's gathering of the party leadership was Vice Chairman Ye Jianying, a veteran leader who has usually seemed to side with Hua Guofeng on political issues. Ye in past years has spent winter months in his native Guangdong Province. At the same time, however, he has a demonstrated record of absenting himself from the capital as an expression of dissatisfaction with political developments which he has opposed, and it is not clear whether his present failure to appear in the capital reflects more than his usual winter sojourn in the south.

REVERSAL OF DENG'S ECONOMIC POLICIES

Policies advocated in the 1 January New Year's editorial in the party paper RENMIN RIBAO gave the impression that Hua Guofeng is gaining ground in the ongoing political infighting. An annual assessment of the past year's achievements and the coming year's tasks, the editorial normally appears to reflect a consensus of views in the top party leadership. In the current situation, with Hua's status in doubt, it is therefore striking that the editorial's discussion of the economy and the party's tasks suggested further setbacks for the reform wing of the party, led by Deng Xiaoping, and a resurgence of support for political themes associated with Hua.

The New Year's editorial strongly reaffirmed the negative, pessimistic assessment of China's economic situation conveyed in a major RENMIN RIBAO editorial on the economy on 2 December, prior to the opening of the central work conference. The earlier editorial had signaled the postponement of the program of accelerated economic reform promoted by Deng Xiaoping and endorsed at the National People's Conference (NPC) session last September. The reforms, according to the 2 December editorial, are to be subordinated to efforts to readjust sectoral imbalances in the overall economy--readjustments which were to have been completed in 1982, but which the editorial indicated would now take several more years.

While acknowledging that the economic reports delivered at the NPC session were basically accurate, the New Year's editorial noted that "countermeasures" proposed to meet China's critical economic difficulties had not been "sufficiently thorough." The editorial also reversed the NPC's optimistic appraisals of the state's ability to meet anticipated budget deficits in the coming year. It declared that the Central Committee and State Council have resolved to "keep expenditures within the limits of income" regarding "production and construction, facilities for administrative establishments, and improvement in the people's livelihood"--all of which have been cited as main causes of China's continuing budgetary deficits. To carry out the extended economic retrenchment, the editorial added, "it is of course necessary to revise the fiscal plan for the national economy and the 1981 budget that were approved by the NPC session last year."

In elaborating the implications of the deeply pessimistic revised assessment of China's economic situation since the NPC session, the New Year's editorial seemed concerned that popular expectations may have been raised excessively by the promises of Deng-promoted economic liberalization. "We have made casual remarks and promises and drafted some impractical plans for future economic development--although we were motivated by the fervent hope to make the country strong and the people happy--and we caused complaints and disappointment among the people because these promises and plans did not materialize," the editorial observed. It called for efforts to explain China's difficulties "clearly and factually" to the Chinese people to "enhance their confidence" and "eliminate misunderstanding and contradictions."

REASSERTION OF POLITICAL VIEWS ASSOCIATED WITH HUA

Even more striking than the 1 January editorial's reversal of economic policies was its resurrection of elements of a political line clearly identified with Hua Guofeng. Thus, for example, it used old slogans traditionally associated with Maoist economic voluntarism--slogans which had been directly criticized in the press last summer, as Deng, Premier Zhao Ziyang, and other leaders whipped up enthusiasm for economic and political reform:

+ The editorial called on the Chinese people to "make protracted and arduous efforts to 'transform China in the spirit of the foolish old man who moved the mountain.'" The press last August criticized this metaphor for voluntarist economic change from a 1945 Mao essay as promoting "imbecilic" and blind dedication to "utterly impractical" projects.

+ The editorial called upon the people to demonstrate the revolutionary spirit of "fearing neither hardship nor death"--a slogan that was denounced last August in connection with Deng-supported criticism of the Bohai oil rig disaster as encouraging rash and irresponsible economic work without regard for the needs and safety of the workers.

In suggesting that current economic problems have further exacerbated a long-acknowledged "crisis of confidence" among the people in Chinese socialism and the CCP itself, the editorial strongly reasserted the "four basic principles"--the need to "uphold the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought." Emerging from leadership meetings on domestic difficulties in the spring of 1979, these "principles" have been key propaganda themes serving the preoccupations of leaders, like Hua and Ye Jianying, concerned with the need to combat "right deviationist" attacks on the party's leadership from society at large and to overcome the people's "crisis of confidence" in the party, as well as to restrain Deng Xiacping's efforts to promote drastic political and social reform. As authoritative commentary had done following the 2 December RENMIN RIBAO editorial on the current economic difficulties, the New Year's editorial also strongly reaffirmed the need for "political and ideological work" by the party to uphold "stability and unity," a concern associated conspicuously with Hua Guofeng.

The 1 January editorial's emphasis on the importance of ideology and selfless revolutionary spirit in constrained economic circumstances seemed to be reopening a thinly veiled public debate last spring between Hua Guofeng and Deng proteges, including Hu Yaobang. At a science forum in March 1980, Hu had evenhandedly maintained that modernization required achievements in the "spiritual" realms of science and technology and literature and art as well as in ideological theory. Speaking to the same point in a controversial speech to a PLA conference a month later, Hua Guofeng gave greater emphasis to ideology, arguing:

> As we strive to realize communism, we should not only develop a high level of production but also greatly raise the people's consciousness. Therefore, political and ideological work must be strengthened and must not be weakened, now or in the future.

The New Year's editorial not only upheld Hua's viewpoint, but seemed to offer an even more direct response to Hu's approach. It declared:

> We should emphatically point out to the whole party and all the people: The socialist country we want to build should not only be highly civilized materially, but also highly civilized spiritually. So-called spiritual civilization not only means science and culture, it also denotes communist ideals, conviction, morality, discipline, revolutionary stand and principle, and comradely relations among the people. How can we build socialism if we do not have such a spiritual civilization and communist ideas and morality? Comrade Mao Zedong once said: 'Man must have some spirit.'

ARMY ENDORSEMENT OF NEW LINE

The reassertion of traditional Maoist themes in the party press has received particularly strong applause from the army paper JIEFANGJUN BAO. According to Beijing radio on 2 January, the army paper two days earlier carried reports on PLA units strengthening ideological and political work by focusing on the "four basic principles." The same issue, according to another Beijing radio report on the 2d, also carried an article on the need to accept lower living standards, explaining that economic development under socialism aims at raising the material and cultural living standards of all the people and that "a revolutionary's purpose in work and struggle cannot be just to pursue his personal happiness but to seek a happier life for all the people." According to a XINHUA report on 4 January, JIEFANGJUN BAO chided earlier criticism of the call for a spirit of "fearing neither hardship nor death" as "a distortion of a correct slogan" and observed that in current circumstances "we need this kind of revolutionary spirit."

U S S R

DECREE DECENTRALIZES FARM PLANNING, BOOSTS INCENTIVES

One of the most significant Soviet resolutions on agriculture in recent years, a new decree published on 17 December, has reduced the number of obligatory planning indicators sent down to farms and has strengthened incentives for farms and individual farmers. The decree grants more room for initiative on the part of farm leaders and, like the agricultural reforms adopted in Hungary and Bulgaria in recent years, decentralizes a large number of planning decisions previously handed down from above. The Soviet reforms are being instituted against the background of a reorganization of Soviet agricultural agencies that may significantly alter the organizational structure of agricultural administration.

DECENTRALIZATION The long Central Committee - Council of Ministers decree, published in the 17 December SELSKAYA ZHIZN (RURAL LIFE), announced changes aimed at "correctly combining centralized leadership of agriculture with further development of the managerial independence of enterprises." A detailed followup editorial in the 19 December issue of the same paper boldly characterized the decree as introducing "a fundamentally new system of planning and incentives," ending "excessive petty supervision over farms, their leaders, and specialists," and sharply reducing the number of plan indicators sent down to farms from above.

According to the decree, the indicators involving internal farm operations and production decisions will be left to the local farm leaders to work out, always bearing in mind the need for "absolute fulfillment" of procurement plans. Thus, local leaders will now be responsible for volume of production, amount of land sown, crop structure, size of herds, yield of crops, productivity of animals, and technology and organization of production. Farms will still receive a procurement plan, but the decree establishes what the editorial calls a "strictly limited" number of indicators for farms:

+ For kolkhozes, the centrally determined decisions will be reduced essentially to the procurement plan. They will receive only three indicators: volume of individual agricultural products to be sold to the state; the amount of equipment, fertilizer, and other items the state will deliver to the farm; and the tasks for introducing scientific-technical achievements.

+ For sovkhozes, which are owned by the state, the centrally determined decisions will reflect the state's financial controls. Thus, in addition to procurement plans, they will receive instructions on such things as the wage fund, planned profit, payments to the state budget, and limits on the volume of investments and construction work. "Calculations" reflecting these factors will be sent to kolkhozes also, but in their case they will apparently be nonbinding.

INCENTIVES The decree also establishes a variety of new incentives for both farm managers and individual farmers. To financially aid and stimulate farms, it additionally provides for higher prices for above-plan sale of products, postpones 10 billion rubles of farm debts, and cancels interest on these debts.

The biggest changes in incentives affect individual farmers. Farmers will be able to receive bonuses for a wide variety of reasons, such as raising labor productivity, cutting costs, increasing production, raising quality or yield, preventing cuts in livestock herds, and saving irrigation water. The decree in effect also introduces the long-debated "Shchekino" incentive system by saying that farmers who perform more than one job and thereby help cut the payroll will receive bonuses based on the savings realized. Moreover, local farm leaders are granted additional rights to award bonuses to farmers in ways calculated to stimulate effective work: sovkhoz leaders can work out their own new bonus systems instead of using the present system, and farm brigades can award bonuses to brigade members on the basis of their work performance.

LIMITS OF REFORM While the reform will have the effect of reducing controls and increasing incentives, it does not go as far as those in Hungary or Bulgaria or those advocated by some Soviet reformers. The present Soviet decree reserves to the state the function of determining what each farm must deliver, thus ignoring past reform proposals to send procurement plans to local procurement agencies rather than to farms. Hungary has freed farms from obligatory planning indicators, including procurement goals, thus allowing farms to determine their production and sales plans and influencing farm decisions indirectly through economic levers. Under the more limited Bulgarian reform, a farm still receives obligatory plan indicators setting out the quantities of specific products the farm has to sell to the state; but these are limited to only a few main crops, and the farm is free to plan production and sale of other crops itself. The Bulgarian reform, like the present Soviet reform, allows farms to work out the indicators covering internal farm operations and production decisions.

Even the limited reduction of central controls foreseen in the new Soviet decree may fall victim to the habitual bureaucratic tendency to impose guidance from above. The imposition of additional indicators by ministries was one of the main factors undermining the 1965 economic reform, which similarly sought to cut drastically the number of indicators sent down to industrial enterprises and thereby unleash local initiative and improve economic performance. One of the more promising aspects of the new decree is that it specifically recognizes this danger and warns against the practice of "foisting" additional requirements on farms. Gosplan First Deputy Chairman P.A. Paskar, in the October PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO (PLANNED ECONOMY), also assailed the imposition of additional indicators regarding crops and livestock herds on farms.

BRIEFS

VIETNAM: New State Constitution Ratified

Hanoi has completed a four-and-a-half-year effort to draft a new constitution. The final document, ratified by the National Assembly on 18 December, confirmed basic changes in government institutions that were contained in a draft constitution released in August 1979. However, some recent trends in Hanoi policy were reflected in alterations of the earlier draft. The final constitution was more forthright than the draft document in underscoring Hanoi's tilt toward the Soviet Union and, at least implicitly, reflected greater concern about the threat from Beijing. It added more effusive expressions of praise for Soviet assistance, and it modified the draft's general statement about relations with communist states to specifically pledge solidarity with the Soviet Union, Kampuchea, and Laos. Hanoi's increasing concern with internal subversion was reflected in the addition of a provision on treason and in higher priority given to those tasks of the Council of Ministers dealing with social order, political security, and defense. Last fall Hanoi linked Beijing with the subversive threat in articles calling for greater vigilance against alleged Chinese efforts to fan popular dissatisfaction through psychological warfare aimed at undermining party policies and disrupting social order. Several changes were made in the constitution's section on economic reform in an apparent attempt to speed the socialization of Vietnam's economy, a major constitutional goal.

PYONGYANG: Kim Il-song Echoes Themes Aired at Party Congress

Kim Il-song's annual New Year's address for the most part reflected the foreign and domestic policies he enunciated at the party congress held last October. The address underscored Kim's earlier call for greater stress on internal economic development and a more flexible approach toward Seoul on the question of reunification. Kim touched on the United States only in passing this year, continuing a trend, first noted in 1978, toward restrained treatment of Washington on this occasion. Kim failed to dwell on the situation in the South, and he passed up the opportunity to personally excoriate South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan. This treatment contrasts with the North's daily barrage of scathing criticism of the situation in the South and of Chon personally. Kim reiterated, but failed to elaborate on, his congress proposal to establish a confederation as the political framework of a reunified Korean state.

As usual, the bulk of Kim's message was devoted to domestic concerns. He repeated his call to fulfill the 10 long-term economic goals he introduced at the congress, and he gave high priority once again to the need for raising the people's living standards, in fact giving greater emphasis to consumer goods and light industry than in any New Year's message since 1973. In dealing with agricultural production, Kim implicitly acknowledged that the 1980 grain harvest had failed to meet the goal of 9.5 million tons. He revealed that last year's harvest had only equalled the 1979 record yield of 9 million tons, and he called on farmers to try to attain the 9.5 million figure in the coming year. Breaking with his practice over the past two years, Kim failed to mention foreign trade, although he had given the subject unusual prominence in his New Year's addresses of 1979 and 1980 and had called at the party congress for priority efforts by all sectors of the economy on behalf of increasing foreign trade.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 29 DECEMBER 1980 - 4 JANUARY 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (2,924 items)		
Brezhnev New Year's Greetings to Soviet People	7%	(--)
Cuban National Day	5%	(--)
Polish Situation	4%	(1%)

Beijing (536 items)		
Kampuchea-Vietnam Dispute	5%	(3%)
Afghan Situation	3%	(5%)

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+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

- + TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967
- + SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967
- + SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970
- + TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

POLAND-USSR

Tensions in the Polish crisis have risen in recent days, as Warsaw has shown a new determination to impose discipline on the workers movement and Moscow has heightened its pressure for stern measures. The Polish Government not only has refused to back down from the two most recent Solidarity-backed challenges--the demands for a farmers union and a five-day work week--but for the first time has publicized the use of police force to break up worker demonstrations. Moscow has sharpened its attack on Solidarity and has staged a heavyhanded reminder of military power by dispatching Warsaw Pact commander Kulikov on a visit to the Polish capital.

WARSAW STIFFENS STAND AGAINST FARMERS UNION, FREE SATURDAYS

Warsaw's shift to a tougher line was dramatically underscored by PZPR First Secretary Kania's speech on 10 January to a joint meeting of the PZPR and the United Peasant Party (ZSL). Denouncing pressures by Solidarity for government approval of a private farmers union--a demand which the regime has resisted on the grounds that the private farmers are landowners, not employees--he used invective against the union that had not been heard in his speeches before. Kania told the meeting that attempts to form a "so-called rural Solidarity" came chiefly from "outsiders" who are completely alienated from the peasants' true interests and who do not bother to conceal their "antisocialist" and "counterrevolutionary" aims. He hinted broadly that the organizers were spiritual decendants of the "landed aristocracy" and that their purpose was to create a political opposition and foment anarchy in the countryside. In an earlier speech to a ZSL congress on 13 December, Kania had limited himself to a reasoned argument that the private farmers' interests could best be served through improvement of the longstanding, government-sponsored "agricultural circles" rather than through "new structures."

The tougher rhetoric was backed up by actual shows of force in the following days. Warsaw radio announced on the 11th that "forces of order" had ejected Solidarity sit-in strikers from the town hall in Nowy Sacz. With the exception of the arrest of a union member in late November--later voided by the courts under Solidarity pressure--that was the first publicized use of force against workers since the beginning of the crisis. The action was followed by another show of force on the 12th, when the police ended a two-week sit-in strike by several dozen members of the rural Solidarity in the town offices of Ustrzyki Dolne.

The regime also stood its ground in insisting that workers report to their jobs on 10 January in the face of a strike call issued by Solidarity to back up its demand for work-free Saturdays. In sharp contrast to its capitulation to Solidarity demands in early confrontations, the regime this time announced in advance that workers would be docked a day's pay if they stayed off the job and then denounced Solidarity strongly for defying the government and going ahead with the strike. The party paper TRYBUNA LUDU on the 12th charged that the course taken by "some" in staying home from work on Saturday "leads nowhere" and "tightens the rope around our necks," adding that "similar actions, whether one likes it or not," will lead to "anarchy."

While the outcome of the test of strength is not yet fully clear, the government has been issuing statements indicating that the majority of the work force failed to heed the strike call. A PAP "communique" issued on the 11th claimed that "about 65 percent" of the workers nationwide had reported for work on the 10th and that 40 percent of the country's miners came to work "voluntarily" that day, even though the miners had already been given all Saturdays off. Further minimizing the significance of the strike, the communique noted that more than million workers had taken last Saturday off "in place of" the uled free Saturday on 31 January. Substantially the same claims forward in a 13 January report of a Politburo meeting, whic , however, mention Solidarity's role in the work stoppage.

MOSCOW ATTACKS SOLIDARITY LEADERSHIP, SUPPORTS KANIA REGIME

Moscow has taken an increasingly critical view of the Polish domestic situation in recent days as the confrontation between Solidarity and the Kania regime has mounted. The latest reports have included attacks for the first time on the Solidarity leadership and new warnings about the dangers of anarchy and counterrevolution. These reports, however, have largely been drawn from Polish assessments and have implicitly recognized that the Polish leadership is trying to face up to the challenges by taking a firmer line.

Moscow's grimmer view of the Polish domestic situation has focused mainly on the work-free Saturday issue and has included increasingly frequent criticism of Solidarity and warnings against destabilizing actions. For instance, PRAVDA on 10 January reported that the Solidarity "leadership" had rejected the government's proposals on the five-day work issue and charged that this action disrupted the work rhythm and aggravated the country's economic problems. The same report cited warnings in TRYBUNA LUDU against "anarchic" incidents such as the occupation of public buildings and pressures to replace local officials. Similarly, PRAVDA on the 12th cited Polish news sources as saying that Solidarity representatives were harassing workers who showed up Saturday at a plant in Lodz. But it also replayed the Polish claim that the "majority" of Polish workers had defied Solidarity and had gone to work Saturday.

The Soviet attacks on Solidarity, while increasingly frequent, are generally in line with official Polish assessments and go no further than the sharpest Soviet criticism in the past. For instance, the PRAVDA attack on the Solidarity leadership, while focusing on the Solidarity policymakers and not just on some negative forces within Solidarity, is roughly parallel to Moscow's 24 November attack on Solidarity as an organization responsible for threatening a rail strike. And the reports about anarchic incidents and harassment of loyal workers appearing in PRAVDA on the 10th and 12th recall an 8 December TASS report on similar activities at a plant in Kielce--a report which, unlike the latest ones, did not cite Polish media sources.

Moscow's treatment of the Polish leadership, meanwhile, has implied that the Kania regime is fully aware of the dangers facing the country and, despite continuing serious problems, is taking an appropriately tough stance. Thus PRAVDA on the 12th cited favorably Kania's hardline speech in which he rejected the formation of a rural Solidarity and warned against antisocialist and counterrevolutionary tendencies. Similarly, TASS on the 10th cited remarks by Politburo member Stefan Olszowski warning against anarchy, criticizing some actions by a local Solidarity branch, and denouncing counterrevolutionary intentions. And PRAVDA on the 13th carried an article by Polish party official Stanislaw Wronski expressing "understanding" for Soviet "anxiety" over Poland but also Poland's determination to surmount its problems and maintain the "socialist character" of Solidarity.

One exception to the parallelism between Soviet and Polish assessments of the situation was a 10 January IZVESTIYA article, that reported an "open letter" from an obscure Polish group, "Veterans of the Workers Movement," calling for a resolute struggle against a "growing threat of counterrevolution." In late November Moscow had similarly exploited the views of hardline Polish factions--at that time, old-style trade unionists and military veterans--to put pressure on the Kania regime. These references are reminiscent of Soviet reports on Czechoslovakia in 1968 that cited favorably the statements of hardline Czechoslovak factions. However, Moscow ascribed to those groups even more provocative statements--ones implying the need for intervention by Soviet troops--and it orchestrated massive Soviet domestic support for their views.

PACT COMMANDER KULIKOV VISITS WARSAW, RECEIVED BY LEADERS

Warsaw Pact commander Kulikov's visit to Poland, reported by TASS and Warsaw radio on 13 January, is his first such visit to an East European country since the beginning of the Polish crisis. His visits to the GDR in September and Prague in October were in the context of multilateral affairs, a military exercise in the first case and a Warsaw Pact Military Council session in the second. Although the timing of the present visit and the publicity accorded it clearly stamps it as a demonstrative gesture, it falls into a pattern of visits Kulikov has paid to East European countries during the past two years. Kulikov previously visited Poland in January and September 1979 and attended the Warsaw Pact 25th anniversary session in the Polish capital in May 1980. His past itinerary has also included at least one visit to all the other Pact member countries in each of the last two years, as well as multiple trips to Hungary in 1979 and to Bulgaria and the GDR in 1980.

While the report on Kulikov's talks with Polish leaders Kania and Pinkowski was cryptic and uninformative, there has been no consistent pattern in this respect in the reports on his previous visits to East Europe; some have been similarly brief--including the one on Kulikov's last bilateral visit to Warsaw on 22 September 1979--and others lengthy. The characterization of the visits as "cordial and friendly" is not inconsistent with the formulas used in connection with earlier visits to other East European countries. In some cases, the formulas have been warmer, in others there has been no characterization at all.

The Soviet Union cannot help but be aware that the visit will be seen in Poland--particularly by the leaders of Solidarity--as a reminder of the power that can be brought to bear in support of the "forces of order" in that country. The position of Kulikov as commander of the Warsaw Pact is also well calculated to recall the fate of Czechoslovakia some 12 years ago. Curiously, there is an almost exact precedent for the present visit in the history of the events of 1968. Very early in the Czech crisis--in February 1968--the then Warsaw Pact commander visited Prague and met with local dignitaries corresponding to those who received Kulikov. Yakubovskiy, like Kulikov, was accompanied by the representative of the Joint Supreme Command for Warsaw Pact Forces in Czechoslovakia, and his visit was also described as "cordial and friendly." Yakubovskiy's subsequent travels in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were connected with specific military functions.

USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW SUSTAINS CAUTIOUS HOPES FOR REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Moscow's cautious hopes for an improvement in bilateral relations under the Reagan Administration appear to have survived the presidential transition period. Soviet media have been generally complimentary of the President-elect's cabinet selections and have continued to defer judgment on his policies. At the same time, however, Moscow has shown no reluctance to respond critically to statements on specific issues by incoming Administration officials and to warn against the hardline policies which it says some Western observers are urging on the new Administration.

Moscow has generally ascribed moderate views to the new cabinet and found promise of centrist policies from the new Administration. TASS' Washington correspondent offered a reassuring assessment of the cabinet in a 3 January article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (SOVIET RUSSIA) and argued that the composition of a President-elect's cabinet is a better guide to his political intentions than his campaign statements. While there has been no authoritative Soviet comment on the cabinet, an official in the Central Committee's International Information Department took an optimistic view in the 1 January issue of the USSR Writers Union weekly LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. The official, Vitaliy Kobysh, said the new cabinet contained "people of basically moderate views" and predicted they would not follow the anti-Soviet path which he accused the Administration of trying to perpetuate. Kobysh found evidence in statements by the President-elect and his close assistants that they see the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations as a "foremost priority."

HOPES ON SALT, CHINA

Moscow's effort to appear receptive to new approaches on SALT from the incoming Administration is one indication of its hopes for U.S.-Soviet relations. In the face of the President-elect's rejection of SALT II, Soviet leaders have ignored the treaty in their public statements since the election while reaffirming their commitment to the strategic arms limitation process. Soviet commentators have replayed President Brezhnev's 17 November pledge to respond positively to any "constructive steps" taken by the Reagan Administration.

Moscow may also hold out hope for changes in U.S. China policy, if recent comments by veteran Soviet political observer Valentin Zorin are any indication. On a 27 December television program, Zorin suggested that the Reagan Administration may be more skeptical than its predecessor of assistance to China's military modernization program and might well be disposed to a reexamination of U.S. policy toward Beijing. Soviet media on the whole have ignored evidence of friction between Beijing and the incoming Administration.

Moscow's generally positive reaction to the President-elect's cabinet choices has not deterred Soviet media from responding critically to some of their public statements during the transition. Cabinet designees Alexander Haig, Caspar Weinberger, William Casey, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick--as well as former Secretary of State Kissinger--have all been the subject of critical attention in Soviet reporting. General Haig in particular has provoked expressions of skepticism. A 12 January Moscow domestic radio commentary characterized his statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States should improve its defense posture before resuming SALT negotiations as an "unrealistic" position "dictated by a utopian desire to achieve military supremacy" over the USSR.

Moscow appears to hold little hope for cooperation with the incoming Administration in such regional trouble spots as the Middle East. Soviet media sharply criticized Dr. Kissinger's December trip to the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, saying it was carried out "on the instructions" of the Reagan Administration. A Central Committee official on 9 January predicted that the incoming Administration would leave in force President Carter's policies in that region.

USSR-CHAD

MOSCOW BACKS TRANSITIONAL REGIME, HITS FRENCH ROLE

> Since the end of Chad's civil war last month, Moscow has stepped up its support for President Goukouni Oueddei's transitional government. While Soviet media have had little to say about Libya's ties to Goukouni's regime, they have commented freely on alleged Western plans to interfere in Chad's affairs.

Moscow avoided forceful shows of support for Goukouni or opposition to former Defense Minister Habre's rival forces following Habre's rebellion against the OAU-endorsed coalition government last March, even though underlying Soviet sympathies were apparent. With the effective end of the fighting in December, Moscow assumed a higher profile. By early January TASS and Moscow radio commentaries were portraying Habre as a protege of "neocolonialists" and maintaining that "stabilization" of the situation in Chad under Goukouni was "in the interests of peace and security in Africa." A more balanced analysis that appeared in PRAVDA on 28 December voiced support for Goukouni but stressed the importance of domestic reconstruction and implementation of the OAU's call for elections by January 1982.

LIBYAN, WESTERN INVOLVEMENT A 14 January PRAVDA article contained Moscow's first direct response to international criticism of Libya's ties to the Goukouni regime. PRAVDA labeled as Western "propaganda" claims that "Libya has captured Chad" or that Chad "no longer exists." The party daily had earlier reported without comment that the Chad-Libya communique signed in Tripoli on the 6th had called for a "strategic alliance" and for the presence of Libyan troops in Chad "to safeguard the security and peace" of the country. Soviet media have reported that the Chad-Libya communique called for "unity" between the two countries but have ignored subsequent reaction to the statement from neighboring African states.

While condoning Libya's role in Chad, Moscow has been openly critical of what has been described as the threat of Western interference in the region. A 5 January TASS commentary charged the West--particularly France and the United States--with considering military intervention in Chad under the pretext of combating "the mythical hand of Moscow." The commentary also replayed Goukouni's accusation that the CIA was behind the Western plans. PRAVDA articles on 10 and 14 January were particularly critical of the French diplomatic and military response to developments in Chad. A 10 January report in the party daily accused Paris of trying to "drag certain African countries into its plans for safeguarding France's strategic and economic positions" in the region, while acknowledging that France had publicly "ruled out" intervening in Chad. On the 14th, PRAVDA criticized the growing French military presence in the region.

CHINA

BEIJING CLAIMS POLITICAL STABILITY DESPITE HUA'S ABSENCE

> Beijing's reception of several foreign delegations has revealed continuing problems with the political standing of party Chairman Hua Guofeng and Vice Chairman Ye Jianying in the wake of high-level leadership meetings last month. During the visits, Chinese officials offered public reassurances that China remains stable politically and economically in an effort to counter concern over indications of intensified political conflict and acknowledged setbacks to programs of economic reform in recent weeks.

The ongoing Beijing visit of North Korean Premier Yi Chong-ok has served to underscore uncertainty over Hua Guofeng's political standing. Hua thus far has not been reported receiving the North Korean delegation, the first time he has not extended such a courtesy meeting as party chairman to a visiting premier or chief of state since he relinquished his position as PRC premier last September. At the same time, however, XINHUA on 10 January implicitly confirmed that Hua remains party chairman when the news agency reported Yi Chong-ok extending greetings on behalf of North Korean leader Kim Il-song to the Chinese leadership--naming Hua in normal rank order at the head of several CCP Politburo Standing Committee members--and, more authoritatively, again on the 11th when it cited Premier Zhao Ziyang's mention of Hua in similar fashion in conveying Chinese leadership greetings to Kim. The references to Hua are the first known Beijing mentions of him since his last reported public appearance on 27 November.

Hua's failure to greet the North Korean delegation, together with XINHUA's implicit confirmation that nominally he remains party chairman, might seem to strengthen the probability that he was effectively removed from active involvement in party affairs at leadership meetings last month but awaits formal removal at a future Central Committee plenum.* The evidence remains inconclusive, however, as Beijing's reception of the North Korean delegation deviated in several respects from precedents established during past Chinese meetings with government delegations from fraternal communist countries. These anomalies may reflect recent evident problems in Sino-Korean relations more than Hua Guofeng's tribulations. Most notably in this regard, the party paper RENMIN RIBAO failed to greet the North Korean delegation with the traditional welcoming editorial, and even though the delegation was, strictly speaking, a government delegation, the CCP was peculiarly underrepresented at functions throughout the visit. Hua Guofeng's eclipse would have been signaled more clearly if party General Secretary Hu Yaobang--the party leader most frequently rumored, according to Western press reports, to be slated to preside over party affairs once Hua steps down--had received the North Koreans.

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* Beijing media did not carry a 2 January PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement to foreign journalists confirming that Hua Guofeng remains party chairman. The leadership conferences of late November and December are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 December 1980, pages 10-15 and 7 January 1981, pages 4-8.

Beijing's failure to clarify Hua Guofeng's status during the North Korean premier's visit appears quite striking in light of its efforts to remove uncertainty over the standing of second-ranking party leader Ye Jianying. XINHUA on 9 January reported that National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee Vice Chairman Liao Chengzhi, speaking with the visiting president of Japan's House of Councillors, explicitly denied foreign news reports that party Vice Chairman Ye had been removed from his concurrent post as NPC chairman. Ostensibly forestalling speculation over why Ye has not met the visiting Japanese parliamentary delegation--which XINHUA acknowledged was invited by him--Liao stated that Ye is not in Beijing but in Guangzhou, where "he usually spends the winter," and offered to arrange a meeting with Ye there if the Japanese delegation wished. Ye Jianying, who has appeared to be a supporter of Hua Guofeng on various political issues, has in fact appeared in his native Guangdong in past years during the winter months, but he also has established a record of absenting himself from the capital when political developments there have not been to his liking.

ASSURANCES OF STABILITY

In reporting on various leadership meetings with foreign guests in the capital, Beijing has made a clear effort to provide assurances of political order and stability in China, no doubt to offset foreign speculation caused by the rampant recent public indications of intensifying leadership contention. XINHUA's 12 January report on party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping's meeting with the visiting president of Japan's House of Councillors cited Deng as claiming that "the present political situation in China is the most stable since the 1960's." A Beijing radio broadcast to overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia on 10 January reported overseas Chinese affairs specialist Liao Chengzhi urging a visiting Chinese-American not to believe foreign news reports that China's political situation is unstable and voicing assurances that the CCP remains "united." In the wake of recent authoritative press commentary conveying a pessimistic leadership appraisal of China's economic situation, XINHUA on the 11th cited Zhao Ziyang as reassuring Japanese guests that Beijing's recent reemphasis of readjustment as the primary task in China's economic work will lead to "no change" in Beijing's policies of increasing economic cooperation with foreign countries.

Beijing in the past has similarly gone out of its way to offer public reassurances of stability after major leadership meetings that have augured significant shifts in policy lines. Chinese media, for example, highlighted leadership assurances of political stability during meetings with foreign guests in the wake of a party central work conference in November 1978, on the eve of the landmark Third Plenum. In April 1979, Chinese media cited leadership assurances that China's economic policies would remain stable following a major economic conference that inaugurated the current economic readjustment program.

USSR

BODYUL PROMOTION SIGNALS MOVE TO CREATE AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The 19 December promotion of Moldavian First Secretary I. I. Bodyul to USSR deputy premier appears to be a key step toward establishing the national Agroindustrial Complex that Brezhnev has been promoting to strengthen agriculture's claim on national resources. At the 21 October CPSU plenum, Brezhnev announced that the Politburo had decided to create such a supraministerial organ to manage all agriculture-related activities as one planning unit, and he apparently intends to have his reliable protege from Moldavia organize the new structure. Bodyul is a longtime proponent of the concept and has wide experience in creating agroindustrial formations in Moldavia, which has served as a showcase for experiments along these lines. With his close ties to Brezhnev and many top agricultural officials, Bodyul seems likely to become head of the new complex and an influential figure in national agricultural leadership.

While the announcement of Bodyul's appointment as deputy premier did not specify his duties, his close and virtually exclusive identification with agriculture leaves little doubt as to his responsibilities. Moreover, his public stands closely identify him with the promotional efforts that have been made on behalf of the new agricultural complex. As early as July 1978, in a KOMMUNIST article, Bodyul proposed the creation of a USSR agroindustrial council that would include leaders of agricultural and agriculture-related ministries, Gosplan, and various other organs. In recent years national leaders--including Central Committee Agriculture Secretary Gorbachev--have trooped to Moldavia to view Bodyul's varied agroindustrial and interfarm organizations, and Bodyul has publicized these experiments in numerous articles in the national press. Most recently, the December VESTNIK, organ of the Academy of Sciences, reported that the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium had held a special session to hear Bodyul explain Moldavia's experience in agroindustrial integration.

The creation of such an Agroindustrial Complex would form a powerful new entity on the Soviet political scene and greatly increase agriculture's power vis-a-vis other segments of the economy. Agricultural spokesmen have been arguing that such a shift is necessary because the prices of industrial goods purchased by farms have been rising faster than those of agricultural products, which has caused agriculture to lose ground in its exchanges with industry. Although agricultural lobbyists usually avoid the touchy question of priorities and resource competition with other sectors, at least one--economist I. N. Buzdalov, in a March 1978 EKONOMIKA SELSKOGO KHOZYAYSTVA (ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE) article--frankly acknowledged that establishment of an Agroindustrial Complex "might to a certain degree reduce the share of investments for other branches."

Agricultural spokesmen foresee an Agroindustrial Complex that would include agriculture, agricultural processing industries, and the industries supplying farms with equipment, fertilizer, and other materials. The question whether heavy industry leaders must surrender to agriculture control over agricultural machinebuilding ministries is a source of contention. A June 1978 PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO (PLANNED ECONOMY) article specifically acknowledged that wide disagreements still existed over which ministries to include, while a recent article in the economic mathematics journal EKONOMIKA I MATEMATICHESKIYE METODY, No. 5, 1980, recalled that Hungary had experienced similar contention. It stated that inclusion of agricultural machinebuilding industries in Hungary's complex had proved a mistake and had had to be reversed.

Despite the arguments, Soviet leaders appear set to transfer industries such as agricultural machinebuilding and fertilizer to the agricultural complex. Gosplan First Deputy Chairman for agriculture P. A. Paskar--himself a close colleague of Bodyul while premier of Moldavia from 1970 to 1976--in an October 1980 PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO article, specifically advocated including all agricultural machinebuilding ministries under a state agroindustrial committee in the Council of Ministers and announced that in March 1980 Gosplan had formally decided to plan agriculture and agriculture-related branches as an Agroindustrial Complex. The October removal of I. F. Sinitsyn as minister of tractor and agricultural machinebuilding may reflect preparations to include his ministry, since Sinitsyn has an industrial education and a background in the automotive industry, whereas his successor A.A. Yezhevskiy has a more agricultural background. Similarly, the removal of fertilizer production from the Chemical Industry Ministry and creation of a separate Ministry for Mineral Fertilizer and the formation of a separate Central Committee section for agricultural machine-building, announced by Brezhnev at the October plenum, appear to be moves in this direction.

The 62-year-old Bodyul, prospective head of the new agricultural entity, appears likely to become an important figure, especially in view of his close ties with a remarkable number of Moscow leaders. Two of his onetime colleagues from Moldavia now hold top posts in agricultural planning: former Moldavian Premier P. A. Paskar and former Moldavian Deputy Premier G. A. Dolgoshey now are Gosplan first deputy chairman for agriculture and director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Economics of Agriculture respectively. Bodyul is close to Brezhnev's longtime personal assistant for agriculture V. A. Golikov, who rose in Moldavia and has coauthored articles on agricultural reorganization with Bodyul. Bodyul recently played up his relationship with both Brezhnev and Central Committee Secretary Chernenko, recalling in a November issue of POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE (POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION) how Brezhnev as Moldavian first secretary and Chernenko as Moldavian Agitprop head had led and taught Moldavia's leaders back in 1951.

YEAREND REPUBLIC REPORTS DETAIL WIDESPREAD ECONOMIC SHORTFALLS

> Most of the Soviet republics have failed to achieve their five-year plan goals for industrial growth according to speeches delivered in the recent series of national and republic supreme soviet meetings and republic party plenums. Although the range of performance varied substantially, the overall evidence of slowing industrial growth provides striking testimony to the impact of tightening resource restraints on the national economy. Soviet officials, apparently disturbed by the poor showing, went to unusual lengths to disguise the extent of the shortfalls, failing to report results in some republics and fudging the records of others.

The dimensions of the shortfalls revealed by the speeches were underscored by the relatively poor performances of the RSFSR and the Ukraine, the two most industrialized republics. The RSFSR, whose economy is larger than that of all the other republics combined, fell well short of its planned rate for industrial growth. In an apparent effort to gloss over this shortfall, no five-year results have been announced for the republic, but by adding the 19-percent growth, reported a year ago, for the first four years of the plan and the

4-percent growth for 1980, reported in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 20 November, we see that the RSFSR will fall at least 10 percentage points below target. Ukrainian leaders made a similar effort to obscure the poor performance of their republic, revealing no figures at all for five-year or 1980 industrial growth. But the Ukraine's four-year growth of 19.3 percent and its 2.6-percent growth for the first nine months of 1980, reported in PRAVDA UKRAINY on 25 October, indicate that it too will fall about 10 points short.

REPUBLIC PRESS REPORTS OF
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 1976-1980
(in percent)

Republic	Plan Guidelines (March 1976)	Final Plan (October 1976)	Expected Growth (Oct.-Nov. 1980)*
Azerbaijan	37-41	39	47
Armenia	43-47	46	46-47
Belorussia	39-43	43	43
Georgia	37-41	41	41
Uzbekistan	35-39	36	30
Tajikistan	38-42	39	29.3
Lithuania	32-36	32	28
Moldavia	45-49	47	not reported
Kirgizia	33-37	37	(27)
Estonia	22-26	26	24
RSFSR	35-39	36	(24)
Ukraine	30-34	33	(23)
Latvia	26-30	27	20
Kazakhstan	39-43	40	almost 20
Turkmenistan	30-34	30	12.7

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* Figures for 1976-80 growth were given for all republics except Kirgizia, the RSFSR, and the Ukraine in speeches made at the October session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and at November republic party plenums and supreme soviet sessions; figures for those three republics were calculated by combining partial figures.

As a region, the Central Asian republics turned in the poorest performance in the Soviet Union over the past five years. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, whose leaders complained in the early years of the plan that allocated investments were being withheld, suffered the worst shortfalls, achieving less than half their planned industrial growth. In contrast, Uzbekistan helped its current lobbying efforts for additional funds by achieving a relatively respectable growth, only six points short of its goal. The Tajik and Kirgiz economies did not perform quite as well as Uzbekistan, as they both had slightly lower growth figures despite their higher goals.

Relatively strong economic performances were turned in by most western republics, according to the yearend reports. Belorussia's Gosplan chief expressed confidence at the October USSR Supreme Soviet session that his republic would meet its 43-percent goal, although leaders were conspicuously silent on this subject in their November reports on the republic's economy. The three Baltic republics all claimed to be relatively close to meeting their modest plan targets. Leaders of less industrialized Moldavia have been unusually reticent about their republic's industrial growth over the past five years, a modesty which appears consistent with press reports indicating that the republic will fall well short of its ambitious goal.

The Caucasian republics, still in the midst of an economic boom that began in the early 1970's, turned in the best figures on the Soviet balance sheet. Azerbaijan's performance was clearly outstanding as it surpassed its 39-percent growth target by a wide margin. Armenia's growth should be nearly as great. At the 12-13 November republic supreme soviet session, the republic Gosplan chief predicted that Armenia would meet its 46-percent goal, and another spokesman predicted an overfulfillment by 1 percent. Local reports in Georgia also indicated that its goal would be met by the end of the year.

Moscow was apparently still uncertain fairly late in the year of the final performance figures of even the more successful republics. Thus, congratulatory messages sent to Armenia, Belorussia, Estonia, and Georgia by the Central Committee in November and December specified that the republics had met the "main guidelines" of the 10th Five-Year Plan--a relatively easy target, since the "main guidelines" represented the four-point range established in the draft plan before the final specific goals were defined. In fact, except for Estonia, which acknowledged that it would fall two percentage points short of the official goal, the other three republics indicated that they expected to meet their final goals by the end of the year.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 5-11 JANUARY 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,438 items)		
Persian Gulf Situation	7%	(--)
Kampuchean Second Anniversary	6%	(--)
Polish Situation	5%	(4%)
Afghan Situation	4%	(2%)
Disarmament	3%	(1%)

Beijing (583 items)		
DPRK Premier Yi Chong-ok in PRC	6%	(--)
Thai-Vietnamese Border Tension	4%	(--)
Vietnamese Domestic Situation	3%	(2%)
Soviet Report on PRC-Pakistani Military Collusion	3%	(--)

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22 JANUARY 1981
FB TM 81-003

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
5 April 1967 - six months prior to
current date

USSR-IRAN-GULF

MOSCOW CONTRASTS U.S. "ADVENTURISM," SOVIET PURSUIT OF PEACE

The behavior of Soviet media in the past two weeks, as the negotiations over release of the American hostages came down to the U.S. inaugural deadline, points to Soviet concerns over a possible future U.S.-Iranian accommodation and, more broadly, the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf region. Constricted by its own limited influence over Iran and other Gulf states and subjected to continuing criticism of its intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow has been seeking to project an image of a Soviet Union motivated by a desire to secure peace and assure the interests of all parties concerned in the region. At the same time, it has presented a contrasting picture of a United States pursuing its own selfish ends to the detriment of regional states. A sudden burst of publicity for Brezhnev's December "peace doctrine" for the Gulf coincided with an intensification of long-standing charges of possible U.S. military action against Iran or elsewhere in the area, designed to generate suspicion regarding U.S. intentions.

HOSTAGE ISSUE Following the resolution of the hostage crisis, Soviet media have toned down their earlier charges of an imminent U.S. military threat to Iran while playing up--as they did throughout the crisis--Iranian allegations of ongoing U.S. "political and military" interference in Iran's affairs. Routine-level comment denouncing purported U.S. designs on Persian Gulf oil resources has continued, along with standard Soviet allegations of "Pentagon plans" to "further step up the American military presence" there. Moscow reported the Algerian intermediary role in the hostage negotiations in a neutral fashion, not disposed to applaud, but also clearly careful not to criticize the contribution of a major nonaligned state.

As the Carter Administration's deadline for a settlement of the hostage crisis approached, Moscow played up assertions from a variety of sources concerning the possibility of U.S. military intervention in Iran, climaxed by an unusually intemperate article by a senior PRAVDA Middle East expert, Pavel Demchenko, on 17 January. Demchenko's article appeared alongside other, particularly scurrilous charges of U.S. preparations for "armed aggression against Iran," attributed to Indian and Lebanese sources and typically replayed by Soviet media.

Demchenko's allegations, which were all the more notable in that he attributed them only vaguely to reports in "the newspapers of many countries," included a claim that the United States was preparing a "dangerous adventure" against Iran liable to be executed "at any moment." Echoing a similar remark by Soviet President Brezhnev in November 1978, as opposition to the late shah was mounting in Iran, Demchenko concluded by warning that the Soviet Union had repeatedly stressed the "inadmissibility" of any foreign interference in Iran's affairs. The infrequency of the appearance of this formulation and the strident tone of the Demchenko article suggested--as Brezhnev's 1978 remarks had seemed to do at that time--that Moscow had not ruled out the possibility of U.S. military action to resolve the situation. However, no other elements of Moscow's propaganda behavior during the final days of the Carter Administration pointed to anything other than propagandistic exploitation of the American predicament.

Moscow did not directly acknowledge a reported U.S. protest over its media treatment of the crisis, but a 19 January TASS denial of Soviet intent to "complicate American-Iranian relations" asserted defensively that the "entire world press"--not further identified--had been reporting on Washington's "direct threats" to use force against Iran "over the past few days."* Demchenko, in a subsequent PRAVDA article on the 19th, charged Washington with turning the hostages into "an object of dishonest bargaining" and of alternating "alluring promises" with "crude threats." But he also recalled--possibly with an eye to the security of the recently-attacked Soviet Embassy in Tehran--that the seizure of the U.S. Embassy had been a "violation of international agreements on the immunity of embassies and diplomatic personnel." Subsequent comment, while blaming the seizure of the U.S. Embassy on U.S. support for the former shah, has replayed this theme; a 21 January commentary broadcast in English to North America declared that the "brazen indifference to international law" involved in seizing an embassy and its staff "cannot be tolerated."

SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS

Ostensibly neutral on the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, Moscow has continued to encounter difficulties in its efforts to cultivate ties with its neighbor Iran without alienating its treaty partner Iraq. The Iraqi-Iranian dispute is only one of the sources of friction between Moscow and Tehran, which range from the price of Iranian gas to Iranian criticism of the Eastern "superpower" for its military presence in Afghanistan. The Afghan issue prompted the latest Soviet-Iranian exchange. After formally protesting the late December attack on its embassy in Tehran by Afghan demonstrators, Moscow on 12 January registered its displeasure with Tehran by publicizing another protest against the official Iranian reaction to the embassy incident.

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* Examples of earlier Soviet responses to U.S. protests against Soviet media behavior--shortly after the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979, and in late 1978 as the shah's position deteriorated--are discussed in the TRENDS of 15 and 21 November 1979 and 4 and 10 January 1979.

At the same time, Moscow has tried to reassure the Iranian regime that it has no territorial designs on Iran and is not providing military assistance to Iraq. In early January Moscow promptly rejected an allegation in a Jack Anderson column in the Washington POST that the Soviet Union, in unofficial secret contacts with key U.S. officials, had suggested that the most sensible solution to the Iranian problem would be division of the country into Soviet and American spheres of influence. A 5 January unsigned TASS item--followed by a similar article in PRAVDA and a Persian-language commentary on the 6th--maintained that the Soviet Union would not discuss with anyone the partition of Iran since such an action would be incompatible with the principles of Soviet foreign policy. Again with an eye to reassuring Tehran, a TASS report from Tehran on the 10th and a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) article on the 15th denounced "inventions" about supplies of Soviet tanks to Iraq and "imaginary participation" of Soviet specialists in Iraqi operations against Iran.

Moscow continues to maintain its pose of impartiality on the Iran-Iraq conflict, urging the parties to resolve their disputes themselves through negotiations. The Demchenko article in PRAVDA on the 19th, for example, noted evenhandedly that Iran and Iraq had long been divided by a territorial dispute, that they were vying for influence in the Gulf, and that there was an "acute clash of religious and personal ambitions." Demchenko reiterated the standard charge that the United States is exacerbating the conflict to further its own interests.

GULF PROPOSALS Brezhnev's December proposal for achieving "peace and security" in the Persian Gulf--which appears to constitute Moscow's long-range program to further its own interests in the region while diminishing or stabilizing U.S. influence--received an unusual burst of press and radio publicity in the second week of January. The amount of broadcast comment was striking in that it was almost twice as heavy as the initial round of radio applause the week after Brezhnev enunciated the "doctrine" during his early December visit to India. Moscow may have had several immediate objectives in mind in stressing its proposals at this juncture, when regional states--and the USSR itself--would be anticipating a reassessment of U.S. policies and strategies in the area by the new Reagan Administration, particularly if the hostage issue were resolved. The campaign might also have been calculated to impress participants in forthcoming conferences in the area--the Islamic Conference Organization summit convening in Saudi Arabia on 24 January and the nonaligned ministerial gathering scheduled for early February in India. But Soviet commentators--such as IZVESTIYA's Matveyev on 8 January--have suggested that the proposals have applicability to problems beyond the Gulf and implied that they would be the foundation of Soviet negotiating positions on such questions as an Indian Ocean peace zone, access to energy resources, and guarantees on international shipping.

USSR-CUBA-EL SALVADOR

MOSCOW, CUBA HAIL INSURGENTS' DRIVE AGAINST SALVADORAN JUNTA

Following the onset of the leftist guerrilla offensive in El Salvador on 10 January, Moscow has portrayed the insurgents as gaining the upper hand and sharply restated its thesis that only an "armed invasion" by the United States can prevent the eventual collapse of the "genocidal regime." For the first time, Moscow has also speculated that any U.S. military action in El Salvador might be extended to other countries in the region. While Cuban treatment of the offensive has been largely reportorial, Havana has rejected Salvadoran charges of involvement of "foreign guerrillas" in the struggle and countercharged that the armies of Guatemala and Honduras, with U.S. backing, are preparing to intervene. Havana and Moscow have publicized the proposed government program of the leftist opposition, but neither has acknowledged the insurgents' call for peace talks with the United States.

MOSCOW Seeking to bolster its claim that Washington is prepared to save the Salvadoran junta "at any cost," Moscow ridiculed the recent U.S. decision to resume military aid to El Salvador, which had been suspended in December following the killing of four American religious workers, allegedly by Salvadoran security forces. A commentary by Moscow radio Latin American affairs specialist Levchenko, broadcast in English on 15 January, ignored the fact that the decision had been prompted by the offensive against the junta, asserting instead that it was "not a question" of restoring the aid since "it had not stopped for a single day," and characterizing the aid as a "prelude" to U.S. military intervention.

Consistent with its recent endorsement of armed struggle as the only option open to the Salvadoran left, Moscow has portrayed the offensive as signaling the "inevitable collapse" of the ruling junta. Buttressing the view that conditions exist for carrying the offensive to a successful conclusion, a Levchenko commentary broadcast in Spanish on 13 January contended that the leftist forces had the "complete" support of the Salvadoran masses. The commentary cited the recently established leftist clandestine radio--Radio Liberation, reportedly located in Nicaragua--as saying "the time has arrived for decisive battles" and for the formation of a "democratic revolutionary" government. Levchenko warned, however, that the struggle to overthrow the Salvadoran regime might provoke a militay response from the United States.

While Moscow has long contended that the United States is preparing to intervene in the Salvadoran conflict, either through the use of Latin American expeditionary forces or directly, these warnings have become more strident in recent weeks as the scale of the war between the junta and the leftist guerrillas has widened. For example, a PRAVDA article on 11 January unfolded "several options" which it said the United States is considering for El Salvador. The article asserted that Washington believes intervention by the armies of Guatemala and Honduras is the "most convenient" option, but it did not rule out the "possibility" of "direct" U.S. military intervention. PRAVDA characterized the prospects of U.S. military action against the guerrillas under the OAS flag as "highly problematic." The countries belonging to that organization, it said, have already expressed opposition to the "two-faced" U.S. policy that "claims to be a champion of human rights, on the one hand, and gives broad political and military support to reactionary regimes, on the other."

Touching for the first time on the potential regional implications of U.S. intervention in El Salvador, a widely broadcast Levchenko commentary on the 17th professed to see "far-reaching goals" behind U.S. support for the junta. It cited a U.S. magazine as saying that a war in Central America would be a "fine excuse for crushing once and for all" revolutionary upheaval in the region. The commentary dismissed the "tale" about "some kind of intervention" by Nicaragua in the Salvadoran conflict as a cover for Washington's "plans" for intervening in Central America--plans which, Levchenko speculated, could include the overthrow of the Sandinista-led government in Nicaragua as well as military action against the leftist opposition movements in Guatemala and Honduras.

Moscow has reported on some of the policies the leftists said their "government-in-arms" will implement in El Salvador. Giving legitimacy to the left's military and diplomatic efforts, a feature on El Salvador broadcast on the 13th noted that the "new" government would have the "fulfillment of popular and national interests" as its main objective and would follow a policy of nonalignment.

HAVANA Havana has stopped just short of explicitly denying allegations of Cuban involvement in the guerrilla offensive. Without acknowledging that such a charge had been leveled against Cuba and Nicaragua, Havana's domestic service on 15 January dismissed what it termed the "noisy publicity campaign" about the arrival in El Salvador of "presumed guerrillas" as a "falsehood" designed to justify U.S. intervention. Addressing the issue more directly, however, Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca, during a recent visit to Panama, was reported by AFP on the 15th as brushing aside the question of a Cuban role, saying "this is normally what is said about Cuba." Havana typically failed to replay Malmierca's remark to Cuban audiences, continuing the Castro regime's long-established practice of not informing the Cuban public on sensitive issues until it is deemed opportune to do so. Havana has offered only its usual expression of "solidarity" with the leftist offensive, maintaining that the struggle in El Salvador is "exclusively the affair of the Salvadoran people."

Havana has pointed to the alleged presence of Guatemalan and Honduran troops in El Salvador to warn of the regional implications of the deepening conflict. A PRENSA LATINA commentary on the 16th, for example, ridiculed the notion that the Guatemalan and Honduran "roles" were restricted to rendering "logistical support" to the junta. It argued that "no one could assume" that U.S. military advisers in El Salvador would stop Guatemalan and Honduran armed forces from escalating their "interference" if the Salvadoran regime "cannot be saved."

POLAND-USSR

Twelve days after the inconclusive confrontation over work-free Saturdays, the attitudes of the three principals in the Polish crisis remain substantially unchanged. The Polish leaders are continuing to show signs of a new determination to reaffirm party authority and bring Solidarity under effective control. Solidarity is continuing to press the issue of work-free Saturdays, thus apparently setting the stage for a new test of strength. Moscow is still giving tacit support to the Kania regime while sharpening its attacks on Solidarity.

KANIA REASSERTS AUTHORITY AS SHOWDOWN LOOMS WITH SOLIDARITY

Continuing the show of authority he displayed on 10 January, Kania has again warned Solidarity in no uncertain terms against overreaching its appropriate sphere of activity and attempting to act in the political sphere. Speaking to enterprise party organization leaders in Warsaw on 14 January, he declared that there can be no "diarchy" in Poland, asserting that such a division of authority had never worked in any state. While promising that Solidarity could expect to play an important role in a "democratic" Poland, he indicated that it would be one among many institutions of society. He hinted broadly that it might not enjoy a monopoly in representing the workers' interests, declaring that he had noted with interest, and supported, the revival of the previously existing industrial branch trade unions. Regime authority was further asserted in a hardline speech on the 17th by Deputy Premier Mach, who served notice that despite Solidarity's efforts at "blackmail," the regime's decision to dock the pay of all those who did not report for work on the 10th would not be rescinded.

Tougher criticism of Solidarity has also been the order of the day. Thus Kania charged in his speech on the 14th that the union is "a territory of active penetration by the enemies of socialism," who do not conceal their "counterrevolutionary" aims in carrying out such acts as occupying public buildings and "extorting" government decisions in their favor. In the same vein, PZPR Politburo member and Secretary Grabski, a leading liberal reformer, chided the union at the meeting for refusing to fulfill its responsibility to improve production and combat "anarchy."

While striking a tougher public stance, regime spokesmen continue to stress that good relations with the union are both desirable and possible and that Solidarity need only live up to its own charter to ensure a satisfactory partnership with the government and a practical start toward solving the country's economic ills.

Solidarity also appears disinclined to pass the point of no return in pressing its demands, although it has set the stage for a new confrontation on work-free Saturdays. With a showdown looming on the next scheduled Saturday workday, the 24th, it remains to be seen whether the regime will continue its recent policy of not backing down on basic issues or whether Solidarity feels it has the support of public opinion to press for concessions from the regime.

MOSCOW SCORES LEADERS OF SOLIDARITY, SUPPORTIVE OF KANIA

Moscow continues to rely heavily on official Polish statements for its public portrayal of events in Poland, in effect giving tacit support to the assessments and actions of the Polish leaders. Thus PRAVDA on 17 January carried extensive excerpts from Kania's speech on the 14th to enterprise party organization leaders, citing both his more moderate statements--such as his assertion of the regime's readiness to cooperate with Solidarity--and his more hardline statements--such as his reference to the infiltration of the union by enemies of socialism and his rejection of diarchy. Similarly, PRAVDA on the 16th reported the hardline speeches by Polish officials Barcikowski and Grabski on the same occasion, including their criticism of unjustified demands by Solidarity. And TASS on the 20th carried an interview with Polish official Stanislaw Gucwa, in which he scored Solidarity "leaders" for pressuring the authorities and falling under the influence of extremists.

Moscow's own reportage has tended to strike a balance between sharp attacks on unspecified negative elements in Solidarity and broadly laudatory accounts of healthy elements in the Polish work force said to be restoring the economy to its normal rhythms. For instance, the trade union daily TRUD on 14 January cited a Polish worker as saying that enemies of socialism have "infiltrated the Solidarity leadership" but also as expressing confidence that workers at his plant "will not succumb" to them. Similarly, PRAVDA on the 21st cited Polish press sources as blaming "certain local Solidarity leaders" for creating tension, but it added that the Polish leadership bodies have "sufficient strength" to curb any threats. In a more positive vein, PRAVDA on the 17th cited support by Warsaw communists for the party's stabilization efforts and noted that many Warsaw plants have started the new year in a "businesslike way, restoring the necessary labor productivity and discipline."

One unusually sharp commentary on Solidarity by a Soviet newsman, warning of a growing anticommunist "infection" in the union, apparently was not carried in Soviet media but was published in Prague's RUDE PRAVO. NOVOSTI commentator Vladimir Nakaryakov, writing in the Czechoslovak party daily on the 14th, said that the founders of Solidarity failed to notice that "rats infected with the germs of anticommunism are settling down on its decks and spreading the infection" and that some of them were "trying to get nearer to the captain's bridge." He expressed the hope that the Solidarity leaders and organization would heed this threat and "carry out the inevitable disinfection." Like Moscow reports, the Nakaryakov article portrayed the Polish domestic situation generally favorably, saying that antisocialist forces were meeting increasingly great resistance and that a "broad front of prudence and responsibility" had been formed.

YUGOSLAVIA

YUGOSLAV LEADER URGES LESS PRO-WESTERN STANCE ON POLAND

> In one of the first signs of political posturing in East Europe as a result of the Polish crisis, a Yugoslav leader has moved to position himself against what he sees as a pro-Western bias in Yugoslav press treatment of the Polish crisis. The leader--current number two man in the party, LCY Secretary Dusan Dragosavac--voiced his criticism in a speech to a Kosovo political aktiv on 13 January, reported by the Belgrade daily BORBA on the 15th.

Reaffirming Belgrade's support for the Polish regime's efforts to resolve the situation and its opposition to any foreign interference, Dragosavac charged that the Yugoslav press does not always maintain this posture of noninterference and that it sometimes "fails to sufficiently see the presence and activities of other forces" when criticizing Soviet-style "real socialism." To further clarify his meaning, Dragosavac recalled that Belgrade remained "consistent with socialist principles" when it broke with Moscow in 1948 and that it should not now show sympathy for "anything that is or could be antisocialist."

Dragosavac's criticism of the Yugoslav press for its treatment of the Polish situation brings to mind his similar call for evenhandedness following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In the wake of some outspoken Yugoslav articles on the intervention in early 1980, which prompted polemics from Moscow, Dragosavac at a June party plenum scored the press for sometimes uncritically adopting Western media positions on international issues. His comments drew a rejoinder at the plenum from Slovenian Joze Smole, who dismissed any attempts to stifle press freedom and "creative polemics." Since that time, Dragosavac has taken further steps to reaffirm his credentials as an ideological watchdog. In July he chastised the media for lacking sufficient ideological zeal on domestic issues and in November he criticized communists who "lose all socialist perspective" and adopt "anticommunist positions."

KAMPUCHEA-PRC

BEIJING BACKS KHIEU SAMPHAN REGIME'S QUEST FOR BETTER IMAGE

Under pressure from other Asian nations and prodded by its Beijing ally, the Democratic Kampuchean regime is again attempting to upgrade its international image. By publicizing new purported evidence of a broadened base of support, the DK apparently hopes to influence the decision on Kampuchean seating at the nonaligned conference in New Delhi next month. Although Beijing appears more willing than the Khieu Samphan regime to entertain the idea of a coalition government, both continue to insist that nothing be done which might undermine DK military effectiveness.

DK and Beijing reporting of several events in late December and early January manifested a shared desire to improve the DK's image. A 3-7 January meeting of the DK Cabinet that coincided with a visit of Prince Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Narindrapong to DK-controlled areas and a subsequent briefing of DK ambassadors were publicized in such a way as to underscore a recent improvement in the DK's political position and to attach a high priority to furthering this trend. A Cabinet statement carried by the PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VODK) said the DK would "unite with all patriotic forces and people" to ensure national survival and observed that "more people, political officials, and intellectuals" from overseas were joining the struggle. The statement stressed the importance of united front efforts in 1981 when they would have "greater impetus" for the political program and "new strategic political line" of the Patriotic and Democratic Front and Government of National Union of Kampuchea (PDFGNUK). While it did not discuss the substance of the ambassadorial meeting, VODK said the diplomats had departed on 10 January more determined than ever to contribute to the anti-Le Duan struggle--a statement that seems to presage renewed diplomatic efforts to strengthen the DK's international status.

VODK pictured Prince Norodom Narindrapong's visit as demonstrating the DK's ability to win the cooperation of other "patriotic forces," potentially including Sihanouk, but stopped short of suggesting any specific arrangement. Thus the 14 January VODK announcement of the visit did not mention that the prince was Sihanouk's son but did say he had attended a New Year's reception with Khieu Samphan and had pledged to "support the struggle of our people in every way possible." VODK also mentioned his presence at news conferences held by Khieu Samphan for foreign reporters several days later but did not report his statements to the press that he had "joined" the DK-led insurgency or his comment that he hoped his father would also join.

The publicity for these developments seems motivated in part by an expectation of renewed debate leading into the impending nonaligned foreign ministers meeting over the Kampuchean seat left vacant at the last two sessions. Calls since October by a number of ASEAN countries, most notably Singapore, for a change in the composition of the Kampuchean leadership may have reinforced the DK and Beijing concern.* Added grounds for concern could be found in several statements by Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Ito this month--during Suzuki's visit to several ASEAN countries--which appeared to hedge Japan's support for the DK leadership. The principal DK-PRC response has been twofold: to try to make the DK regime appear more palatable while arguing that the regime is indispensable to the survival of the Kampuchean people. The first theme was illustrated by VODK broadcasts of a series of "legal principles," adopted following a 6 October Cabinet meeting, which represented the DK as a parliamentary democracy with full guarantees of human and legal rights. The second theme, played repeatedly since mid-November, has threaded through VODK commentaries claiming that the DK and PDFGNUK are leading the Kampuchean people in the anti-Vietnamese struggle not out of a desire to "cling to power" but because the DK is "the sole fighting force" capable of defending Kampuchea against the Vietnamese.

An added element of the DK response to the statements by ASEAN leaders has been a suggestion of willingness, albeit reluctant, to accept leading roles for people like Sihanouk and Son Sann. During a 20-25 November visit to Indonesia, DK Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ieng Sary told a news conference his government would be willing to accept Sihanouk as the head of a neutral regime provided Sihanouk was prepared to give the anti-Vietnamese struggle top priority. Reflecting the DK leadership's habitual reluctance to commit itself to close cooperation with its rivals, VODK's 1 December report of the news conference omitted the direct references to Sihanouk and to a possible official role for him, noting only that Ieng Sary had said the DK was trying to broaden the front to win the support of all Kampucheans "regardless of their past or political inclinations."

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* Disagreement between Beijing and ASEAN countries over the Kampuchean issue is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 November 1980, pages 6-9.

PRESSURE FROM BEIJING Beijing has been pushing the DK to build a more broadly based regime that might attract wider domestic and international support while making it clear that the Chinese would not favor changes that could undermine DK military effectiveness. Thus XINHUA dispatches in late November gave prominent play to the remarks by Ieng Sary that VODK had so carefully softpedaled. XINHUA highlighted Ieng Sary's statements of willingness to accept an important role for Sihanouk, at the same time stressing his statements that Vietnam could not be expected to withdraw from Kampuchea unless it were driven out by force. On 1 December, reporting the first combined Khmer Serei and DK attack against SRV forces, a XINHUA commentary by Guo Ping said this event showed that "various resistance forces in Kampuchea will close their ranks" and that the DK forces remain "the most powerful and main force against the Vietnamese aggression." By contrast, VODK said only that a group belonging to the Kampuchean National Liberation Movement--the Moulinaka, one of the Khmer Serei factions--had "joined" the PDFGNUK. XINHUA reports of the visit of Prince Narindrapong to Kampuchea stressed that he was Sihanouk's son, that he had joined the DK forces, and that he had expressed hope that his father would "join the Democratic Kampuchean Government in a united front because there is no other way to struggle." VODK's version mentioned none of these points.

Beijing's apparent lobbying for a more active role for Sihanouk than the DK would wish to accept is in keeping with past PRC-DK differences. Perhaps to reassure the DK as much as to try to convince Asian nations that the DK is worthy of support, Beijing has placed continuing emphasis on the DK's importance as the main force against Vietnamese aggression. This argument was pressed authoritatively on 27 December in a RENMIN RIBAO Observer article on the second anniversary of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.*

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* Beijing's treatment of the second anniversary of the Vietnamese invasion is discussed in the TRENDS of 31 December 1980, page 12.

DPRK-PRC

PREMIER'S BEIJING VISIT SURFACES SIGNS OF SINO-KOREAN COOLNESS

> Pyongyang and Beijing media coverage of North Korean Premier Yi Chong-ok's recent visit to China served to underscore the chill in relations, first evident in 1978, between the two countries. Yi's arrival on 10 January failed to trigger the customary welcoming RENMIN RIBAO editorial, and his departure on the 14th was not marked with the usual concluding statement in the press. These omissions serve to cloud the assertion by both sides that a unanimity of views was reached during the talks. Chinese and Korean reporting during Yi's visit failed to identify specific areas of possible disagreement. But Yi did seem to respond to Chinese sensitivity on the Korean leadership succession issue by failing even to allude to that issue while in China, although he did mention it during his subsequent visit to Burma.*

Beijing was the first to call attention to its cooling relations with Pyongyang by failing to issue the routine welcoming editorial in the party paper, but both sides registered a degree of estrangement by failing to publicize the usual characterization of atmospherics at the welcoming ceremony. Similarly, KCNA's atypical failure to report on the second and concluding round of talks on the 11th may have signaled that differences had been aired the previous day. XINHUA's version of the talks on the 11th indicated that Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang had offered routine Chinese support for Pyongyang's recent reunification proposal, terming Kim Il-song's call for a Korean confederation at the party congress last October "reasonable and correct."

Both sides used the banquet speeches to reiterate their standard positions on questions such as Korean reunification and U.S. troop withdrawal from the South, but Pyongyang and Beijing diverged in their treatment of the occasions. KCNA characterized the first banquet on the 10th as "friendly," while XINHUA failed to do so. XINHUA's report on the second banquet did not repeat Zhao's characterization, as reported by KCNA, of Korea as "our close neighbor."

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* Chinese reaction to efforts to build up Kim Chong-il to succeed his father, Kim Il-song, is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 December 1980, pages 11-12.

Korean and Chinese reporting on the departure of the North Korean delegation for Burma on the 14th continued to reflect telling discrepancies. KCNA did not report any remarks by either premier on the occasion, but XINHUA cited Zhao as saying the trip had been "highly successful" and asserted that Yi himself was "very much satisfied with the fruitful results" of the talks. The lack of a formal joint statement at the end of the visit accords with recent Chinese practice, but when CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng visited Pyongyang in 1978, both the Korean party daily, NODONG SINMUN, and RENMIN RIBAO published concluding statements that closely followed the form of communiques. Similarly, in November the visit by the Yugoslav premier was marked with a Chinese press statement.

U S S R

PRESS TREATMENT OF FUNERAL RITES DOWNGRADES KOSYGIN'S ROLE

Detailed examination of Soviet press treatment of Kosygin's death confirms initial impressions that the regime deliberately played down his political importance and historical contributions. In contrast with the practice normally applied to leaders of his rank, the press printed virtually no messages of condolence, carried no tributes to him beyond brief words of praise in the funeral orations, and even misrepresented his political role. The formula used to identify him in the obituary and other formal statements omitted any mention of his chairmanship of the Council of Ministers or membership in the Politburo.

While Kosygin's obituary and the lying-in-state and funeral ceremonies were all duly and properly reported, the press carried no articles extolling his years of service and even failed to report the eulogies in messages of condolence from foreign and domestic leaders and organizations. PRAVDA on 25 December and IZVESTIYA on the 26th carried only a TASS list of condolence messages received from foreign leaders, not the messages themselves; and the list did not appear until well after his funeral on 23 December. As published abroad, many of the messages extolled Kosygin and lamented his loss. Messages from within the Soviet Union were brushed off in a one-sentence TASS report, carried in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, merely noting that various organizations in the USSR had sent them. The only message from a Soviet organization or governmental unit to appear in the central or republic press was a message from the RSFSR Government, published in full in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 23 December. No messages of sympathy appeared in the press organs of the Komsomol, trade unions, other republics, or even Kosygin's own Council of Ministers or hometown of Leningrad.

In contrast, whole pages devoted to texts of messages from Soviet and foreign organizations and individuals had marked the death of some other Politburo members, including less important figures such as former Defense Minister Grechko and veteran Bolshevik Voroshilov. Even relatively junior Politburo member Kulakov was honored with the publication in PRAVDA of the text of messages from the Moscow city party organization, the trade unions, and the Komsomol when he died in July 1978.

Official announcements carried in the press also appeared to minimize Kosygin's importance by repeatedly referring to him as "member of the Central Committee" rather than as Politburo member or former head of government. The announcement of his death, the reporting of his lying-in-state, and the reporting on condolences characterized Kosygin only as "a prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state" and "member of the Central Committee"; his obituary and the funeral orations characterized him in much the same way, mentioning his status as premier and Politburo member only far down in the text. Although Kosygin submitted his resignation as both premier and Politburo member in October and was released from his government post, he was never formally dropped from the Politburo and hence presumably should have been treated as a Politburo member. But even as a former Politburo member he could have received far more honors, as Voroshilov's case demonstrates.

The relatively minor importance attached to Kosygin's death was also reflected in the attendance at the funeral. Although most Moscow-based Politburo members were present, none of the seven Politburo members based in the provinces showed up--even though they had all come to Moscow for Brezhnev's 74th birthday only five days earlier.

BRIEF

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Soviet Army Maneuvers Pictured

Pictures of Soviet BMD assault vehicles on maneuvers in Afghanistan were prominently featured at the top of page one in the 7 January 1981 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR), the central organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense. This is the first time such pictures are known to have been published in the Soviet press. While explicitly calling the maneuvers instructional, the captions to the two pictures implicitly suggest that the motorized rifle companies pictured are engaged in combat operations. According to the captions, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan provides an excellent training ground where officers and men can learn to "correctly orient themselves in complex, rapidly changing tactical circumstances." Previous Soviet acknowledgments of a combat role for Soviet forces in Afghanistan came in the indirect form of letters to the editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, in June and September 1980.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 12-18 JANUARY 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,437 items)		
Afghan Situation	6%	(4%)
British Labor Members' Visit	3%	(--)
El Salvador Situation	6%	(3%)
Polish Situation	5%	(5%)
Soviet-Mongolian Friendship Treaty 35th Anniversary	4%	(--)

Beijing (724 items)		
DPRK Premier Yi Chong-ok in PRC	11%	(6%)
Japanese Parliamentary Delegations in PRC	9%	(1%)
Dutch Sale of Submarines to Taiwan	3%	(1%)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- USSR on Iranian release of U.S. hostages
- Soviet treatment of Reagan Administration

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28 JANUARY 1981
FB TM 81-004

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

- SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958
- SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958
- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958
- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
5 April 1967 - six months prior to
current date

USSR-IRAN

MOSCOW DISAPPROVES EMBASSY SEIZURE, FAULTS U.S. POLICIES

> Moscow has sought to question U.S. motives and cast suspicion on American actions throughout the prolonged hostage crisis while courting Tehran's favor through its tendentious, transparently pro-Iranian treatment of the issue. The occasional professions of support for the principle of diplomatic immunity appear to have been prompted largely by U.S. objections to Soviet media behavior or by Soviet concern over Iranian treatment of the USSR's own mission in Tehran. As in the past, recent assertions of the USSR's position on this point of international law have virtually excused Iranian behavior as the understandable result of erroneous U.S. policies toward Iran.

Characteristically, Soviet coverage of the final episodes in the hostage situation continued to replay Iranian allegations about U.S. policy and parrot Iranian terminology--for example, in noting the alleged "espionage" activities of the detained Americans. Moscow has sustained its charge that the hostage situation was used as a "pretext" for the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf area to ensure U.S. control over the region's oil supplies and to "threaten" the countries of the region. Asking rhetorically why U.S. forces have not been withdrawn now that the hostages have been freed, Moscow continues to contrast the "aggressive" American posture in the region with Brezhnev's "peace and security" proposals, set forth in December.

Moscow has belatedly suggested some Soviet awareness of the profound effect of the hostage crisis on the American people but has contrived to portray the drama of the hostages' return as a media event and the "overlong odyssey" as a result of mistakes by the Carter Administration. IZVESTIYA's New York correspondent, in a 27 January article reported by TASS, observed somewhat sarcastically that American media attention to the hostage question created the impression that "there was nothing else noteworthy in the world." PRAVDA's correspondent in New York, A. Tolkhunov, conceded in a 22 January article that the fate of the former captives had "moved the Americans deeply." But the thrust of his remarks was that officials of the previous U.S. Administration bore responsibility for artificially prolonging the crisis. He complained that the Carter Administration had concocted "another anti-Soviet falsehood" by accusing the Soviet Union of "virtually inflaming the conflict over the hostages," whereas the USSR in fact had characterized the seizure of the U.S. Embassy as a contravention of international law "from the start."

Soviet reluctance to emphasize publicly the USSR's "unequivocal stand" on this issue seemed underscored in a commentary broadcast on Moscow radio's English-language World Service on the 28th. The commentary acknowledged in effect that such assurances had been conveyed privately to the United States. It asserted that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and other officials, "in the course of their numerous contacts with the Americans," had made a point of saying that "for all our sympathies for the Iranian revolution, we could not recognize as legitimate the arrest of U.S. citizens in Iran."

USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW HOPES FOR IMPROVED TIES WITH NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION

Moscow has greeted the inauguration of President Reagan with public expressions of hope for improved bilateral ties tempered by some apprehension about the new Administration's foreign policy. Leadership statements and media commentaries have underscored Moscow's interest in getting an early reading on the Reagan Administration's attitude toward restarting the strategic arms limitation dialogue, the issue Moscow views as the core of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. As it has during previous changes of leadership in Washington, Moscow has thus far treated the new President with restraint, although cabinet officials have been the object of criticism.

Moscow has authoritatively reaffirmed its eagerness to negotiate on strategic arms with the Reagan Administration even while showing considerable skepticism about the new Administration's approach to this question. Foreign Minister Gromyko, in remarks at a 27 January meeting with visiting GDR Foreign Minister Fischer, repeated sentiments expressed by Soviet President Brezhnev on 17 November stressing Moscow's interest in receiving U.S. disarmament proposals. As reported by TASS, Gromyko said Moscow would support any initiatives promoting peace and detente, "wherever they come from," and that this "applies, of course, also to the United States of America." Media commentary has also suggested that Moscow is awaiting specific clues to the Administration's position on arms control. Veteran TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov suggested in a 25 January foreign affairs discussion program on Moscow radio that the CSCE meeting reconvening in Madrid on 27 January should reveal something about the Administration's approach. The meeting, he said, offers President Reagan a unique opportunity to "back up his declarations of Washington's love of peace with practical deeds."

Gromyko has also suggested that Moscow is apprehensive about the Reagan Administration's posture toward SALT. According to a 19 January TASS summary of Gromyko's article in the CPSU theoretical journal KOMMUNIST (No. 1, 1981), the Soviet foreign minister emphatically declared that the USSR would continue the arms control dialogue only under conditions of continued adherence by both sides to the principle of equality. He rejected the notion that the Soviet Union would "participate in talks which will render the SALT II treaty null and void and crush [its] basic principles," and he stated that the USSR "rejects categorically any approach which would place one of the sides at a disadvantage." No Soviet leader had mentioned the SALT II treaty since the U.S. elections, although Soviet communiques in November with Italy and Mozambique had called for its early entry into force.

While Moscow had continued to exercise restraint toward President Reagan, Soviet commentators have recently begun taking critical exception to remarks by Reagan cabinet members and to policies the Administration might adopt in the Middle East and Latin America. PRAVDA on 16 January charged that Secretary of State Haig was presenting himself as a "supporter of a 'hard line' toward the Soviet Union." Both Haig and Defense Secretary Weinberger were accused by Central Committee official Oleg Anichkin, in a 23 January Moscow domestic broadcast, of advocating superiority in strategic arms over the Soviet Union in order to place Moscow in an unequal negotiating position. Anichkin envisioned no improvement--from a Soviet perspective--in U.S. policy in the Middle East. He also warned that "it appears" the United States will take measures "to suppress all conflagrations of the revolutionary liberation struggle" in Latin America.

CHINA

TRIALS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION CLIQUES ADD TO PARTY DISARRAY

> Beijing's just-concluded trials of the "gang of four" and the surviving leaders of Lin Biao's 1971 conspiracy helped advance some of the political goals of Deng Xiaoping and of his reform wing of the CCP, but at considerable cost. The trials failed to fully establish the party's rejection of factional politics and commitment to constitutional and legal regulation of political conflict, and they further strained relations within the leadership. Problems with the trials, combined with recent reversals of economic policy and the unseemly treatment of Chairman Hua Guofeng, have damaged party unity and prestige and could derail the important party reforms planned for the upcoming 12th CCP Congress.

XINHUA's announcement on 25 January of the judgments against the 10 former party and army leaders ended China's first public trials of important political figures. The trials opened on 20 November and finished hearing testimony on 29 December. Beijing had heavily underscored the importance of the proceedings with regular press and radio reports on their progress. In addition, Beijing television carried segments of the trials, including the dramatic expulsion from the courtroom on 12 December of defendant Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's widow. The trials also drew extensive authoritative press comment, including editorials in the party paper RENMIN RIBAO in late September, when the plans to hold the trials were made public, in November when the trials opened, and on 26 January after their conclusion.

STRESS ON LEGALITY RENMIN RIBAO uniformly emphasized the importance of the trials in further discrediting the power politics of the Cultural Revolution and in establishing in China the rule of law as the regulator of political activity and the guarantee of political stability in the future.*

RENMIN RIBAO's 26 January editorial hailed the trials as a "great victory for the socialist system" and declared that now, with an established legal system, "we can effectively defend the people's democracy, safeguard political stability and unity, and ensure the success of the four modernizations." A 27 January RENMIN RIBAO signed article added that the trials had effectively used the "law as a yardstick," even to the point of acquitting the gang of four of charges that they were engaged in criminal conduct when they colluded against Deng Xiaoping in 1974. The article noted the former high positions of the defendants as evidence that in China the law applied equally to all regardless of political standing. It also claimed that the trial had been conducted without outside interference: "Any eventuality was adjudicated according to the law by the judges, and no one had the right or ability to interfere."

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* Preparations for the trials and their opening are discussed in the TRENDS of 1 October 1980, pp 12-14, and 26 November 1980, pp 7-10.

Beijing's effort to use the trials to demonstrate the ascendance of constitutionality and legality was undercut by evidence of CCP manipulation before and during the hearings. The reported delays in establishing the court and in opening the trials suggested party contention over the conditions under which the trial would be held and the specific charges that would be brought. In fact, the defensive tone of the RENMIN RIBAO 26 January editorial seemed intended to answer criticism that the whole trial process was a political vehicle for the Deng faction. Apparently to portray the defeat of Deng's former enemies as a just, legal outcome, rather than as a political vendetta, the editorial denied allegations that only "a difference of political opinions" was involved and maintained that the defendants had committed "extremely grave counterrevolutionary crimes, not what some people called mistakes in work."

Similarly, extended recesses during the trial--when party meetings were in session--and the nearly month-long delay in announcing the verdicts and sentences also suggested party maneuvering over delicate issues raised during the trial. Another indirect indication that party leaders interfered in the trial appeared in a 23 January BEIJING RIBAO article decrying the interference of county party officials in local courts. The article did not directly suggest that the same thing was happening in the national trials, but its publication while the court was deliberating verdicts and sentences was highly provocative.

LEADERSHIP DISAGREEMENT

From the beginning, the most controversial aspect of the trials was its treatment of Mao Zedong's culpability for the disastrous Cultural Revolution and the past involvement of current leaders in leftist incidents. Clearly, the very fact of the trials served long-held objectives of Deng Xiaoping, who has believed that official party condemnation of leftist politics is necessary to remove from the party the remaining proponents of leftism and to prevent a recurrence of political chaos. But authoritative comment on the trials over the past four months indicated that the trials' goals were to be limited to dealing with only a few incidents of the strictly criminal behavior of a very small number of living defendants, leaving the more sensitive political judgments aside for deliberation by the CCP.

Comment by top PRC leaders, including Deng, and the 48-count indictment indicated that the trials would steer clear of the issue of Mao's responsibility for the excesses of the period. Almost certainly these limits were imposed as a result of a compromise between party reformers anxious to hold the trials and conservatives, led by Chairman Hua Guofeng and Vice Chairman Ye Jianying, who consistently have battled to preserve Mao's image and the prestige of officials, themselves included, who benefited from the Cultural Revolution.

Once the trials got under way, the arguments put forth by two members of the gang of four--Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan--apparently severely tested the limits placed on the trials and further complicated relations within the CCP leadership, which were already strained as a result of major debate under way over other issues just as the trials opened.* Jiang Qing's defense that she was acting in accordance with the instructions of the CCP Central Committee and its chairman, Mao Zedong, seemed to catch the court off guard and may have led to the adjournment of her trial from 12 December to 23 December. Tensions were probably further heightened in the first week in December by a three-part article written by the three surviving children of former PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi, whom Jiang stood accused of persecuting to death. The article, published in the trade union paper GONGREN RIBAO, portrayed Liu's repeated unsuccessful efforts to enlist Mao's help in dealing with the political crisis that was developing in 1966.

The adjournment of Jiang's trial coincided with a CCP work conference on the economy, which probably discussed CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng's links with the leftists and Jiang's allegations about Mao. Hua had been missing from public view since 27 November, and he has yet to make an appearance. A judgment regarding Mao--that he was responsible for starting the Cultural Revolution but was still to be considered innocent of crimes--was reflected in a RENMIN RIBAO Contributing Commentator article on 22 December, the day before her trial resumed.

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* The signs of high-level debate are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 December 1980, pages 10-15; 7 January 1981, pages 4-8; and 14 January 1981, pages 10-12.

XINHUA's handling of Jiang's case further underscored the sensitivities aroused by her defense. XINHUA coverage of Jiang's trial alluded at first only circumspectly to her defense on 5 December, when it reported that she "argued vexatiously and endlessly, trying to shirk her responsibilities" for persecuting Liu Shaoqi and others. Following the resumption of her trial on 23 December, XINHUA reported progress in the trial but gave no details of her defense until the court's final session on 29 December.

FUTURE PROSPECTS The final verdicts on the gang of four and Lin Biao conspirators removed one source of nagging controversy from the immediate political agenda. But the issues left over from the trial--particularly the reputation of Mao and the status of Hua--seem likely to complicate high-level political relations at an already difficult time. Confusion at lower levels over political direction has now been added to puzzlement over changes in economic policy. Mixed signals from Beijing were apparent in the 26 January RENMIN RIBAO editorial, which praised the trials' achievements but diluted their political effect by pointing at the danger of enemies on the right as well as on the left. It warned sharply against political instability, which it said was caused not only by the remaining members of the just-tried cliques and the lingering influence of their policies but also by people with "extreme individualist and serious anarchist tendencies" . . . who are influenced by domestic and foreign elements "hostile to socialism." Such signs of disarray at the top point to a probable delay in the national party congress expected by midyear.

KOREA

PYONGYANG REJECTS SEOUL'S PROPOSAL FOR KIM IL-SONG VISIT

Although the DPRK has rejected South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan's 12 January proposal for Kim Il-song to visit Seoul, its carefully worded response seemed intended to keep the door ajar to the possibility of future contacts. The North's reply, in a 19 January statement by KWP Political Bureau member Kim Il, leveled the most authoritative personal attack on Chon since the October Korean Workers Party Congress. However, Kim Il's invective remained well below the level of criticism in routine North Korean media. He failed, for example, to call for Chon's overthrow or resignation, an omission which may signal that Pyongyang has not totally ruled out the possibility of dealing with Chon sometime in the future.

Kim Il's statement, and the subsequent comment ridiculing Chon's proposal, criticized Chon for having seized power through force and for having suppressed disturbances in Kwangju last May. It maintained that Chon is an illegitimate and unfit counterpart for reunification talks. However, judging by past practice, this image of Chon may not be carved in stone. Pyongyang backed away from similar characterizations of Chon's predecessor, Pak Chong-hui, in 1977 and 1979 in an effort to promote negotiations. While Pyongyang denounced Chon's portrayal of himself as a counterpart to Kim Il-song, a 21 January commentary in the party daily, NODONG SINMUN, recalled that the North had called for contacts between the "supreme chiefs" of the North and of the South several times since 1972.

Kim Il, speaking in his capacity as chairman of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, listed five demands for the Chon regime to meet to "rectify its stand," but he did not describe them as preconditions for a dialogue. Four of these demands--calls for the South to release opposition leader Kim Tae-chung and other imprisoned democrats, to cease its policy of anticommunism, to repudiate Pak Chong-hui's June 1973 statement on two Koreas in the United Nations, and to demand the withdrawal of all U.S. troops--have been broached before and were set forth as a negotiating package by the North's vice chairman of the North-South Coordinating Commission (NSCC) in March 1975. The demand for Seoul to end its policy of anticommunist confrontation remains the keystone to Pyongyang's call for democratization in South Korea, a process it hopes will lead to the replacement of Chon's regime by a more flexible government. The only new demand Kim Il made was for Chon to apologize personally for "massacring fellow countrymen" in Kwangju.

Pyongyang's reaction to Chon's proposal provided further evidence of the North's desire to leave open the possibility of a dialogue with the South on the DPRK plan, presented at the party congress last fall, for a North-South confederation. Kim Il ignored the fact that Chon had dismissed the confederation proposal as "unrealistic." Similarly, Pyongyang has passed up other opportunities to criticize disparaging remarks from the South regarding the confederation proposal. Thus the North did not denounce recent statements by the ROK unification minister and by an ROK representative of the NSCC attacking the confederation proposal. Neither Pyongyang's official media nor the clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification responded to Chon's statement, in a November interview, that he viewed the North's call for a confederation as a propaganda exercise and that he preferred a more gradual approach to reunification.

The most authoritative comment on South Korean "misperception" of the confederation proposal was in a 30 December NODONG SINMUN commentary that accused the South's radio Voice of Hope of distorting the plan, but did not refer to the opinions expressed by individual South Korean leaders. The commentary argued that the confederation was not a transitional step to reunification but the framework of a reunified state, that it represented a new proposal, and that by having made it the North had once again proved that it had no desire to invade the South.

USSR

DECREE ORDERS STEPS TO EXPAND PRIVATE LIVESTOCK RAISING

In a notable new turn to private initiative as a means of easing agricultural shortages, the Soviet leadership has adopted a decree outlining measures to spur food production on private plots. This is the second time in recent years that the regime has sought to encourage private-sector farming by decree, but the earlier decree--issued with little publicity in 1977, at a time when the shortages were less serious than they are today--did not go as far as the present one. The new decree's main feature is endorsement of a system for contracting with farmers to raise livestock on their private plots, a controversial system used successfully in Hungary and recently promoted by a number of Soviet republic leaders.

The new Central Committee - Council of Ministers decree "On Extra Measures to Increase Production of Agricultural Products on Citizens' Private Plots" was published in the 18 January SELSKAYA ZHIZN (RURAL LIFE) and is getting more publicity than its 1977 precursor. The 14 September 1977 decree endorsing greater reliance on private plots was never carried in the press and only appeared in special collections of decrees later published in book form in small press runs. Economic necessity, particularly the present serious meat shortages, has apparently overcome political embarrassment and emboldened the regime to seek pragmatic solutions.

A special concern over meat is reflected in the decree's focus on livestock and its call for using the contract system to encourage livestock raising on private plots. This system--providing aid and incentives for farmers to raise livestock privately--is a much cheaper way of increasing meat production than the construction of large livestock complexes, which has been the main approach in recent years but which has produced disappointing results. The contract system has long helped boost farm output in Hungary. Since 1977 it has also been used successfully in a few Soviet regions, mainly in Georgia, Odessa, and Lvov.

This system, which has been quietly spreading for several years, began to receive a surge of public endorsements late last year. In speeches during October and November Azerbaijani First Secretary Aliyev (16 October), Latvian First Secretary Voss (11 November), and Estonian First Secretary Vayno (18 November) endorsed what they termed the "Odessa experience" and urged their farms to copy it, while Leningrad First Secretary Romanov (31 October) boasted of using the contract system successfully in his oblast. Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze, who has favored contracts since 1977 and has sent a number of Georgian delegations to study the Hungarian experience, pushed the system enthusiastically at an 11 November republic plenum and asserted that the CPSU Central Committee had approved the system in Georgia and the Ukraine. The contract system appears to have the blessing of CPSU Central Committee Agriculture Secretary Gorbachev as well. In the July 1980 KOMMUNIST (No. 11), he singled out for praise the methods of using private plots to boost meat production in Odessa, Volyn, Georgia, and Latvia--all of which use the contract system.

A curious absentee from the lineup of republic leaders supporting the system is Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy, whose republic has provided the Odessa model. Rather than taking advantage of the successful initiative originating in his bailiwick, Shcherbitskiy in recent years has consistently avoided any mention of the contract system in his speeches, even when discussing methods for increasing livestock production. On the contrary, he has repeatedly criticized Odessa for its agricultural performance. His negative assessment was reflected in a recent Odessa party election conference, reported in the 31 December SILSKI VISTI (RURAL NEWS), which dwelt on shortcomings and completely ignored the successful results of the contract system. Shcherbitskiy's apparent lack of enthusiasm for reliance on private farming is consistent with his commitment to ideological orthodoxy and abhorrence of pragmatism and opportunism.

CENTRAL ASIANS LOBBY FOR ADDITIONAL WATER RESOURCES

With the 26th CPSU Congress set to open next month, debate has intensified over a costly and controversial hydroengineering project to divert the flow of Siberian rivers to irrigate the plains of Central Asia. This grandiose plan, which was discussed at the last CPSU congress, is now being promoted by Central Asian leaders as a promising answer to the country's food problems and as a means for boosting the hard-pressed regional economy. Opposition to the plan, though less outspoken, is being raised by spokesmen for other regional interests that would be adversely affected by the investment of resources in the water diversion project, as well as by groups concerned with ecological questions.

At the 25th CPSU Congress, in 1976, Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov--whose republic stands to gain the most from the water diversion project--as well as other Central Asian leaders mounted an effort to speed up work on the planning of the project but failed to win a commitment to complete the planning by 1980. The hoped-for commitment was also missing from the draft of the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan, which went no further than calling for the continuation of project studies. In an apparent effort to generate pressure for reconsideration of this temporizing decision, Rashidov called a special meeting of the Uzbek Central Committee shortly after the five-year plan was released to address the problem. According to the short report on the session in the 20 December PRAVDA VOSTOKA, the participants pointed out the importance of the project to the country's food program and recommended that the final five-year plan, to be reviewed at the 26th CPSU Congress, include a decision to begin work on the water diversion project.

In the meantime, local specialists have been mounting a lobbying campaign to drum up support for the project in academic and technical circles. In a 6 July PRAVDA VOSTOKA article, for example, the president of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences and other prominent scientists emphasized the urgency of the problem, warning that additional sources of local water would begin to be exhausted by 1985 and calling for the creation of a special centralized administration to accelerate work on the project. They promised that the additional water not only would vastly improve crop yields but would also help achieve full employment among the "fast-growing" local population. This demographic argument was advanced even more strongly in an article in the August issue of ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, the journal of the Uzbek Writers Union, which contrasted projected birthrates for

Central Asia and other areas and predicted that it would be "difficult" to provide full employment in the years ahead without diverting the Siberian waters. In return for the water, it held out the prospect of better food supplies for regions now being built up in Siberia.

Although there has been less public opposition to the plan, a coalition of interests has clearly come together to work against it. Conflicting regional interests appear to play a part in the controversy, as was evident at a recent meeting on Uzbekistan at the USSR Academy of Sciences, reported in the November issue of its monthly VESTNIK. At that session a member of the Uzbekistan Central Committee defended his region's needs against the interests of national opponents, pointing out that the project involved an important social question affecting "the fate of millions" of Central Asians and that it also was a "political" issue. A speech by Academy First Vice President Kotelnikov seemed to challenge arguments based on Central Asian interests. He suggested that future studies of the project should not be limited to engineering questions but should examine the wisdom of continuing the project at all, and he added that such work should not be carried out only in Central Asia. Environmentalists have also opposed the project, arguing, as did two members of the Academy in the 11 June 1978 PRAVDA, that more environmental impact studies were needed, and pointing out that planned excavations would disturb the ecology of the affected areas.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 19-25 JANUARY 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,123 items)		
World Youth Peace Forum	6%	(--)
Brezhnev Greetings	3%	(--)
Gromyko KOMMUNIST Article on Leninist Foreign Policy	6%	(--)
Release of U.S. Hostages	4%	(--)
TASS Denial	1%	(--)
El Salvador Situation	3%	(6%)

Beijing (670 items)		
Dutch Sale of Submarines to Taiwan	11%	(3%)
Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	5%	(--)
Australian Foreign Minister Anthony Street in PRC	5%	(--)
Reagan Inauguration	4%	(--)
CCPCC Greeting to Italian CP on Founding Anniversary	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on terrorism, U.S. accusations
- USSR reply to U.S. protest on hostages
- Polish tension despite strike letup

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4 FEBRUARY 1981
FB TM 81-005

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW REJECTS U.S. CHARGES, URGES BILATERAL TALKS

Moscow has responded sharply to the Reagan Administration's attacks on Soviet policy but has made it clear that the U.S. approach to bilateral negotiations is still the Soviet Union's main concern. The Soviets have brusquely rejected charges of Soviet support for international terrorism by Secretary of State Haig and other U.S. officials and leveled predictable countercharges against the United States. But the only authoritative public reaction thus far, a 2 February TASS statement, reiterated the readiness of "Soviet leading circles" for negotiations and their continuing hope that Washington will show interest in pursuing U.S.-Soviet talks.

Moscow has not publicly acknowledged the stiff Soviet Foreign Ministry protest over recent Administration statements delivered to U.S. Charge d'Affaires Jack Matlock on 2 February. The widely publicized TASS statement focused specifically on State Department officials' recent charges of Soviet support for terrorism and did not mention President Reagan's initial public comments on the USSR. The statement, like supporting media commentary, flatly denied the U.S. charges. It restated Soviet opposition to "terrorism" but defended Soviet support for national liberation movements. Soviet commentaries predictably have sought to regain the propaganda initiative by turning the charges about terrorism back against the United States.

More cautious treatment of President Reagan personally was apparent in Soviet media coverage of his 29 January press conference. The account of the President's remarks published in the Moscow central newspapers rebuked him for uttering "premeditated distortions" of Soviet policy in response to reporters' questions, but it sidestepped his specific charges about Soviet duplicity. Further criticism of the President's press conference statements has appeared in subsequent Soviet commentaries, but the commentators cited Western sources instead of speaking on their own authority. Successive issues of PRAVDA, on 1 and 2 February, cited Washington POST articles as commenting that the President was resurrecting rhetoric from the days of the cold war and undermining U.S. domestic support for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

While Moscow continues to defer a public, official judgment on the outlook for U.S.-Soviet relations, Soviet commentators have professed to see inauspicious omens in the Administration's initial public statements. For example, the Moscow domestic radio's foremost foreign affairs commentary program concluded on 1 February that the tone of the new Administration "is clearly beginning to be set by those circles of extreme reaction" who seek U.S. military superiority over the USSR.

USSR-U.S.-IRAN

USSR DEFENDS STAND ON HOSTAGE ISSUE, QUESTIONS U.S. GULF AIMS

Formally rejecting U.S. criticism of Soviet media treatment of the hostage issue, a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement has insisted defensively that the USSR "repeatedly" and "publicly" stated its support for the principle of diplomatic immunity throughout the crisis. A sudden spate of publicity for this Soviet position in Persian-language broadcasts, which contrasts with Moscow's previous reticence in comment beamed to Iranian audiences, suggests continued concern over potential threats to its own embassy in Tehran.

A 29 January Soviet demarche to the U.S. charge d'affaires ad interim in Moscow, reported by TASS under the rubric "At the USSR Foreign Ministry," rejected "slanderous" U.S. "allegations" that the Soviet Union, through its media, had tried to complicate the release of the hostages. The Foreign Ministry statement charged that a recent U.S. demarche to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and the publicity allegedly accorded it in the United States, had the "obvious purpose" of inciting U.S. public opinion against the Soviet Union. Again raising the question of American intentions in the Persian Gulf, the statement alleged that the U.S. protest aimed at covering up plans for consolidation of the American military presence in the region.

Moscow offered thin evidence of its "consistent and unambiguous" position on the detention of the embassy staff:

+ The Foreign Ministry statement asserted that the USSR's "principled approach" had been "repeatedly expounded in public" and was known to both the U.S. and Iranian Governments. This was clearly a reference to the sole Soviet elite statement directly addressing the hostage issue, made by Foreign Minister Gromyko at a Bonn press conference in November 1979. In response to a question, Gromyko had stated that the USSR's position in support of the convention on respecting diplomatic immunity was known to both the U.S. and Iranian Governments. Just a day before the Foreign Ministry statement, IZVESTIYA's Vitaliy Kobysh had indicated that such acknowledgments of the illegitimate nature of the embassy seizure had been made by Gromyko and other Soviet officials "in their numerous"--but private--"contacts with American officials."

+ As further proof of the Soviet stand, the statement recalled the Soviet Union's affirmative vote on the December 1979 UN Security Council resolution calling on Iran to release the hostages. The statement made no mention of the USSR's subsequent veto of the January 1980 Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions against Iran--a veto occasionally cited by Soviet media during the crisis to illustrate Moscow's support for the Iranian revolution.

+ To substantiate the assertion that Moscow had made its position on the hostage question known to the Iranian Government, Kobysh, in his 28 January article, even went so far as to assert erroneously that IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin had caused "thunder and lightning" in "certain Iranian circles" by criticizing the Iranian revolution's excesses, "including the holding of U.S. employees and the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran." The Bovin article in question--published in the magazine supplement to the 9 September 1979 IZVESTIYA--in fact preceded the embassy seizure by almost two months.

+ Moscow itself indirectly pointed up the selective manner in which it had treated the hostage question for Iranian audiences. The passage in the Foreign Ministry statement claiming Soviet "public" opposition to the hostage seizure was known to the Iranian Government was not included in the version of the statement carried on Moscow radio's Persian service.

During the hostage crisis, references to the USSR's support for international legal principles as they pertained to the situation in Iran appeared occasionally in commentary in Russian and English, but the few allusions to the principle of the territorial inviolability of foreign embassies broadcast in Persian appeared to reflect Soviet concern over the security of its own diplomatic personnel and premises in Iran. One commentary in late June 1980, ostensibly pegged to the American hostage issue, in fact suggested Soviet displeasure over the detention of a Soviet diplomat in Tehran. As recently as mid-January Moscow publicized in Persian a Soviet Foreign Ministry protest to the Iranian ambassador in Moscow over the Iranian Government's inadequate response to the attack on the Soviet Embassy in Tehran on 27 December.

Current Persian-language broadcasts have dwelled on standard themes--such as praise for Soviet-Iranian cooperation in trade and sports--and have continued to harp on the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf as a threat to Iran and to portray the United States as hostile to the Iranian regime. A commentary by veteran Persian-service staffer Vera Lebedeva on 3 February, for example, cited recent statements by President Reagan and Secretary Haig to support her assertion that by showing disrespect for the Iranian right to sovereignty, "Washington has also shown disrespect for international conventions."

USSR-POLAND

The Kania regime appears to have emerged from the 31 January settlement with its authority tarnished by its inability to translate its recent hardline posturing into real influence over Solidarity or the workers. Statements by government spokesmen since the settlement have been notably free of the self-assuring rhetoric that has accompanied earlier milestones in the Polish crisis, and they have been punctuated by bitter condemnations of Solidarity, a bitterness highly uncharacteristic of the largely even-tempered Kania regime. Moscow's portrayal of the Polish scene has become increasingly negative, with direct attacks on Solidarity as a subversive "political" force and, in contrast to earlier periods, few indications of confidence in the ability of the government to handle the situation.

WARSAW ATTACKS SOLIDARITY, AMBIGUOUS ON FUTURE POLICY

The Polish authorities approached the latest showdown with Solidarity apparently confident that the union's call for a strike on 24 January could be vitiated by a show of toughness on the part of the government. Any such hopes were dashed, however, by Solidarity chief Walesa's strong endorsement of the strike. That ensured its widespread observance by the workers and forced the regime into the latest negotiations with the union. Warsaw again tried to take a tough stance on the eve of the 30-31 January talks. A Government statement was issued on the 29th warning that the regime had an obligation to preserve order and would take action to keep plants and enterprises open if the strikes continued. The next day, the chief prosecutor's office issued a further statement serving notice on the Solidarity strikers that their "criminal" acts, such as occupying public buildings, could result in their arrest. The failure of these warnings to take effect has highlighted the weakness of the regime and evidently increased its susceptibility to Soviet criticism.

The Kania regime is confronting the situation by putting on a continuing show of toughness, apparently intended, in part at least, to convince Moscow that it is still capable of dealing with the crisis. First Secretary Kania, in a 2 February speech to a commission preparing the next party congress, did not even mention the agreement but repeated and intensified his past criticism of Solidarity. Echoing a hardline 29 January TASS report on Poland, Kania charged that the union was being steered in the direction of an "opposition political party" by individuals who are not workers but instigators and "advisers"--an apparent reference to the dissident KOR organization. He added that such opponents, who are "active in workplaces," must be dealt with firmly. Kania also declared, in sweeping terms, that Solidarity, which had proclaimed itself to be a trade union, had been transformed into "an organization far removed" from the provisions of its statutes.

In a similar vein, PZPR Politburo member and Secretary Olszowski, in a speech at the 2 February meeting, charged that Solidarity had departed from its statutes in carrying out "political and prestige strikes," which, he said, "must profoundly perturb every Pole who wishes his homeland well." Regime alarm over continued strikes in the southern cities of Jelenia Gora, Rzeszow, and Bielsko Biala was reflected in charges by the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on the 2d and 3d that "some" regional Solidarity leaders were bent on stepping up tensions and were thus having a "dangerous" effect on the public climate.

PARTY FACTIONALISM

The regime's continuing inability to impose its authority over Solidarity seems sure to stimulate sharpening differences of opinion between reform and orthodox factions in the PZPR over basic ideological issues. These differences were publicly aired by Olszowski in his 2 February speech. On the issue of watering down the party's Marxist-Leninist ideological basis, Olszowski asserted that "the party must be itself" by taking an "unequivocal" stand and that to be itself the party must "overcome the tendency toward making changes" in fundamental ideology and must "clearly define its pedigree and character." He also reminded the reformers that the current campaign to end the party's duplication of the work of state and economic bodies must not result in the party's renunciation of its "direct interest" in production and economic management. Such a renunciation, he declared, would amount to the party's withdrawing from its responsibility for the country's affairs as a whole and from dealing with the present crisis. Finally, on the issue of party democracy, Olszowski contended that the party cannot function without unity and denounced "some comrades who have forgotten that without centralism democracy is not worth any more than centralism without democracy." On the overall situation, he pointed out that the party is faced with the task of both dealing with the current anarchy in the country and combating the "disorder and disorientation" in its own ranks.

MOSCOW PLAYS DOWN AGREEMENT, URGES TOUGHER MEASURES

The Soviet Union is increasingly indicating its dissatisfaction with the Polish situation, including the performance of the Kania regime. Moscow virtually ignored the 31 January agreement between Solidarity and the Polish Government, reporting it tersely in PRAVDA the next day but failing to praise it in subsequent comment. Moreover, the Soviets have selectively edited some Polish regime statements to imply reservations over conciliatory aspects. For instance, a 31 January PRAVDA account of the tough Polish Government statement two days earlier conspicuously omitted the few concluding passages expressing the authorities' readiness for continued talks and cooperation with Solidarity. Similarly, a 28 January TASS account of an article in the Soviet army paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) by Polish journalist Ignacy Krasicki carried only its more critical remarks about the domestic situation and none of the lengthy comments about the party's growing strength and its "victorious struggle" against antisocialist forces. An almost open demand for tougher policies by the Kania regime was contained in a 3 February PRAVDA report which said that the Polish workforce "expects that measures will be adopted to step up the repulse of the counterrevolution."

Moscow has also become increasingly outspoken in attacking Solidarity as a "political" force and a threat to Poland's stability, at the same time challenging its legitimacy by portraying massive public disaffection with its leadership and actions. These themes were made clear in a 29 January TASS correspondent's report, appearing in PRAVDA the following day, which accused Solidarity of "veering to the right" and becoming a "political organization" and repeatedly cited public doubts over its actions. Similarly, a 1 February IZVESTIYA commentary attacked Solidarity "leaders" for their confrontational course and depicted the union as encountering growing disillusionment and divisions within its ranks. A TASS report in PRAVDA on the 2d questioned the union's good faith when it charged "some Solidarity members" with continuing disruptions "despite the statements made after the talks" with the government.

In the meantime, Moscow has continued its favorable publicity for two hardline Polish groups--the old-style trade unions and a veterans group headed by Politburo member Mieczyslaw Moczar--in effect seeming to suggest that there may be viable alternatives to the political forces and figures currently operating in Poland. A striking new sign of favor for the old-line unionists appeared in the Soviet trade union daily TRUD on 31 January. The paper reported a previously unmentioned visit to Poland, at the invitation of the old-style Polish metalworkers union, by a delegation of an international metalworkers union. The report said the delegation had "observed with satisfaction the stepped-up activity of Poland's branch (old-style) trade unions," and it criticized forces that "use Solidarity as a cover" to harm the economy. Moscow also gave a ringing endorsement, at the conclusion of its sharply worded 29 January TASS report, to the views of Moczar's veterans group on the need to end anarchy and restore order. The report included the group's assertion that these views are shared by millions of Poles.

CZECH, GDR COMMENT Poland's neighbors Czechoslovakia and East Germany, for months in the van of criticism of the Polish labor situation, have been even less reserved than Moscow in voicing skepticism over the labor agreement and warning about the dangers inherent in the workers' unrest. Thus Prague radio on the 31st described the agreement as a virtual defeat for the government, saying that Solidarity had succeeded in "pushing through" its demands, including those of a "political character." An East German commentary carried by ADN on the 2d accused the Solidarity leadership of "flying the color of counterrevolution," said that the Polish economy is "threatening to collapse," and complained that the unrest was disrupting Polish exports to the GDR as well as the process of socialist economic integration.

INDOCHINA

FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE UNVEILS REGIONAL PEACE PLAN

The recent biannual meeting of the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea advanced initiatives aimed at checking Chinese influence in the region and at gaining greater legitimacy for the Hanoi-backed Phnom Penh regime. The statement marking the end of the 27-28 January conference in Ho Chi Minh City, the third meeting of the Indochinese foreign ministers, contained unprecedented proposals for a regional conference of Indochinese and ASEAN states and for bilateral treaties of peaceful coexistence between China and the Indochinese countries. The proposals failed, however, to register any shift on the key issue of Vietnamese troop presence in Kampuchea, the main stumbling block to the relaxation of regional tensions. The announcement at the conference that an Indochinese summit meeting will be held sometime this year was a measure of the continuing trend toward greater cooperation among the three Indochinese states.

At the two earlier meetings, the Indochinese foreign ministers had called for regional discussions on establishing a Southeast Asian zone of "peace and stability," but the 28 January conference broke new ground in proposing a regional conference of the five ASEAN states--Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia--and the Indochinese countries. According to the statement, the conference would discuss problems of "mutual concern" in the interest of restoring peace and stability in the region. It would conclude a treaty on regional peace that would then be internationally guaranteed. Reflecting the standard Indochinese line on the cause of regional tension, the statement suggested that the conference should focus on eliminating Chinese interference in the region. A 29 January editorial in the Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN was even more explicit in linking the relaxation of regional tension to ASEAN acceptance of Hanoi's line on China, noting that an "appropriate solution" could be found if the ASEAN states were to "clearly recognize" China's expansionist policies as the main cause of regional tension.

On the key issue of Vietnam's military presence in Kampuchea, the statement reiterated the Indochinese countries' "categorical rejection" of ASEAN's view that the Vietnamese invasion and continued military occupation of Kampuchea is the root cause of regional tension and should be the topic of an international conference. The statement repeated Hanoi's standard line on conditions for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, promising a total withdrawal when the threat from China is eliminated and a partial withdrawal when Thailand ends its support for the ousted Pol Pot regime and other "reactionary" Khmer elements.

The statement also rejected the ASEAN view that China must participate in any regional discussions and specifically barred Beijing from taking part in the proposed regional conference. But the foreign ministers did seek to curb what they perceive as China's expansionist and anti-Indochinese policies by proposing for the first time that bilateral treaties of peaceful coexistence be signed between China and the Indochinese states. Previously Hanoi had proposed an array of plans for solving Sino-Vietnamese border problems, but it had always stopped short of proposing a comprehensive bilateral treaty.

Along with the official statement marking the conference, a joint communique was issued on the 28th that served to underscore the recent trend toward development of a special relationship between the three Indochinese countries. According to the communique, the foreign ministers exchanged views on holding a summit conference in order to "unceasingly consolidate and broaden" cooperation between the three countries. Although the communique failed to set an exact date for the summit, a 29 January editorial in the party paper NHAN DAN indicated that it would be held this year. The three Indochinese countries have been holding biannual foreign ministers meetings since January 1980, a practice the communique indicated would continue.

USSR

CHERNENKO HOLDS PUBLICITY EDGE IN PRECONGRESS MANEUVERING

With the 26th CPSU Congress less than a month away, there has been little indication of manipulation of party elections to favor any central leader or faction. The only political maneuvering clearly evident in the press has been a certain competition for publicity, especially between senior Central Committee Secretaries Chernenko and Kirilenko. While the government has been undergoing extensive shakeups since Premier Kosygin's departure, local party leaders are being routinely reelected around the country and no shifts of power are apparent. In the apparent rivalry between Kirilenko and Chernenko, Chernenko has been winning the greater publicity, particularly in the provincial press, where some republic leaders have seemed eager to signal support for Brezhnev's confidant.

With most of the December-January oblast party conferences concluded, virtually all oblast first secretaries have been reelected. Two regional first secretaries, Moldavian leader Bodyul and Orenburg leader Kovalenko, were promoted to central government posts in December, and Brezhnev has promoted his proteges to leading posts in the Council of Ministers since Kosygin's retirement in October. But no regional party leaders have been purged, and there have been no signs of anyone manipulating cadre decisions to build support in the party apparat.

While there are as yet no indications that factions are being built up via traditional patronage appointments, some republics are exhibiting favoritism toward Central Committee Secretary Chernenko, suggesting the beginnings of a minibandwagon. Kirgiz leaders for the past couple of years, and more recently Georgian leaders, have devoted special attention to Chernenko. Azerbaijanis hinted at favoritism by ranking Chernenko's portrait in fourth place during the 7 November Baku parade and publicizing this ranking in a photograph in their republic press. Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul also recently displayed special favor for Chernenko, even though he had not notably boosted Moldavia's favorite son in the past. In the November issue of Moscow's POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE (POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION), Bodyul noted that Chernenko had spent "many years" as head of the Agitprop in Moldavia and had "armed us with instructive experience" in conducting ideological work.

Recalling Brezhnev's tenure as Moldavia's first secretary, Bodyul mentioned that Brezhnev and Chernenko had jointly addressed a propaganda conference in 1951. Previously, such personal reminiscences about Brezhnev had usually focused on Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe and on the shared past of Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, and Tikhonov.

Most of the current publicity for Chernenko has centered on his recent book, "Questions of Work of the Party and State Apparatus," which defines the work methods to be used by party and state officials. Published in July 1980 in 120,000 copies, the book contains little that is new or extraordinary but stresses familiar themes associated with Chernenko, pressing officials to heed public opinion--via sociological studies and examination of letters--and to seek ways of drawing party members and citizens into broader participation in the political process. The book has been reviewed widely in the local press: in Kirgizia on 9 October and 30 November, in Turkmenistan and Lithuania on 9 October, in Georgia on 28 October and 2 November, and in Kazakhstan on 29 November. Georgia--singled out in Chernenko's book for more attention and praise than any other area--has devoted exceptional publicity to the book, with the republic press running highly laudatory reviews and even announcing on 20 November that the book was being translated into Georgian. A 2 November article in the Georgian-language paper KOMUNISTI by a Tbilisi rayon party leader stated that everyone in his rayon was studying it. The works of Politburo members other than Brezhnev are seldom reviewed in republic papers; it is even more unusual for them to be translated into local languages or to become subjects of party studies.

The republic publicity for Chernenko's book puts him measurably ahead of his fellow Central Committee Secretary and probable rival Kirilenko, whose recently issued collection of speeches has been ignored in local press organs. Moscow publications have been more balanced, with reviews of the books by both Chernenko and Kirilenko appearing in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, KOMMUNIST, VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, and POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE. Kirilenko's book has also been reviewed in the December PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN, and an unusual personal boost for Kirilenko from local leaders reflected his leadership of the auto industry: local leaders from Tataria, writing in the November VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS (QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY), mentioned that Kirilenko had visited their Kama truck plant six times and praised his personal contribution to the construction of that project.

BRIEFS

USSR ECONOMY: Downturn Mars Completion of Five-Year Plan

Despite autumn predictions by state planning officials and local party leaders that the Soviet economy would finish strongly in 1980, the final year of the 10th Five-Year Plan, newly released data indicate that the rate of industrial growth in the USSR has declined for the fourth consecutive quarter. According to figures published in the 24 January PRAVDA, the Soviet economy grew by only 3.6 percent during 1980, well short of the 4-percent growth predicted by Gosplan chief Baybakov at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 22 October. Forecasts by local leaders at November republic party plenums and supreme soviet sessions were also overly optimistic. Although most republics shared in the yearend decline, certain areas of the country were affected more than others--a circumstance that has further accentuated previously evident regional variations in economic performance. Thus most of the European and Central Asian republics fell further behind their plan targets, whereas the Caucasian republics bucked the negative trend and continued to outperform other regions by a wide margin.

USSR AGRICULTURE: Local Responsibility Urged To Cut Shortages

Shifting responsibility to local governments is the latest panacea being promoted by Soviet authorities as a means of dealing with current food shortages, providing further evidence both of the severity of current agricultural problems and of Moscow's willingness to resort to unusual methods in dealing with them. There were signs of such a shift in yearend party and government meetings on economic problems and in the new draft five-year plan's call for strengthening the "role and responsibility of republics, krays, oblasts, and rayons . . . in satisfying the population's demand for food products." Now, an article by a prominent economic spokesman in the party's foremost ideological organ has asserted that this increased responsibility is a long-established "Leninist principle" and an important form of incentive. P.A. Ignatovskiy, a frequent writer on agricultural topics and editor of Gosplan's official journal, wrote in the party theoretical journal KOMMUNIST (No. 18) in December that Lenin had formulated the principle of placing more responsibility for food supply on local authorities as a way of stimulating increased food production in the 1920's. Ignatovskiy urged a return to this principle until the current shortages are over. Calling this a "territorial" form of incentive, he complained that it had been neglected until recently and that this had allowed local governments to shirk their responsibility for supplying the populace with meat, milk, and vegetables.

PRC-SOUTHEAST ASIA: Beijing's Dual-Track Policy

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang in a press conference in Bangkok during his visit to Burma and Thailand made it clear that China intends to maintain its low-level relations with communist-led insurgencies in Southeast Asia while cultivating closer ties with governments in the area. At the same time, Zhao's remarks suggested that Beijing may continue to downgrade its ties with communist parties as part of its efforts to woo the ASEAN nations and focus attention on Moscow and Hanoi as the sources of tension and instability in the region. On 1 February XINHUA reported that Zhao, in response to a question about Chinese support for communist parties in ASEAN countries, said that these relationships "are mainly political and moral" and that China would endeavor to ensure that the relations "will not affect our friendship and cooperation with these countries." He reiterated Beijing's position that it disapproves of the exportation of revolution and interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Zhao's statement reaffirms the policy articulated by Deng Xiaoping during a visit to Thailand in November 1978, which was followed by a reduction of Chinese media attention to the Southeast Asian communist parties. In recent months, several Southeast Asian countries have been pressing Beijing to renounce its ties with insurgencies as evidence of its sincere desire for long-term friendly state-to-state relations, peace and stability.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 26 JANUARY - 1 FEBRUARY 1981

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Moscow (2,993 items)		
GDR Foreign Minister Fischer in USSR	5%	(--)
Indian National Day	5%	(1%)
USSR Foreign Ministry Statement on Media Treatment of Hostage Issue	4%	(--)
Polish Situation	3%	(2%)
CSCE Conference	3%	(--)

Beijing (841 items)		
Zhao Ziyang in Burma and Thailand	33%	(--)
Australian Foreign Minister Anthony Street in PRC	4%	(5%)
Islamic Conference, Mecca	3%	(2%)
Gang of Four Sentencing	3%	(1%)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- New Polish resolve to dampen disorder
- Soviet views on terrorism

Confidential
Declassified

11 FEBRUARY 1981
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

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TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

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+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
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  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

POLAND-USSR

A determination to reaffirm party authority while persisting in the policy of renewal appears to be the message the Kania regime has signaled by the appointment of Defense Minister Jaruzelski as premier. The Soviet Union promptly reported the event, along with other news from the Polish plenum, but has not otherwise expressed any public reaction--a reserve which it consistently observed with earlier Polish plenums.

WARSAW NAMES JARUZELSKI PREMIER, STRESSES SELF-RELIANCE

The Kania regime's appointment of Defense Minister, Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski as premier--the fourth to occupy that post in 12 months--brings to the position a widely respected symbol of national unity who may be thought capable of lending credibility to the regime. The replacement of Pinkowski by Jaruzelski, at the 9 February PZPR Central Committee plenum, came in the wake of public, official warnings at the end of January that the Solidarity union had overstepped legal bounds and might be subject to prosecution.

Kania underscored the symbolism of Jaruzelski's appointment in his concluding speech at the 9 February plenum, a speech which carried the message that a tougher policy toward Solidarity is indispensable if the country is to survive as an independent state. Stepping up his attacks on the union, the PZPR first secretary charged that contrary to its disavowal of political aims, Solidarity had tried to interfere with the prosecution of antisocialist leaders, attempted to prevent publication of the official press, coerced its members, and made public statements attacking socialism, the communist party, and "our alliances." Such activities, he declared, have made Poland "a weaker link in the socialist community" and have aroused "justified concern" on the part of its allies. Kania asserted that "we must take matters into our hands" to restore order, discipline, and normal work--an injunction which he underscored by a direct appeal to the country's armed forces and organs of public order to defend Poland's independence and revolutionary gains. He warned that Poland's socialist system and the country's independence would be defended with equal determination.

There were indications in Kania's speech and in the plenum resolution that the regime hopes to dilute Solidarity's power by blurring its image as the unique instrument of the renewal movement. Thus Kania paid special respects to the old-style industrial branch trade unions, noting with gratification their recovery and growing influence. He promised to give greater attention to the branch unions' efforts on behalf of the workers' social welfare, health, and safety. All instances of "discrimination against and lack of appreciation for" the role of the branch unions, he asserted, should be dealt with "sternly." The final plenum resolution, carried by Warsaw radio on the 10th, similarly downgraded Solidarity, mentioning it in only two of its 23 points. The 14th point listed Solidarity second in its enumeration of the three main trade union groups in the country--the old-style branch unions, Solidarity, and the "autonomous" unions (independent but not affiliated with Solidarity). The 16th point briefly condemned Solidarity as the object of penetration by "enemies of socialism" and as a disrupter of public calm and order.

MOSCOW REPORTS PLENUM PROCEEDINGS, MAINTAINS PRESSURE

Moscow has limited its coverage of the Polish plenum to factual reports on the proceedings and major speeches, a practice it observed with earlier plenums. Despite the absence of editorial comment, Moscow has made it clear that it remains highly critical of the course of events in Poland. Moscow radio and TASS reports on plenum speeches by Kania and Grabski were selective, apparently calculated to signal approval of their harsher remarks about Solidarity. A similar message was conveyed by a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (LITERARY GAZETTE) article, reported by TASS on the 11th, which challenged the legitimacy of Solidarity's claim to be a trade union and accused its "backstage bosses" of seeking political power.

These continuing signs of pressure follow a steady buildup of attacks on Solidarity in the days leading up to the plenum. A series of TASS reports--carried in PRAVDA on 6, 7, and 10 February--alleged that anti-socialist forces in the union's leadership were pressing efforts to destabilize the country. The report on the 7th was particularly sharp in accusing counterrevolutionary forces of launching a "frontal attack on the party" and in listing various actions by Solidarity that abused the union's authority. The report on the 10th went beyond Moscow's usual general attacks on "some leaders" in Solidarity by singling out union official Gwiazda by name for criticism. Moscow reports thus far have remained unauthoritative and have not directly accused the Polish leadership of showing insufficient resolve. One Czechoslovak foreign radio broadcast on the 10th, however, took a step in this direction when it said that the "Polish Government headed by Josef Pinkowski had failed to take consistent measures against the increasing expressions of antisocialism in Poland."

USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW REJECTS TERRORISM BUT BACKS NATIONAL LIBERATION

> The current Soviet-U.S. exchanges over international terrorism have brought to the fore basic differences over the definition and causes of terrorism that have long characterized the East-West dialogue. Soviet spokesmen regularly voice disapproval of individual terrorist acts like those that have plagued the West in recent years, but they defend the use of violence by what they view as genuine revolutionary movements and make no apologies for Moscow's support for such movements.

Moscow's reaction to the Reagan Administration's recent accusations about Soviet support for terrorism has been long on rhetorical countercharge and short on substantive discussion, but Soviet official spokesmen and scholars have occasionally addressed the problem at greater length in recent years. Zinoviy Mirskiy, a scholar associated with the Institute of General History, set forth the standard Soviet position on terrorism twice in the past two years in articles in the foreign affairs weekly NEW TIMES.

TERRORISM IN THE WEST Mirskiy rejects individual terrorist acts as a form of "adventurism" counterproductive to progressive social change even as he finds cause for them in the inadequacies of the capitalist system. In a January 1979 NEW TIMES article, Mirskiy argued that economic and social despair leads some young people in the West--like those who join Italy's Red Brigades--"to take revenge on the bourgeois state and society." The "adventurers" among them, he said, wrongly advocate terrorism as a "shortcut" to social change. It makes no difference, he wrote in a second article in August 1980, that organizations like the Red Brigades call themselves antibourgeois revolutionaries; their actions only "play into the hands" of the bourgeoisie. Mirskiy and other Soviet commentators emphasize that such organizations have no place in a genuine revolutionary movement and cite Lenin's opposition to political assassinations in the context of tsarist Russia as support for their position.

NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE Mirskiy and other Soviet spokesmen distinguish between terrorist organizations and national liberation movements such as Nicaragua's Sandinistas, Namibia's SWAPO, and the PLO. They firmly defend the option of armed struggle for the latter. While the Red Brigades and other extremist groups are "conspiracies of individuals," Mirskiy argued in his

January 1979 article, national liberation organizations are popular-based movements engaged in "mass struggle" against oppression. While Lenin repudiated wanton violence, Mirskiy maintained, he also repudiated pacifism in the face of oppression. Mirskiy concluded that "the use of force against the class enemy is justified when it is an integral part of the revolutionary mass movement against social or national oppression."

KOREA-U.S.

PYONGYANG SCORES PRESIDENT REAGAN ON CHON TU-HWAN VISIT

South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan's U.S. visit drew an outburst of criticism from North Korean media, ending Pyongyang's three-month period of restraint in public comment on the Reagan Administration. But Pyongyang's reaction contained evidence of deliberate moderation suggesting that the North continues to hope for talks with the United States in spite of the current level of rhetoric. While criticism of President Reagan was sharp, it remained at a lower level of authority than that aired during the visits to Seoul by Presidents Carter and Ford, in 1979 and 1974. Pyongyang also failed to comment on the U.S.-ROK position on tripartite talks with the North, as set forth in the joint communique marking Chon's 1-3 February visit to Washington. Beijing virtually ignored the Chon visit, but Moscow maintained a low-level assault on U.S. Korea policy and attempted to portray the visit as evidence that the United States, not the Soviet Union, supports and condones international terrorism.

The derogatory DPRK central media references to President Reagan raised to a new high the level of personal invective against him. Characterizations of the President as a "war maniac," "clown," and "gangster fit for the theatrical stage"--images drawn most sharply in a 5 February Commentator's article and a 10 February commentary in the party daily NODONG SINMUN--signaled Pyongyang's displeasure with the Administration's new Korea policy. The stinging criticism of President Reagan contrasts with the earlier failure of North Korean media to respond to remarks by him and his advisers on Korea. From November through late January, the only items critical of the President-elect had been carried by the clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (VRPR), which Pyongyang often uses to air criticism while withholding comment in central media so as to maintain flexibility in dealing with sensitive topics or emerging situations. This restraint continued through the inauguration as both central media and VRPR ignored the event.

Pyongyang has granted most recent U.S. presidents a postelection grace period, a restraint that seemed to reflect the North's interest in opening a dialogue with Washington on the Korea question. The initial restrained treatment of President-elect

Reagan seemed particularly deliberate given his campaign promise to cancel the Carter Administration's plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. For the past several years, personal attacks on U.S. presidents have tended to be cyclical in nature, increasing during such occasions as the annual U.S.-ROK military exercises and presidential visits to South Korea. Although the criticism of President Reagan as Chon's host was biting, it was issued at a lower level of authority than North Korean comment on the visits to Seoul by Presidents Ford and Carter. Both of those events triggered DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman statements, but the Chon visit drew no higher level criticism than the NODONG SINMUN Commentator's article.

Predictably, the Commentator's article on Chon's visit focused its attack on the section of the U.S.-ROK joint communique announcing the nullification of former President Carter's troop withdrawal plan. It also criticized the communique's expression of U.S. security obligations to the ROK, the provision for additional military aid and defense technology to the South, and President Reagan's support for Chon's 12 January call for Kim Il-song to visit Seoul. Noticeably missing from all North Korean comment on the joint communique, however, was any reference to President Reagan's reaffirmation that the ROK must be a full participant in any future negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. The North maintains that Seoul should attend the U.S.-ROK talks only as an observer and participate when questions arise relating to the South.

BEIJING, MOSCOW

Beijing's treatment of Chon's visit was low keyed, limited to a single XINHUA report on the Reagan-Chon 2 February talks which failed to criticize either President Reagan or the joint communique and only mildly criticized Chon as "desperately dependent" on the support of U.S. troops. By contrast, Beijing replayed North Korean reportage and comment during the Ford and Carter visits. The cautious approach Beijing took toward Chon's U.S. visit may reflect both Beijing's desire to establish good relations with the Reagan Administration, and tensions in relations between China and Korea over the past few years. Such silence is also in line with now standard Chinese reticence to endorse Pyongyang's position on issues such as U.S. troops and Korean reunification.

Unlike Beijing, Moscow used the Chon visit to attack Washington. TASS and the central press replayed North Korean comment and criticism and originated criticism of their own. Moscow used the occasion to press its recent campaign to refute the Administration's charges that the Soviet Union supports and condones international terrorism. According to a TASS commentator on 4 February, the hospitable reception shown Chon, "the leader of the terroristic dictatorship, shows all the falsity and hypocrisy of the current campaign in the United States over the alleged 'involvement' of the Soviet Union in 'international terrorism.'" Chon's visit illustrated, according to the commentator, that Washington is encouraging terror "for suppressing the struggle of the peoples for freedom and progress."

USSR-AFGHANISTAN

"LITERARY GAZETTE" URGES CAUTION IN HANDLING SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The Kabul government--and by implication its Soviet supporters--may face a "catastrophe" unless a more cautious and pragmatic approach to the social transformation of Afghanistan is adopted, according to a Soviet journalist who has written frequently on Afghanistan. This sober judgment and the analysis of Afghan social conditions underlying it are in marked contrast to the largely upbeat Soviet commentary on Afghanistan since the December 1979 invasion, most of which has explained current problems as survivals of the past or as the result of imperialist machinations.

In an unusually frank article in the 28 January issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (LITERARY GAZETTE), Aleksander Prokhanov discussed the current Afghan situation in terms reminiscent of earlier Soviet criticism of the policies of deposed Afghan leader Hafizollah Amin. Prokhanov argued that the Afghan authorities must proceed slowly lest they cut certain "knots" in the country's social fabric that appear to be obstructions but that in fact are the social, economic, and political foundation of Afghanistan. Prokhanov--one of several recipients of Soviet awards last year for Afghan reportage--said regionalism, tribalism, nomadism, and religious sectarianism were among the most intricate of these "knots." Prokhanov acknowledged Kabul's successes in some areas but implied that more sophisticated efforts were needed.

SOCIAL BALANCE Prokhanov warned that Afghan society exists in a delicate and precarious balance and that any incautious intervention might lead to disaster. He found this danger to be particularly great in work among the nomads and with the various religious groups in the population.

Prokhanov indicated that the nomads, who make up a large part of the population, are an inviting but dangerous target: on the one hand, they frequently provide a "cover" for rebel activities and as such are appropriate military targets; on the other hand, they "represent a delicate, mobile, capillary structure penetrating all parts of the country," tying it together. According to Prokhanov, any attempt to restrict nomadic activities, such as closing the borders with Pakistan, would cause the "collapse" of all small-scale retail trade and adversely affect the economic and social fabric of the country. In Prokhanov's view, Kabul must come to terms with the nomadic population, not simply suppress it. Kabul must also attempt to overcome religious sectarian conflicts among its Muslims, he said. On this score, Prokhanov saw a great number of successes and happily contrasted them with the problems now found in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

REGIONAL DISINTEGRATION The article suggested that another critical problem confronting the Kabul government is the intense regional patriotism of many Afghans. According to Prokhanov, these loyalties are being exploited by imperialist forces and internal reaction with the aim of creating a number of Afghan ministates. There have been calls, he said, to create such new states around Qandahar and in Badakhshan, and the Kabul authorities must act to prevent such movements from getting out of hand. Prokhanov suggested that local patriotism could be countered effectively by drawing on the broader Afghan patriotism of the various tribal groups and by pointing out to them that such ministates would "instantly" be swallowed up by Pakistan and China. While he indicated that more should be done, Prokhanov noted with approval Kabul's efforts in this direction.

NEW ROLE FOR AFGHAN ARMY Prokhanov portrayed the army as the institution in Afghan society in which all these pressures are most evident. Imperialist propagandists, he said, have tried to exploit all the various differences in Afghanistan in order to destroy the effectiveness of the army. Reflecting obvious sensitivity on this score, he said that these efforts had failed and that the army had become a school "in the new relations between nations." Interestingly, Prokhanov did not suggest that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan or the National Fatherland Front was playing a similar unifying role.

BRIEF

PRC-U.S.: Beijing Notes Support for Normalization Communique

PRC concern over the Administration's China policy appears to have been partially allayed by the State Department spokesman's statement on Sino-U.S. relations last week. A 6 February XINHUA dispatch reported with tacit satisfaction spokesman Dyess' statement during a press briefing on the same day that the United States will "abide by" and "honor" the "solemn undertakings" of the January 1979 normalization communique and that the Administration regards the communique as an international obligation that constitutes "the basis of our relations with China." However, XINHUA suggested China remains concerned over Washington's position on Taiwan. The news agency noted the spokesman's comment that a comprehensive China policy review has not been completed, and XINHUA's English-language report on the press briefing indicated that he was uncertain regarding the status of candidate Reagan's campaign promise to alter the treatment of Taiwan officials in the United States.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 2-8 FEBRUARY 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (2,946 items)		
U.S. Charges of USSR Involvement in International Terrorism	11%	(--)
TASS Rebuttal	6%	(--)
Nonaligned Conference, New Delhi	8%	(--)
Polish Situation	5%	(3%)
U.S. Revival of Neutron Bomb Issue	4%	(--)
Forthcoming 26th CPSU Congress	4%	(--)

Beijing (640 items)		
Zhao Ziyang in Burma and Thailand	18%	(33%)
PRC Spring Festival	14%	(1%)
Nonaligned Conference, New Delhi	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Nonaligned Ministerial Conference
- Impact of Polish events in USSR republics

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19 FEBRUARY 1981
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

The communist world divided along traditional lines in assessing the results of the nonaligned foreign ministers meeting in New Delhi on 9-13 February. China and nonaligned moderate Yugoslavia expressed satisfaction with the conference declaration's call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. While the meeting appeared to set back Soviet and Cuban efforts to give the movement a strictly "anti-imperialist" cast, Moscow and its allies predictably put the best face on the results--minimizing the positions taken on Afghanistan and Kampuchea and playing up other conference decisions.

BEIJING PLAYS UP, MOSCOW IGNORES, KEY CONFERENCE POSITIONS

Beijing and Moscow have waged a minor propaganda skirmish in their postconference commentary. Beijing has shown elation at what it has characterized as a defeat for Moscow, in sharp contrast to its public dissatisfaction with the results of the September 1979 Havana nonaligned summit. A 15 February RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article called the conference declaration's demands that foreign forces be withdrawn from Afghanistan and Kampuchea a "significant victory in safeguarding the principles of the nonaligned movement." The USSR and "its agents," the article concluded, failed in their efforts to change the orientation of the movement.

Moscow has virtually ignored the paragraphs on Afghanistan and Kampuchea in the conference's political declaration. Focusing its postconference commentary on other issues, Moscow has maintained that the meeting successfully resisted efforts by Beijing and the West to divert the nonaligned movement from its "anti-imperialist" course. The only Soviet reference thus far to the consensus on Afghanistan came indirectly in a 13 February TASS dispatch reporting an official protest by the Afghan foreign minister. A 16 February TASS commentary simply finessed the decision on Kampuchea by characterizing its call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country as a slap at China and Thailand.

BELGRADE, HAVANA FIND DIFFERENT REASONS TO CLAIM SUCCESS

Belgrade, a leader of nonaligned moderates, has expressed strong satisfaction with the results of the conference. Yugoslav spokesmen have long pushed for a firm nonaligned position on both Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Vrhovec, in an interview with Belgrade radio on the 13th, said that Belgrade is "very satisfied" with the conference outcome, which he said showed that the "use of force in all its forms, hegemony, and interference are impermissible." TANJUG on the 13th hailed the meeting as a "total success," saying that the movement has "forcefully returned to itself" in rejecting a "probloc approach." It cited the positions on Afghanistan and Kampuchea as vindicating the "authentic principles" of nonalignment. Zagreb radio commentator Sundic on the 14th said that the meeting would serve as a "great lesson" for those who advocate a "natural alliance with one of the blocs."

Havana, a leader of movement radicals, has attempted to portray the meeting favorably by ignoring the Afghanistan and Kampuchea questions and focusing on other issues--such as U.S. policy toward Latin America--on which Cuban positions generally were accepted. For example, Cuba welcomed the conference declaration's condemnation of "all forms of intervention and meddling" in El Salvador and its generalized appeal to governments to abstain from supplying arms and offering other types of military assistance--without specifying whether to the junta or the insurgents--"under the current circumstances." Havana's reticence on the Afghanistan and Kampuchea decisions underscores Cuba's dilemma in preserving both its nonaligned status and its ties with the USSR, particularly following President Fidel Castro's belated endorsement, last December, of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. At the same time, Foreign Minister Malmierca defended Havana's ties with Moscow and Hanoi in an interview with PRENSA LATINA on the 13th, in which he chided the ASEAN bloc countries in the nonaligned movement for "giving a negative tint to the word solidarity."

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEANS HAIL "VICTORY"; HANOI CLAIMS SABOTAGE

Indochina's communist regimes have presented more forcefully the differing assessments of the nonaligned conference offered by their respective mentors in Moscow and Beijing. Both Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced the declaration's stance on Kampuchea as "sabotage" against the movement by a minority of its members. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, in a 14 February interview with VNA's New Delhi correspondent, accused Singapore and Pakistan of leading an effort to divide the nonaligned movement over the Kampuchea and Afghanistan questions. But Thach sought to put the best possible face on the portion of the declaration on Kampuchea by suggesting that it endorses Hanoi's view that all foreign troops--including Chinese and American--should be withdrawn from Southeast Asia. And a 15 February article in the Hanoi party daily NHAN DAN said confidently that the nonaligned movement would not be thwarted by a minority that had "defected to imperialism and international reaction." A Phnom Penh radio commentary on the 17th made similar charges, reaffirming the legitimacy of and continued need for Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea.

The anti-Vietnamese Democratic Kampuchean regime characterized the declaration's passage on Kampuchea as a "major victory." A commentary broadcast by the PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of Democratic Kampuchea on the 14th called the decision a "shameful defeat" for the Soviets and their Cuban and Vietnamese allies. The conference declaration, the radio added, provides "vigorous encouragement" for the Kampuchean people to continue their struggle.

CHINA-SOUTHEAST ASIA

BEIJING SCORES GAIN IN EFFORT TO PROMOTE ANTI-HANOI FRONT

Beijing's efforts to maintain pressure on Hanoi have received a boost from Prince Sihanouk's announcement that he is prepared to discuss the formation of a new coalition government in Kampuchea. Beijing is enthusiastically promoting such an arrangement in response to ASEAN countries' demands for a more acceptable Democratic Kampuchean (DK) leadership. The DK regime headed by Khieu Samphan has agreed to begin talks with Sihanouk but remains hesitant to commit itself to the aims of its Chinese ally. As part of its strategy for pressuring Hanoi, Beijing is also stepping up support for Vietnamese resistance against Le Duan.

Beijing's gratification at Sihanouk's announcement was expressed authoritatively by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, who told French newsmen on 12 February that China welcomed Sihanouk's proposal. XINHUA the day before had cited AFP reports of 8-10 February that Sihanouk had agreed to serve as head of state and president of the united front without being responsible for executive, administrative, or military operations--a replay of his role from 1970 to 1975. XINHUA reported that he had named Penn Nouth, Khieu Samphan, and Son Sann as acceptable candidates for prime minister and made clear that he thought the Khmer Rouge had to be accepted because it had "the most effective and strongest fighting forces."

Conveying China's view of Sihanouk's announcement as a step toward satisfying ASEAN demands for a new, internationally respectable leadership for the DK, XINHUA seized promptly on favorable responses to the news from ASEAN leaders and in the press of ASEAN countries. Beijing's domestic service on 16 February summarized developments relating to Sihanouk's offer, which it said was welcomed by international public opinion--especially by ASEAN.

While the reasons for Sihanouk's change of mind about possible cooperation with Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot are uncertain, his announcement came in the wake of signals that Beijing might be moving to support Son Sann, leader of the National Front for the Liberation of the Khmer People, as head of a coalition. Son Sann visited China in December last year and subsequently announced from Thailand that he would form a new government to compete with the DK regime for the Kampuchean seat in the United Nations at the General Assembly session this fall. In early February, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang stated in a Bangkok press conference that either Sihanouk or Son Sann would be acceptable as leader of a new united front. Sihanouk may now hope to forestall a shift of Chinese support to Son Sann and gain other political concessions from Beijing. Nevertheless, by pointing up the importance of the DK's military capability he has accepted Beijing's foremost condition that nothing be done to undermine the military effectiveness of the DK.*

Beijing has not reported Sihanouk's demand for greater Chinese military backing of pro-Sihanouk resistance forces in Kampuchea, but instead has attempted to give credence to prospects for a broader front which would include Son Sann along with Sihanouk and the DK. Beijing publicized a communique from the Son Sann group saying it accepted "the proposal" on forming a great union of all Khmer national liberation movements; although the communique was issued several days before the Sihanouk statement, Beijing's report made it appear to be a response to his proposal.

DK HESITANCE

That the Khieu Samphan regime is less enthusiastic than Beijing about developing a new united front is suggested by the behavior of the DK's clandestine radio Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VODK), transmitting from Chinese territory. VODK has neither reported that Sihanouk offered to lead the united front nor mentioned his other conditions. Implying that Sihanouk had accepted the DK's legitimacy, a VODK "special report" on 13 February said Sihanouk had extended greetings to Khieu Samphan, Pol Pot, and other Kampuchean leaders, expressed a desire to "discuss and consult" on the possibility of setting up a united front government, and sent a memorandum to the DK regime. On 13 February VODK broadcast a response sent to Sihanouk two days earlier by Khieu Samphan expressing pleasure that "the Samdech [Sihanouk] is willing to form a united front embracing all patriotic forces in Kampuchea and a national coalition government opposed to the Le Duan aggressor clique" and offering to lead a delegation to meet with Sihanouk to discuss a "specific program of action." Other VODK broadcasts, while continuing to emphasize the need for a wider united front, have maintained that the DK is the most important element in the anti-Vietnamese struggle and that it is continuing to win support. A VODK editorial of 10 February, coinciding with Sihanouk's offer, warned that anything that hampers the force fighting against Vietnam would "willingly or unwillingly" abet Vietnamese aggression: "Therefore, Kampuchean nationals who are really patriotic will not do such things."

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* Beijing's effort to enhance the Khieu Samphan regime's quest for a better image without undermining its military effectiveness is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 January 1981, pages 12-14.

OTHER PRESSURES FROM BEIJING

Clearly hoping Sihanouk's demarche will reinforce its political pressures on Hanoi, Beijing is concurrently expanding activities intended to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Hanoi leadership. CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng hosted former Vietnamese Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, now residing in China, the day after the Vietnamese party's 3 February anniversary, but the occasion was billed only as a lunar new year celebration. XINHUA released the text of a speech by Hoan to Vietnamese compatriots during a recent visit to South China in which he called on Vietnamese nationals living abroad as well as at home to work for another revolution in Vietnam. On 3 February a XINHUA article on the Vietnamese domestic situation took note for the first time of a "National Salvation Front" allegedly carrying out insurgent activities against the Hanoi regime. And on 10 February a XINHUA commentary cited Vietnamese press reports in such a way as to suggest that oppressive regime policies had led to unrest and incipient insurgency.

USSR

REPUBLIC PARTIES ADD "WORKERS" TO TOP POLICYMAKING BODIES

> In a remarkable break with longstanding practice, the party organizations of five Soviet republics have elevated rank-and-file workers to their top policymaking bodies--the republic central committee bureaus. The appointments bear a surface resemblance at least to a democratization trend that has been taking place in the Polish communist party, and in at least two cases--both Baltic republics--the moves appear to have been directly prompted by the Polish crisis. These actions of the Soviet republic parties appear against a background of renewed propaganda efforts by Soviet publications and spokesmen to present the Soviet Union as a defender of workers' interests and to refurbish the image of Soviet trade unions in this regard.

The new appointments, which emerged from a series of otherwise routine republic party congresses and plenums in recent weeks, were clustered in two areas--the Baltic, where official concerns about potential influences from Poland have been evident for months, and the Caucasus, where the Polish virus is clearly less of a concern but where local leaders have long prided themselves on their promotion o "socialist democracy." The motivations of the five party organizati appear to have been differentiated accordingly.

In Lithuania where the leader of a painters brigade was elected to the bureau, party leaders began to show an unusual degree of solicitude toward local trade unions shortly after the crisis in neighbori Poland began. The Latvian party also appears to have taken a defens measure to forestall any possible spillover from Poland when it elec a milling machine operator to join the ranks of its top leadership. Party leaders from the Caucasus, however, well isolated from Polish events, appear to have been pursuing longer range efforts to improve party responsiveness to public needs when they added workers to all three republic bureaus. Leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan have long been strong advocates of broader public participation in policymakin In his 22 January speech to the Georgian party congress, First Secre Shevardnadze strongly emphasized this theme, declaring that improvem in economic management can be achieved only through the expansion of its "democratic basis," which necessitates a greater role for worker

The Soviet Union's image as a defender and promoter of workers' interests has come in for new attention by Soviet spokesmen in recent months, presumably as a prophylactic campaign against the contagion from Poland. An effort to humanize the trade unions seemed evident in the new October anniversary slogan for 1980, which dropped the traditional call for trade unions to help boost production, urging them instead to work harder to improve people's "living and working conditions." Since then the press has continually stressed the idea that the trade unions' primary task is to advance the welfare of workers, as well as the theme that unions should play a greater role in managing the economy. The most authoritative statement on this subject came from Politburo member Chernenko, writing in the November KOMMUNIST, No. 17, who urged "broader" worker involvement in monitoring the work of management. This theme has also been stressed in repeated calls, such as that in an 18 November PRAVDA editorial, for trade unions to oppose more actively violations of workers' rights by "overzealous administrators."

BRIEF

SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS: Publication of Gromyko Letter

The USSR's public release of Foreign Minister Gromyko's 28 January letter to Secretary of State Haig appears to have been conceived as a rejoinder to the Reagan Administration's public criticism of Soviet policies. Soviet media handling of the letter suggests that Moscow is still deferring judgment on the Administration's ultimate intentions. The letter, carried in full by the official news agency TASS, received wide coverage in Moscow radio's foreign-language services. It failed to appear in any of the major Soviet newspapers, however, and received scant attention on the domestic radio. A 13 February TASS commentary sought to present the public release of the letter as a response in kind to a U.S. breach of diplomatic confidence. The Soviet Embassy in Washington released the letter, TASS said, because the United States had "made public the contents" of Secretary Haig's earlier letter to Gromyko.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 9-15 FEBRUARY 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,021 items)		
Nonaligned Conference, New Delhi	11%	(8%)
Polish Situation	9%	(5%)
Gromyko Reply to Haig Letter	4%	(--)
U.S. Revival of Neutron Bomb Issue	3%	(4%)
U.S. Charges of USSR Involvement in International Terrorism	3%	(11%)

Beijing (669 items)		
French Socialist Party Leader Mitterand in PRC	15%	(--)
Nonaligned Conference, New Delhi	11%	(3%)
Japanese Economic Delegation in PRC	4%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

FBIS 40TH YEAR 1941-81

Trends in Communist Media

This issue is devoted to Soviet policy positions enunciated by Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress

Declassified
Confidential

25 FEBRUARY 1981
FB TM 81-008

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, D. C. 20013

25 February 1981

NOTE FROM THE DIRECTOR, FBIS:

Forty years ago, the U.S. Government inaugurated a new service to monitor foreign public broadcasts. A few years later a similar group was established to exploit the foreign press. From the merger of these organizations evolved the present-day FBIS. Our constant goal throughout has been to provide our readers with rapid, accurate, and comprehensive reporting from the public media worldwide.

On behalf of all of us in FBIS I wish to express appreciation to our readers who have guided our efforts throughout the years.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

- + TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

- + SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

- + SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

- + TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

INTRODUCTION

General Secretary Brezhnev's report to the 26th Soviet party congress was conciliatory in tone though it revealed few changes in policy substance on issues of concern to the United States. Speaking on 23 February, Brezhnev called for negotiations on disputed issues, emphasized arms control more than defense preparedness, and chose not to respond to Reagan Administration charges about the Soviet role in Central America.

In his fourth appearance before a CPSU congress as the party's top leader, Brezhnev spoke candidly about the realities that face the USSR at home and abroad. But the policies he outlined in his four-hour report reflected familiar priorities and a continued disinclination to attempt radical innovation. He spoke with a sense of urgency about limiting the arms race, called for a range of regional and international negotiations, and made incremental adjustments in several current Soviet positions.

On the domestic front, Brezhnev pressed a series of measures designed to address specific economic and social problems, but he offered no grand design for halting the continuing economic slowdown and announced no significant shifts in the allocation of Soviet resources.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

PRIORITY FOR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, FEW POLICY INNOVATIONS

Brezhnev's report offered a prescription for relations with the Western powers that is essentially indistinguishable from the "peace program" he first presented at the 24th congress in 1971 and updated at the last congress in 1976. He drew a picture of an international environment that has sharply deteriorated in the last five years, but he renewed calls for East-West dialogue and maintained that an easing of international tension is essential for the solution of Soviet domestic problems.

STATUS OF DETENTE Brezhnev constructed his grim assessment of the current international situation upon a pessimistic interpretation of current political trends in the West. He opened his report to the congress by conceding that the period under review had been a "complex, tempestuous" time in the international arena. He complained specifically of a sharp increase in the "aggressiveness of imperialism," singling out the United States. Examining the shifting political alignments in the West, Brezhnev concluded that the rising influence of the opponents of detente had been assisted by the current "aggravation" of capitalism's economic problems.

ARMS CONTROL Brezhnev posited arms control as a "pivotal" aspect of Soviet foreign policy and addressed the issue repeatedly throughout the international section of his report. He characterized the arms race as the "main threat" to international security. But he argued adamantly that negotiations must proceed on the basis of what he portrayed as an existing military balance, and the proposals he offered contained no radical departures.

The Soviet leader offered a mixture of new and revamped arms proposals that build on the goals he established at the last congress:

+ Extension of the zone covered by the Helsinki CSCE agreement's "confidence-building measures" to include the "entire European part of the USSR," provided the West makes a corresponding move. This offer seems aimed at West German and French interest in such measures and brings Moscow closer to acceptance of the French plan for a European conference on military detente, currently under discussion in Madrid at the Helsinki review conference.

+ A moratorium on the deployment of new Soviet and Western "medium-range nuclear missile" facilities in Europe. Brezhnev said both sides should curtail preparations for "additional means," including the U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. The moratorium offer follows Brezhnev's original proposal in October

1979 to reduce Soviet medium-range systems in Europe provided NATO decided to forego its own theater nuclear force modernization program.

+ A ban on deployment of neutron weapons. Brezhnev reiterated his December 1977 pledge not to build these weapons unless they appeared in the West.

+ A special session of the UN Security Council, with the "top leaders" of the Council states participating, to seek "the key" to improving the international atmosphere and preventing war. Thorough preparation and the participation of other world leaders would help ensure "positive" results, Brezhnev said.

CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON DIALOGUE WITH U.S. ADMINISTRATION

Brezhnev's Central Committee report combined a reaffirmation of the importance the Soviet Union attributes to the U.S.-Soviet relationship with acknowledgment of the current strains in bilateral ties. In underscoring the significance of bilateral relations, the Soviet leader placed particular stress on strategic arms control. He sharply criticized trends in U.S. policy since the 25th CPSU Congress but indicated that Moscow still hopes for a working relationship with the Reagan Administration.

Moscow's hopes for the Reagan Administration were apparent in Brezhnev's pointed reference to the utility of summit meetings as well as in his tentative assessment of the Administration's policy goals. Avoiding the harsher invective of recent Soviet media commentary, Brezhnev rebuked the Administration for making statements that "seem to be specially intended to poison" bilateral relations. But he indicated that Moscow still anticipates that "those who now determine U.S. policy will ultimately be able to look at things more realistically." Since the international situation depends to a large degree on our two countries, Brezhnev concluded, there is no reasonable alternative to normal relations.

FLEXIBILITY ON SALT

Brezhnev's remarks on the strategic arms dialogue sustained the flexible posture he adopted after the November election. He insisted on the retention of "everything positive" from past negotiations and vowed that the USSR would negotiate only on the basis of equality. But he avoided explicit mention of SALT II in affirming Moscow's readiness to continue talks with the new Administration "without delay." He singled out ballistic missile submarines as an area in need of further limitations but offered no illumination of Soviet intentions regarding observance of the already negotiated provisions of SALT II.

COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

FLEXIBILITY TOWARD POLAND, OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

POLAND Brezhnev's remarks on Poland, the first extensive comment by a Soviet leader since the start of the labor unrest last summer, seemed intended to underscore Moscow's determination to ensure a successful resolution of the crisis while avoiding disclosure of any particular actions it may be contemplating. Brezhnev strongly reaffirmed the Soviet Union's "fraternal" ties to its neighbor and warned gravely against Western efforts to tamper with this relationship. But he also spoke expansively of national differences among socialist countries, seeming to hint at Soviet willingness to accept far-reaching changes in the Polish internal system.

Brezhnev's comments on the Polish domestic situation balanced expressions of concern over destabilizing tendencies with signs of support for the regime's normalization efforts. He reiterated Soviet charges that "enemies of socialism," aided by the West, are trying to promote "anarchy" and "counterrevolution" in Poland and pose a "threat to the foundations of the socialist state." But he portrayed favorably the party's efforts to overcome the crisis--citing its efforts to strengthen its ranks and ties to the workers and to resolve the country's economic problems--and accepted Kania's assessment that the current problems are caused by policies associated with the Gierek regime. Brezhnev also seemed to pave the way toward accepting some unorthodox new features in the Polish system in his heavy stress on the "wealth of ways and methods" in developing socialism--a theme to which he returned repeatedly in his remarks on Poland and elsewhere. Thus he welcomed the efforts of various East European countries to come up with original solutions to their problems. He also maintained that the development of unity among communist countries "does not blot out our national specificity and historical peculiarities."

Along with these signs of toleration, Brezhnev made it clear that Moscow would not countenance a threat to Poland's status as a member of the Soviet bloc. These remarks seemed intended to appeal to hardline elements in the Soviet leadership and East Europe without committing Moscow to any particular action. Brezhnev thus paraphrased some of the double-edged language of the 5 December Warsaw Pact statement when he said that the Soviet bloc countries "will stand up for Poland" and "not leave her in the lurch." In his most forceful statement, Brezhnev underscored Moscow's intention to leave open its options, declaring, "let no one have any doubt about our common determination to secure our interests and defend the peoples' socialist gains."

BLOC RELATIONS

Brezhnev's remarks on Poland came in the context of a generally routine review of Moscow's relations with other communist countries. As "socialist community" countries he named Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. The list differed from his enumeration at the last CPSU congress by the addition this time of Laos and the omission of North Korea and Yugoslavia--countries with which Moscow's relations have cooled since 1976.

The only negative note in Brezhnev's remarks concerned economic relations within the bloc, which have suffered from the strain of worldwide inflation as well as from the disruptive effects of the Polish crisis. He observed that "the recent years have not been the best for the national economies of a number of socialist states" and pointed out bluntly that the USSR's exports to the CEMA countries have exceeded its imports from those countries during the past five years, indicating that the "reduced" price of Soviet oil shipments to East Europe is an important factor in that deficit. Brezhnev said the CEMA countries' "many large problems" should be discussed by their leaders--an apparent proposal for another of the ad hoc sessions of CEMA party leaders that have been held on rare occasions in the past.

AFFIRMATION OF CHINA POLICY; RECOGNITION OF CHANGE IN PRC

Brezhnev signaled no expectation of any imminent change in Sino-Soviet relations but confirmed that Moscow is now taking seriously the internal ferment that has developed in China following Mao Zedong's death. He reaffirmed the longstanding Soviet position that China bears responsibility for the bilateral impasse. At the same time, he credited Beijing with positive internal changes whose ultimate implications it was too early to judge.

Brezhnev offered an assessment of the post-Mao leadership's foreign policy that was as negative as the one he had offered in 1976 on the eve of Mao's death. He told the congress that there had been no change for the better in Chinese foreign policy and no movement in Sino-Soviet relations. Just as he had at the last congress, Brezhnev accused Beijing of trying to aggravate the international situation and of aligning itself with the imperialist powers. Soviet proposals for normalizing Sino-Soviet relations, he said, nevertheless remain open.

Brezhnev's favorable comments on Beijing's current domestic policy course gave further official sanction to a position he first endorsed in a speech in Kazakhstan last August. Brezhnev reported to the congress that "changes are now taking place in China's domestic policies." He found cause for satisfaction in the fact that the policies of the Cultural Revolution period have come under sharp attack in China, although he added that only the future would reveal the ultimate impact of internal policy changes. Brezhnev seemed to underscore the potential for the USSR of internal developments in China even as he hedged on their current impact, remarking that there are "no grounds yet" for speaking of changes for the better in Chinese foreign policy.

Brezhnev's remarks on China amount to an endorsement of the views of a minority of Soviet China-watchers who since shortly after Mao's death have been crediting Beijing with significant alterations in Mao's legacy. At the same time, they seem to contradict what has remained until now the dominant Soviet public view--that the changes instituted by Beijing are a mere facelifting of Maoism that only threatens to make it more effective.

CONCILIATORY APPROACH TO EUROCOMMUNISM, INTERPARTY DISPUTES

Judged against the background of Moscow's problems with the West European communists since the 25th congress, Brezhnev's assessment of the state of the international communist movement was restrained and conciliatory. He chose to sidestep rather than confront the issues that are currently controversial within the movement. He made the traditional claim of continuing gains for the nonruling parties in the last few years, but seemed more intent on reaffirming Moscow's tolerance--within limits--of the differences that continue to mark interparty relations.

Brezhnev echoed his congress report five years ago in setting out Moscow's perception of the permissible limits of diversity among communists. "Differing assessments" and "debates" over strategy and tactics, he said, are a natural consequence of the increasingly complex tasks facing communist parties. He affirmed the right of parties to impart a "specific national character" to their views and dismissed the notion that the CPSU seeks to impose a pattern binding on all parties. The Soviet party's response to criticism of its policies or internal affairs, he said, is to listen carefully to "comradely and constructive" comments but to reject any remarks that "distort socialist reality" or violate communist "principles."

Brezhnev was careful not to exacerbate further the CPSU's differences with the two major Eurocommunist parties, the Italian and the Spanish, whose top leaders chose to boycott the congress. He implicitly acknowledged the strains that currently mark Moscow's ties with those two parties by omitting them from a list of West European parties with which the CPSU maintains "good relations." But he eschewed the blunt warnings against "opportunism" and "revisionism"--codewords for independent-minded Eurocommunists--that were prevalent in this as well as in other speeches at the 25th congress, and he avoided discussion of the contentious subject of "proletarian internationalism." Instead of seeking support for Moscow's controversial Afghanistan policies, Brezhnev made a pitch for unity in the movement by invoking the noncontroversial theme of world peace. The "struggle for peace," Brezhnev said, is the "grand unifying principle" of the world communist movement.

THE THIRD WORLD

MODERATE TONE ON SOVIET ROLE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Brezhnev's report reflected Moscow's increasing recognition of the diversity in political and economic development that characterizes the Third World. He devoted most of his attention to state-to-state relations with established governments rather than to the remaining national liberation movements.

Brezhnev chose not to engage the Reagan Administration at length on the question of the Soviet role in the developing world. He made no mention of Central America, ignoring U.S. complaints about Soviet and Cuban assistance to the insurgents in El Salvador. He briefly dismissed efforts to lump national liberation movements together with terrorist organizations as a fruitless attempt to stem progressive change. Brezhnev offered no specific pledges of support to liberation movements, but he reasserted Moscow's right to respond to requests from established regimes for help in strengthening their defenses.

Discussing Moscow's relations with regimes of "socialist orientation" in the Third World, Brezhnev used the more flexible definition of this concept that has evolved in the USSR over the past decade. Noting that the paths of economic and social development chosen by such countries are "of course" not identical, he listed such common features as the "gradual" liquidation of Western monopolies and large capitalist concerns, state control of the key economic sectors, and restriction of the activities of foreign capital. At the 24th congress in 1971, Brezhnev presented a rigid ideological picture of development in such nations, featuring the "struggle against exploitative relations" and the expansion of the state sector as the main themes and detailing the radical economic nationalization programs then under way in several countries.

IMPLICATIONS OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION, ISLAMIC UPSURGE

Addressing the question of religious revival and political unrest in the Muslim world, Brezhnev lent his authority to the proposition that political movements acting in the name of Islam can be progressive as well as reactionary. Applying this reasoning to Iran, the Soviet leader concluded that the Iranian Revolution, while filled with "complications and contradictions," is "fundamentally" anti-imperialist.

Brezhnev argued that the "liberation struggle" can unfold under the "banner of Islam" but that "reaction" can sometimes use "Islamic slogans" to cover "counterrevolutionary" objectives. Historically, Soviet writing on Islamic movements has characterized them as largely negative. But Brezhnev's language here recalls that of Soviet Middle East expert Yevgeniy Primakov in an innovative article on the "Islamic Upsurge" in the August 1980 issue of VOPROSY FILOSOFII (PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY).* Reflecting Primakov's arguments, Brezhnev declared that the main criterion in evaluating Islamic movements is "the aims pursued by the forces declaiming particular slogans."

Brezhnev's remarks on Iran sounded a tentative note. He again wished the Iranian people success on their path to freedom and prosperity. But for a second time he warned that good relations with Iran could develop only on the basis of "reciprocity." He had voiced much the same complaint, in a speech in Alma-Ata last August, about Iran's failure to accord its neighbors reciprocal respect. The appeal for reciprocity would not seem unreasonable in Soviet eyes, given the numerous recent Iranian denunciations of Moscow's presence in Afghanistan and its neutral stance on the Iranian-Iraqi conflict.

SUPPORT FOR CONFERENCES AS MEANS OF ADDRESSING REGIONAL ISSUES

By calling for discussion of Middle East and Asian problems in a variety of forums, Brezhnev set the policy outlines for Soviet approaches to regional disputes. Through the proposals for conferences, Moscow is seeking to reactivate a Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli dispute, legitimize its interests in the Persian Gulf, and contain criticism of its presence in Afghanistan. Brezhnev's call for a broad international conference on the Arab-Israeli problem seems calculated to upstage the new U.S. Administration with an initiative ostensibly designed to break the current stalemate. For the first time, Brezhnev explicitly stated the Soviet Union's willingness to combine discussion on Afghanistan and on the Persian Gulf, although Soviet treatment of the two issues had long indicated that Moscow favored such a connection. Brezhnev also expressed an unprecedented willingness to reduce tension in the Far East by strengthening trust in the military sphere there.

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* For a discussion of the Primakov article, see the TRENDS of 16 October 1980, pages 8-10.

NEW MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE PROPOSAL

For the first time in some two years Moscow has advocated a conference to seek a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Giving the appearance of promoting a fresh start on a solution, Brezhnev did not revive the dormant Geneva conference format that Moscow, as Geneva cochairman, was still urging at least as late as January 1978. Brezhnev vaguely proposed a "specially convened international conference" on the problem, but he was careful to stake out a claim to Soviet interest in association with any initiatives of other parties, such as the Europeans. He also pledged readiness for a "joint search" with the United States, even while recalling "certain experience in this respect" several years ago--an allusion to the October 1977 joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the Middle East, which some Soviet spokesmen later complained had been "unilaterally renounced" by Washington. While he did not suggest that the proposed conference be convened under UN auspices, he did say that the United Nations could "continue to play a useful role" in resolving the question.

The elements of a settlement as envisioned by Moscow remain unchanged. Brezhnev in fact could have been quoting from his September 1978 speech in Baku or his December 1977 PRAVDA interview when he called for full Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories seized in 1967, Palestine Liberation Organization participation in any peace talks, recognition of the Palestinian people's right to their own state, and guarantees of the security and sovereignty of all states in the region, including Israel. Just as he had done in Baku, Brezhnev in his congress speech routinely assailed the "Camp David policy" as "anti-Arab collusion" aimed at splitting the Arabs and reiterated Moscow's unwavering insistence on a "comprehensive" settlement.

JOINT CONSIDERATION OF AFGHAN, PERSIAN GULF PROBLEMS

Brezhnev for the first time explicitly raised the possibility of discussion of the "international aspects" of the Afghan problem and questions of Persian Gulf security in tandem. He said the USSR was ready to consider both issues independently but had no objection to discussing them together. This suggests that Moscow is trying to persuade the West to look seriously at Brezhnev's December 1980 proposals on the Gulf by allowing the problem of Afghanistan to be tabled at the same time.

Moscow has been trying to gain Western recognition of the USSR's own "southern border security" concerns while acknowledging Western interests in access to Gulf oil. As early as last February, Brezhnev in effect denied that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had as its ultimate aim a move into the Gulf, and at the same time conceded that U.S. concern over the safety of oil supply routes was "in a way understandable." The Soviets are also clearly trying to establish a role for themselves in the Gulf and do not want to foreclose the option of Soviet purchase of oil from the region. Comment has consistently maintained that the USSR's oil supplies are adequate and that it has no need for Gulf resources, but there has been an occasional hint of Soviet interest. The TASS commentary by Portugalov a year ago, which suggested an "all-European" conference to discuss Gulf oil questions, offered the first, albeit indirect, acknowledgment: Portugalov cited West German Chancellor Schmidt as observing that the Soviet Union, as a potential purchaser of Near East oil, had a legitimate right of access to its sources.

The Portugalov article received virtually no followup attention, but it presaged Brezhnev's own "peace doctrine" on the Gulf set forth during his visit to India last December. At that time Brezhnev had outlined "mutual obligations" which might be undertaken by the industrial states; in his congress speech he raised this to the level of an "international agreement" but was no more specific about how such an accord could be reached.

Since Brezhnev's December proposal, Moscow has offered a further hint of potential Soviet interest in Middle East oil resources. In the regular "Taking Up a Point" column in the 16 January issue of the weekly NOVOYE VREMA (NEW TIMES), staff writer Andrei Stepanov explained Soviet security and economic interests in the Middle East in response to a letter from a U.S. reader. "Although we have enough oil of our own," he said, "it is not excluded that we may find it economically justified to buy Middle East oil. Why not? Others are doing it, are they not?"

PROPOSALS FOR FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Brezhnev expressed concern for Japan's closer military cooperation with Washington and Beijing, a perception that may have been behind his unprecedented offer to hold talks with interested countries on the question of extending military confidence-building measures to the Far East. Moscow's offer to establish such measures as prior warning of military exercises and notification of major troop movements may be aimed at reducing Japanese fears of a Soviet threat to the area--concerns which Beijing regularly exploits. Moscow previously had included the Far East in its general calls for spreading detente throughout the world, but Brezhnev's proposal to extend to the Far East the types of measures now in force in parts of Europe was apparently a new one. Brezhnev failed to detail the call, noting only that agreement between the Soviet Union, China, and Japan on such measures would go far in reducing regional tensions.

On Southeast Asian issues, Brezhnev failed to mention specifically the regional peace plan recently aired by the Indochinese foreign ministers, voicing only routine support for the creation of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia. But a major campaign appears under way in support of the proposals put forth by the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea at their meeting in Ho Chi Minh City last month. TASS on the 22d revealed that a coordinated diplomatic effort has been launched to inform the ASEAN countries--Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia--of Moscow's readiness to take part in an international conference aimed at guaranteeing any future treaty between Indochina and ASEAN. Moscow's previous comment on this proposal had stopped short of outlining any explicit role in guaranteeing a regional peace treaty.

DOMESTIC POLICY

FOCUS ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH PROMISE OF LIMITED CHANGE

In addressing the domestic situation, Brezhnev concentrated on the new five-year plan and the economic problems facing the country in the coming years. His most noteworthy statements centered on food shortages, ineffective administration of the economy, unfavorable demographic trends, and overdependence on trade with the West. His announced remedies included approaches that were significant and controversial, if not necessarily innovative or radical.

Regarding the overall direction of the economy, there were no surprises. Brezhnev reiterated the longterm goal set by other recent congresses of improving the people's welfare, stressed the need for more consumer goods and services, and discussed needs in the fields of agriculture, machine building, energy, transportation, and new technology. Brezhnev did not urge any specific shift in the priority of investments but did praise the new plan's higher priority for consumer goods and increased investment for transport. He also reiterated the need to continue heavy investment in agriculture.

AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS Brezhnev's extensive discussion of agricultural problems and ways of increasing output reflected recent trends toward less orthodox approaches. Citing current difficulties in supplying meat and other items, he reiterated his longstanding support for continued heavy investment in agriculture, but he also stressed the need to turn more to private farming and decentralization of planning. He praised a November decree on agricultural planning, which he said limited administrative interference in farm work and established more incentives. He also cited a January decree on private plots ordering more aid to private livestock raising. The practices established by the two decrees seem modeled after systems developed abroad--in Bulgaria and Hungary respectively. Although Brezhnev did not specify the apparent foreign origins of these decrees, he did elsewhere praise Bulgarian and Hungarian agricultural innovations, a recognition rare in such Soviet public statements.

MINISTERIAL REORGANIZATION Brezhnev revealed that steps have already been taken to help eliminate poor coordination among the numerous industrial ministries and departments, one of the causes of economic ineffectiveness and mismanagement. Recalling his own proposals at the last congress to create new organs to supervise groups of related ministries, Brezhnev announced that some such units have now been created in Gosplan. He also announced the recent creation of a Council of Ministers commission to handle development of West Siberian oil and gas and a similar interdepartmental commission in Gosplan that will be located in Tyumen.

The need to create such new organs has been sharply debated in recent years, but Brezhnev's statements are the first indication that some of them have in fact been created. The creation of some of these units may have been facilitated by Premier Kosygin's retirement last October, for the Council of Ministers had appeared to resist such changes despite Brezhnev's repeated urgings. The creation of the West Siberian commission indicates a victory for West Siberian oil lobbyists like Academician A.G. Aganbegyan, who in 1978 specifically called for such a high-level commission under the Central Committee and Council of Ministers to force better coordination among ministries involved in West Siberian development. The fact that other supraministerial units mentioned by Brezhnev are only at the Gosplan level indicates that advocates of such units for other spheres had to settle for less powerful organs than those achieved by the West Siberians.

MANPOWER PROBLEMS In an unusually frank discussion of resource problems affecting the economy, Brezhnev highlighted manpower as one of the critical issues confronting the Soviet economy in the 1980's. According to Brezhnev, this is a multifaceted problem which includes labor shortages in some areas and surpluses in others, unfavorable migration trends, and shortages of requisite skills. Reporting that these problems have recently become "more acute" Brezhnev recognized that more radical solutions than regional pay differentials are necessary to overcome the manpower imbalances that now exist in the country. In an apparent effort to stem the declining birthrate in the European parts of the country, Brezhnev endorsed several measures similar to those proposed in the draft of the new five-year plan which would provide additional economic and social incentives in certain areas to encourage larger families. To provide badly needed manpower for energy-rich Western Siberia and other remote areas targeted for development, Brezhnev hinted that measures should be adopted to stimulate migration from the fast-growing regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The latter proposal is a measure of the regime's concern regarding the manpower disproportions, since it flies in the face of evidence that the indigenous populations in those regions are strongly resistant to leaving their native lands.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Apparently influenced by the impact of the U.S. embargo on high technology, Brezhnev called on Soviet industry to achieve a greater degree of economic independence by reducing costly imports of foreign technology. Such a retrenchment would be consistent with Brezhnev's promotion of Soviet technology but clashes somewhat with his longstanding support of foreign trade. During the early 1970's, Brezhnev promoted East-West trade as an integral element of detente. Brezhnev's stress on technological independence appears to reflect not only disappointment with the results of detente in this regard but a resurgent "autarkist" sentiment in the Soviet Union itself, particularly among some segments of the scientific community. In April 1980, for example, Academy of Sciences President Aleksandrov took the occasion of a formal observance of science day to call for making the Soviet Union "completely independent" of foreign sources for advanced technology. Brezhnev appeared to endorse the sentiment as a means for spurring Soviet science and encouraging the application of advanced technology to industry. But he made it clear elsewhere in his speech that he wishes to maintain economic ties with the West, and he acknowledged that the Soviet Union was continuing to supplement domestic food supplies through foreign trade.

SOCIAL POLICY In what could turn out to be one of the most significant remarks of his speech, Brezhnev invited his listeners--that is, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc states--to draw a lesson from the Polish events and, in particular, to "lend a sensitive ear to the voice of the masses." Brezhnev's message, it seems clear, was that communist leaders can best avert the problems that have overtaken Poland by being sure that their policies are responsive to the legitimate needs and wishes of the people. That Soviet leaders have been drawing such a practical conclusion from the Polish events was indicated most recently by the election last month of ordinary "workers" to the bureaus of republic party organizations in five republics. Even before the Polish events lent urgency to the issue, various party leaders and experts in the Soviet Union had been advocating reforms aimed at eliciting greater public participation in local administration, trade union, and economic matters. Brezhnev reflected some of the recent public commentary on this subject when he called upon the unions to be less cautious in exercising their legal rights and to take a greater role in economic planning and management. His concern for greater contact with the masses was also evident in his encouragement of party leaders to pay greater attention to workers' letters and in the special praise he bestowed upon the Central Committee's letters department.

CONTINUITY IN DEFENSE POLICY, CONCERN OVER ARMS BURDEN

While Brezhnev devoted relatively little attention to military policy, his remarks on defense-related issues appeared to add up to a firm but not provocative position on the arms competition with the United States. While eschewing any intention to seek military superiority, Brezhnev firmly warned that the Soviet Union "would not permit such a superiority to be established over us." His argument for arms control was based on the familiar proposition that the superpowers are confronted with the inescapable dilemma that they must either control the arms race or be destroyed by it. It would be "dangerous madness," he said, either to "attempt to defeat each other in the arms race" or "to count on a victory in a nuclear war." Brezhnev did not refer directly to the material costs of the arms competition, but he did imply that such costs constituted another of the factors arguing for arms control. The decline of detente and the resumption of the arms race, he complained, have placed "no small burden on us." Brezhnev did not return to the theme of the defense industry's contribution to the civilian economy--a subject he had aired at considerable length in his speech to the October 1980 plenum.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 16-22 FEBRUARY 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,099 items)		
CPSU 26th Congress	13%	(--)
Soviet Armed Forces Day	3%	(--)
U.S. Charges of USSR Involvement in International Terrorism	3%	(3%)

Beijing (606 items)		
Nonaligned Conference, New Delhi	7%	(--)
Sihanouk Proposal To Form Anti-SRV Front in Kampuchea	3%	(--)
French Socialist Party Leader Mitterand in PRC	3%	(15%)
Soviet 26th CPSU Congress	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Conclusion of CPSU Congress:
  Absence of Soviet support for Cuba
  Tentative backing for Polish regime
  Common interests among local leaders

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
5 April 1967 - six months prior to
current date

CPSU CONGRESS

The themes of continuity and unity remained the keynotes of the 26th CPSU Congress as it concluded its work on 3 March with the reelection of the Politburo and Secretariat. In keeping with these themes, Moscow avoided any new departures on sensitive foreign policy issues during the congress. Moscow seemed reluctant to demonstrate support for Fidel Castro in the developing issue between the United States and Cuba over El Salvador. Soviet leaders were similarly cautious on the Polish issue, maintaining the tentative support for Kania that they have shown since the end of last year. One area in which practical concerns seemed to override the stress on unity was in the traditional lobbying by local Soviet leaders for central attention to their concerns--an effort that was pressed at this congress as vigorously as in earlier meetings.

MOSCOW RELUCTANT TO PLEDGE DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR CUBA

Moscow has again underscored its reluctance to commit itself publicly to a security guarantee to Cuba, a pledge President Castro seemed anxious to elicit in his speech to the CPSU congress. Careful Soviet handling of Castro's speech and General Secretary Brezhnev's failure in his congress report to mention U.S. charges of Cuban interference in El Salvador suggest that Moscow is sensitive to being drawn into a potential U.S.-Cuban confrontation, a situation which in turn would complicate Soviet efforts to engage in a dialogue with the new Administration. Castro's speech to the congress stopped short of explicitly denying a Cuban role in El Salvador, but he rejected as "clumsy lies" U.S. attempts to attribute the upheaval in El Salvador to "international conspiracies."

Castro's efforts at the congress to trigger a sign of increased public support for Cuba from Moscow drew only vague expressions of routine support as Moscow sought to play down the image painted by the Cuban leader of a growing confrontation between Cuba and the United States over El Salvador. Although PRAVDA carried a full version of Castro's congress speech, the 24 February TASS report on his remarks omitted those passages which tended to imply a Soviet commitment to defend Cuba. TASS did not include Castro's portrayal of the Soviet Union as a "guarantee" against U.S. "threats" of intervention, nor his assertion that the liberation and independence of nations depend on Soviet "might, which imperialism will be unable to ignore." Similarly, TASS excluded Castro's claim that Cuba was "openly threatened with a military blockade and even more drastic measures" and in danger of being "destroyed."

The TASS report also failed to report Castro's remarks that appeared to imply that Moscow, having won Havana's endorsement on its policies toward Afghanistan and Poland, is now duty bound to step up its support for Cuba. Castro stated that "ingratitude, opportunism, or betrayal" would never become factors in Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union, a reference seemingly designed to evoke a reciprocal pledge from Moscow that it will not abandon Cuba in the face of U.S. pressure on the Salvadoran issue. TASS reiterated Moscow's support for the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, noting Castro's standard position "not to reject an olive branch if extended."

Moscow's reluctance to extend a security guarantee to Cuba was also signaled by Brezhnev in his report to the congress on 23 February when he failed to even mention Central America, thus passing up the opportunity to respond personally to charges from the Reagan Administration regarding Soviet and Cuban complicity in the Salvadoran conflict. Although Brezhnev specifically reasserted Moscow's right to respond to requests for help in strengthening the defenses of established Third World regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia, he failed to extend any such guarantee to Cuba. And in his talks with Castro on 26 February, Brezhnev was reported by Soviet media only to have expressed routine, unspecified support for Cuba's efforts to build socialism and to oppose "another anti-Cuba campaign" waged by "U.S. imperialist circles."

Moscow's effort to limit its exposure on the question of support to Cuba was evident earlier in its treatment of last month's visit to Cuba by a high-level military delegation headed by USSR Deputy Defense Minister Ogarkov. Although the visit appeared designed to give Cuba a measure of reassurance in the face of Washington's toughening line on El Salvador, Moscow's and Havana's contrasting treatment of it pointed to divergent views on just how sharply to draw Moscow's commitment to Havana. For example, Moscow totally ignored a 11 February Havana rally, reported by Havana on the 13th, at which Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro called attention to the alleged U.S. threat to Cuba in a fashion which seemed calculated to elicit a reassuring response from Ogarkov. Ogarkov's rally remarks, also reported only by Havana, implied that Cuba's defense depends on the combat readiness of its own armed forces. He stated that Cuba's ability to defend itself rests in the quality of its military training, and he failed to follow Raul Castro's example and allude to the Soviet support during the Bay of Pigs invasion as an example of Soviet-Cuban "solidarity" during Cuba's "most critical moments."

Havana's current search for increased public support from Moscow dates back to last December, when President Castro, in his speech to the Cuban Communist Party congress, exhibited anxiety over the Reagan Administration's policy toward Cuba and warned of an "increased military threat" from the United States. For the first time, Castro publicly stated his personal endorsement of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, thus attempting to remove this issue as an irritant in Soviet-Cuban relations. And in backing the Warsaw Pact's "right" to safeguard Poland's integrity against the "onslaughts of imperialism," Castro seemed to argue implicitly that the application of the Brezhnev doctrine could be extended to Cuba as a loyal ally of the Soviet Union.

KANIA REGIME RECEIVES RENEWED QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT FROM USSR

A last minute meeting between Brezhnev and Polish party chief Kania the day after the congress ended appears to confirm Soviet agreement to a further extension of the Polish regime's period of grace. A fairly lengthy statement on the talks, issued on 4 March, portrayed the Polish situation as still serious but reaffirmed "confidence" in Warsaw's ability to overcome the crisis and reported a "common approach" by the two sides to the questions discussed. The outcome of the meeting suggests at least a partial success for Kania's efforts, evident in his congress speech, to ease Soviet and East European concerns about the Polish situation. The leaders of Moscow's East European allies played down the Polish issue in their congress remarks, muting some of their concerns while generally withholding declarations of support.

The tone of the latest statement recalls the communiques issued after the last two summit meetings on the Polish crisis. The report on the 30 October Brezhnev-Kania talks had similarly described Poland's problems as "acute" and had scored imperialist "subversion" while registering confidence in the Polish communists' ability to overcome the crisis. The 5 December Warsaw Pact leaders statement also expressed confidence in Warsaw, but tempered it with the double-edged declaration that Poland can count on the Soviet bloc's "solidarity and support" and that it will remain a socialist state. Brezhnev, in his keynote congress speech, stopped short of explicitly expressing confidence in the Polish communists, although he appeared to support Kania's analysis of the situation in blaming the crisis on the mistakes of the past.

CONGRESS SPEECHES Poland's Kania gave a ringing pledge, in his 24 February congress speech, to devote his regime's best efforts to overcoming the crisis in his country. Echoing Brezhnev's generally approving remarks of the previous day, the Polish leader stressed that his party "has a full sense of patriotic and internationalist responsibility" for resolving the crisis and thanked Moscow for its "faith" in the Poles' capacity to work out their problems "independently." He was strongly applauded by the assembly when he said that "we have the will and strength to make sure that counterrevolution will fail in Poland." He was more subdued in other speeches in the next two days: at a meeting in Volgograd on the 25th, he merely noted the USSR's "understanding and general support" for Poland, observed that his regime was "trying to prevent the economic situation from getting worse," and predicted that the difficulties would be overcome provided "we stand firm" on Marxist-Leninist principles. In a Warsaw car plant speech, on his return home the next day, Kania dwelt at length on the "anxiety" expressed at the congress over the Polish situation, indicating that Warsaw had much to do to earn the "respect" of its socialist allies.

Of the Soviet bloc leaders other than Brezhnev and Kania, only Hungary's Kadar mentioned Poland explicitly in his congress speech, reaffirming confidence in the Poles' ability to "find the socialist answer to cope with the present difficult situation." Bulgaria's Zhivkov took a similarly moderate line in press conference remarks--reported by Warsaw radio but not by Sofia or Moscow media--to the effect that Poland's problems are its own business. Romanian leader Ceausescu's speech reaffirmed "each party's right to independently decide its political line." The two East European leaders who have taken the hardest line on the Polish issue noted their concerns only briefly and indirectly. Czechoslovakia's Husak dismissed as "vain" attempts by the West to "uproot" any country from the socialist community, and the GDR's Honecker expressed resolve to defend socialism against "all hostile attacks." Moscow carried each of the East European leaders' remarks in PRAVDA with only minor variations.

REGIONAL LEADERS JOIN FORCES TO PROMOTE LOCAL INTERESTS

A new wrinkle in the traditional lobbying efforts practiced by local leaders at party congresses showed up in a number of speeches at the 26th CPSU Congress as leaders from neighboring geographic areas appeared to mount coordinated efforts to promote joint regional interests. In some cases the parallelism of advocacy was so pronounced as to suggest that informal coalitions had been formed to press demands focused on regional shortages of critical resources: water in Central Asia, energy in the Transcaucasus, and manpower in the industrialized European areas.

WATER The most clearly coordinated lobbying effort at the congress was mounted by Central Asian leaders in behalf of an enormously expensive plan to obtain additional water by diverting Siberian rivers to the south. Playing upon current concerns over the country's food program, advocates of the project held out the promise of bountiful new sources of supply. Thus Politburo member Kunayev, the first secretary of Kazakhstan, linked the completion of the project to increased grain and meat supplies and held out the specter of a "disaster" in the grain-producing Virgin Lands--an area closely associated with Brezhnev's early career--if the project is not implemented. Kunayev's suggestions were strongly endorsed by Politburo candidate member Rashidov, the Uzbek party chief, who reflected the intense discussion of this subject at his republic party congress when he promised that the additional water would provide a "major contribution" to the country's food program. Joining his neighbors, Turkmen First Secretary Gapurov urged party and state officials to act favorably on the water diversion program. A dissonant note was sounded by the head of the Altay party organization, who reminded delegates that his region was a major supplier of grain to the country and that its interests should be "more fully considered" in any distrubution of Siberian water. A variant and possibly competitive plan for water diversion was mentioned by the first secretary of Krasnodar, who promised that the Kuban could provide abundant new food supplies if water from the north were diverted "via the Volga to the Northern Caucasus."

ENERGY Energy shortages, which apparently have been exacerbated over the past year by the cutoff of gas supplies from Iran, were a principal concern of congress speakers from the Transcaucasian republics. This problem appears to have been particularly acute during the winter months; leaders from all three republics have recently complained in the local press about frequent disruptions in supply. At the congress Politburo candidate member and Azerbaijani party chief Aliyev described the energy situation as an "urgent problem" for the entire region and urged central ministries to help alleviate the "large deficit" that had built up. Citing Aliyev's remarks, Georgian First

Secretary Shevardnadze, also a candidate member of the Politburo, complained that local energy supplies were not keeping pace with the rest of the economy and called for the construction of a new power station to make up for this shortfall. Armenian party chief Demirchyan also appealed for additional aid from Moscow to increase local energy supplies.

MANPOWER The growing squeeze on manpower resources was a major concern at the congress of many party leaders from the industrialized European regions of the USSR. To cope with anticipated labor deficits these leaders stressed the need for additional capital investments to modernize local industry and other labor-saving measures. Leningrad party chief and Politburo member Romanov, for example, linked economic growth to more effective use of manpower and called upon industry to release surplus labor to bring the number of jobs more in line with the number of available workers. Moscow Obkom chief Konotop was also extremely concerned with manpower shortages, sharply criticizing industries that sought to increase production by adding new workers and calling for a "sharp reduction" in industrial construction to help reduce manpower needs. Latvian party chief Voss described efforts in his republic to deal with the "extremely tight" labor situation by imposing limits on the number of workers employed by local industries; but he complained that this program was being undermined by all-union ministries that did not consider themselves bound by these limits. Lithuanian First Secretary Grishkyavichus reported that sources of additional manpower in Lithuania, too, had been "practically exhausted" and requested additional funds for plant modernization.

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

BEIJING REEVALUATES RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Beijing seems to be considering the possibility of reopening contacts with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)--broken since 1967--as part of an ongoing effort to establish ties with a wide variety of leftist parties in building its united front against the Soviet Union. The JCP has also shown some interest, but disagreements over the Kampuchea question and Japanese defense policy suggest that it will be difficult to fully normalize party relations.

Beijing has shown signs of interest in the JCP after more than a decade of hostility. Low-level favorable references to the JCP in Chinese media have portrayed it as a party that is independent of Moscow--the key requirement Beijing considers in establishing relations with a leftwing party. On 13 December last year XINHUA reported that the JCP and the CPSU had failed in their 5-10 December talks to reach agreement on the Afghanistan question. The news agency cited the JCP charge that Moscow's explanations of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan "are not true" and its call to the USSR to "correct its mistake by withdrawing its troops." A month later, on 14 January, XINHUA reported that AKAHATA, the official organ of the JCP, had denounced the USSR's "naked intervention" in Afghanistan and demanded that it withdraw. Nothing has developed since then, suggesting that Beijing may desire more conclusive evidence of a change in JCP policy, including modification of its support for the Kampuchean regime backed by Moscow and Hanoi.

The JCP has appeared ambivalent about the possibility of improved ties with the CCP. Chairman Miyamoto, in his address to the JCP Central Committee on 19 November, approvingly cited a 1 November article in the CCP theoretical journal HONGQI (RED FLAG) that admitted past mistakes in interfering in the affairs of other parties and promised to adhere to complete independence as the basis for party relations. In a New Year interview for AKAHATA, Miyamoto also stated that he could find signs of a "return to sound judgment" in China. Nevertheless, he rejected the Chinese stance on the U.S.-Japan mutual security relationship and claimed that the CCP was still indirectly attacking the JCP in RENMIN RIBAO--probably an allusion to Chinese praise of other political elements in Japan for supporting current Japanese defense policy.

While Miyamoto said he believed it would be some time before a solution to such differences between the JCP and CCP could be found, he suggestively predicted that there would be future progress in the "international communist movement."

BACKGROUND Since the death of Mao Zedong, Beijing has stepped up its efforts to cultivate foreign party ties in order to encourage a broad united front against the USSR. Dissension in international communist and socialist ranks over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided Beijing with an opportunity to make new gains for this policy. In April last year the CCP restored party ties with the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) during a visit by PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer. At that time CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang declared that Beijing was "willing to reestablish, restore, and develop relations with all working class parties that uphold independence and a correct position." On this basis the CCP established ties with the Venezuelan Christian Socialist Party in September, with the Spanish Communist Party in November, with the Greek Communist Party (Interior) in December, and, most recently, with the French Socialist Party, during a visit by its leader, Francois Mitterrand, to China last month. A summing up report of the Mitterrand visit in RENMIN RIBAO on 17 February said that the new ties denoted the CCP's willingness to develop friendly relations with "other socialist parties in West Europe" and again stated Beijing's desire that all parties that "uphold justice, oppose aggression, and work for social progress and world peace" should unite against hegemonism.

Relations between the JCP and the CCP were disrupted during the Cultural Revolution in 1967, a few months after a meeting in Shanghai between Mao and Miyamoto, which failed to produce agreement on how the two sides should approach the USSR. Beijing's subsequent endorsement of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in the early 1970's also became a major bone of contention between the two parties, as did the JCP's denunciation of China's attack against Vietnam in February 1979 and its support for the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea. In spite of these outstanding differences, the ongoing disagreement between the JCP and the CPSU, heightened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, has apparently tempted the CCP to test the waters of reconciliation.

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MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 23 FEBRUARY - 1 MARCH 1981

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Moscow (2,887 items)		
CPSU 26th Congress	62%	(13%)
Brezhnev Report	14%	(--)
Tikhonov Report	5%	(--)

Beijing (689 items)		
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Zambrano in PRC	12%	(--)
Netherlands Sale of Submarines to Taiwan	7%	(--)
CPSU 26th Congress	4%	(3%)
Soviet-Indochinese Appeal for ASEAN-Indochina Regional Conference	3%	(--)
Fifth National People's Congress 17th Session	3%	(--)

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- Moscow on U.S. defense spending
- Elections to CPSU Central Committee

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

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TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

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USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW PRESSES FOR TALKS, RESPONDS ROUTINELY TO DEFENSE HIKE

> Moscow is treating the Reagan Administration's policy toward the USSR as "irresponsible" but not yet set in concrete. Soviet media have responded with predictable rhetoric to the Administration's charges about Soviet policy in the Third World and to its proposals for sharp increases in U.S. defense spending. At the same time, however, Soviet spokesmen have been pressing with renewed vigor for bilateral dialogue, echoing Brezhnev's comments in his report to the 26th party congress and insisting on Moscow's readiness for mutual compromise.

Despite sharp media criticism of current U.S. policy, Moscow appears to be temporizing on the prospects for a working relationship with the Reagan Administration. Leading Soviet commentators on U.S. affairs appear to be counseling restraint by discounting early Administration statements and strongly hinting that circumstances will yet force the United States to negotiate with the USSR. USA and Canada Institute director Georgiy Arbatov appeared to convey that message in his first official comments on the new Administration, published in the 9 March issue of PRAVDA. Writing for the first time as a full member of the Central Committee, Arbatov declared that "few people" would venture to draw conclusions about the future policy of the Administration from the first statements of the new President and Secretary of State. Arbatov indicated that his conclusions were based on the belief that the Administration has yet to adjust its approach from the election campaign to the realities of Presidential office.

CAMPAIGN FOR DIALOGUE Brezhnev's report to the 26th party congress appears to have signaled an invigorated campaign in Moscow for dialogue with the United States. In this effort Moscow has adopted a public posture that combines impatience to begin discussions with an air of moderation and compromise. Arbatov exemplified Soviet impatience at what he described as the Administration's hesitation to adapt its words to reality, warning that "harsh objective conditions" require answers "soon" from Washington. Vitaliy Kobysh, section chief in the Central Committee International Information Department, in a 4 March LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (LITERARY GAZETTE) article, illustrated the other facet of Moscow's approach. Kobysh portrayed

President Brezhnev as resisting the temptation to reply in kind to "bellicose, if not hysterical" statements from the Reagan Administration and adopting instead a calm and moderate tone. If the United States and its allies "come halfway to meet us," he wrote, problems that seem insoluble today could be solved.

RESPONSE TO DEFENSE INCREASES Moscow has responded in unremarkable fashion to Secretary of Defense Weinberger's recent proposal for sharp increases in U.S. defense spending. Soviet media have renewed charges that the United States is seeking military superiority, but there has been no authoritative reaction. The 8 March KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) was particularly strident in accusing the Administration of escalating the arms race and preparing for war. The military daily did not raise the issue of counteraction by the USSR but alleged that U.S. policies were creating anxiety among the European allies. On 6 March, two days after Secretary Weinberger's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, IZVESTIYA's New York correspondent chose to address more promising developments in U.S.-Soviet relations. President Reagan's most recent expression of interest in talks with the Soviet Union, he reported, is "the most positive of all those the President has made in response to Soviet initiatives."

26TH CPSU CONGRESS

BREZHNEV AIDES, PARTY OFFICIALS GAIN IN NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE

> The new Central Committee elected by the 26th CPSU Congress provides further evidence of the continuity that was the meeting's salient characteristic. Most notable among those promoted were members of Brezhnev's personal entourage, long-time foreign affairs advisers, and high officials in the Central Committee apparatus.

The changes dramatically underscore Brezhnev's domination of the party, confirm the likelihood of only marginal policy change, and virtually ensure that the coming leadership succession will be controlled by men of the General Secretary's choosing. The sharp increase in central party officials on the Central Committee may have broader institutional significance, including a stronger role for the party in critical policy areas where the normal institutional arrangements are not producing satisfactory solutions.

The most notable new members of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission are the following:

+ Brezhnev's son, Yuriy, now first deputy minister of foreign trade, and his son-in-law, Yuriy M. Churbanov, now first deputy minister of internal affairs and previously only a Central Auditing Commission member, were elected Central Committee candidate members, a status usually accorded only full ministers.

+ All Brezhnev's personal assistants were elected to the Central Committee this time. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, a candidate member last time, joined G.E. Tsukanov as a full member; A.I. Blatov, previously a Central Auditing Commission member, and V.A. Golikov, never before elected to any central body, became candidate members. Moreover, Brezhnev's Supreme Soviet assistant, Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretariat chief A.I. Lukyanov, was added to the Central Auditing Commission.

+ Brezhnev's close ally Chernenko gained promotion for two of his assistants. The first deputy head of the Central Committee's General Department, K.M. Bogolyubov, previously only a Central Auditing Commission member, was elected a full Central Committee member; the head of the Central Committee's Letters Department, B.P. Yakovlev, was added to the Central Auditing Commission. (New Premier Tikhonov's assistant B.T. Batsanov, chief of the premier's personal secretariat, was reelected to the Central Auditing

Commission, although he is a holdover from Kosygin's tenure as premier rather than a newly promoted Tikhonov protege.)

+ Brezhnev's foreign affairs advisers and detente spokesmen also prospered. In addition to Aleksandrov-Agentov, academic advisers Georgiy Arbatov and N.N. Inozemtsev and U.S. specialist First Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko were promoted to full Central Committee members. IZVESTIYA Political Observer A.I. Bovin, a frequent and controversial writer on detente with apparent ties to Brezhnev, was added to the Central Auditing Commission.

+ Brezhnev's three leading proteges in the KGB, deputy chairmen S.K. Tsvigun, G.K. Tsinev, and V.M. Chebrikov, were promoted from candidate to full members of the Central Committee.

+ Even Brezhnev's personal physician was rewarded with membership in the Central Auditing Commission. Ye. I. Chazov, whose post as deputy minister of health and head of a cardiac center clearly did not justify such status, was nevertheless elected.

INCREASE OF CENTRAL PARTY OFFICIALS

The number of government officials and regional party secretaries in the Central Committee increased marginally, but the main increase resulted from the addition of Central Committee apparatchiks. Central Committee voting membership expanded from 287 to 319; meanwhile, the number of Central Committee department heads and deputy heads (who are not simultaneously Central Committee secretaries) rose from four full members to 15. Most such officials were moved up a step or two--from candidate member to full member or from the Central Auditing Commission to candidate Central Committee member--reflecting a higher status for such posts. Thus, while most department heads were only candidate members or Central Auditing Commission members in 1976, most are now full members. Moreover, most of the first deputy heads are now full members as well, whereas before few were even candidate members.

Department Heads and Deputy Heads

	1976	1981
CC full members	4	15
CC candidate members	11	12
Central Auditing Commission	9	2

The higher status for leaders of Central Committee departments may reinforce their power in dealing with ministers and other top government officials, most of whom are full Central Committee members.

MOSCOW SEEKS COMMUNIST UNITY, MUTING OF CURRENT DISPUTES

Moscow tried to sustain an aura of world communist unity behind Soviet policies at the 26th CPSU Congress, but its tactics only highlighted a continuing dispute with independent-minded West European communists. Heavyhanded treatment of the Italian delegation in particular underscored Moscow's determination to keep discord generated by its policies in Afghanistan and Poland from marring the congress proceedings. Soviet sensitivity to dissent at the Congress is especially apparent in contrast to the more tolerant attitude shown at the 25th congress in 1976, when Soviet speakers engaged in a spirited give-and-take with Italian and French communists regarding questions of strategy and authority within the communist movement.

Moscow's concern for the appearance of harmony was aided by the return of the French communists to a supporting role. PCF delegation head Gaston Plissonnier, substituting for campaigning party boss Marchais, delivered a warm message of support to the 24 February session that blended standard expressions of the French party's autonomy with a pledge to deepen the PCF's solidarity with Moscow. The CPSU appeared to reward the PCF's renewed pro-Soviet orientation--a shift consecrated just after the Afghanistan invasion during Marchais's January 1980 visit to Moscow--by according Plissonnier higher status than that given him five years ago, equivalent to what Marchais himself would normally receive. At the 25th congress Plissonnier and the PCF had been one target of General Secretary Brezhnev's admonishments to the West Europeans against ideological deviations.

The Italian communists bore the brunt of Moscow's efforts to keep interparty differences under wraps. Party delegation leader Pajetta was clearly snubbed--shunted aside with several delegates from minor foreign parties to deliver his remarks to a 27 February meeting held elsewhere in Moscow. Soviet officials appear to have overreacted to the prospect that Pajetta would raise the touchy issues of Afghanistan and Poland, the subject of recent sharp polemics between the two parties and a contributing factor in PCI Secretary General Berlinguer's decision to boycott the congress. The PCI representative in fact outlined his party's position on these issues in straightforward, nonpolemical terms, and his speech was duly reported in full in the 2 March PRAVDA. Upon his return to Rome, Pajetta expressed displeasure at the discourteous treatment he received but also indicated he had no wish to dwell on the incident.

Pajetta's treatment may have been largely a reflection of Moscow's pique with the active public role the PCI has taken in recent months to lobby for Soviet foreign policy restraint--particularly toward Poland. The PCI delegate's Moscow speech was no more objectionable for its handling of bilateral differences than British party General Secretary McLennan's brief mention of Afghanistan in his 28 February speech to the congress itself. Another European party also at odds with Moscow, the Spanish, avoided a similar rebuff when its delegation left prematurely, citing the abortive coup in Spain as the reason. Despite the public assurances of Soviet party affairs expert Vadim Zagladin, a press spokesman for the congress, the Spanish greetings message has not yet been published in the Soviet central press.

CALL FOR COMMUNIST UNITY

It remains to be seen whether President Brezhnev's call at the congress for greater communist unity based on a shared concern for world peace presages a new campaign from Moscow for orchestrated expressions of interparty cooperation. Soviet media have widely publicized Brezhnev's remarks since the congress, but there has been little discussion of specifics. At a 3 March press conference in Moscow, International Information Department chief Leonid Zamyatin--the official press spokesman for the congress--responded in cautious terms to a question about the prospects for a new world conference of communist parties. Moscow favors such a meeting "in principle," Zamyatin said--in an answer reported only on Moscow radio's international service--if a "majority" of communist parties are similarly inclined. Such a meeting, Zamyatin said, should take up the "cardinal" issue of world peace.

A new quest for communist unity also appeared to be the point of an article by a mid-level Central Committee official, Yuriy Krasin, which appeared in NEW TIMES (No. 7, 1981) on the eve of the party congress. Krasin, a deputy rector of the Academy of Social Sciences, suggested that the current international situation imparts new urgency to the coordination of communist policies. Krasin ruled out the establishment of a "center in the communist movement," but he did suggest that some kind of "complex mechanism" to exchange views and experience might be appropriate. Krasin suggested that such a mechanism should focus its efforts on emerging "global problems," primarily on the prevention of nuclear war and on economic development in the Third World.

MOSCOW COOL TO PYONGYANG'S CALL FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS

North Korea used the occasion of the 26th CPSU Congress to signal once again that it wants to improve relations with the Soviet Union, a two-year-old initiative that continues to elicit a cool response from Moscow. Pyongyang's wooing of Moscow was reflected in the unusually high level of the delegation it sent to the congress, led by Premier Yi Chong-ok, and in an unprecedented public greeting from Kim Il-song to Brezhnev on his reelection as CPSU general secretary. Moscow's chilly reaction to Pyongyang's advances was apparent in Brezhnev's report to the congress, which omitted North Korea from a list of fraternal socialist states and contained only a passing reference to support for the North's reunification policy.

OVERTURES FROM PYONGYANG

By sending Yi, who recently concluded a state visit to China, Pyongyang may have signaled that it hopes to apply a more evenhanded approach in its relations with Moscow and Beijing. Yi's attendance at the Soviet congress raised the North Korean representation there above the level present at the two preceding Soviet party congresses. The Korean delegation to the CPSU congress was also at a higher level than the representation Moscow sent to the Korean party congress last December, when CPSU Politburo member and Moscow party chief Grishin visited Pyongyang.

Yi's speech to the Soviet congress on 25 February was warmer toward the Soviet Union than the speech Vice Premier Pak Song-chol delivered at the Soviet party congress in 1976, when Korean-Soviet relations were at one of their lowest points. For example, in contrast to Pak in his congress speech five years ago, Yi hailed the leadership of General Secretary Brezhnev by name. In further deference to the Soviet Union, Yi spoke of a "decisive" Soviet role in liberating countries after World War II, a more positive characterization than Pak's description of the Soviet role as "important." He also thanked the congress for consistent Soviet support for the North's reunification policy; there was no such expression of gratitude in 1976. Yi's description of the traditional friendship between the Korean and Soviet parties and people went beyond Pak's more limited reference to relations only between the two peoples. Yi even went so far as to characterize

Korean-Soviet friendship as "bound with blood"--an expression reminiscent of the term "sealed with blood," which Pyongyang has often used to describe Korean-Chinese friendship.

Kim Il-song's unprecedented message to Brezhnev on his reelection as CPSU general secretary served to dramatize Pyongyang's overtures for improved relations. The message was more cordial than Kim's messages to the Soviet leader on past occasions--in 1977, when Brezhnev took over from Podgornyy as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and in 1979, when Brezhnev was reelected to the Supreme Soviet. On both those occasions Kim had extended "warm" congratulations; in this message he offered his "warmest congratulations and comradely greetings" and, like Yi, praised traditional friendship and cooperation between the Korean and Soviet parties and people. By contrast, Kim's messages to Brezhnev in 1977 and 1979 hailed only the relations between the two peoples.

MOSCOW'S RESPONSE There is no sign from Moscow that the Soviet Union is warming to Pyongyang's advances. On the contrary, while Brezhnev's report to the 25th CPSU Congress included the DPRK in a list of fraternal socialist states, this year the Soviet leader dropped North Korea as well as Yugoslavia from that list. Brezhnev referred only briefly to North Korea and Yugoslavia--after discussing the loyal East European regimes and just before launching into criticism of China. Moreover, his comment on Korea was even briefer than his comment on Yugoslavia, and it contained no praise for or promise of specific support for North Korean policies or bilateral ties. "The Soviet Union is in solidarity," Brezhnev said, "with the struggle of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a peaceful, democratic unification of the motherland free from outside interference and strives to deepen and enrich ties with it." Followup Soviet publicity for this statement of support was restricted to a brief, almost word-for-word replay in a Moscow radio broadcast beamed to Korea on 4 March.

Soviet treatment of Yi during the congress seemed to have hewed strictly to protocol. Thus Yi was received by his party and government counterpart, Premier Tikhonov, for a "friendly" discussion. In keeping with Yi's rank, his tours of factories and other facilities got more Soviet media coverage than those of the lower ranking Pak Song-chol in 1976. Yi reportedly laid a wreath at the Lenin Mausoleum, a gesture Pak is not known to have made in 1976.

POLAND

ARMY PAPER REVIVES ANTI-SEMITISM ISSUE IN ATTACK ON DISSIDENTS

> The long-dormant issue of anti-Semitism in Poland has been resurrected in harsh terms by the military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in its denunciation of the Solidarity-led Warsaw rally on 8 March, the anniversary of the 1968 Polish student demonstrations in support of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. The army paper's hostile, anti-Semitic stance toward the anniversary--representing an escalation of its past criticism of the dissidents--is in striking contrast to the mild, conciliatory treatment given the commemoration by the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU.

While the party paper, presumably reflecting Kania's views, warned against opening old divisive wounds on the anniversary, the army daily revived the charge, widely promoted at the time, of "Zionist" responsibility for the disorders--a move clearly aimed at fostering a split between the Solidarity union and its dissident KOR advisers, Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, both of whom are Jews. Further evidence of hardline efforts to achieve such a split came in a counterdemonstration on the 8th, conducted by old-line communists who made anti-Semitic attacks on KOR and stressed that the Solidarity union must be a strictly "Polish" movement. Similar anti-Semitic Polish nationalism has been associated with Mieczyslaw Moczar, who was purged for his role in putting down the 1968 riots but was rehabilitated and named to the PZPR Politburo in December of last year.

In an appeal for calm before the Sunday anniversary demonstration, an unsigned article in the 7-8 March TRYBUNA LUDU studiously avoided any mention of the alleged Zionist role in the 1968 disorders, noting in moderate terms that the March events were an important episode in Polish history and worthy of objective and "unemotional" study. It cautioned against "attempts to use the anniversary of the March events to embitter and divide the public" or to renew old divisions and create "new" ones. The paper stressed that the way out of the present crisis in Poland lies in an "alliance" of the forces of commonsense and civic responsibility and in working for the unity of all Poles. Unity and calm, it added, are necessary for the successful implementation of the program announced by Premier Jaruzelski in early February, which included a 90-day moratorium on strikes.

In contrast, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on the 9th, the day after the anniversary, bluntly denounced the commemoration as a subversive event. According to the summary carried by the Polish news agency PAP, the article charged that those commemorating the anniversary were trying to "heat up the emotions of the past in order to be better able to carry out attacks on socialism." Recalling that the student disorders 13 years ago had occurred at the time of the U.S. "subjugation" of Vietnam and Israel's "aggression" against the Arab states, the paper called Kuron and Michnik Zionist leaders of the disorders, saying that their loyalty to Israel was stronger than it was to Poland. In an apparent warning of further charges against the dissident leaders, the article said, "We are far from having exploited all our arguments in exposing the supporters of dismantling socialism in Poland."

USSR-PERSIAN GULF

MOSCOW PORTRAYS GULF COUNCIL AS REFLECTING DOMESTIC TENSIONS

Signaling its displeasure over the formation of a "coordination council" by Saudi Arabia and five Gulf states, Moscow has insinuated that the move was prompted by apprehension over domestic political problems and has pointedly called attention to antiregime movements faced by some of these countries. Moscow has traditionally looked with suspicion on Riyadh's moves toward regional cooperation, viewing them as maneuvers to strengthen Saudi and, ultimately, U.S. influence in the area.

Moscow promptly expressed skepticism about the aims of the council, established at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE in Riyadh on 4 February. While the ministerial council was expected to focus on regional peace and security, said a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 6 February, there were indications that the conferees were more concerned about their own internal situations. Coincident with establishment of the council, Moscow radio's Arab service in early February publicized statements by a representative of the Bahraini National Liberation Front, an organization previously given only sporadic attention. The Bahraini NLF member even proclaimed support by the front and by the "Saudi Communist Party"--virtually never mentioned by Moscow--for President Brezhnev's Persian Gulf security proposals.

In a more dramatic flourish, Moscow invited Bahraini NLF members to the 26th CPSU Congress, and a front delegate was cited by PRAVDA on 4 March as hailing the USSR's "repeatedly confirmed" solidarity with the "liberation struggles" of Gulf and Peninsula peoples. The front spokesman--like Moscow itself--depicted Saudi Arabia as the prime mover of the council and saw that body as serving "imperialist" interests. Moscow's annoyance with Riyadh seemed further underscored by its failure, for the first time since 1977, to broadcast the annual Arabic-language talk commemorating the establishment of Soviet-Saudi diplomatic relations in 1926.

The spate of publicity for "national liberation" spokesmen comes against the background of a sophisticated Soviet analysis last fall of the potential for "social explosions" in Saudi Arabia--and, by extension, in other Gulf countries undergoing rapid social and economic change. A two-part article in the monthly magazine

ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY (AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, Nos. 8 and 9, 1980) had characterized the stability of the Saudi regime as "temporary" given the sociopolitical vacuum following the "destruction" of the old social balance.

USSR

MILITARY LEADERS STRIKE BALANCED POSTURE ON ARMED FORCES DAY

The Soviet military's commemoration of Armed Forces Day on 23 February was well attuned to the spirit of Brezhnev's report to the 26th CPSU Congress that day. Military officials writing in the Soviet central press echoed official denunciations of Western policies but adopted a moderate tone in describing Soviet responses. Defense Minister Ustinov denied in a PRAVDA article that what he described as Moscow's refusal to be provoked by the West was a sign of weakness--suggesting that there may be others in the regime who take a different view.

The military spokesmen employed a standard repertoire of accusations against the West to deplore the present state of East-West relations. Common themes were the notions that the West was out to "bury detente," that it was even going so far--according to some spokesmen--as to make "intensive material preparations for another world war." In going on to describe Soviet reactions to this situation, the military projected an image of restraint. Drawing on formulas that have acquired currency in the Brezhnev era, they denied that the Soviet Union is seeking "superiority," they asserted that Soviet military power is intended to avert war, they declared that Soviet defense expenditures "are not in excess of what is necessary," and they insisted that Soviet strategic doctrine is "strictly defensive."

Defense Minister Ustinov alone dealt with key foreign policy issues, exhibiting a cautious approach and warning the West to behave similarly. He was particularly explicit in denying Western charges of Soviet support for international terrorism, interpreting such charges as an attempt to discredit the national liberation movement. He referred to SALT II in positive terms, saying that it "could be an effective obstacle" to a renewed strategic arms race. He described the Soviet Union as committed to a policy of restraint. In response to the "imperialists'" efforts to stir up enmity, he said, the Soviet Union pursues a "calm, balanced, and constructive" policy aimed at peaceful coexistence, detente, and disarmament.

DENIAL OF WEAKNESS Ustinov's denial that the Soviet Union was showing "weakness" may have been nothing more than a rhetorical flourish in what was, on the whole, a somewhat indignant broadside against external critics of Soviet policy. But certain aspects of the statement raise the possibility that it may have been aimed at currents of opinion within the regime representing elements impatient with detente and anxious for a more vigorous assertion of national interests. It came in the context of a defensive presentation of the rationale for the Soviet Union's policy of restraint. The Soviet Union has enough "self-control and sense of responsibility," said Ustinov, not to yield to provocations, "whatever their source." The polemical overtone is reminiscent, moreover, of similar signs of discord provoked by Brezhnev's 1979 arms proposal for Europe. There were intriguing hints after Brezhnev's 6 October 1979 Berlin speech offering unilateral force reductions in exchange for concessions from NATO that elements in East Europe and within the regime considered it unduly conciliatory. Among the indications were statements from some Soviet officials praising the "courage" of the speech and one, by a high military officer, denying that it showed "weakness."*

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* The circumstances and some of the data are discussed in the TRENDS of 27 February 1980, pages 5-6.

BRIEF

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Soviet Sacrifices Noted on Treaty Jubilee

Despite Soviet preoccupation with the CPSU congress, both Moscow and Kabul gave extensive coverage to the 60th anniversary of the first Soviet-Afghan treaty, on 28 February. In contrast to earlier commemorations of this treaty, both sides emphasized the sacrifices the Soviet people have made to assist in the socioeconomic transformation of Afghanistan and largely ignored the political changes that have taken place there. But both sides, as they did last year, stressed the "organic" development of Soviet-Afghan relations as expressed in the 5 December 1978 treaty--the "legal basis" for the Soviet invasion of December 1979--and used the occasion to justify that intervention. In a 28 February SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA (SOCIALIST INDUSTRY) article that may reflect Soviet concern over the expense of this venture, Soviet commentator M. Nepesov pointedly referred to the aid--including military materiel--that the USSR has given to Afghanistan, even when the Soviet people faced "hard times" at home.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 2-8 MARCH 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,129 items)		
CPSU 26th Congress	41%	(62%)
International Women's Day	8%	(--)
Soviet-Polish Leaders Meeting, Moscow	4%	(--)

Beijing (618 items)		
Soviet 26th CPSU Conference	9%	(4%)
Fifth National People's Congress 17th Session	6%	(3%)
Soviet Appeal for ASEAN-Indochina Regional Conference	3%	(3%)

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18 MARCH 1981
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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current date

POLAND-USSR

The status and prospects of the Kania regime remain fragile but stable, and Soviet policy toward Poland has not become more threatening, judging by the public commentary of the two countries since the 4 March Brezhnev-Kania meeting. Kania has come under new political pressure at home, possibly in part because of uncertainty concerning his standing with the Russians, but he has struck back confidently at his critics and shows no signs of changing course. Soviet comment on Poland has remained low keyed and has notably failed to play up the threat of intervention implied by the reemergence of the Brezhnev doctrine in the 4 March statement, although some commentaries have contained references to the doctrine. The most significant development in the Soviet commentary was a new PRAVDA article on trade unions, which appears to mark a turn toward conservatism in a debate which has shown signs of remarkable flexibility on a sensitive doctrinal issue.

KANIA FACES PRESSURES FROM CONSERVATIVE, LIBERAL FACTIONS

Kania has come under attack from both conservative and liberal forces lately, as the uncertainty following the 4 March meeting with Brezhnev appears to have increased his vulnerability to internal criticism. Barely a week after the army daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI had flaunted anti-Semitic symbols in calling for a tougher policy against Solidarity and its KOR advisers, Kania was subjected to strong criticism from the liberal wing in a ZYCIE WARSZAWY article which virtually accused him of incompetence in carrying out the renewal program. Kania has struck back hard at his critics, serving notice that the new pressures from both ends of the political spectrum will not dissuade him from his moderate course.

The article in the 14-15 March issue of the government paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY was pegged to current tensions in Radom where Solidarity's threat of a general strike forced the regime to capitulate to union demands for removal of local party, government, and police officials. The article charged that "the party was too slow in reacting to the course of events" and should have removed such officials earlier, rather than letting tensions build up into a strike situation. "If the party does not display initiative in good time," it declared, a "political vacuum" is created and the party has only itself to blame if Solidarity tries to fill this vacuum by taking on a "political" role. Emphasizing that it was the party leadership, not the government, that was at fault, the article praised Premier Jaruzelski's 10-point program for economic recovery and urged Solidarity's inclusion in "joint management" of the country's economy.

Kania has shown no signs of knuckling under to his critics. Quite the contrary: In responding to the conservatives, he declared in a speech at a 12 March session of the party congress preparatory commission that "we have no intention of resorting . . . to anti-Semitism for any purpose whatsoever." He added that anti-Semitism is "alien to communists" and incompatible with Poland's traditions and "tragic experience" and that "our party will never feed on" such sentiments. On the 14th, he hit back at the charges of lack of initiative on the part of the PZPR leadership, asserting that the party has an unswerving will to carry out "the renewal" and to ensure that the errors of the past will never again be repeated. Also in apparent response to the government paper's criticism, Kania insisted that "we are doing all we can" to improve economic management and that the role of Solidarity, as well as that of the old industrial unions, is a "large one."

Other major players in the Polish drama have not made any overt effort to exploit the new pressures on Kania. A 15 March statement by the Polish Catholic bishops, though reiterating the church's standard support for a private farmers' union (opposed by Kania), made a strong plea for "prudence" and calm and implicitly rejected extremism in warning workers not to be "exploited by anybody for narrow private or group goals alien to the interests of the nation." And Politburo member Mieczyslaw Moczar, who has been identified with anti-Semitism in the past, condemned this prejudice as well as liberal extremism in an interview carried by ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 17th. Moczar denounced both the Solidarity-led and conservative rallies held on the 8 March anniversary of the 1968 student disorders as having exacerbated tensions and harmed Poland's image abroad.

MOSCOW SENDS MIXED SIGNALS ON POLAND SINCE KANIA MEETING

Moscow's comment on Poland during the past two weeks has done little to clarify some of the uncertainties about Soviet intentions left by the 4 March Brezhnev-Kania meeting. While the statement on that meeting contained some signs of sharpened pressure on Warsaw--most notably in its invocation of the Brezhnev doctrine--recent comment has failed to reflect any buildup of such pressure or other threats. At the same time, despite the relative calm prevailing on the Polish labor front, the Soviets have declined to give the Kania regime more than the qualified vote of confidence apparent in the 4 March statement.

In the most authoritative comment since the bilateral talks, an 8 March PRAVDA editorial on the CPSU congress largely echoed the 4 March statement in affirming confidence that the Polish communists are "fully determined to ward off the serious threat hanging over their country's socialist gains." Moscow has also replayed several official Polish statements, including those by Kania, reaffirming that the Poles have sufficient strength to overcome the crisis. Moscow has shown restraint in declining to report two breaks in the labor peace--at Lodz and Radom--or to show open support for the "anti-Zionist" attacks on dissidents Michnik and Kuron, as have some Czechoslovak media. The Brezhnev doctrine has been recalled only in several low-level commentaries--including two English-language radio broadcasts on the 6th and a radio roundtable on the 8th. Thus far Moscow has given only minimal publicity to the Warsaw Pact command exercises now being staged in and around Poland.

Moscow's explicit comment on the Polish labor scene also has been ambiguous and does not seem to reflect a concerted effort to show that the situation is growing out of control. On the negative side, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 7th stepped up charges against Solidarity by portraying its leaders Gwiazda and Lis as KOR agents, and TASS the same day reported that "armed groups" of Solidarity were preventing legal bodies from serving a summons to dissident Michnik. At the same time, English-language radio commentaries by Olenichev on the 6th and 12th portrayed Polish industrial production as gradually returning to normal, and PRAVDA on the 16th cited remarks by Kania that Solidarity can play a "major role" in improving management and productivity.

PRAVDA DEFENDS NEED FOR PARTY DOMINANCE OVER TRADE UNIONS

The latest in a number of articles on trade unions that have appeared sporadically in PRAVDA since early in the Polish crisis strikes a stridently doctrinaire note in what has heretofore seemed to be a relatively unstructured airing of ideas in reaction to the new trade union phenomena in Poland. In contrast with earlier articles that appeared to open the door to accommodation with Solidarity-type unions by recalling Lenin's flexibility on practical issues and by rejecting the notion of a "set model," the present article takes a rigidly uncompromising stance, insisting on the subordination of all trade union activities to party tutelage. Written by V. Ivanov, a historian, the article hails the 60th anniversary of the 10th party congress, an event celebrated in party history as marking the defeat of the "workers opposition," an earlier effort to challenge party authority in the name of the workers.

Ivanov made the most of the historical symbolism in stressing the continuing importance in contemporary times of the subordination of trade union activities to party policy. Dismissing the arguments of earlier articles on the same subject, which emphasized the function of trade unions as defenders of workers' rights, Ivanov returned to the classical Leninist proposition that their "main task" was to serve as a "school of communism." He interpreted this to mean that unions should be concerned primarily with encouraging worker productivity and educating the masses. He took sharp issue with the notion that trade unions should play a larger political role, condemning those who held such views with the assertion that Lenin had believed such elements were pursuing "purely demagogic ends" and "seeking special privileges for a bureaucratized section of workers."

A number of Ivanov's critical thrusts seemed aimed at specific groups or at individuals--some possibly in Poland--but the identities of the targets were not made clear. Pointing out that the 10th party congress had underscored the need to strengthen party influence over the trade unions "in every possible way," he stressed the contemporary relevance of its decisions. "Even now," he said, it is necessary to follow the example of the congress and struggle against "opportunists"--people who, he said, are trying to turn the management of the economy over to the trade unions and deny the party its legitimate role. He also attacked "modern anticommunists," again not identifying them, accusing them of seeking to liquidate the gains of socialism by spreading antiparty slogans.

BACKGROUND Since the early weeks of the Polish crisis, Soviet authorities have clearly been grappling with the problem of how to deal with the Solidarity phenomenon in terms of their own theory and practice. The relatively flexible approach of earlier PRAVDA articles indicated that they were seeking a theoretical framework that could justify the acceptance of Solidarity so long as it did not challenge the supreme authority of the party. This accommodating approach was first seen in a 25 September PRAVDA article by G. Alekseyev, which dwelt on the "breadth and diversity" of Lenin's writings on trade unions and seemed to suggest a tacit acceptance of "free" trade unions so long as their activities did not stray beyond certain limits. A 26 December PRAVDA article by M. Baglay went even further, suggesting that party influence in trade unions might be exercised mainly through the persuasive powers of communists who are also union members. He also asserted that there was no need for socialist trade unions to "mechanically copy" each other and that they should adapt to local conditions.

Signs are mixed on the reaction of top party leaders to the themes of these discussions. In his speech last month to the party congress, Brezhnev asserted in regard to Poland that there were a "wealth of ways and methods" conforming to the socialist model, but he also suggested that there were limits beyond which these adaptations could not go. The January issue of the authoritative party journal KOMMUNIST (No. 2), by contrast, took a much more rigidly doctrinaire approach to the relationship between ideology and policy. Without referring to any specific issue, the editorial sharply attacked those who attempt to treat ideology lightly when making political decisions. It warned that such "theoretical blindness" would be a "flagrant mistake bordering on political shortsightedness." And, in an apparent attack on those deemed too willing to adapt to changing circumstances--as in the current situation in Poland, presumably--the editorial argued that politics must not be dependent upon "chance events" nor neglect principles to achieve "temporary local successes," but must be the "master" of such situations. The author warned that lapses of this type could lead to "counterrevolution" or "economic chaos."

USSR-U.S.-AFGHANISTAN

TASS STATEMENT GENTLY REBUKES REAGAN ON AID TO INSURGENTS

In an unusually soft-spoken TASS statement, Moscow has responded at the lowest authoritative level to President Reagan's remark in a 9 March television interview that the United States, if asked, would "consider" military assistance to Afghan insurgents. The decision to issue a formal response, after a week of routine commentary on the subject, suggests heightened concern about U.S. understanding of Soviet interests in Afghanistan. Consistent with Moscow's general posture toward the Reagan Administration, the statement stressed Soviet readiness for dialogue on international problems, including Afghanistan.

The 18 March TASS statement mildly cautioned that a U.S. policy of assistance to the Afghan insurgents--now "officially confirmed" for the "first time"--would further complicate the situation in the region and lead to new difficulties in the pursuit of a political settlement. Earlier comment, which had more stridently characterized the President's remarks as "challenging" and "bellicose," had similarly regretted that his statements had come at a time of purportedly growing international interest in a peaceful resolution of the situation. The TASS statement accused Washington of exacerbating tensions in the Persian Gulf and obstructing talks on an Indian Ocean peace zone. It implicitly set these actions against the background of the succession of Soviet proposals for peaceful resolution of such problems through international discussion and accord. In particular, TASS' phraseology recalled Soviet President Brezhnev's expression of willingness, in his CPSU Congress report, to discuss the "international aspects" of the Afghan problem in conjunction with questions of security in the Persian Gulf.

The statement avoided any confrontational tone or threat of counteraction. TASS did observe that people of all countries of the area, "including Pakistan," would "inevitably lose" as a consequence of U.S. participation in "armed interference" in Afghanistan. As for the Soviet Union, TASS merely reaffirmed that it would continue giving Afghanistan necessary assistance as long as "acts of aggression" against that country continued.

USSR-SOUTH AFRICA

MOSCOW FUELS AFRICAN FEARS OF U.S. TILT TOWARD PRETORIA

Moscow is seeking to capitalize on African concerns about the direction of U.S. foreign policy under the Reagan Administration. Soviet media have been vigorously replaying speculation that the Administration intends to strengthen ties with the Republic of South Africa and have portrayed statements by the President and other officials as evidence of Administration hostility to black African interests. While seeking to benefit from concern about U.S. policy, Moscow has avoided any specific public offers of support to its clients in the region.

U.S. SHIFT PORTRAYED

Soviet media began raising the specter of negative shifts in American policy in Africa as the Reagan Administration took office. Moscow's radio and press commentary suggested that South Africa's intransigence at the Geneva conference on Namibia in January was due to Pretoria's hopes for greater sympathy from the new Administration and warned of weakening U.S. support for a negotiated settlement. A broad picture of malevolent U.S. designs on Africa was painted in a 27 January commentary on Moscow radio's international service by Anatoliy Gromyko, director of Moscow's Africa Institute. Gromyko predicted that the new Administration would create a "smokescreen" of Soviet-American confrontation in Africa to hide its real intention--"confrontation with the Africans and Africa's progressive regimes."

Soviet media stepped up their efforts to exploit black African concerns in the wake of the Reagan Administration's public attacks on the USSR. Soviet broadcasts have portrayed the Administration's campaign against terrorism as an assault on Third World liberation movements like the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC). The new Administration's "warmongering statements," a 17 February English-language commentary claimed, have led directly to Pretoria's "increased aggressiveness" against the two movements. Moscow radio's Africa service highlighted President Reagan's remarks on U.S.-South Africa relations in a 3 March television interview with CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite. A commentator told his African listeners on the 11th that the President had called South Africa America's "true ally" and pledged that Washington would not leave Pretoria "in the lurch."

Moscow promptly picked up on U.S. press reports that the new Administration was considering assistance to UNITA insurgents fighting the Soviet-backed government in Angola. Soviet commentaries have depicted UNITA as a puppet of South Africa. By rendering assistance to the group, said TASS on 16 March, the United States would be aiding Pretoria's "terroristic policy toward independent Africa."

COMMITMENTS AVOIDED

Moscow's attacks on U.S. policy have predictably avoided discussion of Soviet options in South Africa. In his speech to the 26th CPSU Congress on 23 February, President Brezhnev called attention to the "increasing strength" of liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia but sidestepped the question of Soviet support. Soviet handling of statements at the congress by leaders of the two movements--ANC's Alfred Nzo and SWAPO's Sam Nujoma--also pointed up Moscow's guarded public posture on specific forms of support. The 3 March TASS international service account of Nzo's speech--the full text of which was published in PRAVDA the same day--deleted his reference to Moscow's "constant support" for the ANC. Nujoma's speech at the congress thanked the USSR for its "multifaceted material, political, and diplomatic support," but his 4 March meeting with Politburo candidate member Boris Ponomarev produced a statement in PRAVDA the following day that spoke only of Soviet "solidarity" with Namibia's liberation struggle.

USSR

Despite the apparent absence of major developments affecting the leadership at the 26th CPSU Congress, the occasion was not entirely devoid of controversial ideas and political maneuvering. Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze used his congress speech to make an unusual appeal for "democratization" as a means of alleviating what he suggested is a serious credibility gap between leaders and led. Although there was no change in the status of any Politburo member, subtle maneuvering by CPSU Secretary Chernenko and his supporters was apparent during the congress and the preparations for it.

GEORGIAN LEADER SHEVARDNADZE APPEALS FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION"

Shevardnadze's appeal for "democratization," in his congress speech on 24 February, struck a very unusual note for a congress marked by a spirit of continuity and lack of controversy. As reported in the 26 February PRAVDA, Shevardnadze spoke of democratization and social justice and directly challenged conservative leaders who ignore public opinion and insist on traditional party prerogatives and exclusive power in decisionmaking. Discussing the need for "socialist democracy," he condemned "outmoded forms of mutual relations between leaders and led" and complained that "some leaders" were "unprepared" to understand the need for new methods. He described one such leader who complained that "this democratization of yours will end with my being fired"--a result which, he added, came true, because such leaders were no longer needed. He stressed the need for justice and honesty to win public confidence and emphasized that in Georgia "in recent years we have seriously undertaken study of public opinion."

In fact, Georgia has done much to establish a new relationship between leaders and led in recent years. A special council to study public opinion was created in the Central Committee several years ago, and evidence suggests that it has actually influenced party decisions. In keeping with the republic leadership's stated desire to be more frank and open with the public, Georgia's newspapers have become more informative, and weekly information bulletins are being published for party members. Permanent commissions on economic and social questions, composed in part of rank-and-file party members, have been established at various levels of the republic's administrative organization to promote exchange of views between leaders and led.

The new style of leadership and relationship with the public was presented as a major accomplishment of the republic in statements at the Georgian party congress in January. In his report Shevardnadze praised the permanent commissions as a "further development of democratic principles" and boasted of a new "atmosphere of frankness," in which leaders can keep abreast of the real situation and the party rank and file can be confident that their opinions will reach the leaders and be considered. Ideology Secretary Yenukidze described the restoration of "mutual trust between the party leadership and the broadest masses" as a big achievement in Georgia and explained that that improvement had required both more information for the public and more study of public opinion on the part of the leaders.

The Georgian party leaders appeared to go out of their way to demonstrate their characteristic democratic style at the republic party congress. In contrast to the CPSU congress--and other republic congresses--where the first secretary spoke for the entire leadership and few other leaders had an opportunity to speak, virtually all Georgian bureau members delivered speeches at their congress. Shevardnadze used his opening report to characterize the achievements and shortcomings of virtually every bureau member and ended with a striking recitation of his own personal shortcomings. And in an apparent extension of the permanent commission idea, republic leaders divided congress delegates into 15 "working groups," each of which met for a half day--an arrangement which gave almost all delegates a chance to speak out. Delegates were given specially prepared books of information on Georgia's economic and social policies. Subsequent congress speakers lauded the working groups as a contribution to intraparty democracy. Shevardnadze in his opening report enthusiastically announced that the working groups would become new permanent commissions that would continue to function until the next congress. Georgia was also one of the Soviet republics that added a rank-and-file worker to its elite decisionmaking bureau for the first time this year.

NATIONAL SUPPORT Shevardnadze's campaign for "democratization" is clearly being supported by influential forces. CPSU Secretary Chernenko, for one, has publicly endorsed Georgia's innovations in broadening participation in decisionmaking, studying public opinion, and better informing the public--ideas parallel to his own proposals. In his 1980 book on the work of the party and state apparat, Chernenko devoted several pages to Georgia's experiments in the "systematic inclusion of a wide party aktiv and the working masses in discussion of the most important political and economic tasks."

Brezhnev has also appeared to be sympathetic. At a ceremony on 5 March to award Shevardnadze the nation's highest title, "Hero of Socialist Labor," Brezhnev lauded him as a "mature leader" whose "boldness" and "feeling for the new" had "won him authority in the republic and beyond its borders."

Shevardnadze's supporters appear to be currently orchestrating favorable publicity for Georgia's innovations, suggesting that a campaign to get others to copy Georgia may be under way. No sooner did the 22-24 January Georgian congress close than laudatory articles on it and its innovations appeared in the CPSU Central Committee's two leading journals, KOMMUNIST and PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN, in issues signed to press in early February. Especially noteworthy was the long KOMMUNIST article, written by deputy chief editor Ye. I. Bugayev, specifically praising a whole list of Georgian innovations, including its working groups, public opinion council, information policy, and the election of a worker to the republic bureau.

CHERNENKO SCORES MARGINAL GAINS IN POLITICAL VISIBILITY

Although the 26th CPSU Congress cast little new light on who will be Brezhnev's successor, it was apparent that efforts to keep Chernenko's candidacy active and visible were made both during the congress and at some of the earlier republic congresses. Senior Politburo members carefully followed their customary protocol order during the course of the congress, but there were a few signs of continuing attempts to nudge Chernenko into the limelight. The most notable came midway in the congress, when PRAVDA and other papers on 27 February carried photos of Brezhnev and Chernenko holding talks with Cuban President Fidel Castro. Since Chernenko's presence could not be explained by the nature of his duties, his inclusion and the publicity given it appeared designed to boost his image as a senior leader involved in world affairs. This impression was heightened by the fact that some papers--KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA--carried even more politically charged photos of the event, showing Brezhnev, Castro and Chernenko posing as a threesome. Although Chernenko was not at other meetings between Brezhnev and bloc leaders, it is significant that he was present at the first of the series, with Castro. Later on 6 March, Chernenko was included in politically significant photos showing Brezhnev presenting awards to Politburo members Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Kuznetsov, and others.

Brezhnev gave Chernenko an indirect plug in his Central Committee report by stressing the importance of citizens' letters and stating that work with letters had been improved by the creation of a Letters Department in the Central Committee. Chernenko has been the leading advocate of upgrading the importance of letters from the populace as a means of informing the leadership of public attitudes, and the new department is largely staffed by his proteges.

While there is little public evidence to indicate which leaders did most of the organizational work for the congress, there was one indication that Chernenko may have played a significant role. Chernenko was the only member of the Politburo or Secretariat included in the secretariat of the congress elected on the opening day. Chernenko had similarly been a member of the secretariat at the 1976 congress, before he rose to the position of Central Committee secretary and Politburo member, and his organizing abilities were apparently so highly valued as to recommend him for the role again.

A final sign of Chernenko's success at the congress was the fact that two of his most direct subordinates were promoted there. The first deputy head of the Central Committee's General Department, K.M. Bogolyubov, previously only a Central Auditing Commission member, was elected full Central Committee member, while the head of the new Letters Department, B.P. Yakovlev, was added to the Central Auditing Commission.

LOCAL CONGRESSES

Chernenko also received boosts at some republic party congresses, mainly from leaders who have recently shown signs of favoring him. At the Kirgiz congress, First Secretary Usubaliyev lauded Chernenko's recent book on the party and state apparatus and revealed that Kirgizia had set up a letters sector in its Central Committee following the creation of the CPSU Letters Department. At the Georgian congress, First Secretary Shevardnadze in his concluding speech also alluded to Chernenko's book and the chairman of the republic auditing commission mentioned that Chernenko had written a "note" (zapiska) on improving reception of citizens' complaints--a fact not publicly revealed before. At other congresses, Chernenko's campaign for more attention to letters and complaints produced much commentary but no personal credit to Chernenko. Moreover, outside of Kirgizia's new sector, no republics appear to have set up new Central Committee units to handle letters.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 9-15 MARCH 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,070 items)		
CPSU 26th Congress	16%	(41%)
Soyuz T-4 Space Mission	4%	(--)
Vietnamese CP Leader Le Duan Meeting With Brezhnev	4%	(--)

Beijing (643 items)		
Democratic Kampuchean Leader Samphan in PRC	6%	(2%)
Japanese Trade Delegation in PRC	5%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow, Warsaw on Bydgoszcz crisis
- Beijing response to U.S. assurances

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25 MARCH 1981
FB TM 81-012

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
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POLAND-USSR

Confronted by a sharpening domestic crisis complicated by Warsaw Pact exercises on Polish territory, the main actors in the current crisis appear to be trying in different ways to avert a catastrophe. Kania appears to have dealt himself out of any search for compromise with the workers with the unyielding position taken by the Politburo in its 22 March statement, but he may be reassuring the Soviets by his show of stubbornness. Jaruzelski, by contrast, appears to be identifying himself as the agent of compromise between the leadership and the workers by maintaining low public visibility and by indicating a desire to continue talking. Walesa also seems to be a force for compromise, a main uncertainty in the equation being his ability to persuade the workers to be patient with the government. The Soviets, in the meantime, have been keeping up a drumfire of critical commentary on Poland, while displaying their military potential by the current exercises.

KANIA ADAMANT, JARUZELSKI HINTS COMPROMISE IN NEW CRISIS

The hardline Politburo statement on 22 March delivered the most sweeping regime indictment of the Solidarity union to date, asserting that the union's behavior in connection with the Bydgoszcz events on the 19th shows that "political" action has gained "the upper hand" in its activities. It added the charge--as a separate paragraph--that "this creates a state of anarchy." It went on to declare that Solidarity's announced retaliatory strikes have "a clearly political character." Stressing that such "blatantly" illegal actions as Solidarity's occupation of public buildings in Bydgoszcz will not be tolerated, the statement defended the militia's forcible ejection of the demonstrators--the first instance of serious injury since the start of the strikes in July--in asserting that the "organs of law and order" had acted on the orders of the competent authorities and "in accordance with the law." Kania himself, in a speech to rural activists two days later, presumably with the Pact maneuvers principally in mind, manifested indignation toward Solidarity in asking rhetorically: "Who has the courage to turn a local incident into an issue that threatens national catastrophe?"

Concurrently, Premier Jaruzelski, while maintaining a low public profile, has seemed to hold the door open to compromise. In a statement publicized by Warsaw media on the 21st, he reacted with restraint to Solidarity's temporary break-off of negotiations with the government, urging their resumption with the remark that "only a constant dialogue and a patient examination of the conflicts" can resolve the crisis. On the 23d, speaking to the rural activists whom Kania addressed the next day, Jaruzelski again showed concern to defuse the crisis. Expressing disinclination to "expand on" the Politburo statement on the Bydgoszcz affair, the Premier voiced confidence that "a sense of patriotic responsibility will emerge victorious in this matter."

Comment in the media has been more in line with Jaruzelski's tone of compromise than with the Politburo's harsh posture. The liberal paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY, in a 21 March article entitled "The Price of Dialogue and Calm," conceded that the local authorities in Bydgoszcz might be to blame for the incident while criticizing Solidarity for blowing it up into a national issue. "Neither the government nor Solidarity," it stressed, "is entitled to leave the negotiating table." The moderate party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on the 23d similarly refrained from echoing the Politburo's invective against Solidarity, although it opposed strikes as a solution to the crisis. The government-Solidarity talks held so far on the incident, it declared, show that a dialogue is "not only feasible but indispensable." Concern for objectivity also was evident in Warsaw radio's report on the 22d that numerous meetings throughout the country were in some cases condemning strikes and in other cases denouncing "the brutal treatment of Solidarity union members" in Bydgoszcz. Most recently, an article in the 25 March ZYCIE WARSZAWY portrayed Jaruzelski as the man of the hour in the crisis and Poland's last hope. "At long last we have a government," it said, "that is the cabinet of the last chance." If Jaruzelski fails to implement his program, it added, "it is really hard to tell what will happen to our country." The paper further stressed that "Poland and the world have pinned great hopes" on Jaruzelski.

MOSCOW SHARPENS ATTACKS ON SOLIDARITY FOLLOWING DISORDERS

Moscow has reacted to the disorders in Bydgoszcz and elsewhere in Poland by issuing, in a TASS dispatch, one of its sharpest criticisms of Solidarity and the Polish labor scene since General Jaruzelski became premier six weeks ago. Subsequent handling of the item by TASS itself and by the Soviet press suggests that the crisis may be causing confusion, or even disagreement, among Soviet officials.

After having played down earlier ripples in the labor peace at Lodz and Radom, Moscow sounded a note of renewed concern about the situation in a TASS dispatch of 21 March, two days after the Bydgoszcz incident. Although issued before the PZPR Politburo statement, the dispatch seemed to anticipate the general thrust of the official Polish document in its assessment of the crisis and its tendentious treatment of Solidarity's role in the Bydgoszcz episode. It said that the Polish situation had become "seriously complicated" and that Solidarity was "unlawfully" and "forcibly" trying to occupy a building in the town and was "unceasingly violating" the government's appeal for order by staging numerous strikes. In one passage the dispatch accused Walesa of playing a provocative role in the crisis, calling a remark of his about the gravity of the situation "instigatory." Several hours later TASS issued a rare service message instructing subscribers to delete the accusatory word. PRAVDA and most other central dailies on the 22d carried the corrected version, but the government paper IZVESTIYA included the word, although it made other minor changes called for in the service message.

The episode recalls previous instances of Soviet media manipulation during the Polish crisis that appeared to reflect differences in the regime over policy toward Poland. The most striking examples came in December, when Brezhnev was out of the country and several examples of hardline views on Poland appeared in Soviet media and were subsequently suppressed or altered. One of them--an 8 December TASS dispatch suggesting the onset of anarchy in Poland--never appeared in print. Another--a 10 December speech by Defense Minister Ustinov on the need for increased vigilance concerning Poland--was subjected to some highly unusual press treatment and eventually softened.

WARSAW PACT GAMES HIGHLIGHT SOVIET PRESSURE ON POLAND

Soviet and East European media have been providing routine publicity on the current Soyuz-81 Warsaw Pact exercises, presenting them as a demonstration of bloc military prowess and unity but making no particular effort to draw any lessons for Poland. The format of the ongoing Pact maneuvers seems well calculated to maximize the political impact of the display of military power on Poland while minimizing the propaganda costs abroad of such a show of Soviet muscle. Unlike the usual Pact exercises, which are focused in one country, this one is spread over four states. While the major activity, involving Soviet and Polish troops, is taking place in Poland, that country is not officially billed as the host country, and Pact Commander Kulikov, rather than Polish Defense Minister Jaruzelski, is acting as the director of the games.

As in past joint exercises, including the ones held in East Germany last September, the de facto host country, Poland, has aired glowing radio and television reports of military operations, meetings involving Pact Commander Kulikov and the Polish, GDR, and Czechoslovak defense ministers, and friendly contacts between Soviet soldiers and the Polish populace. The Warsaw military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on 21 March showed some sensitivity over the domestic political situation, remarking that "we people in army uniform cannot remain indifferent" to the coincidence of the two developments, and voiced concern that the new crisis might disturb Poland's "trustworthiness" as a Soviet ally.

KAMPUCHEA

DRAFT CONSTITUTION SEEKS TO LEGITIMIZE HANOI-BACKED REGIME

The draft constitution recently released for public discussion in Kampuchea reflects Hanoi's continuing efforts to legitimize the regime it installed two years ago. In most respects the draft is an institutional clone of the Vietnamese model. However, it does not empower Kampuchean authorities either to declare war or to make peace, an omission which seems to signal Hanoi's resolve to continue to play the major role in determining Phnom Penh's security needs. On the internal Kampuchean leadership situation, the draft provides further evidence that the powers of Vice President and army Commander in Chief Pen Sovan are growing at the expense of President Heng Samrin.

VIETNAMESE ROLE Predictably, the draft constitution released on 10 March by Phnom Penh serves as a measure of Kampuchea's close relationship with Vietnam. The new Kampuchean Government--consisting of a national assembly, state council and council of ministers--will be structurally identical with the system outlined in the 1980 Vietnamese Constitution. And the preamble repeatedly lauds the key role of unity among Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Laos in defeating Indochina's common enemies. It also includes specific praise for the role played by the Vietnamese Army in the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime. Similarly, the draft's section on foreign policy affirms Kampuchea's intention of strengthening the "bonds of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation" with Vietnam, Laos, and the other fraternal socialist countries.

The draft's failure to endow the national assembly and state council with the power to make war and peace leaves Kampuchea without a legal mechanism for exercising one of the basic powers of any sovereign state. The Vietnamese Constitution grants this power to its national assembly and state council, but the Kampuchean draft gives the new council of ministers only the power to "implement" mobilization of the armed forces, and other measures for national defense. It is unclear whether the omission of this power is related in any way to disagreement between Hanoi and Phnom Penh over the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea.

Phnom Penh raised this issue two years ago, in a flurry of frank but short-lived reports suggesting that the Vietnamese military presence limited the new regime's public acceptance.*

LEADERSHIP IMPLICATIONS

The draft constitution seems to confirm earlier signs that Vice President and army Commander in Chief Pen Sovan is the chief beneficiary of Hanoi's apparent lack of confidence in President Heng Samrin. Like the Vietnamese model, the draft states that the chairman of the state council--a new body, which apparently would replace the present KPRC--will also be the commander in chief of the armed forces. By virtue of his army post, Pen Sovan appears to be in line for the key position of state council chairman, thus replacing Heng Samrin as Kampuchea's head of state. The draft also assigns the "direct leadership of the entire revolutionary task" to the ruling party, which Pen Sovan reportedly heads as first secretary.

The erosion of Heng Samrin's power seems reflected also in the fact that the draft played down the role of the KNUFNS, the front group that Heng Samrin concurrently heads. The KNUFNS apparently will lose its current leading role and be relegated to the level of other mass organizations. Phnom Penh media have routinely praised the leading role of the front in the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime, but the draft credits the "clear-sighted leadership of the party" with the main role in overthrowing the previous regime, and merely notes the "close solidarity of the KNUFNS" as one of the contributing factors in ousting Pol Pot.

These signs of a realignment of power within the Kampuchean leadership are consistent with Pen Sovan's role last spring as stand-in for Heng Samrin during his long and unexplained absence from public view. During that time, Pen Sovan failed even to mention the missing president at a national day banquet, which was used as the occasion to unveil the "inner circle of the revolutionary family." Pen Sovan has continued the practice, originated during the president's absence, of signing KPRC documents--once the exclusive preserve of Heng Samrin.**

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* See the TRENDS of 8 August 1979, pages 14-16.

** For a discussion of these anomalies, see the TRENDS of 23 April 1980, pages 3-7, and of 21 May 1980, page 19.

PRC-U.S.

CHINA WELCOMES PRESIDENTIAL ASSURANCES, CAUTIOUS ON TIES

President Reagan's indications of a desire to improve Sino-U.S. relations have been warmly received by Beijing as signals--sought since last November's election--that the new Administration's China policy is moving in a favorable direction. Nevertheless, Beijing's reporting on the recent visit to China of former President Ford has suggested that Chinese leaders--including Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping--remain cautious about future prospects for Sino-U.S. relations, insisting that they can improve only if Washington avoids modifications of the status quo on the Taiwan question.

POSITIVE TREATMENT OF U.S. MESSAGES

XINHUA gave a very positive tone to its account of President Reagan's first formal meeting with Ambassador Chai Zemin, who was accompanied by Ji Chaozhu, deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's Department of American and Oceanian Affairs. In its 19 March dispatch on the meeting that day, XINHUA reported that President Reagan had pledged to promote Sino-U.S. relations "on the basis of the principles laid down" in the 1979 normalization communique--the first time Beijing has reported the President as having made such a statement. The dispatch seemed to stress the consensus nature of this commitment by listing by name the other key Administration officials present, a practice not followed in reports on Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin's consultations in Washington in March 1980.

On 18 March, XINHUA had reported favorably on a letter sent by President Reagan to the National Council for U.S.-China Trade. Noting that a council delegation would deliver the letter to China, XINHUA said the President had affirmed the Administration's desire to "improve prospects for the development of trade with the PRC." And on the 23d, XINHUA reported that former President Ford gave an "oral friendly message" to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and a letter to Premier Zhao Ziyang from President Reagan during "friendly" conversations with them in Beijing.

Earlier, XINHUA had carried upbeat accounts of other PRC contacts with, and remarks by, Administration officials, including Ambassador Chai Zemin and Ji Chaozhu's "cordial" meeting with Vice President Bush on 14 March and "very friendly" discussion with Secretary of State Haig on 20 February. On 11 March XINHUA reported Mr. Haig's reference, in his TIME interview, to Mr. Reagan's 25 August 1980 statement as the guideline for the Administration's China policy. Last August, Beijing vehemently and authoritatively criticized the statement as a "two Chinas" plot. But the 11 March dispatch did not dispute the Secretary's explanation that the statement envisaged U.S. adherence to the normalization communique and a "nonofficial status" for U.S.-Taiwan relations; it merely deplored Secretary Haig's remark that the normalization communique and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) are not "mutually exclusive." At the same time, XINHUA cited with tacit approval a 10 March CBS report to the effect that President Reagan and Secretary Haig had agreed during the previous week to maintain the status quo in relations with Taiwan rather than risk alienating Beijing.

CAUTION EVIDENT IN FORD VISIT Media coverage of former President Ford's 22-23 March visit to Beijing, however, suggested that while he was given "a warm welcome," Chinese leaders remain cautious about prospects for bilateral relations. XINHUA merely reported that Ford had met with Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping but did not cite any comments from Deng. This repeats a pattern evident in the Spring of 1979, when Deng suffered setbacks on the domestic scene and problems over Taiwan surfaced in Sino-U.S. relations due to the passage of the TRA, making Deng vulnerable to criticism for his handling of Sino-U.S. relations. The same pattern has been repeated in his meetings with U.S. politicians since last summer, when the Taiwan issue was raised in the U.S. election campaign. This continued silence by Deng in the official press contrasts with his consistent expression of optimism regarding the importance and the future of Sino-U.S. relations in early 1979 and again after the visit of former Vice President Mondale in August 1979--periods when Deng's domestic political position was strong and Sino-U.S. differences over Taiwan were submerged. For example, when Deng toasted visiting former President Nixon in September 1979, he spoke of the "flourishing friendship" between the two countries and stressed the importance of normalization for "promoting not only Sino-U.S. relations but also the cause of world peace and the struggle against hegemonism."

In contrast, the 22 March banquet for former President Ford was hosted by Foreign Minister Huang Hua, not by Deng, and his toast included implicit warning as well as praise of steps taken so far by the Reagan Administration in its policy toward China. Huang Hua "welcomed" recent affirmations of the "strategic significance of Sino-U.S. relations" and commitment to developing relations on the basis of the 1979 communique. He declared that bilateral relations "have in general developed satisfactorily" in the past two years and could "develop still further"--"as long as" both countries "face up to the stark reality of reality of the world situation, earnestly handle our bilateral relations in the context of overall strategy, and abide by the principles laid down in the joint communique."

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 16-22 MARCH 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,179 items)		
CPSU 26th Congress	10%	(16%)
Brezhnev Greetings to AAPSO Meeting	5%	(--)
TASS Statement on U.S. Interference in Afghan Internal Affairs	4%	(--)
Gromyko's Luncheon Speech for CSSR Foreign Minister Chnoupek	3%	(--)

Beijing (570 items)		
Japanese Trade Delegation in PRC	8%	(--)
Brezhnev Peace Proposal	5%	(2%)

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Trends in Communist Media

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- Divisions in Polish leadership
- Moscow support for hard line in Poland

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
5 April 1967 - six months prior to
current date

POLAND-USSR

Poland has emerged from the latest crisis posed by Solidarity's threat of a general strike at the cost of a new show of weakness by the regime and a display of profound divisions within the party reaching to the top leadership itself. While Moscow has shown alarm over the course of events in Poland, it has refrained from publishing the sort of authoritative justification that would be expected if a military intervention was contemplated. At the same time, it has shown strong support for hardline views on the Polish crisis, presumably to encourage Polish leaders to deal firmly with Solidarity.

STORMY PLENUM POINTS UP CONSERVATIVE-REFORMIST SPLIT

After an unusually frank public airing of differences between reformers and conservatives, the 29-30 March PZPR Central Committee plenum wound up on a note of uneasy compromise along moderate lines, leaving the lineup of the ruling Politburo, for the moment at least, intact. The proffered resignations of Politburo members Olszowski, Grabski, and Ney were not accepted, presumably to preserve some semblance of a united leadership to reassure the Soviets. The plenum was also the scene of ebullient grassroots criticism of the leadership, much of it focused on the perceived reluctance of leaders to pursue the renewal process effectively.

The main report at the plenum, delivered by Kania's moderate Politburo ally Barcikowski, criticized both sides in the standoff over the Bydgoszcz incident. While conceding that the attack on Solidarity members in Bydgoszcz on the 19th was "inadmissible," he assailed the union's escalation of the incident into a major issue, noting that "Solidarity's propaganda machine was immediately set in motion" and dates were set for warning and general strikes. The report dismissed Solidarity's claims that some of its excessive "political" actions were due to "lack of maturity" or coordination difficulties, asserting that rightist elements in the union were trying to push the country into "creeping counterrevolution."

Barcikowski insisted that the leadership was trying to democratize the party down to the grassroots level and complained that these efforts were sometimes hampered by extreme reformers who demonstrated their disaffection by staying away from local meetings, thus undercutting their ability to help eliminate negative phenomena. As an example of counterproductive behavior, Barcikowski cited an open letter from Polish Journalists Association Chairman Bratkowski charging that there was an open split in the party between liberals and conservatives. The open letter, which evoked much commentary at the plenum, praised party leader Kania, Premier Jaruzelski, and Barcikowski by name for what it described as their support for reform but denounced unnamed "hardliners" in the "highest" positions in the party.

RESIGNATION OFFERS The Bratkowski open letter, which Barcikowski said "introduces deep lines of division within the party and its leadership," was cited by both Stefan Olszowski and Tadeusz Grabski in their offers at the plenum to resign from the Politburo. In their speeches, reported by Warsaw radio on the 30th, the two hardliners took personally the letter's attacks on high-ranking leaders who, it said, fear agreement with grassroots party reformers and pursue instead a policy of "confrontation and disinformation"--a charge aimed most pointedly at Olszowski as party secretary for press, radio, and television. In placing their leadership positions "at the disposal of the Central Committee," the two hardliners were joined, at the other end of the spectrum, by a liberal, Politburo candidate Roman Ney, who complained that the leadership was not promoting reform rapidly enough and proposed that the entire Politburo, except Kania, join him in offering their resignations. The radio's account of these three speeches concluded with a brief report that the Central Committee had called for the withdrawal of the resignation offers and had passed a vote of confidence in the Politburo.

GRASSROOTS SPEECHES Plenum speeches by local party figures, as publicized by Warsaw radio, generally favored reform and echoed a recent article in the liberal government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY defending Solidarity's political activities as a response to the vacuum created by the regime's inertia in carrying out reforms. Among the speeches by worker members of the Central Committee, one asserted that "the party has lost the trust of the broad masses of workers," another that a "crisis of confidence" existed among the workers. A worker from Kielce contended that some local party leaders were merely intent on retaining their positions and putting down any reform manifestations by "force." As a result, he said, some local party members identify themselves with Solidarity's stands, including its appeals for strikes, rather than with the party. A Warsaw worker member maintained that the slowness of the renewal process had forced Solidarity to take over all the goals of the process, including political goals. On the conservative side, Bydgoszcz party leader Henryk Bednarski condemned Solidarity's exploitation of the incident in his city but conceded that the situation in the party "has not been good" and that the hardline 22 March Politburo statement on the incident "has not met with support in certain party organizations."

WARSAW MEDIA BEHAVIOR Recent Soviet criticism of Warsaw media for publicizing Solidarity union strike demands points up a Polish media phenomenon that has become increasingly pronounced since the registration of the union last November. Under the pressure of Solidarity demands for full compliance with the commitment to give the union greater access to the media, Warsaw has been increasingly liberal in providing publicity for the union's activities, including its calls for strikes. In doing so, the media have generally maintained a show of objectivity, although spokesmen have not refrained from interjecting indications of disapproval. Warsaw domestic television on 24 March, for example, reported that the National Consultative Commission of Solidarity "unfortunately" had decided to hold a warning strike on the 27th and a general strike on the 31st. On the other hand, Warsaw radio has not scrupled to vent liberal editorial comment, as in a 28 March commentary which described the warning strike as "necessary" to convince both the regime and the union of the need to settle the crisis through dialogue.

Much more sharply tedentious material has appeared recently in the Warsaw PAP Maritime Press Service, raising the possibility that this source may be controlled by pro-Solidarity militants. This service is beamed to sailors and seamen on the Baltic coast one hour daily by radioteletype and two hours daily by Morse code. In the recent period, this service has carried strikingly controversial items keyed to the 29-30 March PZPR Central Committee plenum, most notably the open letter from Polish Journalists Union Chairman Bratkowski to all primary party organizations, which was strongly attacked as divisive by several Politburo speakers. In addition, this service on the 28th carried excerpts from a resolution by the PZPR Works Committee of the Polish Shipping Line "demanding" that a vote of no confidence in the national party Politburo and Secretariat be proposed at the upcoming plenum. The maritime service also reported hostile sentiment against the central party organization on the 31st, saying that reaction to the just-concluded plenum by party organizations in the coastal region was "clearly negative" and that rank-and-file party members now felt that they might have to turn in their party membership cards.

MOSCOW SHOWS INCREASED CONCERN, PROMOTES HARDLINE STAND

Moscow's reportage on the latest Polish plenum has been highly partisan and seemingly designed to encourage the hardliners in the Polish leadership to assert themselves. TASS reports on the main plenum events--the speeches by Barcikowski and Kania and the resolution on domestic issues--have softpedaled favorable references to Solidarity and to the need for increasing party democracy and further investigating the Bydgoszcz incident. They have focused instead on the threats to political stability stemming from Solidarity and the need for the party to unify and take firm, decisive actions.

The reports on the plenum follow a series of TASS reports--carried in PRAVDA on 27, 28, and 30 March--which portrayed the Polish domestic situation as bordering on anarchy and accused Solidarity of increasingly confronting and trying to supplant the legitimate authorities. The substance of one report by TASS on the 29th, accusing subversives of blocking a highway and taking over a Warsaw television transmitter, was promptly denied by Warsaw media later that day, but the report was nonetheless published in PRAVDA on the 30th. By contrast, when Warsaw rejected similar allegations in an 8 December TASS report, the Soviets refrained from publishing it.

Moscow also appears to be focusing increasing critical attention on the Polish media, heretofore relatively unscathed in Moscow's broadsides against Solidarity and antisocialists. The Soviet military daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) on 27 March criticized "some Polish journalists" for allegedly siding with disruptive forces. Similarly, the 28 March PRAVDA report on the domestic situation complained that Warsaw television had been broadcasting Solidarity strike "instructions." And a 30 March TASS account of Barcikowski's plenum speech altered his criticism of "some activists" for anticommunist tendencies to include some "publications."

Moscow has taken a new step to get its line across to the Polish people over the heads of the Warsaw leadership and the increasingly independent and divided Polish media. On 31 March Radio Moscow announced a doubling of the output of its Polish-language broadcasts to Poland. The increase, to start on 1 April, was explained as a seasonal change but obviously was politically motivated since no such massive increase took place in other foreign-language services.

Moscow has also continued its efforts, evident since early in the crisis, to demonstrate support for the most conservative forces in Polish society--in effect showing that alternatives to the present power arrangements might be called into effect in case of emergency. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has been active in highlighting conservative, pro-Soviet sentiments in the Polish military and extensively praised the Polish military paper for countering disruptive propaganda. Soviet papers have continued to report on anti-Solidarity feelings among Polish workers. And the 27 March PRAVDA report on the Polish domestic situation counterposed reports of growing disturbances with statements supporting the government by the Polish war veterans association, headed by Politburo member Moczar.

EAST EUROPE REACTION The Polish crisis has continued to evoke varied reactions from Warsaw's East European neighbors. Nearby Czechoslovakia continues to issue the region's sharpest comment on the Polish situation; a RUDE PRAVO article on 31 March took a step ahead of Moscow in openly criticizing "revisionist" forces within the Polish party. East Germany has also continued its critically slanted reportage, and previously restrained Hungary and Bulgaria have become somewhat grimmer in their assessments. At the same time, Bulgarian leader Zhivkov struck a positive note at the BCP congress on 31 March when he voiced confidence in Warsaw's ability to overcome the crisis. The independent-minded Romanians and Yugoslavs each have authoritatively reasserted their opposition to any intervention. An RCP plenum on 26 March reaffirmed Poland's right to handle the crisis "without any outside interference," and current Yugoslav party leader Mojsov the same day declared that any outside interference in Poland "would be resolutely condemned by all the world's progressive forces."

USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW STEPS UP POLEMICS, SEES U.S. POLICY AS UNDEFINED

Moscow appears to be preparing for a period of intensified public polemics with the Reagan Administration while still leaving open the possibility of diplomatic dialogue with Washington. Soviet media are contrasting President Brezhnev's proposals for negotiations at the recent party congress with what they portray as the Reagan Administration's commitment to gaining military superiority rather than to advancing arms limitation. At the same time, however, Soviet foreign policy observers continue to suggest that U.S. policy toward the USSR is too ill-defined to permit any definitive forecasts.

Moscow's public commentary on the Reagan Administration has been increasingly calculated to score propaganda points rather than to promote bilateral dialogue. Soviet commentaries have especially targeted U.S. defense spending increases in accusing the Administration of "militarizing" U.S. foreign policy. A pseudonymous I. Aleksandrov article in the 25 March PRAVDA--the most authoritative Soviet statement on U.S.-Soviet relations since President Brezhnev's address to the 26th party congress on 23 February--charged the Administration with "multiplying" the errors of the Carter Administration in foreign policy and rushing into an "unprecedented" arms race. The article expressed hope that "in the long run" U.S. policymakers will find it in their interest to seek a normalization of the relationship. Commentaries under the I. Aleksandrov byline have traditionally been used by Moscow to set the official propaganda line on contentious international issues, especially on China.

Soviet foreign policy officials are still maintaining in public that it is too early to make a definitive assessment of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy direction. Central Committee International Information Department officials Leonid Zamyatin and Oleg Anichkin recently echoed USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov's assertions to this effect in the 9 March PRAVDA. Anichkin asserted on a 27 March domestic radio program that the Administration does not have a clear policy or program, citing in particular the problem of limiting strategic arms. On Soviet television's monthly "Studio Nine" foreign affairs discussion program the following day, Zamyatin reported that the Administration's usual response to inquiries about its foreign policy principles is to say that the "White House is still studying the problem."

BACKGROUND Although Moscow continues to advocate dialogue with Washington, the tone of its commentary on the Reagan Administration has steadily hardened in recent months. Immediately after the November election, Moscow adopted an upbeat approach toward the President-elect by playing up his expressions of interest in arms control, deemphasizing his opposition to SALT II, and asserting that his statements had become more moderate at the end of the campaign. In remarking on the change of Administrations in a November address, Brezhnev expressed eagerness for arms control negotiations and promised not to dwell on what had been said during the heat of the election campaign. In the weeks immediately preceding the inauguration, when incoming cabinet officials began to criticize Soviet policies, Moscow gradually hardened its rhetoric. The first authoritative rebuke to the Administration came on 2 February, when Soviet media highlighted a TASS statement rejecting Administration charges of Soviet involvement in international terrorism.

MOSCOW SEES MIXED RESPONSE TO REAGAN IN WEST EUROPE

> At least some Soviet observers believe that President Reagan's approach to the NATO alliance is finding a receptive audience in Europe. The bulk of Soviet media commentary indicates that Moscow still hopes the European allies will pressure the new Administration to restart the arms control dialogue, but some Soviet specialists have pointed to signs of a new unity within the Atlantic Alliance.

Routine Soviet propaganda has predictably paid more attention to signs of discord between European political leaders and the new U.S. Administration than to the evidence of common ground. Soviet media have reported "alarm" in Europe over such incidents as Defense Secretary Weinberger's public comments on possible NATO deployment of enhanced radiation weapons. Mainstream Soviet press commentators--like IZVESTIYA's political observer Vikentiy Matveyev--continue to express optimism that European pressure will temper the U.S. stance on the USSR. Writing in the paper's weekly magazine NEDELYA on 12 February, Matveyev saw an "enthusiastic reaction" from the British to Reagan's policy of "confrontation" but growing public opposition in the Netherlands, Belgium, and West Germany. He predicted that the European public would "close ranks" against such policies.

Some Soviet specialists on East-West relations--USA and Canada Institute section chief Lev Semeyko, IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin, and Central Committee official Nikolay Shishlin--have described the European mood as more complex. Bovin and Shishlin, speaking on a 1 March domestic radio foreign affairs program, acknowledged that European reaction to Soviet President Brezhnev's arms proposals at the 26th party congress was mixed while reporting a generally favorable European response to U.S. policy directions under President Reagan. Bovin suggested that allied unity on East-West policy had benefited from the French foreign minister's late February consultations in Washington, with France now showing a greater desire to "understand American positions and join them." Semeyko, speaking on the same domestic radio program three weeks later, reported the "positive evaluation" that Britain, West Germany, and France were giving to President Reagan's policies. Semeyko said the allies had expressed their alarm to the United States over some of its early pronouncements and that Washington had moved to modify the "extremes" of its positions. But, acknowledging that there was both "unity and discord" in relations between the United States and its allies, the USA Institute official maintained that new "centripetal tendencies" were apparent in the Atlantic Alliance and that "one must take this into account."

U S S R

SOVIET TRADE UNION OFFICIALS OUTLINE EXPANDED ROLE

Since last fall the Soviets have taken a series of steps to spruce up the image of their official trade unions, apparently as a prophylactic measure against any possible spillover effect from the Polish crisis. The most recent evidence of this effort was provided at a 20 March plenum of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), where speakers placed new stress on the unions' participation in industrial management and continued the recent emphasis on the need to more vigorously promote workers' interests. The plenum's efforts to revitalize the trade union movement are in part a response to Brezhnev's speech at the 26th CPSU Congress in February, which criticized union officials for having failed to fully exercise their legal prerogatives and warned party leaders that they should learn a lesson from recent events in Poland and lend a more "sensitive ear to the voice of the masses."

In his speech to the plenum, AUCCTU Chairman Shibayev indicated that the party had a new attitude toward trade unions that required them to defend more actively workers' rights and interests without neglecting traditional concerns for production. Judging from the report of his remarks in TRUD of 21 March, Shibayev interpreted Brezhnev's congress speech as a mandate for trade unions to assume this broader role, asserting that the congress itself had supported an "enhancement" of the unions' functions. Indicating that this expanded role for trade unions indeed represented something new, Shibayev reported that the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee had recently been showing a "new concern" for Soviet trade unions. Shibayev called upon local union organizations to respond to this change by increasing their monitoring of members' living and working conditions while promoting the use of "democratic principles" at individual enterprises. While stressing these new goals, Shibayev and other speakers also discussed in detail more traditional trade union concerns, such as measures for carrying out the provisions of the new five-year plan.

Other plenum materials also indicated that the trade unions were being encouraged to play a more active role in representing workers' interests. A message from the plenum to Brezhnev, for example, elaborated ways in which the unions proposed to exercise more fully their existing rights, declaring that workers' interests would be at the "center" of future trade union activities. In addition to pledging to improve workers' welfare in a number of areas, the message outlined ways in which the unions would work to increase their role in the management of local enterprises. It was said, for example, that they would play a greater role in production planning and management, cadre selection, capital expenditures, and monitoring of collective agreements. These new goals were also reflected in a resolution adopted by the plenum, as well as in a 24 March TRUD editorial on the AUCCTU session.

The broader role for trade union activities outlined at the plenum was also hinted at in two recent articles by top AUCCTU officials on the relationship between the party and the trade unions. Although both were careful to stress the unions' subordination to the party, and to the social goals it promotes, the two officials also cautioned against excessive party control over union activities. Writing in a Central Committee ideological journal, POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE (POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION), No. 2, for example, AUCCTU Deputy Chairman V. Prokhorov stressed that the party must not exercise "petty tutelage" over the trade unions but should assert its influence through the activities of communists who are also union members. Similarly, a 14 March TRUD interview with AUCCTU Secretary V. Bogatikov, marking the anniversary of the 10th party congress, stressed that the party's leadership over the trade unions should not become a "diktat" that the unions follow with "blind obedience." Bogatikov's moderate stance on the party's relationship with the trade unions contrasts sharply with the hardline view taken by V. Ivanov in an 8 March PRAVDA article, also pegged to the anniversary of the 10th party congress.*

The broader role for Soviet trade unions outlined at the recent plenum has been developing gradually since the start of the Polish crisis. The first signs of official concern appeared in the Baltic, and as early as August Lithuanian officials began to stress the need for trade unions to be more attentive to workers' demands. A changing attitude was also evident at the previous AUCCTU plenum, in November 1980, which also paid additional attention to questions of workers' welfare. Earlier AUCCTU plenums, in 1979 and 1980, by contrast, stressed the need for workers to produce more and observe stricter discipline and virtually ignored issues concerned with protecting workers' interests. This shift in official views was also reflected in the new trade union slogan included in the list for the 1980 anniversary of the October Revolution. The new slogan called for improving living and working conditions in place of the previous call for boosting production.

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* See the TRENDS of 18 March 1981, pages 4-5.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 23-29 MARCH 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (2,787 items)		
Soyuz 39 Joint Soviet-Mongolian Space Mission	9%	(3%)
Polish Situation	6%	(1%)
CPSU 26th Congress	4%	(10%)
International Conference of Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War, U.S.	4%	(--)
AAPSO Session, PDRY	3%	(6%)

Beijing (720 items)		
Tanzania President Nyerere in PRC	20%	(1%)
Former U.S. President Ford in PRC	8%	(1%)
Brezhnev Peace Proposal	3%	(5%)
Kampuchea-Vietnam Dispute	3%	(2%)
New Zealand Trade Minister in PRC	3%	(--)

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- Brezhnev moderate on Polish crisis

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

- SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

- SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

USSR-POLAND-CHINA

BREZHNEV PRAGUE SPEECH SIGNALS EASING OF INVASION THREAT

The threat of Soviet bloc military intervention in Poland, heightened in recent weeks by Warsaw Pact exercises and sharpening Moscow comment, appears to have been diminished by Soviet President Brezhnev's 7 April speech to the Czechoslovak party congress. Unlike the statement on the 4 March Soviet-Polish summit talks, Brezhnev's latest pronouncement did not assert the Warsaw Pact's right to defend socialism in Poland and more explicitly voiced confidence in the Poles' "ability" to overcome the crisis. The ending of the three-week Pact maneuvers appeared to accentuate Brezhnev's message. In Poland, meanwhile, splits between moderates and conservatives, in both the communist party and Solidarity, have become increasingly pronounced--developments that Moscow may believe it can use to its advantage.

The timing and setting of Brezhnev's speech was well calculated to reinforce its impact as a new indicator of Soviet bloc policy. As the only top-level leader at the conclave apart from Husak, Brezhnev was relieved of the need to couch his views in the form of a Warsaw Pact summit statement and could thus set a new policy tone without formal coordination. Also sharpening the impact of the speech was the fact that Moscow's commentary on Poland during the preceding week had been unusually sharp and had even included direct criticisms of the Polish communist party. In his remarks on Poland, the Soviet leader predicted that the "Polish communists," aided by genuine patriots, "will be able, one must suppose (nado polagat)," to give a "necessary rebuff to the counterrevolutionary threat," a threat which he noted the Czechoslovak communists "will understand from your own experience." The closest he came to recalling the so-called Brezhnev doctrine was the assurance that the USSR is a "true friend and ally" of Poland and that Czechoslovakia and other bloc countries have a similar relationship with Warsaw.

Polish delegate Olszowski, who followed Brezhnev to the Czech congress rostrum on the 7th, emulated the Soviet leader in omitting any personal mention of Kania. Olszowski's slight of

Kania was the more glaring in view of the speaker's praise of Premier Jaruzelski and his program. Olszowski broadly promised that "the PZPR," guided by patriotic and internationalist responsibility, "will find sufficient strength and will" to lead the country out of its crisis and back on the road of "stable socialist" development. He prefaced this pledge with an admission of the seriousness of the counterrevolutionary threat to his country and informed his Soviet bloc audience that the PZPR leadership "has a correct understanding of your anxiety" about the Polish situation.

SPLITS IN POLISH PARTY, SOLIDARITY UNION

Two end-of-March developments--a stormy PZPR Central Committee plenum and a reluctant decision by Solidarity to call off its threatened general strike--have served to point up conservative-liberal divisions in both the party and the union. In the nationwide series of local party organization meetings in the wake of the plenum, Kania faced sharp expressions of discontent from rank-and-file members. At a Warsaw party meeting, reported by Warsaw radio, debaters charged that party officials had overworked words like "counterrevolution and antisocialism" in attacking reformers. Kania, in his remarks to the Warsaw meeting, promised to pursue reforms more vigorously in accord with liberal criticism but warned against "playing with fire" and weakening Poland's "credibility as an ally." Hardliner Olszowski, who had offered to resign from the Politburo at the plenum, used the occasion of a 3 April speech at a Warsaw steel plant party meeting to take issue with Polish Journalists Association Chairman Bratkowski, who had attacked Olszowski in an open letter. In so doing, Olszowski aired Bratkowski's charge that "there was a line dividing the party leadership" and that "inflexible people (like Olszowski) contributed to all this." Olszowski did not deny the charges, taking issue instead with the fact that Bratkowski had made his letter public, instead of keeping it within party channels.

Further evidence of internal party conflicts was provided by the Warsaw PAP Maritime Press Service, which has frequently aired materials inimical to the party leadership. It reported on the 5th a demand by a local party organization in the Baltic region for an analysis of the work and attitudes of "each" member of the national Politburo and Secretariat, as well as for publication of full texts of their speeches to "avoid the manipulation of their contents." Also the party organization of Polish radio broadcasters in Wroclaw, as reported by the local radio on the

2d, charged that the final resolution of the PZPR plenum had not reflected the rank-and-file criticisms of the leadership voiced at that session and protested against attacks at the plenum on the open letter from Bratkowski.

Warsaw media have also publicized disagreements within Solidarity. In commenting on Solidarity's acceptance of the agreement between Walesa and Deputy Premier Rakowski to head off a general strike, ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 2 April, after noting that "moderation" had triumphed in this instance, said there is "neither unity nor concord" in the union regarding leadership style or negotiating methods. The paper noted that Lech Walesa "seems to lean toward the moderate and realistic trend" in the union. Olszowski, in his 3 April Warsaw steel plant speech, appeared notably intent on exploiting divisions within Solidarity in citing at length a letter from Rulewski, one of the Solidarity activists allegedly roughed up by the militia in Bydgoszcz on 19 March, to the union's national leadership protesting the general strike cancellation. The letter, as portrayed by Olszowski, accused Walesa of failing to play his "trump cards" in his negotiations with Rakowski and of bringing "disgrace" on the union.

CHINESE PREMIER WARNS AGAINST SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND

Premier Zhao Ziyang has stated China's firm opposition to armed Soviet intervention in Poland and has underscored the importance of the Beijing-Washington strategic relationship in this context. PRC leaders have used the Polish crisis to reemphasize that opposition to Soviet hegemonism must be global, not isolated by region, and that the United States, West Europe, and Asian countries must unite to contain the USSR.

In a statement to Japanese newspapermen on 6 April, reported by XINHUA, Premier Zhao Ziyang warned that there was "grave danger of armed Soviet intervention" in Poland and that "China firmly opposes such action." Beijing has not publicly described the Polish situation in such pessimistic terms since December, when authoritative articles in RENMIN RIBAO and HONGQI (RED FLAG) warned of the imminence of a Soviet invasion. After December, Beijing reports on developments in Poland generally suggested that problems were being resolved successfully without outside interference. Increasing Chinese apprehension prior to Zhao's statement had been reflected in a 29 March RENMIN RIBAO commentary, which said the Polish situation had become "extremely tense" and had "aroused grave concern all over the world." Both the 29 March commentary and a 6 April XINHUA commentary by Guo Ping maintained that the Soviet Union was stepping up plans for intervention just when problems within Poland were being solved peacefully through negotiations by the government and Solidarity. Guo cited Warsaw Pact military exercises and Soviet media treatment as evidence of the increased threat.

Premier Zhao did not explicitly say how China might react to a Soviet invasion of Poland, but XINHUA's treatment of his replies to newsmen's questions seemed calculated to underline the potential for enhanced cooperation between Beijing and Washington. XINHUA followed his warning to the USSR with his expression of appreciation for President Reagan's statement that "he sets store by the strategic significance of Sino-U.S. relations and will work to broaden them" based on the principles of the normalization communique. To underscore China's strategic alignment with the West, Zhao then reaffirmed that China will not change its policy of opposing Soviet hegemonism. Beijing has favorably reported U.S. statements warning against Soviet pressure on Poland but did not publicize remarks by Secretary of Defense Weinberger and other U.S. leaders linking U.S. arms transfers to China with developments in the Polish situation.

While endorsing a strong Western stance against Soviet interference in Poland, Beijing has revealed some concern that the spotlight on Poland may blind the West to examples of Soviet and Soviet-backed interference in areas closer to China. XINHUA reports on recent Chinese discussions with Western visitors have indicated that the Chinese leaders emphasized that Poland must be viewed as only one part of a worldwide Soviet drive to achieve hegemony, which must be opposed on all fronts through increased strategic cooperation. In a meeting with British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington on 3 April, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping cautioned that the Afghan and Kampuchean problems "should not be overshadowed by the problems of Poland, the Middle East, and the Iran-Iraq war." Zhao continued this line of reasoning during his recent talks with Swedish Prime Minister Thorbjoern Faelldin. According to XINHUA, Zhao said on 7 April that "the Soviet strategic cockpit remains in Europe, but it mainly employs out-flanking tactics." In talks the following day, Zhao maintained that "regional peace is inseparable from global peace" and that the Kampuchean issue "is not a regional question." Zhao stressed in these conversations and in his Japanese interview that the Soviet Union is intensifying its aggression and expansion on a global scale and that Asian and Pacific countries, the United States, and West Europe must unite in a "joint effort" to contain the USSR.

USSR-CHINA-U.S.

MOSCOW DISCOUNTS TAIWAN AS OBSTACLE TO SINO-U.S. TIES

Moscow has shown no sign of expecting to benefit from President Reagan's public differences with Beijing over Taiwan. Soviet media commentary on former President Ford's recent visit to China played up the closeness of U.S.-China ties and alleged evidence of collusion against the USSR. While generally discounting the impact of the problem of Taiwan, some Soviet China-watchers have suggested that events inside China may yet affect Beijing's approach to the United States.

Soviet media have discounted reports of Sino-U.S. differences and portrayed both Washington and Beijing as disinclined to let Taiwan stand in the way of cooperation against the USSR. A 27 March TASS commentary on the Ford visit asserted that both sides had gone "out of their way" to stress the Soviet threat and concluded that Chinese leaders were prepared "more than ever before" to coordinate their policy with Washington. Other commentary on the visit described Ford as conveying reassurances to the Chinese about President Reagan's intentions regarding Taiwan. A 29 March domestic radio broadcast stated that the President, once he had settled in the White House, had "quickly recognized" a common strategic interest with Beijing in confronting the USSR.

Participants in a 5 April Soviet domestic radio program discounted a recent New York TIMES article which said that Sino-U.S. ties had cooled since the November election. Beijing is only engaging in tactical maneuvers, one commentator suggested, in order to "wrest further concessions" from Washington.

TAIWAN QUESTION In its Mandarin broadcasts to the Chinese audience, Moscow continues to charge Chinese leaders with selling out on Taiwan. Soviet commentators have described Beijing's warnings to President Reagan as mere propaganda for the Chinese people. A 24 March broadcast cited as proof Beijing's "failure" to protest the Reagan Administration's "sale of aircraft" to Taiwan on the eve of the Ford visit. This was an apparent reference, judging from other Soviet media accounts, to a recent London DAILY TELEGRAPH report that Washington would reconsider Taiwan's request for modern military equipment.

Soviet China scholars writing in such academic journals as PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA and PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST describe Beijing's position on Taiwan in terms essentially indistinguishable from Moscow's radio propaganda. They say that Chinese leaders are prepared to accept U.S. ties with Taiwan in order to gain access to Western economic and military assistance. In assessing the Taiwan factor in Sino-U.S. relations in the December 1980 issue of PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA, Soviet Sinologist V.I. Kulikov wrote that China had issued only "formal protests" over U.S. "official" contacts with Taiwan and that the issue was unlikely to impede the further development of Sino-U.S. cooperation.

SINO-U.S. TIES While the vast majority of Soviet commentary plays up the continuity of Sino-U.S. ties, some Soviet China-watchers, including IZVESTIYA's Aleksandr Bovin and the Institute of the USA and Canada's Boris Zanegin, continue to speculate on the possibility of changes. Bovin repeated his views on this question in a December national television program. During a panel discussion of the situation in Asia, Bovin disputed Institute of Oriental Studies director Yevgeniy Primakov's suggestion that the United States was achieving success in its efforts to establish a U.S.-China-Japan "alliance" against the USSR. "I am not sure that it is possible to project China's policy through the eighties," Bovin maintained, since in Beijing today things are "changing." Current trends, he concluded, could produce a "positive evolution" in China's foreign policy.

Zanegin, a specialist on Sino-U.S. relations, saw differences among Chinese leaders over the U.S. relationship in an article he published in the April 1980 issue of USA. Zanegin said that supporters of a one-sided reliance on the West in the Chinese leadership faced a "sizeable opposition." This opposition, he asserted, includes both radical leftists and some "pragmatists" who favor "a more carefully considered line, aimed at the development of multilateral international cooperation" that would include ties with the USSR.

CHINA-JAPAN

ECONOMIC READJUSTMENT COMPLICATES BEIJING'S TOKYO CONNECTION

Beijing appears to be backtracking on its decision at the turn of the year to suspend several large-scale projects involving over 1 billion dollars in Japanese contracts. Recent Japanese delegations to China have been assured of Beijing's continued commitment to economic cooperation, and Chinese leaders have raised the possibility that the projects might be continued under different terms. Such an approach may be controversial within China, because the cancellations were a part of a broader economic retrenchment.

Beijing's concern about the impact of its revised economic policy--involving massive cutbacks in construction and expenditures--on Sino-Japanese relations was apparent in media reports on recent visits by Japanese groups. These included a Japanese Government delegation of inquiry headed by Saburo Okita in February and three other high-level groups in March, headed by Aiichiro Fujiyama, chairman of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade; Kaheita Okazaki, permanent adviser to the Japan-China Economic Association; and Toshiwo Doko, President of the Japan-China Association on Economy and Trade.

During meetings with high-ranking Chinese leaders, the Japanese were repeatedly assured that China's long-range policies remained constant and that the "temporary" emphasis on readjustment would not affect prospects for long-term economic cooperation. For example, Premier Zhao Ziyang was cited by XINHUA on 18 March as telling Doko that China's readjustment was a "positive policy" and that it "does not represent any change in China's determination to realize its modernization program, or any change in the policy of continuing economic reform or in the policy of expanding economic cooperation with other countries." Similarly, Deng Xiaoping, who like Zhao met three of the four visitors, told Fujiyama that "from a long-term point of view, we should continue to enhance Sino-Japanese friendly relations and cooperation, which have long been established and developed," according to the XINHUA account of their meeting on 13 March. XINHUA also cited Deng as telling Doko on the 18th that the "prospect for economic cooperation between China and Japan is good and the scope for such cooperation is large."

BACKTRACKING ON POLICY

That China all along was concerned about the likely foreign reaction to its readjustment was suggested by the absence of any public announcement of suspension of major projects and cancellation of contracts with foreign firms. According to Japanese press accounts, by early February contract cancellations had reached a state which prompted the Foreign Ministry to send Okita to inquire into the matter. The first Chinese reference to the problem came when Deng Xiaoping met with Okita on 12 February. Deng suggested that a "better solution" than inflicting losses on foreign firms could be found "through joint efforts such as using government loans or starting joint ventures so that the cancelled projects may be continued." He added, according to XINHUA, that "if no better way can be found . . . we will assume appropriate economic responsibility." According to Japanese press accounts, Deng's proposal to continue the projects later was formally made by Vice Premier Gu Mu during meetings with Fujiyama on 11 March, and it was again noted by XINHUA during meetings between Gu Mu and Doko on the 18th. XINHUA cited Deng as telling Fujiyama that "when China has difficulties, the Japanese side should give it help." Efforts to resolve the problems will continue, with a visit by Vice Premier Gu Mu to Tokyo scheduled for later this month.

Continuation of the projects may be controversial within the Chinese leadership since the decision to suspend them was based not only on financial considerations but also on problems of site location and projected energy shortages. There is some evidence that Deng's proposal may not have been welcomed by all Chinese leaders. Judging by the XINHUA account, Vice Chairman Li Xiannian, meeting with Okazaki on 12 March, said nothing about the long-term prospects for cooperation or the possibility of continuing some of the projects--the main theme in the meetings between Deng, Gu Mu, and the other Japanese visitors. Li, who did not meet with any other delegation, was quoted as explaining "the necessity of the slowed climate" and as stating that problems in economic and trade relations arising from China's readjustment should be settled "fairly and reasonably" through "friendly consultations." Li's somewhat reserved tone seems particularly striking in view of XINHUA's citation a few days earlier, on 20 February, of Okazaki's statement to Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki that the Japanese Government should "take the initiative" in solving problems arising from the cancelled contracts, implicitly suggesting that Okazaki held a favorable attitude toward Deng's proposal to Okita.

USSR

TENSIONS IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS EVOKE OFFICIAL CONCERN

The Baltic republics appear to have become a potential trouble spot for the Soviet regime, judging by a series of recent statements by local officials apparently aimed at attenuating local dissatisfactions and refurbishing the Soviet image with the local populations. In Estonia this discontent has focused on nationalistic-cultural concerns, recently manifest in local protests against the regime's longstanding russification policies; in Latvia and Lithuania the problems appear to center on social and economic dissatisfactions that have shown themselves in increased official attention to trade union and labor matters. While the concerns of local officials appear to have been heightened by recent events in Poland, it is also apparent that they reflect tensions generated by Soviet nationality policies and the individual circumstances of the republics.

According to numerous Western reports, the fall demonstrations in Estonia were prompted by Soviet cultural policy and local food shortages. A letter by leading Estonian intellectuals published in the West attributed the unrest in part to the growth in the compulsory use of the Russian language, the scarcity of Estonian-language publications, the poor knowledge of Estonian language and culture on the part of other nationalities living in their republic, as well as shortages of food and consumer goods. A more solicitous attitude by republic officials toward Estonian culture appears to give substance to these grievances. In his 28 January speech to the republic party congress, for example, First Secretary Vayno chided the republic's school system for failing to "inculcate" in students a sufficient "love" of Estonian language and literature. In the same vein, a plenum of the Tallin gorkom, reported in the 23 January SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, placed equal stress on the need for Estonians to know Russian and for other nationalities living in the republic to know Estonian. This unusually balanced approach has also been echoed in the local press commentary. An 8 January article in MOLODEZH ESTONII, for example, declared that no one should live in the republic without knowing Estonian. At the same time, officials are not neglecting the familiar administrative methods in dealing with the unrest. There have been numerous local meetings and articles calling for greater law and order, as well as for improvements in the ideological education of youth.

Meantime, in Latvia and Lithuania there have been indications suggesting that the Polish example may be causing local agitation. Officials in both republics have shown a new concern for workers' rights and interests. Although similar attitudes have become evident at the national level and in other republics, they first appeared in Lithuania and have continued to receive wider publicity in Latvia and Lithuania than in other regions of the country. In both republics this attitude has expressed itself in a stream of articles in the local press stressing the benefits provided by local trade unions and encouraging local unions to more fully defend workers' rights against management. Also indicative of the special concern with which local leaders appear to view developments in Poland was Lithuanian First Secretary Grishkyavichus' expression of "anxiety" over events in neighboring Poland at the CPSU congress, a subject not directly discussed there by any other republic leader.

The most striking indication of local concern over labor questions was the election in several republics, including Latvia and Lithuania, of rank-and-file workers to the republic's Central Committee Bureaus. In Latvia, the worker so honored has been made a local celebrity. The new Bureau member, milling machine operator A. Ikauniyeks, was elected to the republic's top policymaking body on 30 January, and the next day his speech to the republic party congress was published in SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA. Since then Ikauniyeks has been interviewed by that paper twice and by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH as well. These interviews were prominently featured, and each emphasized the fact that Ikauniyeks was performing his duties in the factory while serving in the elite Bureau. In contrast, rank-and-file workers recently elected to the Bureaus of Lithuania and of the three Caucasian republics, as well as most other Bureau members in all the republics, rarely receive such attention in the local press.*

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* The election of these workers is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 February 1981, pages 7-8.

YUGOSLAVIA

YUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES CONDEMN KOSOVO ALBANIAN DISORDERS

The post-Tito leadership appears to have successfully maintained its cohesion in the face of the potentially disruptive temptations posed by violent disorders among Kosovo province's ethnic Albanian population in the first days of April. Kosovo and federal bodies promptly joined in condemning the outbreak, seemingly the worst nationalist incident since the 1971 Croatian unrest, and sanctioned firm security measures leading to the suppression of the demonstrations. Neighboring Albania has expressed sympathy for the demonstrators, while Moscow has maintained a discreet objectivity.

The predominantly ethnic Albanian leadership of Kosovo province has taken the lead in denouncing the nationalist demonstrators, with top federal bodies and neighboring regions expressing strong reinforcing condemnations. Speeches by prominent ethnic Albanian officials Fadilj Hodza, Mahmut Bakali, and Dzavid Nimani have condemned the uprisings as "nationalist," "irredentist," and "counterrevolutionary" actions aimed at undermining Yugoslavia's unity, independence, and self-management socialist system. Some of the speeches took issue with the assertions of the demonstrators that Kosovo--Yugoslavia's poorest region--has been economically exploited by Serbia and should be granted full republic status within the federation. Local bodies have claimed massive public condemnation of the demonstrators and have called for renewed indoctrination efforts against Albanian nationalism.

Along with the alleged universality of public denunciations of the demonstrators, several Yugoslav officials--most of whom are ethnic Serbs--have warned against a potential backlash from Kosovo's Serb and Montenegrin minorities and against the spread of nationalism to other regions. Prominent Kosovo Serb Dusan Ristic on 6 April said the Serbs and Montenegrins have a "special responsibility" to distinquish the "hostile act" from the "people" and cautioned that it would be "very dangerous if . . . all the Albanians in Kosovo were blamed" for the disorders. LCY Presidium Secretary Dusan Dragosavac, a Serb from Croatia, warned on the 3d that there is "now a real danger" that "another kind of nationalism" might erupt, declaring that "nationalism is not to be fought with nationalism." Another Serbian official urged Belgrade University students on the 4th "not to allow Albanian nationalism to be used as a justification for the manifestation of nationalism in one's own environment."

The possibility of Tirana's involvement in the unrest was discussed by LCY Presidium member Stane Dolanc in a press conference reported on 6 April. Dolanc said Belgrade "hopes" Albania still adheres to its professions of respect for Yugoslav territorial integrity, but he seemed reluctant to give firm assurances on the subject, stating only that Belgrade had received no note from Tirana and "could not now say that the Albanian Government was behind all this." Dolanc also hinted at possible pro-Soviet involvement, maintaining that "Cominform" emigres were trying to destabilize Kosovo and that their leaflets had been seized by the authorities. Kosovo's Hodza on the 3d also seemed to imply the possibility of Soviet or Albanian complicity, calling the agitators "servants and agents of various intelligence centers and agencies" and denouncing them for "Cominformist" and "dogmatic leftwing" sentiments.

TIRANA, MOSCOW REACTION Neighboring Albania shed its reserve on the unrest on 8 April, when the party paper ZERI I POPULLIT carried an editorial condemning the harshness of the crackdown and expressing sympathy with the demands of the demonstrators for "emancipating" Kosovo from the "tutelage of Serbia" and granting it republic status within Yugoslavia. The editorial claimed that Tirana had no intention of interfering in Yugoslavia's internal affairs but reserved the right to speak for the ethnic Albanians, whom it described as impoverished and "lacking democratic freedoms and political rights." Moscow has reported on the events thus far only in a 6 April TASS report that factually recounted Belgrade's view of the disorders and said that the situation is returning to normal.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 30 MARCH - 5 APRIL 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,062 items)		
FRC Foreign Minister Genscher in USSR	6%	(--)
Polish Situation	6%	(6%)
Hungarian 36th National Day Anniversary	4%	(--)
Bulgarian 12th Party Congress	4%	(--)
CPSU 26th Congress	3%	(4%)
Soyuz 39 Joint Soviet-Mongolian Space Mission	3%	(9%)
Brezhnev Response to Greek Paper on Use of Nuclear Weapons	3%	(--)

Beijing (757 items)		
UK Secretary of State Lord Carrington in PRC	11%	(--)
PRC Delegation in Brussels for PRC-EEC Business Week	6%	(1%)
Polish Situation	4%	(1%)
Assassination Attempt on U.S. President Reagan	4%	(--)
New Zealand Parliamentary Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
Venezuelan Christian Socialist Party Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Beijing approves U.S. strategic approach
- Moscow answers Washington on "linkage"
- Soviets make gesture to Baghdad

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15 APRIL 1981
FB TM 81-015

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW COUNTERS ADMINISTRATION DEMANDS FOR "LINKAGE"

> Moscow has brusquely dismissed Reagan Administration demands for changes in Soviet international behavior as a precondition for bilateral discussions. At the same time, some Soviet spokesmen have expressed concern over the corrosive effect of Third World conflicts on U.S.-Soviet relations and professed interest in discussing the issues involved.

LEADERSHIP REJECTS LINKAGE

In recent weeks Soviet leaders, including President Brezhnev, have vigorously rejected U.S. efforts to link bilateral negotiations to changes in Moscow's behavior. At the Czechoslovak party congress on 7 April, Brezhnev ridiculed what he termed a U.S. attempt to set "preconditions" for negotiations. Washington would view Soviet leaders as "simpletons," Brezhnev argued, if they were to demand that the United States abandon its military bases abroad or end its arming of "dictatorial terrorist regimes" before talks could begin. Bilateral talks can only be successful, he asserted, when neither side attempts to "dictate conditions."

Politburo candidate member Boris Ponomarev--whose responsibilities as party secretary include relations with the United States as well as the Third World--responded in similar fashion to Administration criticism of the USSR in the March issue of the party theoretical journal KOMMUNIST (No. 5). Ponomarev dismissed the linkage issue as an attempt to make the Soviet Union "pay" for detente by giving up its support for Third World liberation movements. If Washington wants to prevent Third World conflicts from flaring up, he indicated, it should respond positively to Brezhnev's foreign policy proposals at the 26th CPSU Congress.

SPECIALISTS RECOGNIZE PROBLEM

Soviet academic specialists have been more forthcoming than the leadership on the problems that Third World conflicts pose for detente. Fedor Burlatskiy, an official in the Central Committee's Institute of Social Sciences, raised the issue on 28 January in the influential weekly of the USSR Writers Union, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. Burlatskiy argued that regional conflicts must be contained through the application of a "local anesthetic," so that the "living tissue" of U.S.-Soviet relations might be preserved. He did not offer a practical application of this approach.

Georgiy Arbatov, head of the USA and Canada Institute, has echoed the call for containment of Third World conflicts and, in comments directed to Western audiences, claimed that Soviet-American discussions could help accomplish that task. In a 23 March interview with the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL, Arbatov maintained that earlier conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia could have been controlled and the introduction of Cuban troops prevented if Washington had been willing to negotiate with Moscow at the outset. The two countries, he concluded, "can and must talk about everything." In a recent issue of the Soviet English-language weekly MOSCOW NEWS, Arbatov implied that revising the U.S. approach to linkage would be more productive. During the May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit, Arbatov claimed, Moscow did not link U.S. Vietnam policy to bilateral detente because Soviet leaders felt that the summit would "yield favorable results in itself." Indeed, Arbatov concluded, the favorable climate that resulted from the summit enabled the two countries to work jointly to defuse the Arab-Israeli conflict the following year.

SOVIET SPECIALISTS HINT AT NEED FOR U.S. OIL TECHNOLOGY

Some cracks have begun to appear in the facade of self-assurance the Soviet Union has sought to maintain with regard to U.S. export controls over the transfer of high technology. The clearest signs of concern have come in recent public commentaries suggesting that a relaxation of these strictures on oil technology might benefit East and West equally. Further indirect evidence comes from Soviet oil specialists who have been lamenting the current lack of equipment for sophisticated drilling and recovery techniques, without specifically linking the problem with the Western embargo. These signs of concern appear against a background of indications that the post-Afghanistan U.S. sanctions on East-West trade imposed last year have encouraged renewed debate in the Soviet Union over whether long-range economic plans can safely be based on the assumption of continued international cooperation or whether the present gloomy prospects for detente necessitate a return to autarky.

A direct assertion that a continued embargo of U.S. oil technology would adversely affect Soviet oil production came recently from Georgiy Arbatov, the leading Soviet expert on the United States. Speaking on a 15 March Moscow radio international broadcast, Arbatov complained that Western export restrictions were depriving the Soviet Union of "necessary" technology for the development of its oil and gas industries. Arbatov added that it would be in the best interest of the United States to lift such restrictions and encourage the "speediest" possible development of Soviet energy resources to help prevent the USSR from "competing" on the world energy market and driving up prices. Similar views were put forth two weeks later by Boris Rachkov, a frequent Soviet commentator on international energy topics. Writing in the 1 April issue of the Swedish paper SVENSKA DAGBLADET, Rachkov also stressed the mutual benefits of international cooperation while acknowledging that the availability of Western assistance would be one factor in determining the level of future Soviet oil production.

Further indirect signs of discontent over the current embargo have been coming from Soviet oil specialists who appear to be concerned over the inadequacies of their own equipment. For example, an unsigned article in EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA (No. 14) stressed the key role high technology will play in future Soviet oil production and urged the appropriate ministries to improve the range, quantity, and quality of sophisticated oil equipment they produced. Among the products specifically discussed were drill bits, an item which became a controversial issue between the Soviet Union and the United States when the latter canceled an agreement to construct a plant in the USSR to produce the bits--a cancellation that PRAVDA bitterly denounced on 12 December. The frustrations of the Soviet oil industry with current capabilities in this field were clearly indicated at the Azerbaijani party congress, where, according to a 31 January BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY report, the head of the local oil industry complained that oil drilling equipment and cutting tools "produced by Soviet machine-building plants do not meet today's needs and suffer from poor quality." The chronic need for additional modern equipment was also stressed by the first secretary of the Tatar ASSR at the recent CPSU congress, where he called for "radical" measures to update equipment to meet the complex challenges facing the oil industry.

The post-Afghanistan tightening of Western trade policies appears to have generated renewed uncertainty in the Soviet Union regarding the wisdom of basing Soviet long-range economic policy on the assumption of a continued flow of East-West trade. The uncertainty has surfaced in renewed debate over autarky versus international economic collaboration as basic principles of economic policy--an issue settled in favor of collaboration during the heyday of detente. New support for autarky has recently been voiced by Academy of Sciences President Aleksandrov, who in a speech in April 1980 suggested making the Soviet Union "completely independent" of foreign technology. He moderated his message somewhat at the 26th CPSU Congress, but again argued against overreliance on foreign technology, warning that such a policy would encourage technological lags. On the other side of the argument, Dzhermen Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, has weighed in with a recent article in PRAVDA supporting expanded foreign trade. Writing in the 27 March issue, Gvishiani underscored the importance of international trade in "technological innovations" and argued that any "artificial interference" in such trade "inescapably damages" scientific progress.

At the moment, a middle road policy between these extremes appears to have the support of the Soviet leadership. At the CPSU congress Brezhnev called upon Soviet science and industry to free the country from costly dependence on foreign technology, but he endorsed the continuation of economic ties with the West.

U S S R - P O L A N D

SOVIET ARMY PAPER HINTS AT CONCERN OVER POLISH TROOP MORALE

Hints of concern lest the Polish armed forces become infected by the spirit of rebellion animating other elements of Polish society have crept into some recent reports carried by the Soviet army paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR). These reports are the more notable in that Soviet propaganda on Poland has been portraying the armed forces as a reliable bastion of socialism and of Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact during the current crisis.

The hints of Soviet concern have come in the form of passing references to ideological and morale problems in the Polish armed forces and under present conditions will be read in Warsaw as more than routine rhetoric:

+ A 4 February review of the Polish military newspaper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI stated that many recent conscripts had taken part in "the events of the past few months" without understanding "everything in these events." This, the Soviet newspaper observed, created a requirement for higher standards in political-ideological work, including the need "to attentively study the mood" in army units. The article also mentioned that only one conscript in three was a member of the Polish communist party youth organization, a circumstance which would surprise Soviet army political workers, who are used to virtually compulsory membership in the Komsomol among their charges.

+ A 14 March article similarly stressed the need for increased and intensified political indoctrination and implied that company commanders and political workers are now obliged to spend their evenings in the barracks holding informal political discussions. The article intimated that Solidarity activists had apparently succeeded in "getting into the barracks" to present their views. While they were said to have been "rebuffed" by the "socialist maturity" of the servicemen, the article's portrayal of such a "penetration" of Polish military facilities casts in a garish light the vigilance problem.

+ A 14 April article asserted that Polish servicemen recognize their "patriotic and internationalist duty" to defend socialism but acknowledged that "not so long ago" some of them--even officers and party members--were "not keenly aware" of the dangers.

CHINA-U.S.-USSR

BEIJING OFFERS QUALIFIED APPROVAL OF U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH

Chinese media have conveyed an increasingly favorable assessment of Washington's strategic policies despite lingering concern over some issues--particularly in the U.S. approach toward the Third World. While this trend dates back to Beijing's favorable reporting on the Carter Administration's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, recent low-level, non-authoritative media reportage and comment have portrayed a firmer resolve in the Reagan Administration to counter Soviet aggression and have credited the new Administration with greater success in gaining the cooperation of U.S. allies in the anti-Soviet effort. Chinese media have indirectly expressed hope, in light of this trend, that Washington will tread cautiously in its relationship with Taipei out of recognition of common U.S.-PRC strategic interests.

FIRMER U.S. POSTURE Beijing has applauded what it perceives as the new Administration's strong determination to counteract Soviet expansion and aggression. While acknowledging that Washington had already "toughened" its policy toward Moscow after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a 15 March XINHUA commentary emphasized that U.S. policy "has become firmer" since President Reagan took office. A 17 March RENMIN RIBAO article hailed the Administration's recently announced five-year rearmament plan as evidence of an "important turning point" in U.S. strategic policy which, the paper suggested, will enable the United States to acquire the wherewithal to meet the Soviet challenge. At the same time, RENMIN RIBAO expressed concern over the troubled state of the American economy which, it warned, could make the proposed military buildup "a long and painful process."

Striking another positive note, Chinese media have praised the Administration's measures in El Salvador. A 28 March RENMIN RIBAO "news analysis" called Washington's actions an "extraordinary" expression of "resolve to check Soviet and Cuban penetration" in Central and Latin America. Criticizing the policies of the previous Administration, the article welcomed the policy "change" as a clear signal to Moscow that "the era of 'hesitation and lack of resolve' in U.S. foreign policy is over." The paper's single caveat was that the effectiveness of the American action was somewhat diluted by lack of support from some of the West European allies who were concerned about U.S. "overreaction."

U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERATION Beijing has seemed particularly pleased by what it regards as increased strategic cooperation between the United States and Western Europe. A 12 March XINHUA article by Yu Enguang noted that the day after President Reagan took office he contacted major Western European allied leaders and pledged to strengthen cooperation and consultation. Yu argued that the "greater importance" the Reagan Administration attached to cooperation with the European allies had already narrowed differences on a number of issues, notably the situation in Afghanistan, the Middle East, NATO defense expenditures, and the Soviet diplomatic offensive. This "noticeable trend" toward "stepped-up negotiations and cooperation," the article said, contrasted favorably with the "mutual nonconfidence" of past years.

The same theme was sounded in a 30 March Beijing domestic radio program. While in the past the United States had pursued a "vacillating, fickle policy and had no clearcut, consistent strategy," the broadcast said, the allies have now "deepened mutual understanding and reduced misgivings on certain issues" even though "dissensions and contradictions" are likely to continue.

In this context, Beijing has appeared to be particularly gratified by the West's reaction to the Polish crisis. Chinese media have reported extensively and approvingly on Western leaders' coordination of warnings against Soviet military intervention--treatment that contrasts markedly with Chinese media portrayal of disorganized and contradictory Western responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Beijing has approvingly cited several recent developments as concrete evidence of a favorable trend toward redressing an alleged military imbalance in Europe. A 3 April RENMIN RIBAO article by Fang Min claimed that the NATO special consultative group meetings in Brussels on 31 March effectively rebuffed a Soviet proposal for a freeze on medium-range missiles which in Beijing's view would have given the Soviets superiority in both conventional and nuclear forces. Calling the Soviet proposal an "old trick" to divide the Western alliance by cajolery and pressure, Fang noted with satisfaction that the meeting had "turned it down in unequivocal terms." A subsequent XINHUA report of the NATO defense ministers' meetings on 8 April similarly approved the decision to reject the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on nuclear weapons deployment and to move ahead with long-range theatre nuclear force modernization.

Beijing's expressions of growing optimism have continued to be qualified by concern that Washington's allies in Europe will not fully respond to the stronger U.S. anti-Soviet global thrust and will retain what China sees as pacifist views and a parochial approach. For example, the 30 March domestic broadcast noted that "contradictions" between Western Europe and the U.S. on some issues "have been sharp," and it pointedly warned against "some people" in Western Europe who continue to "urge detente and prefer making compromises and concessions in order to preserve peace in West Europe." Highlighting the distance Beijing perceives between the United States and some of its allies on this issue, XINHUA on 23 March cited National Security Advisor Richard Allen's denunciation of pacifism in Western Europe and quoted him as saying that "the only way to deal with the Soviet Union is from a strong position." At the official level, Beijing has recently reemphasized to West European leaders the importance of recognizing the global character of the Soviet threat and the importance of joining together to resist it. XINHUA reported on 10 April that Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping that day had warned Swedish prime minister Thorbjorn Falldin that "people should not let their attention be diverted from Afghanistan and Kampuchea by the problems in Poland, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf." XINHUA quoted Deng as saying "we should regard Afghanistan and Kampuchea as the front line in the fight against hegemonism and support the resistance forces there," echoing his similar remarks to British foreign minister Lord Carrington a few days earlier.

OPTIMISM ABOUT EAST ASIA Beijing has recently argued that despite the decline of U.S. military power with respect to that of the Soviet Union in Asia in the 1970's, the overall strategic situation has become increasingly favorable for checking the USSR on its eastern flank. A 27 March RENMIN RIBAO article by Pei Monong stated that with the normalization of U.S.-China relations and the strengthening of ties among China, the United States, Japan, ASEAN and countries of Oceania, "a new pattern has objectively emerged" with those countries on one side and the USSR on the other. This "new pattern," said Pei, "has not only changed the regional balance between hegemonist and antihegemonist forces, but will also greatly check [the Soviet Union's] actions in pushing her global strategy." While admitting to continuing problems in the complex relations among the various countries involved, Pei expressed "full confidence" that "judging by the present situation, the antihegemonist forces have the upper hand."

The upbeat theme in Pei's article was foreshadowed in an article by Jiang Yuanchun titled "On the Soviet Union's Strategy Toward East Asia," broadcast by Beijing domestic service on 18 February. Although Jiang highlighted malicious Soviet intentions and the dangers of Soviet expansionism, he stressed that the Soviet offensive in Asia had set off a "chain reaction" whereby "China has stood firm . . . , the United States has strengthened its alliance with Japan and improved its relations with China, Japan has come to realize the need to strengthen its Self-Defense Forces . . . and both the United States and Japan have adopted an unflinching, antihegemonist stand" on the Kampuchean and Afghan issues. Jiang concluded that "the unity of still more Pacific and Asian countries in their determined efforts against hegemonism will be an important force that will be able to hold Soviet and Vietnamese expansion in check."

Similar optimism has been registered in a series of Beijing media reports on Japanese defense policy since the formation of the Suzuki government. In October last year XINHUA reported increased support by Japanese opposition parties for the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security treaty, and since that time Chinese media have consistently made favorable reference to increased cooperation between Washington and Tokyo in defense matters. In recent examples, XINHUA on 20 March reported Chief of Staff General Lew Allen's call upon Japan to improve its defense forces, and on 9 April XINHUA highlighted Japanese cooperation with the United States and other Western countries in reporting a new Japanese Government study of Tokyo's strategy in countering the Soviet threat. While Beijing does not minimize differences between the United States and Japan on various economic questions, it emphasizes that their strategic cooperation has recently improved.

While expressing optimism about the overall situation in Asia, Beijing has continued to warn indirectly that bilateral issues--particularly the Taiwan problem between the United States and China and the Sino-Japanese economic problems--should be handled carefully by all parties concerned in order not to upset the favorably evolving strategic pattern. Both the Pei and Jiang articles on East Asia stressed that contradictions and differences among countries in the region should be settled through frank exchanges of views and consultations. As Pei put it, "each party should take the stand of the overall strategic pattern, make every effort to preserve, consolidate, and develop this pattern, and also readjust its policy to this effect."

The PRC-controlled Hong Kong press has been more explicit in relating this approach to the Taiwan issue. HSIN WAN PAO, in a 23 March "newstalk" column, counseled that on the question of selling arms to Taiwan, "one should take warning from another's mistakes." Stating that if the United States opts to sell arms to Taiwan it should not expect to receive the "lenient treatment" given the Netherlands, the paper went on to lecture the President: "In order to strengthen the concerted efforts to counter Soviet expansion, Reagan should understand that he must not do anything that may provoke China to anger . . . If he does such a thing, only hegemonists will inwardly applaud him and only hegemonists will benefit from this." In a similar vein, WEN WEI PO's 1 April editorial on former President Ford's visit to China warned: "Since the two countries have agreed to put the global strategy before everything else and to follow the principles laid down in the Shanghai Communique in handling problems between them, the United States should seek to settle specific problems through diplomatic channels and should not act arbitrarily because this will hamper the development of Sino-American relations."

U.S. THIRD WORLD POLICIES

Beijing has expressed its strongest reservations about the Administration's evolving policies toward the Third World. China's central concern is over policies that might have a counterproductive effect on efforts to combat Soviet influence.

Thus an article by Zhuang Qubing in the 16 March journal SHIJIE ZHISHI commented that former President Carter's policies--including negotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty and support for majority rule in South Africa--had "greatly improved U.S. relations with Third World countries" and cautioned against moves that might set back that progress to the advantage of the Soviet Union. If the Reagan Administration were to yield to pressure and change this approach, Zhuang warned, such a "big reversal" would lead to "violent reaction" that the Soviets would exploit, and "this would be detrimental to uniting with all the anti-Soviet forces that can be united with."

Comparable concerns have been expressed in Beijing's assessments of Administration policies in the Middle East. A 7 April RENMIN

RIBAO Newsletter by Xing Xiang Chao on Secretary Haig's visit to the Middle East said that while the United States was "still investigating and studying" its Middle East policy, its approach was to give "prime importance" to resisting Soviet expansion in the Middle East by boosting the U.S. military presence, paying insufficient heed to the Arab countries' view that solution of the Palestinian problem is "the core of the Middle East problem." Xing observed that U.S. failure to resolve the Palestine question would be "detrimental to the strategy of countering Soviet expansion" in the Middle East. Similarly, a XINHUA article pegged to the opening of the Palestinian Council on 12 April commented that "while the U.S. Government has attached importance to the Middle East issue, it is out of touch with its core--the Palestinian cause."

With regard to Africa, an article by Zhao Guangyi and Qiu Xiaoyi in RENMIN RIBAO on 9 April said that while the Reagan Administration's position had not yet crystallized, "recent remarks" heard in the United States on the African question "have aroused discontent among the African nations." Reporting denunciations by black leaders in both Africa and the United States of favorable statements toward South Africa, the article concluded that if Washington adopted a policy favorable to the Pretoria regime, it would harm its relations with most Third World and African countries and damage its own "strategic" interests.

USSR-IRAQ

MOSCOW MAKES GESTURE TO BAGHDAD ON NINTH TREATY ANNIVERSARY

Moscow has signaled a desire to paper over, if not ameliorate, its strained relations with Baghdad by slightly upgrading its observance of the anniversary of the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty.

For the first time since 1978, the ritualistic congratulatory message to Baghdad came from President Brezhnev and Premier Tikhonov, rather than from the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers.* Unlike last year, when no ceremony in Moscow was reported, the anniversary was marked this year by a reception attended by low-level Soviet officials and the Iraqi ambassador to the USSR.

A slight hint of bilateral differences appeared in variant Iraqi and Soviet versions of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's anniversary cable to the Soviet leaders. According to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, he spoke of developing friendship with the USSR based on mutual cooperation, struggle against imperialism, and opposition to "all forms of intervention in the region." PRAVDA rendered the last phrase as a statement of opposition to all forms of "imperialist" interference there, removing any suggestion of an allusion to the Soviet Union.

In associated commentary, an 11 April talk broadcast by Moscow in Arabic, pegged to a forthcoming meeting of the permanent Soviet-Iraqi committee on economic and technological cooperation, routinely praised the "success" of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation and cited instances of Soviet technical assistance. However, in line with Moscow's public neutrality on the Iraq-Iran war, it made no mention of the USSR's erstwhile arms supply relationship with Iraq, the subject of occasional cryptic remarks by clearly dissatisfied Iraqi officials. Ongoing frictions in bilateral relations had been underscored by the conspicuously antiregime remarks delivered by the Iraqi Communist Party leader at the 26th CPSU Congress in February, and by the absence of any Iraqi Ba'th Party representation at the congress; an Iraqi Ba'thist delegation had attended the 25th congress in 1976.

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* For background, see the TRENDS of 25 April 1979, pages 7-9.

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MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 6-12 APRIL 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3 119 items)		
Czechoslovak 16th Party Congress	15%	(--)
Brezhnev Speech	7%	(--)
Tikhonov in Austria	10%	(--)
East German 10th Party Congress	4%	(--)
Polish Situation	3%	(6%)
U.S. Space Shuttle	2%	(--)

Beijing (771 items)		
Swedish Prime Minister Falldin in PRC	12%	(--)
Venezuelan Christian Socialist Party Delegation in PRC	5%	(3%)
Thai Coup Attempt	4%	(2%)
Japanese Newspaper Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
Polish Situation	3%	(4%)

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

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TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

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+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

USSR-U.S.

IZVESTIYA'S BOVIN SEES SHARP TURN IN U.S. GLOBAL POLICY

One of Moscow's more temperate foreign policy observers has joined in the Soviet chorus of harsh commentary on U.S. policy under the Reagan Administration. In a flurry of recent appearances in the press and on national television and radio, IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin has accused the new Administration of turning sharply toward global confrontation and deliberately attempting to destroy the structure of U.S.-Soviet relations established in the 1970's. Bovin's views on the Reagan Administration are of particular interest, for during the past decade he has regularly offered the Soviet audience Moscow's least alarming interpretations of developments in Washington.*

In five commentaries during the last four weeks--three in IZVESTIYA--Bovin has suggested that the Soviet Union should prepare for a markedly more antagonistic approach from the new Administration than from its predecessor on both bilateral and Third World problems. While giving a nod to the notion that the new Administration has yet to fully formulate its foreign policy, Bovin argued on Soviet television's "International Panorama" program on 29 March that the outlines of U.S. policy were now "sufficiently visible" and that its cornerstone is "primitive" anticommunism. Washington, he maintained, is moving beyond anti-Soviet rhetoric to actions that entail breaking up the "fairly well developed" structure of bilateral relations and especially its foundation, the SALT process. On 12 April, Bovin told the Soviet radio audience that through the "muddle of contradictory statements" coming from the Administration, a "dangerous" turn toward confrontation with the Soviet Union was discernible.

Bovin has softened the implications of his assessment for the USSR by suggesting that the new U.S. policy will collapse in the face of reality. In surveying the Administration's Third World policy in

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* Bovin's special status among Soviet journalists was underscored last year in his receipt of the Lenin Prize and this year in his election to the party Central Auditing Commission at the 26th CPSU Congress.

10 and 15 April IZVESTIYA articles, Bovin stated that "Washington apparently needs new Vietnams and new Irans" before coming to terms with international realities. U.S. global assertiveness, he wrote in the 18 April IZVESTIYA, will harm not the communist world against which it is directed but "those whom the United States has promised to save and defend."

BACKGROUND Even last fall, when Moscow's official posture held that the incoming Administration offered the prospect of repairing U.S.-Soviet ties, some of Moscow's foreign policy specialists seemed more skeptical. Both Georgiy Arbatov, head of the USA and Canada Institute, and Bovin publicly questioned the grounds for optimism. Bovin contended on a 7 December national radio program, for example, that "a harder line in U.S. policy is at hand" and that the USSR must make preparations for this eventuality.

BREZHNEV CALLS FOR EFFORTS TO KEEP ARMS OUT OF SPACE

> Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev has publicly endorsed "businesslike international cooperation" in outer space and appealed for renewed efforts to avoid its militarization. While he did not mention the U.S. space program directly, his remarks seemed intended to draw an invidious comparison between Soviet restraint, as exemplified by his proposals, and renewed U.S. ambitions to dominate space, supposedly symbolized by the space shuttle. Brezhnev's speech came against the background of Soviet accusations that the U.S. space shuttle program is dominated by the Pentagon and constitutes yet another aspect of America's striving for military superiority.

In remarks at a Kremlin awards ceremony for Soviet and Mongolian cosmonauts on 17 April, Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union has been and remains "a convinced supporter of the development of businesslike international cooperation in outer space." He urged keeping the "shoreless cosmic ocean . . . pure and free of weapons of any kind" and voiced a Soviet desire for "joint efforts" to "preclude the militarization of outer space." Brezhnev has not previously alluded to a need for expanding existing restrictions on the use of space for military activities.

Soviet commentary on the U.S. space shuttle program has criticized it as being under Pentagon domination and as serving primarily military purposes. Drawing heavily on American and other Western commentary, Soviet attacks have noted that one-third of early shuttle flights are scheduled for military purposes, and that even the very first flight included testing an aiming device for laser weapons. Soviet coverage of the shuttle program's military aspects has focused particularly on the development of laser weaponry to be targeted against both satellites and ICBM's, the shuttle's potential as a military command post and communications relay, and plans for launching "spy satellites." All these were interpreted as signs of the U.S. effort to acquire military superiority.

Possibly of more practical significance were charges contained in Radio Moscow broadcasts to North America that the contemplated military activities entail infringements of international agreements. On 14 April regular commentator Vladimir Pozner stated that the panoply of military tasks envisioned for the shuttle would violate the U.N. space treaty. And on the 17th, "military observer" Aleksey Vasilyev, alluding to provisions "which define the special part played by satellites . . . in ensuring international stability," asserted that development of antisatellite weapons "can be construed" as violating the 1972 Soviet-American treaty on limiting ABM's. He further warned that space-based weapons are hard to monitor and cautioned that extension of the arms race to space "will make it very difficult, or even impossible," to reach an agreement on limiting strategic arms.

Soviet complaints about American "spy satellites" are not new, but they were deemphasized in Moscow's propaganda during the heyday of detente in the early 1970's. Since then, Soviet warnings against space-based infringements of national sovereignty have gone hand in hand with acknowledgments of the legitimacy of limited observations necessary to verify Soviet-American arms control agreements. In pillorying the military components of the shuttle program, Pozner recalled the USSR's early initiatives to prohibit the militarization of outer space and expressed his personal view that the Soviet Union stood ready to negotiate "some kind of comprehensive agreement" in this sphere. While Brezhnev's remarks are too vague to qualify as a serious proposal for a new space agreement, they serve to project an image of Soviet interest in broad and comprehensive arms control agreements, a goal clearly embodied in Brezhnev's speech to the 26th CPSU Congress.

USSR-POLAND

MOSCOW SHOWS RENEWED RESTRAINT ON POLISH SITUATION

Moscow has shown new signs of restraint toward Poland in recent days, suggesting at least a grudging willingness to continue to work with the Kania regime. Moscow's present moderate tone can be traced to Soviet leader Brezhnev's 7 April speech to the Czechoslovak party congress, in which he defused growing tensions by expressing a qualified vote of confidence in the Polish communists. Despite the appearance of some critical reportage shortly after the speech, in recent days other high Soviet officials have reinforced his expression of confidence, and Moscow comment has become less strident and alarmist. The milder tone in Soviet comment comes at a time of calm on the Polish labor scene and further efforts by the Warsaw leadership to accommodate grassroots demands to democratize the party.

Recent statements by Leonid Zamyatin, head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, and promiment Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko have reflected the spirit of Brezhnev's statement in Prague that one could expect the Polish communists to defend socialism themselves. In a statement on Moscow television on 18 April, Zamyatin asserted flatly that the Polish communists "will be able to defend the cause of socialism" and rebuff any threats, adding that the Polish leaders are "doing everything possible" and that the party "should deal with the crisis itself." Chernenko, in a Lenin anniversary speech in Moscow on the 22d, similarly said that "the Polish communists and Polish working people have built a strong and independent socialist homeland and will not give up their achievements." Both Zamyatin and Chernenko balanced their remarks with warnings against Western interference and double-edged reminders to Warsaw that it can rely on its allies.

Another sign of eased pressure on Warsaw, and of an effort to project normality in Soviet-Polish relations, was Moscow's handling of the bilateral treaty anniversary on 21 April. Speaking at a traditional ceremonial concert in Warsaw on the 21st, Soviet Ambassador to Poland Boris Aristov said that the Polish communists "will manage, under the leadership of the PZPR, to resolve the complicated tasks and ensure that the country comes out of the crisis." Aristov noted that Poland's economic problems have "considerably hampered" economic cooperation but also thanked some Polish enterprises for meeting their obligations. Commemorative articles appearing in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 21st largely avoided controversial topics and contained similar expressions of confidence in Warsaw.

Despite these reassurances, Moscow has clearly been alarmed over the growing democratization movement within the Polish party, although its treatment of this phenomenon thus far has been circumspect. Moscow conspicuously failed to report a 15 April meeting in Torun of grassroots party members, which demanded greater democratization and called for the removal of hardliners from the leadership. A TASS report on the 17th gave a fairly orthodox cast to party leader Kania's remarks to a congress commission session that day, noting tersely the need to strengthen party democracy but also citing the need for party unity. By contrast, Prague television on the 17th unabashedly condemned the Torun meeting as a gathering of "rightwing revisionist currents in the PZPR" that want to transform the party into "some kind of social democratic party."

WARSAW ON TORUN MEETING Although there was no advance publicity for the Torun meeting, Warsaw media have carried reports and commentary on the event. The party daily TRYBUNA LUDU described the meeting correctly as representing new horizontal organizations in the party which emerged spontaneously as a result of the rank and file's mistrust of the regular party hierarchy. The government paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY said much the same, adding the observation that the new organizations would not have arisen "if everything in the party had functioned correctly." The newspaper also indicated that the meeting had been approved in advance by the central party authorities. Whatever the nature of the official approval, it was apparently less than enthusiastic, since no Politburo member attended the meeting. The highest officials present, judging by Warsaw media reports, were deputy head of the PZPR Central Committee Organizational Department Ryszard Lukasiewicz, and PZPR Marxism-Leninism Institute Director Andrzej Werblan--a reputed orthodox stalwart who was dropped from the Politburo on 2 December. Werblan either concealed his true colors on the Politburo or changed his political orientation after leaving, because hardline Politburo member Grabski chided him at the March plenum for his allegedly belated espousal of liberal reform ideas.

USSR-FRANCE

MOSCOW STAYS NEUTRAL IN ELECTION, ANTICIPATES GISCARD WIN

Moscow has tried to appear evenhanded in its public treatment of the French presidential contest but apparently expects incumbent President Valery Giscard d'Estaing to be reelected. Soviet media have given favorable attention to Giscard as well as French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais despite the recent complaints of some Soviet officials about an increasingly pro-U.S. orientation in Paris. Moscow's posture on the election is in keeping with its traditional appreciation for French leaders who insist on France's independent role in foreign affairs--meaning independent of the United States and NATO--regardless of their position on the domestic political spectrum. The same considerations led Moscow to favor the Gaullist candidate over Giscard in its reporting on the 1974 election.

Despite Moscow's neutral posture, Giscard clearly emerged from an early PRAVDA assessment as the leading candidate. PRAVDA Paris correspondent Kharlanov, examining the candidates in the paper's 13 March edition, implied that the incumbent had the advantage of experience while his opponents suffered from a variety of electoral drawbacks. Giscard has earned personal prestige in France, Kharlanov noted, as a "restrained and prudent politician, particularly in the international arena." His Gaullist opponent, Chirac, is hampered by the fact that his own party is not fully behind his candidacy, the PRAVDA correspondent said, while the Socialist nominee, Mitterand, suffers from the lack of a "clear and consistent political program." Kharlanov had warm words for Communist candidate Marchais but seemed guarded about his prospects, noting that the PCF leader was the target of an "anticommunist crusade" in the French media.

Kharlanov's report drew immediate speculation in LE MONDE and LE MATIN that Moscow was voting for Giscard, prompting PRAVDA to issue a rejoinder on the 17th denying any interference in the election campaign. Since the Kharlanov incident, PRAVDA has seemed intent on avoiding any further controversy, restricting its coverage to brief reports on major election appearances by Giscard and Marchais, with only truncated accounts of their campaign statements.

Moscow has given Marchais favorable, though discreet, support during the campaign. In addition to PRAVDA's coverage, Soviet French-language broadcasts to Europe in the past week have focused in general terms on the poor state of the French economy--a central theme in Marchais' campaign. But Moscow's careful publicity for Marchais appears to reflect its appreciation for the PCF leader's loyal support of Soviet policies on Afghanistan, Poland, and NATO's theater nuclear force modernization decision rather than any serious expectation of a PCF victory.

Soviet replay of Marchais' election remarks has enabled Moscow to air criticism of French foreign policy without speaking on its own authority. Marchais' charges against the incumbent closely mirror those of Moscow, laid out in blunt fashion last December by candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev during an interparliamentary exchange visit to Paris. According to the 18 December issue of the PCF daily, L'HUMANITE, Ponomarev told a press conference the day before that Moscow took a dim view of France's work on neutron weapons, its decision to boost military spending, calls by members of the ruling coalition to "review" the Soviet-French relationship, and various appeals within France for closer military cooperation with NATO.

Ponomarev's complaints of a resurgence of "Atlantiste" sentiment in Paris have been aired in more recent media commentary following French Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet's late February visit to Washington. Speaking on the 1 March Moscow domestic radio foreign affairs roundtable program, IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin and Central Committee official Nikolay Shishlin saw signs of Franco-U.S. rapprochement in Paris' apparent desire to "understand American positions and join them." Bovin concluded that the new Reagan Administration had managed to repair ties with France, "aggravated" during the Carter Administration, and to "synchronize to a considerable extent French and American positions."

BRIEFS

KOREA: Attention to Kim Il-song's Son

Pyongyang is continuing its efforts, in evidence since the 6th KWP Congress last October, to enhance the image of Kim Chong-il as successor to his father, Kim Il-song. Official DPRK media rarely invoke Kim Chong-il's name, and then only in a foreign context. But Pyongyang uses the clandestine radio Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (VRPR), which purports to represent the people of South Korea, to maintain a barrage of praise for the younger Kim. On the official level, Pyongyang media recently pointed up new foreign gestures of respect for Kim Chong-il, reporting toasts to the health of both Kims by two visiting dignitaries--the Burundi foreign minister, at banquets in Pyongyang and Hamhung on 17 and 19 April, and the Guyanese vice president in Kangwon Province on the 19th. KCNA also reported on 26 March that portraits of both Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il graced the opening session of a conference on Korean reunification in Algiers--the first mention by Pyongyang media of the public display of Kim Chong-il's picture.

Also for the first time, VRPR--but still not the official media--acknowledged Kim Chong-il's birthday on 16 February, a date Pyongyang has marked in the past only with references to the "party center." The clandestine radio, which has taken the lead in the campaign to glorify Kim Chong-il, reported that a meeting was held in Tokyo on the 16th to support reunification and to celebrate the birthday. A VRPR commentary that day hailed Kim Chong-il as the "sole successor," a term the radio has often used since last October in comment stressing his leadership qualities. In another feature broadcast on Kim's 40th birthday, VRPR praised him as a "great leader who has reached a perfect stage."

PRC-KAMPUCHEA: Beijing Support for United Front

China continues to attempt to promote a new united front in Kampuchea without prematurely committing itself to Prince Sihanouk or estranging its Democratic Kampuchean (DK) allies. Beijing's cautious efforts were recently evident in its treatment of the DK's sixth anniversary, on 16 April, and of Sihanouk's 21 April news conference after he had arrived in Beijing from Pyongyang. A 16 April XINHUA report on the anniversary was more optimistic than in previous years about the prospects for success of the anti-Vietnamese struggle, citing not just DK military achievements but a "new trend of united struggle" resulting from the DK's self-criticism and efforts to unite with Sihanouk and independent elements headed by Son Sann. Beijing's interest in pressing for a broader united front and its willingness to hedge on the DK's legitimacy as sole embodiment of the anti-Vietnamese struggle were suggested in the anniversary greetings sent by Premier Zhao Ziyang and National People's Congress Chairman Ye Jianying. The message omitted previous years' affirmations of Chinese support for the Kampuchean people's struggle--which in the anniversary context implied DK preeminence--but did state that the struggle would achieve victory "so long as all patriotic Kampuchean forces are united under the anti-Vietnamese banner."

XINHUA's account of Sihanouk's news conference emphasized his expressed wish to hold negotiations again with DK Prime Minister Khieu Samphan in Beijing and then to hold a trilateral conference including Son Sann in a Southeast Asian country. XINHUA cited him as saying that the formation of the united front was a "complicated affair" and would take at least a few months, but it did not mention his demand, carried by foreign news agencies, for Chinese and U.S. aid for his movement. Reflecting the reluctant nature of its commitment to the united front, the DK's sixth anniversary statement by Khieu Samphan, carried over the PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of Democratic Kampuchea on 14 April, made no mention of the effort to join with Sihanouk and Son Sann. Like Beijing's comment, it proferred a more optimistic view of the Kampuchean struggle than in past years.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13-19 APRIL 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,091 items)		
GDR Party Congress	8%	(4%)
Brezhnev Speech at Award Ceremony for Soyuz 39 Cosmonauts	5%	(1%)
Cuban 20th Anniversary of Bay of Pigs	5%	(--)
Conference of Union of Soviet Friendship Societies	3%	(--)
Kampuchean National Day	3%	(--)

Beijing (640 items)		
Japanese Diet Delegation in PRC	4%	(--)
Kampuchean-Vietnamese Dispute	3%	(--)
SRV Conditions for Troop Withdrawal From Kampuchea	3%	(1%)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Soviet pressure on Poland
- USSR, PRC on lifting of grain embargo
- Call for private enterprise in USSR

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29 APRIL 1981
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USSR-POLAND

MOSCOW STEPS UP PRESSURE ON EVE OF POLISH PLENUM

Moscow demonstrated growing concern about liberalizing trends within the Polish party in advance of the 10th PZPR plenum, which opened in Warsaw on 29 April and is scheduled to discuss sensitive party organizational issues. Senior CPSU Politburo member and ideologue Suslov made an unannounced visit to Warsaw on the 23d, one week after grassroots Polish party members had called for far-reaching organizational reforms at a meeting in Torun. Shortly after his return from Poland, Moscow issued its sharpest attack yet on Polish "revisionists." These latest signs of pressure on Warsaw may reflect a shifting consensus toward a harder line within the CPSU Politburo, a possibility underscored by Suslov's unusually active role in recent weeks.

The evidence of a toughening in the Kremlin's mood consists mainly of the symbolism of Suslov's visit and a TASS dispatch on Poland appearing in PRAVDA on 26 April. The statement on Suslov's talks with the Polish leadership did not explicitly invoke the Brezhnev doctrine, as had the statement on the last high-level bilateral talks on 4 March, but it was more rigid than the earlier statement in failing to express confidence in the PZPR's strength or to acknowledge a common approach to the issues discussed. The only indication of support was the highly qualified assurance that the Soviet Union supported the PZPR's efforts to defend socialism and strengthen the party "on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism." The TASS dispatch in PRAVDA on the 26th appeared to offer Moscow's first indirect reaction to the 15 April Torun meeting and expressed one of its grimmest assessments yet of the Polish situation. The article scored "revisionist forces" in the party, which are trying to "discredit party officials" and replace legitimate organizational structures with "so-called horizontal structures." Moscow leveled broad criticisms at "some PZPR members" earlier in April, although it has generally taken pains to conceal the extent of reformist pressures from within the party.

These signs of hardening in Moscow have been accompanied by intriguing hints of possible differences within the Soviet leadership on related issues. The most significant case concerned Suslov's failure in his East German party congress speech of 12 April to so much as mention Poland, let alone endorse Brezhnev's restrained remarks on the issue made only five days earlier in Prague. Suslov and fellow Politburo member Shcherbitskiy, the latter in a speech to the Bulgarian congress at the end of March, also appeared to take an inflexible stance on doctrinal questions that bear on the issues confronting the PZPR, when they warned in almost identical language about the "dire consequences" of any deviations from communist orthodoxy. By contrast, Politburo member Chernenko more closely adhered to Brezhnev's moderate line on Poland and doctrinal issues in his Lenin Day speech on 22 April. These signs recall earlier episodes of disarray in Moscow's handling of its public commentary on Poland, such as the flurry of seemingly contradictory signals last December during Brezhnev's visit to India.

U.S.-USSR-PRC

USSR PLAYS DOWN IMPORT OF GRAIN EMBARGO DECISION; PRC UNEASY

Moscow has minimized the political significance of the Reagan Administration's lifting of the U.S. grain and phosphate embargo in its initial public reaction. Beijing has expressed tacit dismay at the Administration's decision, interpreting what it has taken to be the Administration's first substantive action toward Moscow as a disturbing sign of U.S. readiness to sacrifice broader strategic concerns for the sake of narrow domestic political interest.

MOSCOW Soviet media promptly reported the U.S. announcement of the Administration's decision, but commentaries have portrayed the step as recognition of the embargo's futility rather than as a sign of positive evolution in U.S. policy toward the USSR. PRAVDA's 26 April international review stated that the embargo had been lifted because it had "boomeranged" against its initiators and because such methods "are useless in our day"--standard Soviet assertions since former President Carter first imposed the embargo in January 1980. A commentary broadcast to North America on the 27th maintained that the move "does not signal any radical departure" in Reagan Administration policy but proceeds from domestic policy and economic considerations.

BEIJING Chinese media attention to the Administration's decision thus far has been limited to low-level XINHUA and RENMIN RIBAO (PEOPLE'S DAILY) reports. While not criticizing the decision directly, these reports have tacitly conveyed Beijing's concerns by highlighting criticism of the Administration by U.S. officials and press commentary and by U.S. allies abroad. A 24 April XINHUA dispatch--Beijing's first reaction to the decision--took note of the satisfaction of senators from farm states with the Administration's action but more favorably cited the "strong" reaction of other senators to the decision's implications for Soviet-American relations, including Senator William Proxmire's belief that the move "sets a dangerous precedent." Similarly, a 25 April XINHUA review of U.S. domestic criticism of the Administration's justifications for the decision implied Beijing's underlying concern about the Administration's priorities when it noted that much opinion in Washington believes the Administration's rationale to be "obviously untenable" and that "it is necessary to watch the next act" of the Administration toward Moscow closely.

While the 24 April XINHUA report acknowledged the Administration's statement that the allies were consulted in advance on the embargo decision, subsequent reports have sought to portray dissatisfaction among Washington's allies. Thus, a 27 April RENMIN RIBAO article referred to "bad reactions" from some West European countries which fear that the move will be seen as the beginnings of an overall softening of Washington's attitude toward Moscow. Similarly, a 28 April XINHUA dispatch registered Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki's complaint that Japan was "not consulted" on the matter and his strong criticism of the timing of the decision amid persistent "uncertainties" over the Polish situation.

Beijing's concerned reaction to the Administration's decision on the grain embargo has come against a background of broadly favorable Chinese assessments of the Reagan Administration's attitudes toward the Soviet Union since the President's inauguration last January. Beijing comment has in particular applauded the Administration's readiness to link aspects of Soviet-American bilateral relations to Soviet international behavior and the Administration's stress on coordination and consultation with its West European and Japanese allies against Moscow.*

Beijing had previously taken note of divisions in the Administration over whether or not to continue the grain embargo. Chinese reporting on the U.S. presidential election campaign noted the President's pledge to end the embargo as an ineffective tactic against Moscow. But on 19 and 20 February XINHUA favorably reported the Administration's decision to continue the embargo, citing statements by the President and Administration officials that not to do so would convey the wrong message to Moscow at a critical time. Beijing's own attitude on the issue was clearly reflected in a 23 April XINHUA dispatch noting that the Administration was reconsidering its position. The dispatch cited a "weighty point" made by the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR--"to forget Afghanistan and lift the embargo on a vague assurance that the Soviets will stay out of Poland would be rewarding Moscow for not doing what it should not do anyway."

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* Recent Chinese commentary on the Reagan Administration's strategic policies is reviewed in the TRENDS of 15 April 1981, pages 6-11.

U S S R

PARTY DAILY BOOSTS PRIVATE ECONOMY TO AID CONSUMER SECTOR

An unusually bold proposal to expand private enterprise in the Soviet Union along the lines of some of the more flexible economies of East Europe has been offered by a Soviet expert on comparative socialism. In a strikingly innovative article in the 12 April SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov indicated that small privately owned shops and services could do a better job than state enterprises in alleviating many of the chronic problems plaguing the consumer sector of the economy. Ambartsumov's ideas appear to be in line with Brezhnev's speech at the 26th CPSU Congress in February, in which he suggested that the experiences of other socialist countries should be better utilized in solving the Soviet Union's own economic problems.

Ambartsumov's article is presented as an answer to a reader's inquiry on the compatibility of private initiative with the principles of socialism. Ambartsumov responded by favorably reviewing East Europe's successful use of private enterprise and suggested that the Soviet Union could cheaply solve many nagging problems in the consumer sector by adopting the same methods. For example, he praised the GDR's encouragement of small family-run stores, cafes, and services, all of which, he noted, are more efficient and more profitable than state enterprises. He cited Hungary's successful use of pensioners and moonlighters to operate one-third of all repair shops and to maintain most of the country's housing. Both countries, Ambartsumov reported, have also been very successful in increasing food supplies, especially meat, through the broad use of private initiative in agriculture. By adopting similar measures, he suggested, the poor service, wasted time, and frustrations plaguing the Soviet consumer could be replaced by "rapid, high-quality service" without "overcrowding," similar to that found in other socialist countries. The success of the East European methods, Ambartsumov observed, is obvious to "everyone" who travels there from the Soviet Union.

Ambartsumov laid the foundation for his current article last year in a historical article on the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920's. Writing in NEW TIMES, Nos. 9 and 10, he argued that the NEP period--when private enterprise and capital played a large role in the Soviet economy--remained relevant to contemporary circumstances and that it demonstrated that the private sector can respond "more promptly and flexibly" than the state to consumers' needs. In his current article, Ambartsumov stated that the principles of NEP are still of "paramount importance" and that their "revival" could provide a large boost to the Soviet economy. He assured the reader that such an "unfettering" of the economy would not undermine the socialist system so long as the private sector only controlled a small part of the economy and the state continued its monopoly on the means of production.

BACKGROUND Although other Soviet specialists have occasionally urged the expansion of specific private services in the past, Ambartsumov's suggestions are especially notable because of their breadth and their invocation of East European models. Ambartsumov is a sector chief at the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, which is also the home of I. Buzdalov, who has frequently used East European examples to push for reforms in agriculture. In a September 1979 VOPROSY EKONOMIKI article, Buzdalov disparaged arguments that East European models cannot be applied to the USSR because of the differences of scale involved. In fact, the practice of borrowing from East Europe appears to be gaining respectability in the Soviet Union. A December 1980 CPSU decree on agriculture incorporates features clearly based on Hungarian experience (though not specifically identified as such), and a March 1981 VOPROSY EKONOMIKI article by Buzdalov argued for the adoption in the USSR of various features of agricultural management used in Hungary and the GDR.

DECREE BOOSTS INVESTMENT IN FAVORITE BREZHNEV FARM PROGRAM

A new decree on agriculture appears to confirm Brezhnev's intention of continuing to press for priority for agriculture in the nearly completed 1981-85 Five-Year Plan. Providing the first concrete figure on the amount of agricultural investment in the new plan period, the decree specifies sharply increased investment for Brezhnev's costly program of developing the Non-Chernozem Zone--the relatively infertile heartland of northern and western Russia, which has been turning in a disappointing agricultural performance in recent years. The decree calls for focusing investment on improving rural living standards rather than on expanding production facilities and equipment--an apparent indication that the emigration of labor from the farms has been diagnosed as one of the main factors contributing to the past failures of Brezhnev's program.

The new Central Committee - Council of Ministers decree, published in the 15 April PRAVDA, sets an investment goal of 39.3 billion rubles for Non-Chernozem Zone agriculture in the period 1981-85, as against 31.2 billion invested in the previous five-year period. This indicates a rise of almost 26 percent, even though the 1981-85 plan provides for only a 12-15 percent increase in investment for the economy as a whole. No figures for total agricultural investment appeared in the drafts of the new five-year plan published in December and after the party congress in March, suggesting that differences over allocations persisted even after the draft plans were published.

A notable feature of the new decree is its focus on improving rural living conditions rather than on investing capital directly in areas related to production, such as farm buildings, equipment, and fertilizer. It devotes more attention to construction of housing and cultural and educational facilities than the original 1974 decree on the Non-Chernozem Zone, and it announces that investment for this part of the program will rise much faster than that for the rest of the program. Investment in housing and cultural construction will rise from 5.6 billion in 1976-80 to 9.9 billion in 1981-85--a 76-percent rise compared with the 26 percent rise for overall Non-Chernozem Zone agricultural investment. That holding farm workers in the Non-Chernozem Zone remains a serious problem was indicated by a 19 November 1980 PRAVDA editorial, which stated that half of the 30,000 graduates of agricultural schools sent to the Non-Chernozem Zone every year leave in a short while.

The original Non-Chernozem Zone program, adopted on Brezhnev's "initiative" exactly seven years ago in a decree published on 4 April 1974, has not been notably successful. It has failed to reach its agricultural production goals and has been criticized for producing poor returns on massive investments. Surprisingly, despite Brezhnev's strong sponsorship, the program did not receive all the investment funds originally allotted to it. Although the 1974 decree specified that 35 billion was to be invested in 1976-80, the 1981 decree states that only 31.2 billion was actually allotted and used. Part of this shortfall presumably was the result of widespread diversion of rural construction units to urban construction projects, a practice assailed at length by Deputy Agriculture Minister I. Bystryukov in the January EKONOMIKA SELSKOGO KHOZYAYSTVO (ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE). Apparently to discourage a recurrence of such diversions, the new decree orders strict limitations on construction of industrial enterprises in the Non-Chernozem Zone.

USSR-AFRICA

SOVIET PUBLIC POSTURE ON NAMIBIA FOLLOWS AFRICAN LEAD

The evolution of the Soviet public posture on Namibia since 1978 demonstrates Moscow's deference to the lead of the Frontline States in its policy on southern Africa. Soviet media continue to question Western motives in the region in strident tones, but Moscow now echoes Frontline support for the Western "contact group" plan to achieve majority rule despite its own earlier criticism of the proposal. Indeed, Soviet commentary on Namibia is now replaying African criticism of the Reagan Administration for allegedly abandoning the plan.

Moscow dropped its insistence on direct transfer of power to Namibia's insurgent South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) after the Frontline States and SWAPO agreed in 1978 to accept the Western plan for UN-supervised elections. Previously Soviet media had routinely portrayed the West's proposal as an "imperialist" attempt, in collusion with South Africa, to protect its economic and strategic interests in the country. Since UN Security Council Resolution 435, outlining the Western plan, was passed in September 1978 with the Soviets abstaining, Moscow has shifted positions. Soviet media spokesmen now pose as supporters of the plan while accusing the West of delaying its implementation.

Moscow's current propaganda posture on Namibia proceeds from its broader effort to capitalize on African concerns about the direction of the Reagan Administration's policies in southern Africa. Soviet media denounced Assistant Secretary of State-designate Crocker's mission to Africa in April, broadly replaying African editorial opinion critical of his efforts to persuade African leaders to accept constitutional gurantees of minority rights before elections. TASS on 11 April claimed that black African states see the Administration's proposal as a "plot" to deprive the Namibian people of self-determination. TASS was quick to report the declarations on Namibia adopted by the Frontline States and the Nonaligned Movement's Namibia Coordination Bureau on 15 and 20 April respectively, which called for implementation of the existing UN plan. TASS warned on 25 April, following Crocker's meeting with other contact group representatives in London, that the group's effort to reassure African states of Western support for Namibian independence disguised a policy of procrastination. The "vague formulations" emerging from the London meeting, TASS said, were "obviously designed to deceive world public opinion and radically alter" the UN plan.

MOSCOW RESERVED ON OCCASION OF ZIMBABWE'S FIRST ANNIVERSARY

The belated establishment of formal diplomatic ties between Moscow and Salisbury on 18 February has had little public effect on the cool relations between them. Soviet media treatment of Zimbabwe's first independence anniversary on 18 April was typically correct but careful, crediting the regime with modest successes while pointing out serious problems yet to be resolved.

PRAVDA's Salisbury correspondent offered the most comprehensive Soviet anniversary comment in a 19 April article. The party daily presented a low-key, relatively factual account of Zimbabwe's current situation, consistent with the cautious tenor of Moscow's approach over the past year.* The first year of independence laid the foundation for Zimbabwe's future development, the article said, frustrating the predictions of "political fortunetellers" that intertribal conflict, economic chaos, and military intervention were inevitable. The regime is headed in the right direction, it concluded, but it still faces "a considerable number of difficulties and problems."

Continuing difficulties in bilateral relations may explain Moscow's failure so far to announce any official congratulations to Zimbabwe on the anniversary. Annual national day messages of congratulations from Brezhnev are sent routinely to client states like Angola and Mozambique and are not uncommon for such pro-Western countries in Africa as Senegal and Botswana. President Brezhnev and then-Premier Kosygin sent Prime Minister Mugabe and President Banana a message on the establishment of independence last year, calling Zimbabwe's victorious independence struggle a "bright page in the history of Africa's liberation" and boasting of the USSR's unfailing support for its accomplishment.

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* Moscow's public treatment of the Mugabe government is discussed in the FBIS Analysis Report FB 81-10002 of 9 January 1981, "USSR-Zimbabwe Relations: Soviet Support for Mugabe Tempered by Reservations."

USSR-KUWAIT

MOSCOW SEEKS TO EXPLOIT KUWAITI VISIT, GLOSS OVER DIFFERENCES

Moscow has made a blatant attempt to use the visit to the USSR by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister as-Sabah to portray Kuwaiti sympathy for Soviet positions in the Middle East and to blame the United States for tensions in the region. Through its selective media treatment Moscow avoided acknowledging disagreement over the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and over the newly established Gulf Coordination Council and tried to obscure Kuwait's objections to the central thrust of Brezhnev's Persian Gulf security proposal.

Two aspects of media behavior underlined Soviet dissatisfaction with the 23-25 April Kuwaiti visit: Moscow gave more broadcast publicity to a short TASS report on the talks than it did to the final communique, and in a departure from normal practice, it did not publicize the speeches at a dinner on the 24th, PRAVDA acknowledging only that "friendly" toasts were exchanged.* The 24 April TASS report, like the communique, presented Gromyko and as-Sabah as in accord on certain aspects of the Arab-Israeli and Gulf situations. Unlike the communique, which contained no criticism of the United States, the TASS report said that "it was stressed"--clearly by Gromyko--that U.S. actions to establish an American military presence in the region were the "chief cause" of the aggravation of the situation and created serious difficulties for the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

AGREEMENT ON ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The two sides concurred in their opposition to the Camp David accords and in their condemnation of Israel's "aggressive operations" against Arab neighbors. The joint communique also reflected Kuwaiti agreement with a Soviet position recently reformulated by Brezhnev in his CPSU Congress speech in February: it affirmed the sides' support for the convening of an international conference on the Middle East with the participation of the PLO on an equal basis.

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* Moscow did publicize the dinner speeches during as-Sabah's last visit, in December 1975.

DISAGREEMENT ON GULF, AFGHANISTAN

In describing a "detailed exchange of views" and "proximity" of positions on the Gulf, the communique in effect acknowledged continuing differences on Gulf issues. Shaykh as-Sabah spelled out some of the problems in his dinner speech on the 24th, according to Kuwaiti accounts. He endorsed Brezhnev's December 1980 call for "neutrality" of the Gulf, but strongly suggested his government's opposition to any Gulf security arrangement imposed by outside powers--the heart of the Brezhnev proposal. He made it clear that Kuwait was willing to endorse only specific elements of Brezhnev's plan, such as opposition to foreign military bases and the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Gulf region. The closest the Kuwaiti minister came to a general endorsement of the USSR's Gulf proposals was to declare cryptically that they "have evoked the most positive response" among the "people" of the region.

There was also clear disagreement over the Gulf Coordination Council formed by Kuwait and five other Gulf states in February. The communique made no mention of this organization, but as-Sabah remarked in his dinner speech that Kuwait had "tried to dispel the doubts which the Soviets have raised" about the council and expressed confidence that his hosts would find "positive points" in it, "which you cannot ignore." He pointedly reminded the Soviet Union that Kuwait "supports the right of the Afghan people to determine their own fate and to choose the regime they want without any pressure from anybody."

USSR-AFGHANISTAN

ANNIVERSARY COMMENT REFLECTS PESSIMISM ON AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE

Commentary on the third anniversary of the Afghan revolution suggests that both Moscow and Kabul are pessimistic about the current situation in Afghanistan, although they put the best face on problems in the official messages exchanged on the occasion. Moscow repeated the now standard formula for a negotiated political settlement, advanced by Kabul a year ago, and used the occasion to flail the United States, China, and Pakistan while making a cautious overture to Iran. Afghan President Karmal indicated that the internal situation remains bleak and implied in his anniversary speech that his government might have to be broadened by naming a premier--a position he now holds--and making other unspecified changes in his administration.

AFGHAN "ACHIEVEMENTS"

Having declared the seven days preceding the anniversary Solidarity Week With the Afghan People, Moscow publicized a series of meetings in Moscow, Minsk, and Soviet Central Asia devoted to Soviet-Afghan friendship. Soviet reporting was reserved, without any of the usual claims concerning increasing support for the Karmal regime and victories over the Afghan insurgents. The 22 April NEW TIMES (NOVOYE VREMYA), for example, offered a meager list of "achievements" of Afghanistan during the past year: a balanced budget--"not every state can say it has a balanced budget"--as well as the return of 200,000 refugees, salary increases for government workers, increased industrial output, and feeding the population with "first necessity goods and foodstuffs." The article added, "These are only the basic necessities, of course, but even to simply feed a country where millions of people used to suffer from malnutrition is an achievement in itself." NEW TIMES claimed that Afghan achievements would have been "greater" had it not been for the actions of "the initiators of the undeclared war."

APPEAL TO ISLAM

In a series of speeches the week before the anniversary, Babrak Karmal focused on the great difficulties that "internal reaction" and "foreign intervention" have inflicted on Afghan society, attempted to generate support for his government by appealing to traditional Afghan and Islamic values, and repeated his call for the formation of a national fatherland front. On the 22d he told a group of Islamic religious leaders that Afghanistan had "always been the torchbearer and standard bearer of Islam" in Asia and asserted that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan consistently acted "in accordance with the fundamental spirit of the holy religion of Islam." And on the 25th Karmal told tribal leaders that Afghanistan continued to face many problems and called for a jirgah--a traditional form of tribal council--at which they could be discussed and resolved. He called such an institution "a great legacy from our forefathers." Karmal warned the tribesmen, however, that all the problems of Afghanistan cannot be solved "in days or even in a year."

Kabul radio's reports on the meetings, broadcast to domestic audiences, suggested that Karmal received little or no sympathy from his listeners. For example, no pledges of support by the Islamic religious leaders were reported, but only promises to continue to teach and preach Islam "with faith and sincerity." Subsequent Afghan commentary directed abroad and all Soviet commentary cast Karmal's remarks in standard Marxist categories, largely ignored his appeal to Islam, and suggested that Karmal had received support in every case.

APPROACH TO IRAN Moscow has continued to attack Pakistan but has taken a very different tack regarding Iran. In a Persian-language broadcast on the 24th, Igor Sheftunov offered cautious support for the Iranian revolution and renewed the Soviet-Afghan call for bilateral negotiations between Afghanistan and Iran. Suggesting that the two countries have a common "enemy"--U.S. imperialism--and a common "goal"--the creation of a "just society" albeit each in its own "special" way--Sheftunov called on his listeners to "struggle against imperialism and domestic and foreign reaction" and to bring the nations of Iran and Afghanistan "close together." These common interests, he claimed, make negotiations between the two countries "a topic of priority." Kabul's only comment was limited to Karmal's lament that Iran had not yet responded to his proposals.

YUGOSLAVIA

RECRIMINATIONS CONTINUE OVER KOSOVO ALBANIAN DISTURBANCES

Four weeks after Yugoslav security forces crushed widespread ethnic Albanian disorders in Kosovo province in early April, signs of tension continue to appear. Several reports have indicated that the unrest has sparked concern and counteractions from other ethnic groups, and Belgrade's insinuations about Albanian and Soviet involvement in the disturbances have evoked angry rebuttals from those countries.

Some signs of Serb backlash were apparent in a 21 April commentary by Belgrade radio chief editor Milutin Milenkovic, who expressed concern about what he portrayed as an emigration of non-Albanians from Kosovo in the wake of the disorders. Calling for "serious sociopolitical talks and conclusions" about the alleged emigration, he warned that passing over it in silence threatens Yugoslav unity and the right of Yugoslavs to "live and work undisturbed and peacefully in any part of the country." A meeting of Kosovo communists the same day seemed to play down Milenkovic's concerns, judging by the TANJUG report, warning against "spreading rumors about people leaving Kosovo." Another sign of interethnic tension came on 26 April, when Kosovo radio reported that a local meeting had criticized some citizens for provocative behavior such as "wearing parts of the national costume they have never worn before." In other signs of continuing tensions, a Slovene official on 16 April criticized Kosovo's attitude toward the economic aid it receives from the more developed regions. And Yugoslav media have opened a new debate about censorship following suppression of some of the initial reports on the unrest.

Moscow began its first press skirmish with Belgrade in recent months on 19 April, when a PRAVDA article criticized Belgrade BORBA commentator Vlado Teslic for implying Soviet complicity in the disorders. The Yugoslav paper responded on the 26th with a blast at PRAVDA for distorting Yugoslavia's "transitory difficulties" and threatening the principles of Belgrade-Moscow relations. Belgrade started polemics with neighboring Albania following an editorial in the Tirana party daily ZERI I POPULLIT on 8 April, which denounced the Yugoslav crackdown and voiced support for some of the demonstrators' demands. Following a series of official Yugoslav statements and media commentaries refuting the editorial, the Tirana paper issued another editorial on the 23d, which drew a new round of Yugoslav charges of interference. Belgrade has also criticized Soviet allies Hungary and Cuba for their treatment of the situation.

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 20-26 APRIL 1981

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (2,741 items)		
Lenin's 111th Birthday Anniversary	12%	(--)
Chernenko Speech	6%	(--)
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah in USSR	6%	(--)
Afghan Third Revolution Anniversary	5%	(--)
Joint Communique on Suslov Visit to Poland	4%	(--)

Beijing (684 items)		
Wife of Tunisian President, Mme. Bourguiba, in PRC	6%	(--)
Sihanouk in PRC	4%	(2%)
World Table Tennis Tournament	3%	(--)
Guyanese Vice President Ramsaroop in PRC	3%	(--)
Zairian Roving Ambassador in PRC	3%	(--)

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- Moscow on irrationality of nuclear war

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

- SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

- SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

- TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

USSR-U.S.

BREZHNEV PROPOSES "CODE OF CONDUCT" IN THE THIRD WORLD

President Brezhnev has given what is in effect Moscow's first comprehensive reply to the Reagan Administration's accusations against Soviet international behavior. Using the occasion of a 27 April Kremlin dinner for visiting Libyan leader al-Qadhdhafi, Brezhnev proposed what he termed a "code of conduct" to govern actions by both sides in the Third World. Brezhnev used the proposal to score propaganda points against the United States, but the relatively nonpolemical tone of the five principles he offered suggests that he may envisage a dialogue with Washington.

Brezhnev's principles of behavior are no departure in Soviet public policy, but his speech marks a shift from Moscow's previous position that no such code of behavior was appropriate. Brezhnev's statement may have been conceived to influence this October's North-South summit meeting in Mexico City, but it also comes on the heels of intimations by some Soviet foreign policy specialists that agreed rules of conduct could be helpful in normalizing U.S.-Soviet relations.

In his 27 April speech, Brezhnev repeated earlier Soviet objections to rules of international behavior which, in his terms, would perpetuate Western dominance of Third World areas. But this time he went on to propose five specific principles of international conduct which he suggested should apply to the USSR, the United States, and other permanent members of the UN Security Council. Some of the principles incorporate standard Soviet phraseology for interstate treaties, others draw on themes in Soviet commentary on the Third World. Applying generally accepted international norms to "the young states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America," Brezhnev said, would mean "roughly" the following:

+ Noninterference in the domestic affairs of Third World countries and the renunciation of "spheres of interests"

+ Respect for the territorial integrity of countries and inviolability of their borders and the renunciation of support for "separatist movements"

+ Recognition of the right of the Third World countries to enjoy "equal participation in international life" and to develop relations with any other country

+ Recognition of each nation's sovereignty over its natural resources and equality in international economic relations and support for Third World efforts to eliminate colonialism, racism, and apartheid

+ Respect for nonalignment and renunciation of attempts to create "military-political blocs" in the Third World.

MEDIA COMMENTARY

Moscow is clearly treating Brezhnev's speech as a major statement on Soviet-American relations. Soviet press commentary has depicted his proposed code of behavior as a corollary to proposals he made earlier at the 26th CPSU Congress. Weekly reviews of international affairs in PRAVDA on 3 May and on Soviet domestic radio the same day were devoted almost entirely to discussing the principles offered in the speech, and gave scant attention to the al-Qadhdhafi visit.

Commentaries on the speech by IZVESTIYA political observer Kudryavtsev on 30 April and PRAVDA observer Ovchinnikov on 5 May made it clear that Moscow hopes to use the Soviet proposal to regain some lost propaganda ground against the United States. Both commentators quoted Brezhnev's list of principles verbatim and alleged American violations of each. Both excoriated U.S. policies, particularly those in the Middle East, Central America, and southern Africa. Kudryavtsev asserted that the code articulated by Brezhnev would serve to illuminate Washington's "true aggressive nature," which it seeks to conceal with "imperialist propaganda."

Other commentary, however, suggests that concern about the status of East-West detente may lie behind Brezhnev's proposal as well. Participating in the 3 May domestic radio discussion of Brezhnev's speech, IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin frankly asserted that "some sort of code of conduct is indeed essential." The Soviet Union, he argued, will not agree to efforts to impose on it one-sided rules of behavior, but something clearly must be done if the world is not to become an "arena for clashes and brigandage." Bovin had appeared to signal an impending Soviet initiative just days earlier in an interview while visiting Tokyo. In remarks appearing in the Japanese daily MAINICHI SHIMBUN on 22 April, Bovin admitted that Moscow and Washington "may have to work out something like rules" for competition in the Third World and "devise means of promoting the easing of tension" between them.

BACKGROUND Moscow has traditionally dismissed the notion, raised increasingly in the West since the mid-1970's, that peaceful coexistence in East-West relations requires agreed "rules of the game" in the Third World as well. Soviet officials, when they have acknowledged the issue at all in recent years, have claimed that existing international and bilateral agreements are sufficient for regulating superpower behavior. This position was reiterated publicly as recently as 22 April by Brezhnev's Politburo colleague Konstantin Chernenko. Giving the annual Lenin Day address, Chernenko asserted that the USSR already abides by "generally accepted international norms." The Soviet Union, he said, rejects "a code of behavior that would throw mankind back into a long past age" of Western dominance of the Third World.

The underlying Soviet suspicion of Western calls for an agreed "code of behavior" was evident in comments earlier this year by ranking officials in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU Central Committee. Vladimir Petrovskiy, a member of the Foreign Ministry's collegium and an associate of Moscow's USA and Canada Institute, wrote on the problem in the January-February issue of the Institute of General History's journal, NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA (MODERN AND CURRENT HISTORY). Petrovskiy maintained that the Helsinki Final Act and other East-West agreements concluded in the 1970's provided a sufficient "code of detente" between the United States and Soviet Union. What Washington really wants, he suggested, is to codify a double standard allowing the United States to intervene in the Third World at will while denying the Soviet Union any legitimate role at all. Those in the United States "who think realistically," he argued, must reject efforts to tamper with existing "mutually agreed formulas" for detente.

Central Committee International Information Department chief Leonid Zamyatin took a similar position in a 28 March appearance on the monthly television international affairs program "Studio Nine." Zamyatin labeled demands for new rules of behavior "arrogant" and "unintelligent," for "in many cases" the United States has violated existing standards of international conduct. The Soviet Union, he maintained, has no obligation to "prove that it can behave in a manner acceptable from the U.S. viewpoint."

Brezhnev's decision to go beyond this traditional line may reflect the thinking of other Soviet foreign policy commentators who have voiced concern over the deleterious effects of unregulated Soviet-American competition in the Third World. Midlevel officials like Central Committee bloc relations department Deputy Chief Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Institute of Social Sciences department head Fedor Burlatskiy, and USA and Canada Institute Director Georgiy Arbatov have all publicly aired the issue.* Bovin, however, has been the most outspoken proponent of agreed guidelines. His recent comments were preceded by two earlier references in the past year that conveyed a clear message of restraint to Soviet as well as American policymakers. Writing in the weekly LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (LITERARY GAZETTE) on 1 January 1981, Bovin said that neither side should expect to "like" the behavior of the other in the Third World, but that the inevitable competition of political rivals in these areas made restraint from "sudden moves" and the preservation of "reason" particularly important. Bovin had expounded on the perils of "ill-considered, hasty steps" in foreign policy in the July 1980 issue of the CPSU's main theoretical journal, KOMMUNIST (No. 10). In that article he recalled that Lenin himself had cautioned against actions that would alienate "reasonable capitalists" in the West. Soviet policy today, Bovin argued, should "stimulate the trend toward political realism" in the West. "Caution, circumpsection, and self-control," he concluded, are just as important today as in Lenin's time.

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* For a discussion of the views of Burlatskiy and Arbatov, see the TRENDS of 15 April 1981, pages 1-2.

ARBATOV STILL FINDS EVIDENCE ON REAGAN POLICY INCONCLUSIVE

Moscow's leading specialist on the United States, Georgiy Arbatov, has again suggested that judgments about the Reagan Administration's policies should remain tentative. Writing in the 4 May PRAVDA, Arbatov accused the Administration of deliberately increasing tension to gain support for a defense buildup. But he tempered that charge by speculating that the new U.S. leadership was still in the process of shifting from "election propaganda" to practical politics.

In an assessment of the new Administration's first 100 days, Arbatov echoed most of the sentiments he had expressed in a 9 March PRAVDA article. He maintained that the Administration still had no coherent foreign policy even though there was no shortage of virulent rhetoric. While rhetoric can signal intentions, he suggested, politics remains the art of the possible. Arbatov endorsed an evaluation of the new Administration that he said he had heard on his recent trip abroad--that many of its officials had spent their entire political lives in opposition and needed more time to make the transition from the role of "professional critic" to the reality of wielding power in the nuclear age.

Arbatov's unwillingness to make a final judgment about Reagan Administration policy seems at odds with the negative assessments offered in much of Moscow's current commentary, including that from IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin.* Bovin, usually one of Moscow's more temperate foreign affairs commentators, insisted in a 29 March television appearance that the outlines of U.S. policy had become "sufficiently visible" and that the new Administration was moving beyond rhetoric to actions "breaking up" the structure of U.S.-Soviet relations. Arbatov appeared to allude to differences among Soviet foreign policy specialists, asserting that "some may hope that it [U.S. policy] has not yet been formulated; others may think differently." He concluded that the question "should be left open" for the time being.

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* Earlier comments by Arbatov and Bovin are discussed in the TRENDS of 11 March 1981, pages 1-2, and 22 April, pages 1-2.

USSR

CHERNENKO REJECTS USE OF NUCLEAR WAR TO ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS

Soviet statements in recent months have given new emphasis to the long-proclaimed Soviet view that nuclear war would be a disaster for all mankind. The most significant of these, by Politburo member K.U. Chernenko, repudiates the notion that nuclear war can serve as a rational means of attaining political goals. By seeming to contradict the Clausewitz maxim, endorsed by Lenin, that war is a continuation of politics, Chernenko administered a setback to ideological conservatives who have persistently resisted the notion that the advent of nuclear weapons required corresponding changes in Soviet theory regarding war. His remarks fit into a broader pattern of statements by Brezhnev and other public figures which appear designed to refute American accusations that the Soviet Union views nuclear war as not only survivable but winnable.

While Chernenko did not cite Clausewitz or Lenin in rejecting the rationality of nuclear war, his close paraphrasing of their well-known dictum on the link between war and politics made the target of his remarks clear. Speaking to a ceremonial Kremlin meeting to mark Lenin's birth on 22 April, Chernenko stated that nuclear war poses "such a threat to all civilization, and even to life in our world," that it is "criminal" to view it as a "rational, almost 'legitimate' continuation of politics." He went on to assert that "any responsible state figure must recognize" that the use of nuclear weapons "places the future of mankind in doubt." Chernenko also attacked proponents "on both sides of the Atlantic" of the notion of limited nuclear war, charging that such arguments are intended to foster the "permissibility and acceptability" of a nuclear confrontation. To counter such ideas, said Chernenko, it is important "that the truth about the ruinous consequences of a thermonuclear conflict should be realized to the full by all peoples."

BREZHNEV, OTHERS ON NUCLEAR WAR

Chernenko's statement contributes to a broader Soviet effort in recent months to elaborate on the Soviet Union's long-standing position that nuclear war would have disastrous consequences.* It also follows on and expands upon President Brezhnev's remark to the 26th CPSU Congress at the end of February that it would be "dangerous madness" for the Soviet Union and the United States "to attempt to defeat each other in an arms race" or "to count on victory in a nuclear war." Brezhnev has long been on record that nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences, although he has not previously been so explicit in questioning the possibility of victory in such a war. He first spoke strongly on the consequences of nuclear war in July 1974, when he told a Warsaw audience that existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons were sufficient to "destroy every living thing on earth several times." On subsequent occasions he has alluded to the disastrous implications of nuclear war in a variety of ways. He has asserted that "mankind might be wholly destroyed" (November 1976), that there could be "mass annihilation of peoples" (April 1978), and that "hundreds of millions" would die (October 1980). In a statement published in PRAVDA on January 15th of this year, Brezhnev implied that both sides would be destroyed in any "nuclear duel."

While Brezhnev's congress remarks have set the basic line for all Soviet media, other Soviet figures have also addressed this question in the past four months, for example:

+ Vitaly Kobysh, a sector chief of the International Information Department of the Central Committee, appearing on Moscow television on 31 January (and later in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA), mocked those who think they can "sit out" a nuclear war in "bunkers . . . provided with everything," for when they emerge, they "will see around them a desert burnt with radiation which will not let them live."

+ Political commentator Stanislav Kondrashov, on a Radio Moscow domestic broadcast on 12 March, and in an IZVESTIYA column on the 15th, in calling for an end to the arms race, appealed "before it is too late, [to] sheathe this present-day, all-incinerating, all-destroying thermonuclear sword hanging over everything that lives on earth."

+ Politburo candidate member E.A. Shevardnadze, addressing the Georgian party organization in late March, praised Brezhnev's Congress speech as marking the first time that the consequences of a nuclear war had been stated "so bluntly and candidly from the congress platform." He went on to assert that "the peoples should know the truth about the consequences, ruinous for mankind, to which a new war would lead."

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* For earlier discussions of these themes, see "Soviet Statements on the Consequences of Nuclear War," an FBIS TRENDS Supplement of 17 August 1977, and "President Brezhnev and the Soviet Union's Changing Security Policy," an FBIS Analysis Report of 25 May 1979.

+ Aleksei Arbatov, a specialist on American defense policy and the son of the director of the USA Institute, writes in a recent issue of the official party theoretical journal KOMMUNIST that "the very notion of military supremacy in its traditional meaning--as an ability to win in combat actions--becomes void of any meaning" in view of the existing huge nuclear weapon stockpiles.

BACKGROUND The occasion of Chernenko's remarks lent additional theoretical significance to his seeming repudiation of the Clausewitzian view of war and politics. Because Lenin endorsed this formula, it has frequently been used by Soviet military theoretical writers as a classifying principle to explain the origins and essence of war and the goals of the adversaries. But it may also be construed, as Soviet theorists recognize, to suggest that war is a valid, even legitimate instrument of policy. Chernenko's remarks on the irrationality of nuclear war clearly referred to the latter interpretation of the maxim. His statement thus reinforced the traditional Soviet claim that the USSR would never "choose" to initiate nuclear war, by implying that such a step would be fundamentally irrational.

Chernenko's statement, in paraphrasing Clausewitz/Lenin so closely, has a special resonance in the Soviet military-political context. Twice during the Brezhnev era--in 1965-66 and 1973-74--questioning of the continued validity of this maxim has led to explicit disagreements in the Soviet press.* In each instance, the controversy began when the Clausewitz formula was challenged as out-of-date in the nuclear age. Writing for the military press, faculty members of the Lenin Military-Political Academy in Moscow (the guardians of the ideological purity of Soviet military theory) then chastised by name those who made such remarks for their "methodological mistakes." And in each instance, the politico-military theorists have also insisted on the "justness" of a Soviet response in kind to any nuclear attack, and hence by inference on the rationality of waging nuclear war once the enemy has started it.

Clausewitz's dictum on war and politics was challenged anew in 1979, but there was no military rebuttal. In two domestic broadcasts, Aleksandr Bovin, a prominent IZVESTIYA commentator who had been criticized during the 1973-74 debate, noted the dual meaning of the formula and attacked the notion that nuclear war could be a rational continuation of politics, asserting that in this respect "the interests of the capitalist and socialist countries coincide." More recently, in September 1980, Boris N. Ponomarev, a Central Committee Secretary and Politburo candidate member, stated that nuclear war is irrational. He told a Sofia audience that "world war as a means of achieving political goals has become impossible. It is senseless to count on such a war to establish, for example, the hegemony of the United States or Beijing."

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* See "Soviet Military Theorist Resumes Debate Over War-Politics Issue" in FBIS SURVEY of 4 August 1966, pp. 33-36; "Soviet Debate Over Role of Military Power During Detente," an FBIS TRENDS Supplement of 23 August 1973; and TRENDS articles on this topic of 26 September 1973, 13 February 1974, and 21 February 1974.

Soviet spokesmen have been vociferous in denouncing Western accusations that the USSR contemplates using nuclear war to advance its political goals. In the December 1980 issue of the journal USA, G.A. Trofimenko, a noted Soviet "Americanist," rebuked "semi-educated theorists" who cite Soviet adherence to the Clausewitz/Lenin formula as evidence of an interest in employing nuclear war for political purposes. On the contrary, he asserted, because nuclear war "cannot serve any sensible political goal," it is not a "practical" instrument of policy, and can only be regarded as such "in the realm of theory," that is, as an instrument "which cannot be used."

POLAND-USSR

POLISH PLENUM ENDORSES GRASS-ROOTS DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT

In his speech to the 29-30 April PZPR plenum, Polish leader Kania indicated acceptance of the major democratic reforms demanded by the party rank and file, expressing reservations only about the new "horizontal" party organizations. Kania's stance and the personnel changes carried out at the plenum have been given a generally favorable assessment by the Polish public, judging by the reactions reported in the central media. Moscow has also signaled qualified satisfaction with the plenum by presenting it in routine publicity as a generally orthodox party function without any alarming reformist implications.

Kania, in his main plenum report, explicitly endorsed the need for major changes in the party statute at the upcoming 14-18 July extraordinary party congress. Professing to respond to demands of "thousands of party organizations throughout the country," Kania called for such reforms as secret balloting, the limitation of the number of positions held by a party member, and the separation of party and governmental responsibilities. He went on to endorse the "universally demanded" principle of rotation in office, specifying that it would be applicable to the post of party first secretary. The party leader also strongly endorsed the rank-and-file demand that worker members of the Central Committee should participate in meetings of the Politburo when problems of interest to them are being discussed and declared that this procedure "must be introduced and strictly observed."

Kania was more restrained on the issue of "horizontal" party structures, exemplified by the mid-April meeting in Torun of grass-roots party delegates from all over the country. While viewing such new organizations as a laudable expression of the party's "activeness and animation," he cautioned that such activity should not undermine or supplant historically proven Leninist party structures. In his closing speech, Kania noted noncommittally that many plenum speakers had attributed the horizontal structures movement to dissatisfaction with the party leadership, both before and since the post-August crisis. Another plenum speaker, liberal Deputy Premier Rakowski, was somewhat more forthcoming than Kania on this issue, remarking that the Central Committee should examine what is both good and bad in the horizontal structures movement and develop a working relationship with this movement before the July congress.

PERSONNEL SHIFTS The Kania regime appears to have been successful, for the moment at least, in generally satisfying grass-roots demands for representation in the top bodies while at the same time avoiding an affront to the Soviets by removing major hardline figures. The dismissals from the Politburo were relatively noncontroversial--full member Jozef Pinkowski and candidate member Emil Wojtaszek, both of whom had already lost their positions as premier and foreign minister respectively. Their replacements are two figures elected to the Central Committee before the August events--Gerard Gabrys, a Silesian miner, and Zygmunt Wronski, a worker at the Ursus tractor plant near Warsaw. The two other new appointees, Politburo candidate Jozef Masny and party secretary Kazimierz Cypryniak, are grass-roots leaders swept into office in the poststrike era as first secretaries of the party organizations in Opole and Szczecin.

REACTION TO PLENUM The plenum appears to have evoked general public approval, in contrast to the storm of grass-roots criticism following the last plenum a month ago. Warsaw radio, which has usually shown candor in reporting grass-roots sentiment, reported on the 30th that messages from local party organizations had voiced "satisfaction" with Kania's plenum report and with many other plenum speeches, "especially" the one by Rakowski--presumably a reference to his remarks on horizontal structures. The Catholic daily SLOWO POWSZECHNE in its 1-3 May issue viewed the plenum as showing to "all our people" that the "mighty" current of socialist renewal is finally beginning to affect the party leadership itself, and welcomed the Politburo changes as having increased the role of workers in party life. The paper added that the plenum had allayed fears that the grass-roots reform movement might lead to a breakdown of structures and "chaos" in the party. And Warsaw radio on the 5th reported a postplenum meeting of the Torun party organization, which agreed that the new versions of the party statute "are getting closer and closer to the expectations and demands of the broad party masses."

SOVIET, EAST EUROPE REACTION As in its treatment of the last several Polish plenums, Moscow has portrayed the latest one as reinforcing predominantly orthodox themes, thus signaling both continued support for the Kania regime and pressure on it to limit reformist trends. A 30 April PRAVDA report on Kania's speech trod lightly over his remarks on the need for further reforms and focused on his comments criticizing Solidarity and radical reformers and calling for greater discipline in the party and country. At the same time, the report suggested some flexibility in noting his remarks that Solidarity and even the Catholic Church could play a positive role. While Moscow and most of its East European allies have reported only the names of the new Politburo members, without noting their worker backgrounds, one Hungarian report did comment favorably on their inclusion in the Politburo. Budapest radio's Warsaw correspondent on 2 May said that the two workers have had some party posts and that "perhaps these two workers, with their direct experience of life, will supplement the collective wisdom of politicans with much greater experience."

MIDDLE EAST

LIBYAN LEADER ASKS USSR FOR CLARIFICATION OF TALKS PROPOSALS

Soviet efforts to obscure Libyan-Soviet differences on various questions, such as settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, were apparent in Moscow's editing of the speech by Libyan leader al-Qadhdhafi during his 27-29 April visit to the Soviet Union. President Brezhnev acknowledged Soviet problems with al-Qadhdhafi's "third universal theory" on people's democracy and his Islamic fervor, observing that "our states are distinguished" from each other in many respects, and there are certain "ideological" differences.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT Al-Qadhdhafi did not endorse Brezhnev's February proposal for an international conference on the Arab-Israeli problem, although the Soviet president again pressed it in his dinner speech on the 27th. Speaking in his role as representative of the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (Libya, Syria, Algeria, the PDRY, and the PLO), al-Qadhdhafi in his dinner speech merely expressed vague Front support for "all" the Soviet proposals "aimed at safeguarding peace throughout the world." He made it clear that he had problems, however, when he went on to say that "we believe it is imperative to have a discussion and clarification of your proposal" for an international conference "on the Palestinian problem," as well as on other questions.

Al-Qadhdhafi did not disparage "conferences meant to resolve" the Arab Israeli sisue, as he had done during his first visit to the USSR, in December 1976.* But he pointed out--in one of the passages deleted in PRAVDA's version of the speech--that the Security Council and the General Assembly "have failed to deal with the situation, and international efforts have failed to solve the problem." In the same passage he lectured his hosts, "demanding" that the Soviet Union "bolster the Arab stand militarily and politically and make greater efforts in favor of your friends the Arabs" in the Front and the "progressive revolutionary forces in the Arab area." And in an interview with a correspondent of the Kuwaiti AL-WATAN on the 27th, al-Qadhdhafi outlined the "different viewpoints" of Libya and the USSR on the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Soviets, he said, reject them because they have led to "a separate settlement," while Libya rejects "a separate and a comprehensive settlement alike."

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* Al-Qadhdhafi's earlier visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 December 1976, pp. 9-11.

In the joint communique, the two sides merely repeated the long-standing call for complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and for exercise of the Palestinians' "national rights" to self-determination, up to the creation of their own independent state.

AFGHANISTAN, PERSIAN GULF In addition to clarification on the Arab-Israeli question, al-Qadhdhafi in his speech called for "discussion" on Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. On both issues, the Libyans accepted standard Soviet language in the communique, which expressed Soviet and Libyan solidarity with Afghanistan's struggle for independence and solidarity. The sides repeated the Soviet position on the need for a political settlement of the situation "around" Afghanistan that would reliably guarantee cessation and nonresumption of all forms of outside interference "by imperialist and reactionary forces." Despite the seeming agreement on the Soviet formulation, a Libyan radio commentary on 29 April noted cryptically that in the discussions of Afghanistan, Libya had stressed its respect for the struggle of the Afghan "people" and the need for efforts to ensure Afghanistan's independence and neutrality.

On the Gulf, Libya signed on in the communique to elements of Brezhnev's December 1980 Gulf security proposal--but without endorsing his call in February for an "international agreement" by the industrial states. The sides routinely accused the United States of attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of states of the area and called for guarantees of the sovereign rights of the littoral states and the safety of "sea and other communications" linking the Gulf with the rest of the world.

WESTERN SAHARA In line with customary Soviet treatment of the Western Sahara, the communique confirmed the sides' support for a settlement of the problem "in keeping with UN resolutions, including the one granting the right of self-determination to the Saharan people." But a Libyan political commentator, in a 29 April talk on Tripoli radio's "Voice of the Arab Homeland," asserted that the visit was a "victory for the will of the people of the Western Sahara" and added without elaboration that during the visit "an agreement" had been reached to "strengthen and consolidate the struggle waged by the Saharan people."

USSR KEEPS OPTIONS OPEN IN LOW-KEY COMMENT ON LEBANESE CRISIS

Moscow has kept a low profile on the heightening tension over Lebanon. For the past month routine-level Soviet comment has held Israel, the Lebanese Christian Phalangists, and the United States responsible for the deteriorating situation. The Soviet Union has been predictably silent on its own intentions, and Brezhnev passed up the opportunity to address the Lebanese situation in his speech for the visiting Libyan leader last week.

MISSILE ISSUE Israel's 28 April downing of two Syrian helicopters was promptly denounced by Moscow. But the presence of Syrian antiaircraft missiles in Lebanon--introduced by Syria in the al-Biqa' valley immediately after the helicopter incidents--was only belatedly acknowledged by Soviet media. The first indication that the stationing of Syrian "antiaircraft subunits" in Lebanon was at issue came in a 5 May commentary by TASS observer Leonid Ponomarev, who implicitly sided with Syria by characterizing Israeli demands for withdrawal of the units as "virtual disarmament" of the Syrian-staffed "Arab Deterrent Forces" (ADF) in Lebanon. In a commentary the following day, Ponomarev complained of Israeli demands that Syria withdraw its "air defense units" from "certain areas" in Lebanon, allowing Tel Aviv to launch "without hindrance aggressive raids" on Lebanon. Both Ponomarev and Moscow radio commentator Arutyunov, in an Arabic-language commentary on the 6th, defended Syria's "peace-keeping" role in Lebanon as "part" of the ADF. Arutyunov argued that the "inventors" of the "so-called missile issue" were deliberately ignoring the fact that the Syrian presence in Lebanon was not the cause, but the result, of the Lebanese crisis.

U.S., SOVIET ROLES Ponomarev insinuated in his 5 May commentary that ongoing U.S. diplomatic efforts were not designed to resolve the crisis but to force the "Lebanese side" to accept Israeli conditions, including removal of the missiles. In his commentary on the 6th, he pointed to the dispatch of White House envoy Habib to Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, charging that the United States was exerting pressure on Syria and was ultimately responsible for encouraging Israel to "new aggression." (Moscow has not yet acknowledged the presence in Syria of its own envoy, First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, on what Damascus radio called a three-day "official" visit.)

Setting forth the Soviet position in his first commentary, Ponomarev merely quoted, without attribution, the passage on Lebanon in the Libyan-Soviet communique, which called for cessation of "aggressive actions"; guarantees of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon; strengthening of the authority of the Lebanese Government over the entire country; and observance of the "lawful interests" of the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon. Cryptic remarks by al-Qadhdhafi during his visit had suggested Libyan pressure for additional Soviet support for Syria and the Palestinians, but these generalities on Lebanon in the communique gave no indication of the Soviet response.

Ponomarev carefully avoided any suggestion of Soviet action in his 5 May comment, merely cautioning that "the Arab nation" might lose its patience and restraint. But there was a sharper tone in his comment the next day, which charged that Israel's "continued threats" against Syria and its military preparations were "fraught with extremely serious consequences."

Perhaps concerned not to be identified with any specific course of action, Moscow was at pains to deny a 29 April report that the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon had said the USSR regarded the al-Biqa' valley in Lebanon as of "substantial importance for the security of Syria" and that any military interference in that area would "prompt the USSR to study the question of increasing military aid to Syria." A carefully worded rebuttal in LITERARY GAZETTE, reported by TASS on 5 May, denied that any Soviet diplomat had made such a statement--but it did not specifically deny the substance of the alleged remark. LITERARY GAZETTE directed its ire at Radio Israel as the source of this "obvious lie," but Moscow may also have been admonishing its Palestinian friends against publicizing reports on Soviet views. The same report was broadcast the same day on the clandestine radio "Voice of Palestine," which attributed the statement to "Comrade Soldatov" in an interview with a West German newspaper.

C H I N A

LEADERS FORGING COMPROMISES ON KEY ISSUES FOR CCP PLENUM

Beijing's leaders appear to be reaching agreement on compromises to resolve some of the contentious political issues that have divided them. Recent press articles suggest that a consensus has been reached allowing a balanced assessment of Mao Zedong and a broad sharing of blame for recent leadership failures--positions that fall short of the harsh censure of the left that Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping has demanded. These evident compromises and the reappearance of party Chairman Hua Guofeng make it likely that Hua will retain a high-ranking party post even if Deng succeeds in achieving his removal as chairman. The compromises may open the way for the convening of the long-delayed plenum of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) next month, but it is not yet clear whether Deng will emerge from a plenum based on compromise with the momentum he needs to fully implement his program of party reform.

The apparent compromises on evaluating Mao's leadership and assessing the performance of other leaders may resolve, at least for now, some of the controversy that has dominated Chinese politics for months. Conflict over a range of key political issues came to a head during top-level party meetings last fall and winter and delayed a formal plenary session of the CCP's Central Committee planned for the turn of the year.* Deng Xiaoping evidently had hoped that at the plenum he could use the momentum he had already gained--from the reformist session of the National Peoples Congress in September and the trials of the "gang of four" and Lin Biao factions in November and December--to effect another major shift in the power balance in his favor and decisively repudiate leftist policies through a detailed critique of Mao. This would have prepared the way for a party congress intended to strengthen his hold on the Central Committee and enshrine his reform program to ensure its longevity.

Deng's moves were blocked, however, when major elements in the leadership, particularly in the army (PLA), found his initiatives threatening and argued that they endangered party unity and party control at a time of economic crisis and domestic political instability.* Evidence that this stalemate has been broken includes widespread dissemination in April of a major article on Mao Zedong, emergence of a lenient policy toward leaders who had been criticized, and recent appearances of Hua Guofeng with other top party leaders after a nearly total absence from public functions for over four months.

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* Issues discussed at about the time of the fall and winter meetings are detailed in the TRENDS of 24 December 1980, pages 10-15.

ASSESSING MAO AND THE CCP

That Beijing might be nearing at least an interim agreement on a formal assessment of Mao Zedong's 41 year performance as CCP Chairman seemed indicated by the prominence recently accorded a speech about Mao. While acknowledging his mistakes, it stopped well short of the clearcut critique of Mao that Deng Xiaoping has been seeking. It seemed especially to take into account the sensitivities of Mao's staunchest defenders, such as CCP Vice Chairman and military elder Ye Jianying, Hua Guofeng, and other senior military leaders on the Politburo.

The speech was delivered by CCP Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary Huang Kecheng in November 1980 but was not published until 10 April 1981--a delay suggesting that the content had been controversial. First published in the limited-circulation PLA newspaper JIEFANGJUN BAO, the speech was reprinted in other newspapers in Beijing on the following day and transmitted by XINHUA's domestic Chinese-language news service, dissemination ensuring its appearance in China's provincial and regional newspapers as well. At least one province, Hebei, has issued instructions (on 12 April) that the speech be "seriously" studied and "extensively" publicized. Such widespread dissemination and special attention underscored the importance of the speech and suggests that the basis now exists for building a wider consensus on Mao than was possible late last year. Several factors underscored the significance of the speech as an olive branch extended to the PLA: It was delivered by a former PLA chief of staff who had been purged in 1959 in a power struggle with Mao; it was initially made public in the army's newspaper; and it was substantially devoted to an affirmation of Mao's contributions to the founding of the PLA.

Staking out a middle ground and suggesting that he had Deng's endorsement, Huang introduced his speech as an elaboration of remarks on Mao that Deng had made on "behalf of the Central Committee"--an apparent allusion to Deng's interview in the summer of 1980 with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci. The interview had been published in China in October and November 1980, when sensitivity over Mao's role during the Cultural Revolution was peaking in advance of the trial of the gang of four and Lin Biao factions. Thus Huang echoed Deng's often stated general characterization of Mao: "His merits are primary and his mistakes secondary," and he "saved the party and the state from crises."

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* Problems in the economy are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 January 1981, pages 4-8. Evidence of political disarray is examined in an FBIS ANALYSIS REPORT of 13 February 1981 entitled "Political Instability in China Slows Progress on Reforms."

In tone and substance, however, Huang put forth an assessment that was considerably more emphatic in its praise and more reticent in its criticism than Deng's and which in some respects paralleled judgements Hua Guofeng had made last year. While Deng did not specify Mao's merits, Huang elaborated on them in language that was more effusive than Deng had used. Huang challenged Mao's critics to name "who else made a greater contribution or performed more meritorious deeds than Chairman Mao" early in the CCP's revolution; "if anyone insists that some other people were wiser or contributed more, it will be a mockery of history."

Deng had stressed the importance of clarifying Mao's errors which were "mainly 'leftist,'" promised Fallaci that Beijing would "clearly proclaim [Mao's] mistakes," and sidestepped an obvious opportunity--in his response to Fallaci's questioning--to offer ill health as an excuse for Mao's later mistakes. But Huang, like Hua in the past, declined to discuss Mao's failings in detail and apologized for Mao. Mao's mistakes, he said, were those of a "great revolutionary" and were caused in part by his having "overtaxed his brain" throughout his life for the "cause of the people." Therefore, "we should make allowance for him with feelings of love and respect."

Since the publication of Huang's speech, Beijing media have provided further indications that a consensus has been reached. An unusual XINHUA overseas service report--yet to be heard in domestic media--cited a report in the 4 May issue of the foreign-language weekly BEIJING REVIEW that a document on "historical questions" was ready for discussion at the "forthcoming" CCP plenum. The report said that following its approval at the plenum, the document would be made public at an "appropriate time"--possibly the CCP's 60th Anniversary on 1 July 1981. Moreover, Deng Liqun, a vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the office which is probably preparing the assessments of Mao and the CCP, twice echoed the language of Huang's speech in early May: in an article defending the CCP's leadership, broadcast by radio Beijing on 2 May, and in a message to young people on the anniversary of a pre-1949 political movement, reported on 4 May by XINHUA.

SHARING BLAME FOR ERRORS

The balanced approach to assessing Mao is in keeping with the pattern that has emerged since March in assignment of blame for a variety of more recent policy errors, particularly economic. During a session of the National Peoples Congress Standing Committee which ended on 6 March, officials who had been implicitly criticized in the media for their approaches to the economy were transferred to lesser but still prestigious jobs in the State Council. Similarly, in Hunan Province, provincial CCP first secretary Mao Zhiyong--Hua Guofeng's protege who, at the turn of the year, came under intense criticism for failing to change leftist policies--thus far has survived by dint of a self-criticism. A Hunan RIBAO editorial, broadcast in part by Changsha radio on 30 March, outlined a mild approach to problems in the province and called for education and "comradely criticism" within strict limits to resolve them. The editorial cautioned the victims of past leftist policies not to preoccupy [themselves] with settling past wrongs and affixing personal responsibilities."

In national comment this approach was initially explained in a 10 March editorial in RENMIN RIBAO which, in discussing how to "Clean Up 'Left' Ideas with the Method of Criticism and Self-Criticism," was so inclusive in its targets and so lenient in its methods as to significantly dilute Dengist efforts to discharge or punish opponents. Pointing out that the party work conference in December 1980 had concluded that major mistakes in economic work, especially since 1957, were "leftist" mistakes which had also "found expression in work on all fronts," the editorial declared that "everyone of our comrades, leading cadres in particular, is affected by 'left' things." The real question, it said, boils down to "differences in magnitude and degree of the influence" and to differences "between those who have awakened earlier and those who awakened later."

The 10 March editorial spelled out a mild prescription for correcting past mistakes. It called on leaders to engage in "comradely mutual criticism and mutual help," particularly at "the high and intermediate levels," but made none of the usual threats against those who are slow in reforming. In such a way, the editorial summed up, the "good tradition of criticism and self-criticism" could be restored, "right and wrong" distinguished, and comrades "united and educated." In reiterating calls for an end to the heated and disruptive political movements of the past, the editorial prescribed a policy of leniency and continuing education even for those "who made serious mistakes but refuse to admit [them]."

A later editorial, on 13 April in RENMIN RIBAO, implied that even China's leading critics of leftism--Deng Xiaoping and his allies--have been guilty of misjudgements on the economy. The editorial criticized officials who "pin their hope for modernization on natural resources," such as oil, on the assumption that by using them to pay for importing advanced technology, "China will become strong and prosperous."

Although the most obvious allusion was to top leaders responsible for energy and planning through the 1970's, RENMIN RIBAO's statement could logically also apply to Deng Xiaoping's evident support for their policies from 1974 through 1978. The editorial seemed to draw this connection between Deng and the others when it added that "even if we discover such a huge oilfield, it will not be able to bring $1,000 to the pockets of each of our 1 billion people." On 16 January 1980 Deng had declared that China should strive to provide an average annual income of $1,000 by the end of the 20th Century. That statement appeared in a widely studied speech on tasks for the 1980's, never carried in Beijing media but published in the Hong Kong journal CHENG MING on 1 March 1980. Both Deng and his candidate for party head, Hu Yaobang, have referred to the same target in interviews with foreign visitors. Deng mentioned it most recently in a meeting with a Yugoslav journalist in November, reported by a Yugoslav news service, just before the CCP Politburo decided to readjust China's economic development plans still more severely.

The theme of moderation in criticizing leftist mistakes has been echoed by a number of central and local military leaders, suggesting it is especially welcome in the PLA, whose past support of leftist policies had been especially evident during and after the Cultural Revolution. On 19 April, XINHUA reported Director of the PLA General Political Department Wei Guoqing as calling for rectification of "leftist erroneous ideas" in political work; but he added that not "everyone [is] required to pass the test" and warned against launching movements and elevating the criticism to a "higher plane." RENMIN RIBAO reported on 1 April that PLA units in Urumqi Military Region had discussed the impact of leftism and urged that it be criticized but also advised that "people be treated kindly."

STATUS OF HUA GUOFENG AND HU YAOBANG

Hua Guofeng's recent public appearances on 10 April and 30 April--his first in over four months as part of a major leadership turnout--suggest that Hua is now in accord with, as well as a beneficiary of the lenient approach being taken toward Mao Zedong and other officials guilty of leftist policy mistakes. Media treatment of his appearance has provided only ambiguous hints regarding his future status but--in connection with the prominence given his rival Hu Yaobang--suggests that Hua will surrender his titular leadership of the party to Hu while retaining an important role.

In both appearances--the 10 April memorial meeting for recently deceased novelist Mao Dun and the 30 April soiree celebrating the 1 May international labor day--Hua was listed first among party leaders, confirming that he remains formally the CCP's head. Television coverage of the Mao Dun memorial meeting revealed, however, that Hua entered and left the meeting out of protocol order in a position suggesting the status of a junior Vice Chairman or Standing Committee member. Hu's stature was enhanced relative to Hua's during the funeral when he read the eulogy and when television coverage showed him to be the first leader to enter the memorial hall. Earlier, XINHUA on 31 March published a letter from Mao Dun addressed to Hu--as though he were party chief--requesting admission to the CCP.

REMAINING UNCERTAINTIES

There are hints that some of the PRC's top leaders, possibly including Deng Xiaoping, are not fully satisfied with all aspects of the consensus now emerging. An especially noteworthy, albeit indistinct signal, was Deng Xiaoping's absence from the 30 April May Day soiree. Deng's failure to participate in a gathering which all other top leaders still in Beijing attended may betray dissatisfaction with the developing political situation, or at least with Hua Guofeng's resurgent prominence. Having attended a May Day affair on the 29th and a diplomatic function on the 30th, Deng was clearly in Beijing and not indisposed. PRC media's failure to account for Deng's absence further focused attention on the anomaly. Except for the debilitated Liu Bocheng and the disgraced Chen Yonggui, media coverage of May Day mentioned the whereabouts of all of China's other ranking leaders. The absence from the city of another major figure also leaves lingering doubts about the outcome of recent manuevering. Vice Chairman Ye Jianying remains outside of Beijing, having wintered in Guangdong and celebrated May Day in Shanghai. In the past, Ye has been known to absent himself from the capital when miffed over political developments.

There is evidence, moreover, that debate continues over some key ideological issues which must be settled in order to revise the CCP's constitution and map out future political goals--steps that would normally be taken during the plenum in preparation for a full CCP national congress, but may have to be postponed. For example, three contributing commentator articles--usually vehicles for expressing partisan views of high ranking officials--published in GUANGMING RIBAO and RENMIN RIBAO have discussed the theory of proletarian dictatorship in ways which indicate continuing controversy over the issue.

There is also evidence of debate over sweeping reforms of the CCP's leadership structure which, if implemented, would substantially alter the way in which power is exercised. Thus far they have only been discussed in speeches circulated for debate and revision in documents published in the leftist Hong Kong press and in oblique allegories on ancient Chinese history--indications that they are controversial and in the early stages of discussion.

YUGOSLAVIA

In the first political fallout in Kosovo province since the ethnic Albanian disorders six weeks ago, a Kosovo party plenum on 5 May has replaced the longtime regional party chief and aired widespread divisions in the party and province. The candid and sometimes acrimonious debate at the plenum contrasts with the image of unity projected by Kosovo officials in past weeks and seems likely to foreshadow a more far-reaching shakeup of the party and other local organizations. In the meantime, a new census publicized on the eve of the plenum confirms that the ethnic composition of Kosovo continues to shift in favor of its Albanian majority.

KOSOVO PARTY LEADER REPLACED AT STORMY PARTY PLENUM

The Kosovo plenum provided some of the clearest signs so far of the scope of Albanian nationalist sympathies, and of possible ethnic Serb backlash, in the region. Numerous speakers at the plenum--including outgoing party chief of 10 years Mahmut Bakali and keynote speaker Ali Sukrija--outlined what they portrayed as widespread toleration of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo institutions, and in the party itself. Several speakers criticized Pristina University, scene of some of the disturbances, and Kosovo-Albania cultural exchanges as vehicles for promoting Albanian nationalist sentiments in the Yugoslav province. Two Serb officials at the plenum were unusually outspoken in voicing that minority's concerns, calling for discussions of such sensitive issues as the emigration of non-Albanians from Kosovo following the unrest.

Some plenum speeches contained implicit attacks on former party chief Bakali and hints of a split within the local leadership over the Albanian nationalism issue. One official attacked the party leadership, and by implication Bakali, for showing a "certain tolerance" for nationalism, an "executive suite" leadership style, and improper personal conduct. Another speaker revealed that three party officials--including the newly installed Kosovo party chief Veli Deva--had urged a crackdown on Albanian nationalists earlier in the crisis but their views had been ignored. In brief postplenum comments, reported by TANJUG on the 5th, Deva underscored his reputation as a hardliner on Albanian nationalism by terming it the basic problem the Kosovo party. Presumably to prevent a recurrence of the kind of autocratic political style attributed to Bakali, the plenum limited Deva's term as party chief to one year. Kosovo is thus the first region to implement the principle of rotational leadership already in force in top federal bodies.

CENSUS IN KOSOVO CONFIRMS GROWING ALBANIAN PREPONDERANCE

The results of a 1981 census, released by TANJUG on 4 May, lend substance to concerns expressed by ethnic Serbs at the plenum about the emigration of non-Albanians from the province and a continuing ethnic shift in favor of the Albanian majority. The census shows that the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo has increased by more than 300,000 since 1971. This represents an annual growth rate of 3 percent and pushes up the Albanians' share of the region's population from 73 to 77.5 percent. During the same period, the ethnic Serb population declined by more than 18,000--from 18 to 13.2 percent of the province's total. The number of Kosovo's Montenegrins, ethnically akin to Serbs, also decreased slightly. The census had sparked recriminations from neighboring Albania, when a 10 April Tirana BASHKIMI article said that Albanians were likely to be undercounted because the census was conducted while demonstrators were being suppressed and the region was under virtual martial law.

BRIEFS

USSR-NATO: Moscow Responds to U.S. TNF Talks Offer

Moscow had drawn little satisfaction from the fact that the 4-5 May Rome meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers produced a public U.S. commitment to restarting talks with the Soviet Union on limiting European theater nuclear forces (TNF). Initial Soviet media reaction to the Rome session expressed mixed feelings over Secretary of State Haig's statement of U.S. willingness to start TNF talks by the end of the year and took strong exception to NATO's endorsement of U.S. preconditions for their resumption. Moscow welcomed the U.S. announcement in principle but underscored the "ambiguous" meaning of the U.S. offer by playing up NATO's decision to reject Soviet President Brezhnev's missile moratorium proposal and to set what a domestic radio report called "conditions" for resuming talks that are "unacceptable to our country." Earlier Soviet comment had been sharply critical of Reagan Administration statements similar to those contained in the NATO meeting's communique linking Soviet international behavior to arms control negotiations.

Initial Soviet assessments of the Rome meeting for both domestic and foreign audiences have credited allied pressure for the U.S. announcement on arms talks but also complained of NATO support for U.S. foreign policy. TASS reports and domestic radio commentaries on 5 and 6 May portrayed the Reagan Administration as bowing reluctantly to the insistence of West European governments for a gesture to deflate growing domestic opposition to the 1979 NATO TNF modernization decision. A 5 May domestic radio commentary was typical of the ambivalent Soviet reaction. Noting the Rome meeting's "unanimous" support for TNF talks, it expressed skepticism over NATO's sincerity, claiming that the meeting clearly gave arms buildup priority over negotiations. A TASS commentary on the 6th concluded that the Americans set the pace at the Rome meeting and "dictated" their own concept for conducting world affairs to the Allies.

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Military Experience From Afghan Fighting

Despite indications of Soviet pessimism on the fighting in Afghanistan, an article in the March 1981 VOENNYE ZNANIYA (MILITARY KNOWLEDGE), the organ of the All-Union Voluntary Society for the Support of the Army, Air Force, and Fleet (DOSAAF), suggests that at least some Soviet military leaders see service in Afghanistan as a "real training school"--one which provides valuable leadership experience for Soviet noncommissioned officers. Originally published in FRUNZEVETS, the official newspaper of the Turkestan Military District, the article was reprinted in VOENNYE ZNANIYA in response to "readers' requests" for information on Soviet military service in Afghanistan. Although the article noted that service there is "not the easiest" and "much more serious" then elsewhere, it made no direct mention of a combat role for Soviet troops and attempted to reassure its readers that even in Afghanistan Soviet solidiers are being well taken care of--"a soldier must receive a hot meal each day, no matter what the cost!"

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Trends in Communist Media

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- Brezhnev pessimistic on arms talks
- Moscow on crisis in Lebanon
- Soviet Reaction to French elections

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

- SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

- SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

- TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

USSR-U.S.

BREZHNEV GLOOMY ON ARMS TALKS WITH REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Moscow appears to be drawing pessimistic conclusions about the prospects for arms control dialogue with the Reagan Administration. Soviet media commentary on the 4-5 May NATO foreign ministers meeting in Rome has played up alliance support for the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and discounted the coincident U.S. announcement of readiness to begin talks with the USSR on such weapons at the end of the year. President Brezhnev offered some insight into the perceptions underlying the Soviet attitude in a 9 May address, when he appeared to place the Reagan Administration squarely in the camp of Western statesmen who discount the importance of arms control negotiations.

An 8 May TASS statement, Moscow's most authoritative response to the NATO session, dismissed recent U.S. and alliance expressions of preparedness to hold talks with the Soviet Union on theater nuclear forces as ill-intentioned "camouflage." The statement alleged that the results of the meeting reflected above all "the line of the U.S. Administration of intensifying international tension and escalating the arms race." The NATO alliance talks of a desire to make progress in limiting arms, it said, but at the same time destroys "any sensible basis" for achieving agreement by reducing the agenda for talks to achieving "substantial limitations of Soviet military might." Other Soviet commentary has portrayed the U.S. announcement as a ploy designed to undermine growing West European public opposition to the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles, while characterizing the offer of talks as vague and replete with reservations.

Soviet commentators in PRAVDA and on Moscow radio's domestic and international services have seen an additional reason to doubt U.S. intentions in the recent appointments of Eugene Rostow as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and General Edward Rowny as chief U.S. representative at the disarmament talks. In an 8 May broadcast in English to North America, Central Committee International Information Department official Oleg Anichkin declared that the appointment of people known to be "opposed to disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union" throws "additional light" on how the United States intends to negotiate.

BREZHNEV SPEECH Brezhnev's speech, at a V-E Day ceremony in Kiev, strongly reaffirmed interest in arms control discussions while continuing the recent emphasis in authoritative Soviet statements on the dangers of nuclear war. His apparent pessimism about U.S. receptivity to Soviet initiatives was included in an assessment of the present disposition of political forces in the West that contrasted "sober-minded people" among the leadership in many countries with others who are "accustomed to thinking only in terms of strength and diktat." Echoing current themes in Soviet commentary on the Reagan Administration, Brezhnev accused the latter group of attempting to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union as "their main political credo." The solution of problems through talks and mutually advantageous agreements is "way down" on this group's list of priorities, Brezhnev maintained, "if they give serious thought to this at all." Brezhnev alluded unambiguously to Secretary of State Haig at this point, expressing horror that among such opponents of arms dialogue are some who "openly state" that there are "things more important than peace."

USSR-MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW LOW KEY ON SUPPORT FOR SYRIA, HARSH ON U.S. MEDIATION

Moscow is maintaining a low profile in the crisis over Syrian antiaircraft missiles in Lebanon. Low-level comment has endorsed the Syrian line on the confrontation, but Moscow has yet to comment authoritatively. Although the Soviet press and radio have replayed Syrian claims of Soviet backing, only the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress has alluded to such support. No Soviet commentary on the crisis is known to have referred to the 1980 Soviet-Syrian treaty, which calls for consultations in the event of a threat to the peace and security of either side and coordination of their positions "to remove the threat . . . and to restore the peace."

SOVIET SUPPORT

Moscow's failure to comment authoritatively on the crisis was underscored when President Brezhnev made no reference to Lebanon in his 12 May speech at a banquet honoring the visiting Congolese head of state. Brezhnev had similarly ignored the current situation in Lebanon in his 27 April speech at a banquet for Libyan leader al-Qadhdhafi.

Moscow has not publicly indicated whether Damascus can expect more than political encouragement in its current confrontation with Israel over the emplacement of Syrian missiles in Lebanon. In replaying Syrian claims of Soviet support, PRAVDA on 10 May cited a Syrian National Progressive Front statement vaguely referring to the Soviet Union as a "friend of Syria." A 12 May Moscow radio commentary, broadcast in Arabic, cited a slightly stronger statement by Syrian Prime Minister al-Kasm that Syria would pursue its policies toward Lebanon despite "threats" because it has the support of the Syrian people and "the backing of the socialist countries and the friendly Soviet Union."

Airing the only Soviet-originated suggestion of Soviet backing for Damascus, a low-level anonymous Radio Peace and Progress commentary, broadcast in Arabic on the 11th, declared that the "mighty" Soviet Union "stands on the side" of the "people of Syria and Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance movement." The commentary went on to assert that the 6-8 May consultations between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko and Syrian and PLO leaders in Damascus were "received in the Arab world" as a "warning to those whose pastime is engaging in adventures against the Arabs in the Middle East."

No other Soviet comment has connected the Korniyenko visit with the Lebanon crisis. PRAVDA, in reporting Korniyenko's departure from Syria, noted only that Soviet-Syrian consultations had taken place "within the framework of the common, principled line of the parties of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Near East." By contrast, Damascus television reported that the Soviet envoy and his hosts had discussed the Lebanese situation and that the talks were held "within the framework" of the Soviet-Syrian treaty.

U.S. ROLE, HABIB MISSION Soviet media have predictably criticized U.S. efforts to mediate the dispute, charging the United States with trying to cover up its "overt support" of Israel and weaken Syria's resistance to Israeli pressure. Moscow's allegations of U.S. complicity with Israel have gone so far as to intimate that Secretary of State Haig's recent visit to Israel emboldened Israel to launch "provocations" in Lebanon, and PRAVDA Beirut correspondent Moseyev asserted in a dispatch published on the 11th that according to unnamed "political observers," it was "no accident" that tension in Lebanon escalated coincidentally with presidential envoy Habib's arrival in the region.

Most Soviet comment has warned that there will be more Israeli "provocations" in Lebanon. For example, a Zlatorunskiy commentary, broadcast in Arabic on the 12th, declared that "everything indicates that preparations are under way for a large-scale military action against Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian resistance movement." However, possible constraints upon Israeli action were cited by the LITERARY GAZETTE Beirut correspondent in a TASS dispatch also on the 12th. An Israeli "preemptive strike" in Lebanon, he observed, is "no easy question in the present conditions." Due to the "grave risk" of Israeli losses to Syrian antiaircraft fire, he wrote, an "act of subversion" by Israeli commandos is "most probable."

USSR-FRANCE

MOSCOW EYES CONTINUITY OF DETENTE LINE UNDER MITTERRAND

Moscow appears to be banking on French national interests to sustain the De Gaulle-era legacy of a detente relationship between Moscow and Paris during President-elect Mitterrand's tenure. Initial Soviet public reaction to the Socialist leader's victory on 10 May softpedaled discussion of the foreign policy implications while crediting domestic factors such as the ailing economy and the opposition of the French communists (PCF) for outgoing President Giscard d'Estaing's defeat. Moscow's correct if unenthusiastic response to Mitterrand contrasts with its disapproving preelection comments regarding his foreign policy views and suggests that its hopes for a broad continuity in French foreign policy may be tempered by the prospect of more difficult bilateral relations.

Moscow has been notably reticent regarding the impact of Mitterrand's win on French-Soviet relations, with most commentary restricted to repetition of the platitudes on continuing Soviet-French cooperation contained in Soviet President Brezhnev's 11 May congratulatory telegram. Veteran Soviet commentator Valentin Zorin, speaking in an interview with Hungarian radio on the 11th, suggested that Moscow would hope for the best until developments indicated otherwise. Asserting that no French president has been noted for "sympathy" for the Soviet Union, Zorin said that they pursued East-West dialogue based on calculation of "France's best interests" and that there was no reason to suppose that the new president would depart from this tradition.

Moscow commentary on the change in government has focused on two main domestic reasons for Giscard's defeat. Soviet accounts have claimed that the result reflected a broad desire for social and economic change in France, the 12 May IZVESTIYA reporting, for example, that Mitterrand had even benefited from votes cast by first-round supporters of the rightist candidate Chirac. The PCF's contribution to Mitterrand's win has also received heavy emphasis from Soviet commentary, which widely replayed PCF leader Marchais's self-congratulatory statement declaring the PCF ready to "assume responsibility" both in and out of government. Soviet accounts have not spoken on their own authority to the question of a direct PCF role in a Mitterrand government, although an 11 May TASS report from Paris touched on the prospect in replaying Marchais' remark that Mitterrand realized he would not be able to pursue a new policy without the "participation" of the PCF.

BACKGROUND Over the years Moscow has publicly run hot and cold toward Mitterrand, an ambivalence reflecting the PCF's own fluctuating relationship with the French Socialists. During the 1960's Mitterrand was a favorite bete noire of the Soviet media, but this stand changed in the early 1970's as the PCF rallied around Mitterrand's 1974 Presidential candidacy in the heyday of the "Union of the Left." Moscow seemed to find Mitterrand preferable in that election to Giscard. Following the 1978 breakup of the leftwing unity pact, Moscow began to take its cue from the PCF's increasingly bitter attacks on Mitterrand.

The shift was completed after PCF leader Marchais's formal return to the orthodox fold in January 1980, signaled in his endorsement of Soviet Afghanistan policies during a trip to Moscow to repair strained party ties. Soviet media then began to echo PCF criticism of Mitterrand for having abandoned leftwing unity in a "shift to the right" in both domestic and foreign policy. In a 13 March PRAVDA survey of the contenders in this year's presidential race, Mitterrand was unflatteringly portrayed as trying to conceal the Socialists' pro-U.S. orientation and their sympathy for NATO's arms buildup while striking a deal with the "center bourgeois parties" for support.

CHINA

MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES ADVOCATED FOR CHINESE PARTY

The forthcoming plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee may consider major structural changes in the highest levels of the party that would fundamentally alter the way in which power is exercised in China. The changes are being promoted by CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, both to strengthen his faction's hold on power and to ensure the longevity of political reforms he has been seeking. Deng's plans may yet be thwarted by opponents in the party, particularly by senior military leaders like Ye Jianying who stand to lose power if proposed shifts in the control of the Chinese army (PLA) are implemented.

In his persistent efforts to guarantee the implementation of his modernization and political reform programs, Deng Xiaoping has attempted, with mixed results, to make both personnel and organizational changes in the party. He has sought to remove from authority officials who are not firmly committed to his programs, like CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng, as well as those who are too corrupt, incompetent, or old to carry them out. At the same time, he advocates major organizational changes in the CCP and has already brought about the creation of the Discipline Inspection Commission--in December 1978--and the re-creation of the Secretariat--in February 1980. Because these organizations have largely, but not entirely, included on their rolls members sympathetic to Deng's goals, they have served to strengthen his faction's grip on political power. The changes have also led to a broader distribution of power at the top, thus promoting Deng's efforts to prevent the reemergence of a single political leader as dominant as Mao Zedong.

There is evidence that Deng is now attempting to implement the next steps in his reorganization of the CCP. The changes he is apparently suggesting would increase the relative power of the Secretariat--where Deng has had the most influence--and eliminate the Politburo, the main policymaking body of the CCP, in which Deng has faced his stiffest conservative opposition, replacing it with a younger, possibly more reform-minded leadership group. Deng also appears to be seeking to reduce the influence of the CCP's military policymaking body, the Military Commission, and place it in a position clearly subordinate to the collective leadership of the Secretariat.

Thus far these changes have not been discussed openly in China's own press and radio but have been suggested in PRC leaders' speeches published in the leftist Hong Kong press and in oblique allegories in PRC media on Chinese history. Such handling of the issue suggests that no consensus has been reached on the changes and that they may not be agreed upon in time for the upcoming plenum. They may yet be implemented, however; Beijing gave virtually no public warning of its decision in February 1980 to reestablish the Secretariat during the Fifth CCP Plenum.

PROPOSED CIVILIAN CHANGES

Deng Xiaoping's plan for the reorganization of the CCP was discussed in two speeches, one in August 1980 by Deng and the other in October 1980 by Liao Gailong, a member of the CCP's policy study office. Supposed accounts of the speeches only recently were published in Hong Kong, in the 16 April CHAN WANG and the 1 March CHI SHIH NIEN TAI, respectively. In a speech on 18 August 1980 to an enlarged Politburo meeting, Deng reportedly proposed sharing leadership of the CCP among three bodies: the Central Committee, the Discipline Inspection Commission, and a new advisory body, all to be elected by a CCP congress. Liao reportedly offered more details in a 25 October 1980 speech to a CCP-sponsored seminar on party history. Liao suggested that the Politburo should be abolished and replaced by a new standing committee elected by the Central Committee. Serving the standing committee and the Central Committee would be the Secretariat, which would administer the CCP's daily affairs. A similar standing committee and secretariat would be chosen for the advisory group.

Neither Deng nor Liao was specific about the duties and prerogatives of the new organizations or about how the Central Committee standing committee would differ from the current Politburo or how differences between the groups would be resolved. Deng, however, did imply that the advisory body was intended to replace the Politburo as the preserve for the CCP's most prestigious but elderly and conservative leaders. Deng said that in creating the body he hoped to reduce the average age of the CCP's "working groups"--an allusion, almost certainly, encompassing the Politburo or the standing committee that would replace it--and make room for younger, more "keenwitted" leaders, while at the same time allowing CCP elders to use their experience to "guide" and "supervise" party work.

Liao offered two suggestions to resolve the inevitable conflicts that would arise between the new groups. He proposed that the groups first hold a joint conference to reconcile differences; failing that, a national party congress would be called to cast the deciding votes. The chief beneficiary of this relatively cumbersome arrangement is likely to be the CCP's Secretariat, which will no longer be directly answerable to the Politburo, whose prestige is difficult to challenge.

Who should lead the arrangement Deng is proposing--a standing committee chairman, general secretary, or collective--has not been addressed directly in any public comment. Chinese media have hinted at one possibility, however. An article in the PLA newspaper JIEFANGJUN BAO, on 11 December 1980, broadcast by Beijing on the 19th seemed to suggest that the CCP did not need a chairman at all but could be managed instead by a general secretary. The article--published when deliberations over Hua Guofeng's fate were under way--recalled how Marx had declined the position of chairman of the First Internationale in 1864. It observed that Marx had urged abolition of the post of chairman and had suggested that the movement be supervised by its general secretary alone.

A more direct indication in China's press that such reforms have been proposed appeared in a 17 December 1980 Beijing radio broadcast announcing a "recent" Central Committee and State Council decision to establish "advisory positions from which veteran leaders could continue to contribute to party decisions" without actively participating in leadership jobs. The report generally outlined the advisers' roles but did not specify precisely how they were to be selected or the extent of their powers. But Beijing has not indicated that such positions have been formally established at the Central Committee or Politburo levels.

MILITARY CHANGES

Evidence that Deng may hope to subordinate the CCP Military Commission to the Secretariat appeared in a historical article in the 24 March 1981 GUANGMING RIBAO that discussed military organs in an allegorical review of the evolution of government during the Qing dynasty. In tracing the ups and downs of organizations advising the Qing emperors, the article suggested provocative parallels with the evolution of the CCP's leading organs--the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the very powerful Military Commission, which effectively governs the PLA and which counts among its members numerous military leaders, including Ye Jianying, who have opposed Deng in the past. The article implicitly concluded that the Military Commission's powers should be curtailed, limiting its functions to purely professional military matters.

In its discussion of the creation of an 18th century Grand Council--literally translated as the office of military affairs--the article said that the Council was created to oversee the conquest of territories in Northwest China but that it took on duties far beyond its military requirements. It eventually became a "key government department," the article critically observed, that rose above the "Grand Secretariat" and superseded the Council of Princes and Ministers, the two civilian organs directly responsible to the emperor.

Drawing an implicit likeness to the Military Commission's role during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution, the article explained that the Grand Council's power grew to such an extent, that it came to be "in charge of the appointment and dismissal of provincial governors and department heads, the deployment of troops, the acquisition and spending of state revenues and grain, and the handling of major lawsuits." In addition, having acquired the emperor's confidence, according to the article, the minister in charge of the council amassed great personal power. The article noted that the Qing had failed to change the system but described one unsuccessful reform proposal: "The Grand Council should be a branch of the Grand Secretariat. The latter should not be subordinated to the former. The Grand Secretariat should be the only organ to carry out the imperial instructions."

Control of the military has historically been a central issue in the PRC's political power struggles. Creation of the Military Commission in 1961, with Mao Zedong as its first chairman, was part of Mao's early effort to retain the power that he had lost in 1959 following the disastrous Great Leap Forward, when he turned over the presidency of the PRC to Liu Shaoqi. When Mao resigned as the PRC's president, he also surrendered leadership of the military to Liu, who, under the PRC's 1954 state constitution, headed the National Defense Council (NDC), then the top military policymaking organization, and the PLA. Between 1961 and the Cultural Revolution, the Military Commission rivaled the NDC, but it became preeminent over and then supplanted the NDC during and after the Cultural Revolution, when most of the NDC's members were purged and the organ abolished.

The first state constitution after the Cultural Revolution, adopted in 1975 by the Fourth National Peoples Congress, further formalized the CCP's leadership over the PLA when it declared that the CCP Chairman, then Mao Zedong, also headed the PLA. Because Beijing has not yet altered the provision in the state's constitution that the CCP chairman is also the army's commander, attempts to reform the party's mechanism for controlling the military fit into Deng's efforts to reduce Hua Guofeng's influence.

USSR

GEORGIAN PAPER HITS OPPONENTS OF NUCLEAR POWER, HEAVY INDUSTRY

Popular opposition to the development of heavy industry in Georgia appears to be creating a serious problem for the republic's leaders. According to a two-part article in the Georgian-language daily KOMUNISTI, such "anti-industrial attitudes" appear to be widespread in Georgia and may have been instrumental in delaying several key energy projects, including the construction of a nuclear power plant. Those opposed to industrialization have been arguing their case primarily on environmental grounds, and it appears that similar resistance to modernization has manifested itself in other areas of the Soviet Union.

The 17-18 February KOMUNISTI article by secretary of the Georgian Writers Union Giorgi Tsitsishvili, indicates that resistance to industrialization in Georgia has focused on the proposed construction of the republic's first nuclear power plant. According to Tsitsishvili, there is a "widespread negative attitude" toward nuclear power in the republic, prompted largely by concerns over safety. He observed that "superstitious fears" have been aggravated by public opposition to nuclear power in the United States, which he described as a myth created by the oil companies and the sensationalization of the accident at Three Mile Island. An earlier article by the popular Georgian writer Pandzhikidze in 16 November KOMUNISTI similarly reported that plans for the nuclear power station were '"frightening" the local population and causing a "furor."

In addition to the opposition to nuclear power, there appears to be a more general resistance to the introduction of any new heavy industry into Georgia among some segments of the population. Controversy appears to have been provoked by the prospect of increasing oil drilling in the republic. Tsitsishvili acknowledged that plans for boosting oil production in Georgia would do "some harm" to the environment, but he stressed that additional oil was essential to the republic's economy. Judging by Pandzhikdze's article, opposition to oil drilling apparently became a rallying point for those opposed to any further industrialization in Georgia following a drilling accident which seriously damaged several hectares of agricultural land. The writer criticized those opposing industrialization, accusing a "large segment" of the population of trying to turn Georgia into a republic of "resorts, tourism" and "light industry." Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze himself has taken note of such opposition, hinting in his speech to the republic party congress in January that "anti-industrial sentiments" were an obstacle to planned industrial expansion.

Expanding on his condemnation of the anti-industrialists, Tsitsishvili made it clear that the phenomenon is a complex one, involving strains of local conservatism as well as antimodernism and environmentalism. Tsitsishvili indicated that the opponents of industrialization were "misguided patriots" who viewed each new development project in the republic as an "infringement" of their "national interests." He also stated reassuringly that industrialization could be accomplished with "our own national cadres" without bringing in additional manpower from "outside," a strong hint that traditional national jealousies and tensions play a part in the phenomenon.

Despite the generally technocratic bias of the article, Tsitsishvili gave evidence of due concern for the progressive political methods with which the Georgian leadership has identified itself. He acknowledged that those opposed to development sometimes raise valid points and suggested that their objections should be seriously considered. While recognizing that a "public airing" of views on future development projects would cause additional delays and irritate specialists, Tsitsishvili said that it would also help prevent costly development mistakes. He also expressed the hope that such a review would deter overzealous technocrats from pushing ahead with projects regardless of consequences, and added that previous planning mistakes had done much to provoke the anti-industrial sentiments which now exist in the republic.

BACKGROUND Signs of local resistance to industrialization have been noted elsewhere in the Soviet Union. In Latvia in the late 1950's, for example, opposition to the development of heavy industry on the grounds that it would bring an unwelcome influx of outsiders led to the dismissal of the local deputy premier. Although concern over nuclear power has been less explicit in the past, articles have appeared steadily over the past several years in the Soviet press clearly aimed at reassuring the population regarding the safety of nuclear energy. An article in the November issue of the popular Latvian journal NAUKA I TEKNIKA, for example, presented a detailed argument aimed at proving that there is no "harmful influence" to the area surrounding a local nuclear power plant. Articles in the central press have been more general in stressing the safety of nuclear energy.

YUGOSLAVIA

SERBIAN OFFICIALS WEIGH RESTRICTIONS ON KOSOVO AUTONOMY

The Yugoslav republic of Serbia appears to be weighing restrictions on the special status of its "autonomous province" of Kosovo following the evident failure of Kosovo's leadership to control Albanian nationalist unrest in March and April. While denying any intent to revoke Kosovo's status as an autonomous province, Serbian officials at recent party meetings have implied that the relative independence enjoyed by Kosovo in recent years may have exceeded legal norms and contributed to the disorders. Serbian concerns appear to have been endorsed in a document issued at a League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) plenum on 7 May authorizing an examination of Serbian-Kosovo relations to see if they have conformed to the Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions.

The need to tighten coordination with--and presumably control over--Kosovo was underscored by numerous Serbian officials at Serbian and Yugoslav party plenums on 6 and 7 May, held immediately following the 5 May Kosovo plenum. Prominent Serbian leader Dragoslav Markovic, in a speech to the Serbian plenum, scored what he called a "wrong concept of autonomy" in Kosovo and appeared to accuse Kosovo of trying to usurp functions rightfully belonging to the Serbian Republic. Serbian party official Ivan Stambolic implied that the Serbian leadership was partly to blame, saying that it had tended to ignore Kosovo and failed to instill in it the belief that it was a constituent part of the republic. Serbian President Vidic, speaking at the LCY plenum, underscored the extent of Serbian backlash when he said there were pressures to abolish the status of autonomous province, but he called such views "unacceptable."

While there has been little reaction from Kosovo Albanian officials, some leaders from Vojvodina--which also has the status of autonomous province within the Serbian Republic--have expressed concern over Serbian assertiveness. Speaking at the LCY plenum, newly elected Vojvodina party chief Bosko Krunic warned about the danger of "centralism"--a codeword for Serbian domination--and cautioned that debates over provincial autonomy could become "unconstructive" and "escape control." Former Vojvodina party leader Dusan Alimpic, at the Serbian plenum, similarly warned that stress on Serbian "statehood" could incite countervailing pressures from the two provinces.* A Kosovo Serb official, speaking at the LCY plenum, seemed to discount fears in Kosovo about discussing this issue but also opposed a return to "old type" relations of Serbian dominance. Like a growing number of Serbian leaders, he expressed alarm about alleged continued harassment of Kosovo Serbs by the region's Albanian majority, warning that it encouraged them to leave the province.

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* Kosovo was incorrectly identified in the 6 May TRENDS, page 24, as the first Yugoslav region to implement rotational party leadership. Newly received information indicates that Vojvodina's election of Krunic for a one-year term came on 27 April, one week before Kosovo replaced its party chief.

BRIEF

U.S.-JAPAN SUMMIT: Moscow Denounces "Alliance"

Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's visit to the United States last week drew Soviet comment depicting Tokyo as a willing accessory to a Reagan Administration effort to forge a worldwide anti-Soviet alliance. Commentaries from PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and the official news agency TASS focused on what they portrayed as Tokyo's "full support" for Washington's global strategy, symbolized in Suzuki's "promise" to extend the geographic reach of Japan's military operations to free U.S. forces for deployment elsewhere. A 9 May TASS commentary alleged that the Reagan-Suzuki communique's description of the United States and Japan as "allies," far from being a "formal concession," placed U.S. ties with Japan "on the same footing" as relations within the NATO alliance. Soviet efforts to play up evidence of U.S.-Japanese collusion and to ignore continuing differences on economic and defense policy issues reflect the hard line Moscow has taken toward Japan since Tokyo curtailed bilateral ties in the wake of the December 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

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this issue includes . . .

- Zamyatin on U.S. confrontational policy
- Soviet concern over U.S. role in Lebanon
- Beijing on U.S. China Policy, Taiwan

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
5 April 1967 - six months prior to
current date

USSR - U.S.

ZAMYATIN SEES CLEAR U.S. POLICY SHIFT TOWARD CONFRONTATION

Leonid Zamyatin, head of the Central Committee's International Information Department, has come down strongly on the side of those Soviet officials who assert that the outlines of the Reagan Administration's policies are now sufficiently clear to draw some pessimistic conclusions. Accusing the Administration on a 16 May national television program of steering U.S. policy toward global confrontation with the USSR, Zamyatin seemed to see little room for meaningful bilateral dialogue in the foreseeable future. His message echoed the pessimistic portrayal of Reagan Administration intentions in Brezhnev's 9 May V-E Day speech in Kiev, but it sharply contradicted USA and Canada Institute director Georgiy Arbatov's recommendation in the 4 May PRAVDA that final judgment on the Administration be further deferred.

In his grim depiction of Reagan Administration foreign policy, Zamyatin argued that there was no longer any room for uncertainty about its basic direction. Acknowledging that Soviet commentators "have often said and are still saying" that it is too early to pass judgment, Zamyatin declared that he had "a different opinion." He insisted that his conclusions about U.S. policy were based on "more than just isolated statements by Administration representatives," and he pointed especially to what he termed a "completely finished document," the 5 May NATO foreign minister's communique.

The NATO document, statements by President Reagan, and remarks by national security adviser Richard Allen, Zamyatin said, reveal a policy that:

+ is leading to a "qualitatively new situation" of greater East-West confrontation;

+ has as its main precept opposition to the Soviet Union on a global scale;

+ rejects policies of detente and peaceful coexistence; and

+ manifests a "literally maniacal urge" for an arms race, casts aside the principle of equal security as a basis for arms control negotiations, and calls for achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union.

In the weeks preceding Brezhnev's Kiev address, there were apparent differences of opinion among Soviet foreign affairs specialists over the degree to which the Reagan Administration had formulated a policy approach toward the Soviet Union. Some treated the Administration pronouncements on Soviet policy as mere rhetoric and insisted that policy directions were still ill defined. By mid-April IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin, usually one of Moscow's more moderate foreign affairs commentators, seemed clearly to have rejected such an explanation of the situation. Bovin told the Soviet radio audience on 12 April that through the "muddle of contradictory statements" coming from the Administration, a "dangerous" turn toward confrontation with the Soviet Union was discernible.*

The more cautious approach advocated by Arbatov in the 4 May PRAVDA commentary reaffirmed a stand he had taken nearly two months earlier in a 9 March article in the party daily. Arbatov said that many of the new people in Washington seemed to be having difficulty making the switch "from election propaganda to practical politics," and he recommended that the question whether a coherent U.S. policy had yet been formulated "be left open" for now. In his Kiev address five days later, Brezhnev showed no hesitation in putting the Reagan Administration in the camp of those capitalist statesmen who "regard the attainment of military superiority over the Soviet Union as their main political credo" and place arms control at the bottom of their list of priorities.

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* Comments by Arbatov and Bovin are discussed in the TRENDS of 11 March 1981, pages 1-2; 22 April, pages 1-2; and 6 May, page 5.

USSR-MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW HINTS AT CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE SUCCESS OF U.S. MEDIATION

> Moscow's strong criticism of U.S. efforts to resolve the crisis over the emplacement of Syrian missiles in Lebanon suggests some apprehension that a tacit Syrian-Israeli agreement will lead to Soviet exclusion from Middle East peacemaking efforts. Placing the Lebanese problem in the context of the overall Arab-Israeli dispute, Moscow has emphasized President Brezhnev's February proposal for an international conference to seek a comprehensive Middle East settlement. Syria has given only tepid support to the Brezhnev proposal, and Moscow in turn has continued to withhold any mention of the Soviet-Syrian treaty in the context of the Lebanese situation.

U.S. ROLE Seeking to denigrate the efforts by U.S. Presidential envoy Habib to work out a solution, Moscow has branded his mission as open encouragement of Israel's "aggressive aspirations." In the most authoritative Soviet comment thus far, the head of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department, Leonid Zamyatin, on a Moscow television program on 16 May, criticized the Habib mission as supporting Israeli demands. Cautioning that the crisis could lead to an armed conflict in the region, Zamyatin offered no suggestions for resolving the issue other than to urge "patient settlement" of controversies through peaceful means. He pointedly went on to recall Soviet proposals for resolving various problems, including those in the Middle East.

In a similar vein, an article by Geyvandov in the 20 May PRAVDA, as reported by TASS, insisted that the Lebanese situation could not be resolved by force or by "backstage Camp David-type collusions." The only realistic alternative, he asserted, is to search for a peaceful, comprehensive settlement of the whole Middle East question. As if to suggest that Syria would reject any understanding with Israel, TASS on the 19th cited the Syrian ambassador in Budapest as denying "reports about some tacit agreement" between Syria and Israel over Lebanon in the past. TASS also attributed to the ambassador the statement that "under no American or Israeli pressure" would Syria withdraw its missiles from Lebanon, a remark which appeared to leave open the possibility of some face-saving solution.

SOVIET-SYRIAN RELATIONS

Moscow has supported Damascus in maintaining that the missiles are purely defensive and has replayed remarks by Syrian officials asserting that the missiles do not threaten Israeli security. Viewing the Syrian role in the broader Arab-Israeli controversy, a Demchenko article in PRAVDA on the 17th called Syria the main bulwark of the Arab forces opposing the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. It observed also that Damascus is "absolutely determined" to defend its course and to seek liberation of Syrian territory occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East.

Seeking to portray support for Brezhnev's Middle East conference proposal, PRAVDA on the 16th publicized a TASS account of Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's bland assurance that Syria welcomes the Soviet "initiatives" and will cooperate with "any" international movement advocating a peace based on the principle of justice. The account ignored Khaddam's claim of "firm" Soviet support and his remark that Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko's recent consultations in Damascus were conducted "within the framework" of the Soviet-Syrian treaty. According to a Beirut radio report on the 16th, Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon Soldatov responded to journalists' questions concerning the applicability of the treaty to the situation of the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon by saying: "We do not wish to talk about the treaty, especially since the recent developments are unrelated" to it. Soldatov went no further than to profess Soviet support for Syrian steps aimed at "stopping the battles in Lebanon and improving the situation."

USSR-CHINA

KOMMUNIST TAKES PESSIMISTIC LINE ON CHANGES IN CHINA

President Brezhnev's show of interest at the 26th CPSU Congress in the transformations inside China since Mao Zedong's death may be stimulating a new round in the debate among Soviet Sinologists over the policies of Mao's successors. A signed article in an April issue of the authoritative party theoretical journal KOMMUNIST strongly reaffirmed a pessimistic appraisal of the changes occurring in China, describing a shift to the right toward capitalism that could strengthen Beijing's ties to the West.

In Alma-Ata last August and again at the 26th congress in February, Brezhnev for the first time since Mao's death addressed the domestic policies pursued by China's current leadership. Brezhnev's assessment was guarded: he described the leadership as attempting to "overcome the Maoist legacy" and concluded that only time would show the "true essence" of the changes now taking place.

INTERPRETATION IN KOMMUNIST

Oleg Borisov's article in KOMMUNIST No. 6, 1981, showed no similar restraint in passing judgment on the Chinese leadership's domestic course. Quoting from Brezhnev's report, Borisov acknowledged that changes were occurring but asserted that they were clearly changes for the worse from the Soviet perspective. In both economics and politics, he maintained, "the Chinese leadership is swerving to the right." He portrayed Beijing as resorting to encouragement of private enterprise in an effort to overcome continuing economic problems. He also accused Beijing of describing China as a "state of new democracy," adding that this was a step backward from the pursuit of socialism, since it signaled the inclusion of "national bourgeoisie" along with workers and peasants among the leadership.

Borisov's pessimism about the outlook in Beijing extended to foreign policy. The current leadership, he claimed, shows no interest in improving Sino-Soviet relations. As evidence, he cited Deng Xiaoping's public statement in November 1980 that Sino-Soviet ties "will not change even after 10 or 20 years." Borisov concluded that the move to the right in domestic policy will facilitate Beijing's "virtual merger with the reactionary militaristic elements of imperialism."

OTHER VIEWPOINTS Other Soviet China specialists have continued to take a less pessimistic view of the situation in China. Fedor Burlatskiy, the head of a department at the Central Committee's Institute of Social Sciences, reaffirmed his more hopeful position in the 18 March issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. Burlatskiy again credited the Beijing leadership with searching for "more effective" economic and social policies, although he admitted the situation is still unstable. IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin, in several interviews with Japanese media during an April visit to Tokyo, repeated his view that "positive changes" are continuing in Chinese political, economic, ideological, and cultural life. In a 22 April interview with MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Bovin maintained that the changes in China's domestic policies should favorably affect its foreign policy by the mid-1980's.

BACKGROUND There is a long history of disagreement among Soviet Sinologists over how to interpret the domestic policies of Mao's successors.* Burlatskiy and Borisov published articles last year that revealed differences on one of the key theoretical issues involved in the debate--the nature of the Chinese socioeconomic system and its current evolution.

In the February 1980 issue of VOPROSY FILOSOFII (PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY), Burlatskiy distinguished three possible courses of Chinese development: gradual advancement toward scientific socialism, a restoration of capitalism, and "extended preservation" of the "existing forms"--which he described essentially as a primitive form of socialism. He discounted the first two alternatives as "highly unlikely" and argued that the "most probable" course of development was the third.

In the November 1980 party monthly PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN (PARTY LIFE), Borisov clearly challenged the notion that the "restoration of capitalism" can be discounted as a possible outcome. He pointed to "the activation of private enterprise, an active search for foreign capital, and the intensification of political and social differentiation" in China, and he warned that there was a danger of "a further shift to the right" in Beijing's policies.

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* For a review of Soviet academic and official comment on China's course since Mao's death, see the FBIS Analysis Report, FB 81-10016 of 8 May 1981, "Moscow Weighs Significance of Changes in China."

CHINESE LEADERSHIP REAFFIRMS HARDLINE ANTI-SOVIET STANCE

In recent weeks Beijing has publicly reasserted its hardline view that Moscow's foreign policies rule out the possibility of any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. It is not entirely clear what prompted the Chinese statements, but Beijing may have wanted to reassure Western governments of the constancy of its own policy toward the Soviet Union in order to encourage firm international opposition to Moscow.

Statements by high-level Chinese leaders in early April, reported by Beijing media, reiterated Chinese pessimism about the prospects for Sino-Soviet bilateral ties. On 1 April, for example, the PRC news agency XINHUA reported that PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua had told UK Foreign Minister Lord Carrington that "as long as the Soviet Union sticks to its hegemonist policy of aggression and expansion, China will not change her policy of opposing its hegemonism." On 6 April XINHUA cited a similar statement by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang, noting that he had offered his view while "dwelling on the Sino-Soviet relationship" during a meeting with a Japanese delegation.

Beijing's publicity for these remarks is unusual. Chinese leaders frequently comment on Sino-Soviet relations and their relevance to wider strategic concerns in private conversations with visiting foreign delegations, but their statements are not normally reported by Chinese media. Before April, none had been publicized since November last year.

Beijing's decision to publicize the remarks on Sino-Soviet relations may have been prompted by concern over the possible impact of Soviet peace initiatives raised at the February CPSU congress and by fears that the West is faltering in its opposition to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. The statements on Sino-Soviet relations were accompanied by strong admonitions about the necessity of maintaining international cooperation against the Soviet Union. For example, Zhao Ziyang, in his 6 April remarks, reportedly warned his Japanese guests that the United States, West Europe, and countries in the Asian-Pacific region "face a situation in which the Soviet Union is intensifying its aggression and expansion on a global scale" and therefore "should unite in a joint effort to contain the Soviet hegemonists."

PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping pressed a similar theme in meetings with visitors in April. According to XINHUA, he told Lord Carrington on 3 April that "Brezhnev talked a lot about detente at the 26th CPSU

Congress" but that it was "just words" and there has been "no change in Soviet global strategy." On 13 April XINHUA reported Deng telling visiting Swedish Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin that "people should not let their attention be diverted from Afghanistan and Kampuchea" by problems in other areas like Poland and that they should continue to "regard Afghanistan and Kampuchea as the frontline in the fight against hegemonism."

Beijing's clarification of its attitude toward Moscow may also be intended to ensure that other governments not misinterpret a recent modification in its dealings with the Soviets--the signing in late April of a new protocol on railway transit between the two countries. Beijing had similarly reaffirmed the constancy of its anti-Soviet foreign policy in the spring of 1980, when normal activity in Sino-Soviet relations--such as the dispatch of a new PRC ambassador to Moscow--had prompted speculation about a possible shift in Chinese policy.

The railroad agreement, signed by a "railway traffic committee" visiting the Soviet Union, resumes what had been a normal feature of Sino-Soviet intercourse in the early 1960's. The last known strictly bilateral protocol of this type reported by the media of either side was in 1963. In 1978 Beijing signed a multilateral railroad border transit agreement with the USSR, Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam, as it had done periodically before the Cultural Revolution.

CHINA-U.S.-TAIWAN

Beijing continues to be apprehensive that the evolution of Washington's China policy will lead to serious friction in U.S.-China relations and encourage Taipei to continue to reject PRC overtures to begin steps toward reunification. In the face of what it considers to be negative trends in both Washington and Taipei, Beijing nevertheless has officially reiterated the conciliatory Chinese approach to Taiwan initiated in January 1979 and has provided new indications of its willingness to be flexible in dealing with Taiwan authorities.

BEIJING REMAINS APPREHENSIVE OVER U.S. CHINA POLICY

The continued lack of authoritative comment and the relatively moderate tone of Chinese media reporting on Sino-U.S. relations suggest that Beijing wants to avoid clouding the atmosphere, especially before Secretary Haig's upcoming visit. Nevertheless, XINHUA reports on statements by high Administration officials, coupled with more explicit commentary in the Hong Kong communist press, have conveyed Beijing's warning that a reversal in Sino-U.S. relations is a real possibility if Washington upgrades its relations with Taipei and provides arms to Taiwan.

In recent weeks, Beijing's misgivings over U.S. policy have been aired in several XINHUA reports on statements by Administration officials which discussed U.S. commitments to Taiwan without referring to U.S. obligations incurred in the 1979 PRC-U.S. joint communique on normalization of relations. The most significant reaction was contained in a 12 May XINHUA dispatch from Washington criticizing Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese's remark that day that the United States would fully implement the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The report focused on his statement that U.S. Government offices would receive "official visitors" from Taiwan institutions and, even "more serious," according to XINHUA, that Washington is committed to the TRA's provision on arms sales to Taiwan.

While restrained in language and devoid of any threats, the XINHUA report took on a more ominous meaning when it appeared in the 14 May issue of RENMIN RIBAO enclosed in a box along with a report on the Netherlands' acceptance of Beijing's decision to downgrade Sino-Dutch relations to the charge d'affaires level, thus suggesting the gravity of trends in Sino-U.S. relations. The impact of this reporting was mitigated somewhat two days later, when RENMIN RIBAO ran a 14 May XINHUA report of the U.S. State Department spokesman's explanation that Mr. Meese's remarks did not imply an official relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Nevertheless, this second report repeated statements in the first report that Mr. Meese's remarks "run counter to the basic principles" of Sino-U.S. relations established in the 1979 communique and have "aroused serious concern among the Chinese people."

In earlier reports, XINHUA on 5 May accused Treasury Secretary Donald Regan of violating the terms of the 1979 communique by expressing support for Taiwan's reentry into the World Bank as a "separate nation." On 29 April the news agency criticized Secretary Weinberger for "stubbornly insisting on the so-called 'obligations to Taiwan'" in a speech given the previous day in San Francisco. On 24 April XINHUA reported without comment statements by Under Secretary of State Stoessel that U.S.-China relations "are governed by the terms of the joint communique" in recognition of the importance of China's global role and that, regarding Taiwan, the Administration intends to implement the TRA "faithfully."

Beijing clearly perceives these statements as symptomatic of the emergence, over the past six months, of a new international "adverse current" regarding Taiwan which finds its source in U.S. politics. A lengthy article in the May issue of CHINA RECONSTRUCTS--a monthly magazine designed for foreign readership--attributed the recurrence of a "new 'two Chinas' current" directly to the return to influence of the U.S. "Taiwan Lobby." Pointing out that the Reagan Administration has "only recently" declared its readiness to adhere to the 1979 PRC-U.S. Joint Communique, the article implied that Washington may be under the strong influence of the pro-Taiwan group. A 7 May report in the Hong Kong communist paper HSIN WAN PAO, in noting the role of several domestic pressure groups in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, suggested that the "Taiwan Lobby" may bring about a modification of U.S. China policy detrimental to Beijing. Both articles warned that "retrogression" will result from any attempt to pursue a "two Chinas" policy. The HSIN WAN PAO report pointed ominously to the downgrading of Sino-Dutch relations and explicitly stated that diplomatic relations with the United States would similarly suffer a "retrogression in essence" not just in "form."

Several articles in the Hong Kong communist press cited sources in Beijing expressing PRC concern over the potential impact of this trend in the United States both on Sino-U.S. relations and on Taipei's attitude toward PRC overtures. They suggested ominous parallels to the U.S. decision in the early 1950's to enforce Taiwan's separation from the mainland and recalled the 20 years of PRC-U.S. hostility that followed. For example, a TA KUNG PAO column by Shih Chun-yu, who in the past has seemed closely in touch with thinking in Beijing, criticized Taiwan authorities for "still pinning their hopes on foreign countries." Shih cited "departments concerned in Beijing" which had criticized the "'imaginings' of certain people in the U.S. Administration" who think "China will tacitly assent" to the sale of advanced fighters to Taiwan. He identified this view as a "'two-Chinas' trick" on the issue which "has always been key to changes in Sino-U.S. relations over the past 30 years." Even more explicitly, on 18 May HSIN WAN PAO likened current unofficial warnings by "some people in Beijing" that they will "not turn a blind eye" to U.S. actions regarding Taiwan to similar authoritative warnings from Beijing in 1951.

CCP REAFFIRMS TAIWAN POLICY DESPITE REJECTION BY KMT CONGRESS

Beijing has reacted in a low-key fashion to the highest level Kuomingtang (KMT) rejection to date of its January 1979 call for contacts and talks to begin the process of Taiwan's peaceful reunification with the mainland. The rejection was voiced in President Chiang Ching-kuo's address to the 12th KMT Congress on 5 April and in the congress manifesto of the same date. Beijing's most authoritative response came in a 25 April address by Tong Xiaopeng, deputy head of the CCP Central Committee's United Front Work Department--the organ responsible for CCP relations with other parties, foreign and domestic. Tong played down the importance of the KMT reaction and indicated that Beijing would continue to pursue efforts toward reaching an accommodation that would bring about reunification.

Speaking to a work conference of the PRC-based Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, Tong Xiaopeng stated optimistically that the prospects for peaceful reunification have actually become "more and more favorable" since the 1979 policy was announced. Tong did not revert to pre-1979 hints that Beijing may use force against Taipei or support a popular uprising against the KMT authorities but rather asserted that Beijing is "still" hopeful that Taiwan's "people and authorities" will eventually accept the inevitable "historical trend" favoring China's reunification.

Tong's statement represented the highest level reaffirmation of this approach since Ulanhu, CCP Politburo member and head of the CCP United Front Work Department, did so in mid-February 1980.

Lower level PRC reaction to the KMT congress fleshed out the appeal to KMT self-interest in maintaining its rule on the island which has been implicit from the beginning in the January 1979 offer to "respect the status quo" on Taiwan. A spokesman of the Central Committee of the KMT Revolutionary Committee (which broke off from the main body of the KMT after 1927 and is based in Beijing), in a statement to reporters broadcast to Taiwan on 23 April, lectured Chiang Ching-kuo for going "against the popular will," instead of recognizing that KMT interests and goals--as in the past--could be achieved only through cooperation with the CCP. Wang Kunlun, a vice chairman of the same leftwing KMT organ, in an article published in RENMIN RIBAO on 14 April, reiterated this implicit threat to the KMT's future and--for the first time in PRC national level media--provided details of the alternative Beijing has offered:

> The CCP has declared that it will respect the status quo on Taiwan, refrain from changing Taiwan's current systems, maintain the Taiwan people's current standard of living, allow the continuance of Taiwan's extensive and voluntary nongovernmental contacts with foreign countries, and offer the Taiwan authorities the right to have an army and the right to freely handle personnel matters according to their own judgment.

Those promises were first made by Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping in discussions with visiting U.S. officials in January 1979 but reported only in the foreign press. While Wang's statement of this "offer" is not itself authoritative, its publication in the official CCP organ indicates party approval.

SYMBOLS OF LEGITIMACY

Beijing has reinforced its offers of significant autonomy for Taiwan, after reunification, with new and important indications of its willingness to share the symbols of legitimacy with the KMT. Madame Soong Ching-ling, widow of KMT founder Sun Yat-sen, has been elected on her deathbed honorary chairman of the PRC by the National People's Congress. The decision was made on 16 May, following her 15 May admission into the CCP. While some purely domestic political considerations may have been involved in this decision, it has clear significance as a gesture to Taiwan authorities. Soong, as a top official of the leftwing KMT and Chiang Ching-Kuo's aunt, is the most important symbol of CCP-KMT ties. The wording of the resolution, as published by XINHUA, described Soong as a "beloved and respected" leader of "the Chinese people . . . including the Taiwan compatriots" and praised her for longtime contributions to national goals.

The announcement was followed on 19 May by XINHUA's report of the first meeting of a committee established last fall to prepare for a national celebration to mark the 70th anniversary of China's 1911 Revolution, led by Sun Yat-sen, which established the Republic of China. The anniversary, which falls on October 10, is observed annually in Taipei as national day. At the committee meeting, convened by Politburo member Deng Yingchao, the widow of the late Premier Zhou Enlai, "relevant persons from Taiwan and overseas" were invited to attend the celebrations intended to help in "promoting the return of Taiwan to the motherland."

These announcements seem designed to deliver the strong message that the CCP and KMT share a common origin in the fight against the dynastic system and foreign imperialism and share common national goals of independence and economic development. Beijing seems to be suggesting that the KMT can expect to be granted some real influence and authority if it cooperates in achieving these goals under CCP leadership.

DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS There are severe constraints on how far Beijing can go in concessions to KMT interests, particularly in the absence of any positive KMT response. Difficulties are also created by apparent concern on the part of at least some in the CCP leadership that dissemination of information about Taiwan, which has been allowed in China since early 1979, has contributed to a loss of confidence regarding the CCP and the communist system.

Evidence of such concern surfaced in a recently published speech, delivered in November 1980 to a party Discipline Inspection Commission forum. According to a report in the 10 April issue of the army paper, JIEFANGJUN BAO, the Commission's permanent secretary praised Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "three people's principles" (nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood) but cautioned that "these principles can in no way be compared with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought," which alone can "save China." He warned that "some people want to discard our invaluable treasure," and he asked rhetorically whether these people want to "call back Confucius or the three people's principles," which have been "proved by history to be out of date and impractical."

Wang Kunlun, in his 14 April RENMIN RIBAO article, also seemed to reflect concern about questions raised by KMT challenges to the CCP's legitimacy. He accused the KMT of betraying Sun Yat-sen's three principles and defended CCP efforts to achieve greater democracy, independence, and economic equality for China.

USSR-AFRICA

TREATY SIGNED, AID ISSUES SKIRTED DURING CONGO LEADER'S VISIT

Moscow used the 12-17 May visit of Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso to publicize its support for the aspirations of black Africa and conclude its fourth friendship treaty with an African country.* Soviet statements during the visit emphasized international and regional issues, giving scant attention to Moscow's relations with Brazzaville. The treaty signed on the 13th is notable for the vagueness of its commitments to mutual cooperation and the absence of any defense-related provisions.

President Brezhnev's 12 May Kremlin dinner speech and the joint communique released at the end of the visit were devoted almost entirely to international issues and to applauding the end of the Western colonial era. Brezhnev asserted that Africa's liberation had injected a "fresh and healthy spirit into world politics," and he warned routinely of Western efforts to turn Africa into "another region of military-political confrontation."

The communique, reported by TASS on 17 May, was even harsher about "imperialist" attempts to undermine the independence of developing countries, replaying propaganda themes that have received new life in Soviet media since the beginning of the Reagan Administration. Moscow's priorities seemed more evident than Brazzaville's in the communique's reference to the prevention of nuclear war and the restriction of armaments as the "most pressing" tasks now facing the USSR and Congo.

Soviet media devoted little attention to Soviet-Congolese relations during the visit. An agreement to strengthen ties between the CPSU and the Congolese Labor Party was reported by IZVESTIYA on 19 May, but Moscow announced no new agreements on economic or cultural cooperation. A 13 May TASS report characterized the overall atmosphere of the negotiations as "warm and friendly" but added that both parties have an established practice of "frank exchanges of opinion."

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* The USSR's current treaty partners in Africa are Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Earlier treaties with Egypt and Somalia were abrogated by those countries.

FRIENDSHIP TREATY The text of the 20-year "friendship and cooperation" treaty, published in PRAVDA on 14 May, provides for weaker Soviet ties with Congo than those established in comparable treaties with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. All four treaties bind the partners to "consult" with each other on international questions and "coordinate" their positions in the event of a threat to the peace. The Congo treaty, however, does not specify the issues on which the parties must consult--as the 1976 Angola treaty did--or the level of consultation--as both the Angola and 1977 Mozambique treaties did. The Congo-USSR treaty provides only in general fashion for cooperation on "political, economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technical" matters. Unlike each of the other three treaties, it refrains from any mention of military cooperation. Moreover, the document truncates a standard article in such treaties by omitting the prohibition against entering military "alliances" or any "grouping" of states directed against the other party. The formulation is confined to the customary pledge to refrain from "actions or measures" aimed against the other.

USSR

CHERNENKO CONTINUES TO SHOW STRENGTH IN POLITICAL STATUS

> Although there have been no dramatic changes in recent months affecting succession prospects, there have been indications that Central Committee Secretary Chernenko's status is high and continues to edge upward. Chernenko stood in fifth place in the leadership lineup at this year's May Day ceremonies--his highest ranking ever at a Red Square parade. Other recent firsts for Chernenko include his representation of the CPSU at the party congress of a ruling communist party in December, his delivery of the annual Lenin Day address on 22 April, and the publication of the first collection of his speeches, announced on 18 April.

Although Chernenko has ranked fifth in USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviet sessions since joining the Politburo in November 1978, he has always ranked in eighth place at May Day and 7 November parades, which are more widely recognized as reflecting the party pecking order. This year's May Day parade was the first such occasion where he has outranked the entire second-level Politburo group and stood next to--and perhaps as one of--the leadership's inner circle.

May 1979	November 1979	May 1980	November 1980	May 1981
1. Brezhnev	Brezhnev	Brezhnev	Brezhnev	Brezhnev
2. Kosygin	*	Kosygin	Tikhonov	Tikhonov
3. Suslov	Suslov	Suslov	Suslov	Suslov
4. Kirilenko	Kirilenko	Kirilenko	Kirilenko	Kirilenko
5. Grishin	Grishin	Grishin	Pelshe	Chernenko
6. Gromyko	Pelshe	**	Grishin	Grishin
7. Pelshe	Gromyko	Gromyko	Gromyko	Gromyko
8. Chernenko	Chernenko	Chernenko	Chernenko	**
9. Andropov	Andropov	Andropov	Andropov	Andropov
		Tikhonov	Gorbachev	Gorbachev

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* Kosygin was absent.
** Pelshe was absent.

The press of only one republic, Azerbaijan, carried pictures of Politburo portraits for May Day. The photo of the local reviewing stand in Baku included the portraits of Brezhnev and Tikhonov flanking the great seal, with Suslov and Chernenko flanking them, ranking the latter in fourth place. Azerbaijan has consistently ranked Chernenko in this position since November 1979, when he displaced Kirilenko.

The other recent honors for Chernenko--such as representing the CPSU at the Cuban party congress in December and the publication last month of his collected speeches--granted Chernenko most of the distinctions of high rank he still had lacked. The honor of heading a CPSU delegation to the congress of a ruling party has long been a special privilege limited to senior CPSU Secretaries Brezhnev, Suslov, and Kirilenko. Although the distinction has become less exclusive lately--Shcherbitskiy, a republic secretary rather than CPSU secretary, led the delegation to the late March-early April Bulgarian party congress--it still is an honor shared by few. Publication of collections of speeches, once limited to Brezhnev and other seniors, since 1978 has been extended to virtually all Politburo members. Chernenko, as a relative newcomer, had not previously received this honor, although he was partially compensated for this by the publication of several other books on special topics. With the publication of the Chernenko volume, the newly elected Gorbachev is the only Politburo member without a published collection of speeches.

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Polish harassment of Soviet forces
- Warsaw debate on party reforms
- Moscow on European strategic arms

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

POLAND

WARSAW CONDEMNS, MOSCOW IGNORES "INSULTS" TO SOVIET TROOPS

The Polish regime's efforts to maintain credibility with its Soviet bloc allies have been increasingly strained in recent weeks by repeated incidents of public disorder. Warsaw has reacted in a series of public condemnations, including a Council of Ministers statement denouncing public demonstrations against the presence of Soviet troops. Moscow so far has not reported the anti-Soviet incidents, although it and its East European allies have expressed growing consternation over the Polish security situation.

Warsaw's unprecedented acknowledgment that Polish citizens have demonstrated open hostility to Soviet troops in the country was contained in a 25 May Council of Ministers statement. Initial broadcast versions of the statement described the unspecified incidents as "attacks" (ataki) on Soviet troops, but subsequent versions softened the term to "insults" (zniewazenia). The only specific action thus far mentioned by the Polish media was the desecration of a Soviet war memorial in Przemysl. The statement defended the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in the country on the basis of the 1957 status of forces agreement and on general considerations of national self-interest. It called on the public to avoid actions that would demean Poland's dignity and weaken its international position, and it vowed the necessary "measures to protect and observe the allied obligations."

The Council of Ministers statement is the latest in a series of official pronouncements on the civil disorder since 8 May, when a mob set fire to a militia headquarters in Otwock and forced the release of two prisoners. TRYBUNA LUDU and ZYCIE WARSZAWY promptly denounced the "lawlessness"; and Premier Jaruzelski voiced his denunciation on the 14th, and PZPR First Secretary Kania did the same two days later. Subsequently, the PZPR Politburo on the 20th, in noting a 26-percent rise in crime during the first four months of the year, cited "more and more frequent" cases of interference with police in the performance of their duties. The next day, a session of the Council of State, after having heard reports on the crime situation by the prosecutor general and minister of internal affairs, termed the situation "highly alarming" and a threat to the "functioning of the state." PZPR Politburo member and Secretary Olszowski, speaking to local party activists on the 22d, announced that "mixed army-police patrols" would be instituted to cope with the growing incidents of crime and interference with law enforcement authorities.

SOVIET BLOC REACTION Moscow so far has not mentioned the anti-Soviet incidents, but it has voiced concern over the growing challenge to the Polish security forces. A Moscow radio broadcast to Poland on the 26th, noting the Council of Ministers session, ignored the issue of the treatment of Soviet troops but expressed concern over the "wide scale and scope" of "criminality" and "hooliganism" in Poland, including assaults on militia units. Unlike Warsaw, it said that these assaults were inspired by local Solidarity organizations.

Some of Moscow's East European allies have been more vocal about the anti-Soviet incidents and Polish security problems. Prague reported the insulting of Soviet soldiers and Budapest the defilement of the war memorial. East Berlin expressed particular alarm over the security situation in a 21 May NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article, which bluntly stated that "it is only to be hoped that the government will draw the correct conclusions and protect the police and security authorities from unjustified attacks." The article added that "quite different and much more decisive measures than those already taken are required" to stabilize the country.

PARTY LEADERS SPLIT OVER ISSUE OF "HORIZONTAL" ORGANIZATIONS

The movement to bypass regular party organizations by creating associations of local party units independent of higher control--the "horizontal" ties movement--has produced a serious split among Polish party leaders. The movement, which held a national conference in Torun on 15 April, enjoys considerable support from reformers in liberal regional organizations such as those in Gdansk and Krakow and from moderates in the central party leadership, especially within the Central Committee's Organizational Department. The split became obvious at the 29-30 April Central Committee plenum, where liberals argued that the horizontal movement was a healthy phenomenon that can be used to rebuild confidence in the party, and where conservatives assailed it as violating party statutes and threatening party unity.

The horizontal movement emerged last fall, when party organizations at several big factories, clearly dissatisfied with the slow pace of reform through regular party channels, got together to create their own party units at the local level--party structures not provided for in the party statute--in order to promote change in the party program and party leadership. Founded in September by a Torun factory party committee headed by Zbigniew Iwanow, the movement matured enough by the end of October to establish a "consultative commission" embracing the eight biggest party organizations in Torun. Similar consultative commissions soon sprang up in Gdansk, Krakow, and other provinces. Central and local party officials, alarmed by what they called the "Torun infection," assailed the movement for posing a threat to the traditional vertical organization of the party. Iwanow was expelled from the party but subsequently was reinstated by his local party organization. (According to Central Committee Secretary Stefan Olszowski in the 6 April SZTANDAR MLODYCH, Iwanow has appealed his expulsion to the upcoming congress for decision.) At the December plenum, First Secretary Kania added his voice to the resistance, criticizing such "nonstatutory organizational structures" for fostering factions and dissent.

The fortunes of the horizontal movement began to change when important officials of the Central Committee let it be known in late November that the Organizational Department regarded the new movement positively. Deputy head of the department Ryszard Lukasiewicz, speaking at the April 1981 plenum, said that at the end of November his department had sent an analysis of the movement to the Politburo and provincial party committees describing its origins and leaders sympathetically. Proof that the movement enjoyed influential support was provided in early April, when, according to the 25 April POLITYKA, representatives of the Torun commission were informed that Central Committee officials would attend the big 15 April national conference. POLITYKA declared that this amounted to official "recognition."

When the 1,000 representatives gathered for the Torun "forum" on 15 April, according to POLITYKA, the Central Committee's Organizational Department not only sent representatives but even helped with funding. Although participants voiced harsh criticisms of the party leadership and advanced radical proposals, Lukasiewicz and former Politburo member Andrzej Werblan, now director of the Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism, both addressed the forum. At a press conference, Lukasiewicz said the Organizational Department and Central Committee Secretary Zdzislaw Kurowski--who supervises organizational matters--supported the forum. Torun Province First Secretary Zygmunt Najdowski, whose party organization was reported in the 16 March GAZETA POMORSKA as having denounced the Torun commission for claiming "a monopoly on renewal," also attended and praised the movement. A second national conference was called for May, to be hosted by the radical Gdansk shipyards party organization and the Gdansk consultative commission, which itself has been repeatedly accused of heresy.

While arguments for working with rather than against the horizontal organizations appear to be gaining in the leadership, there is still strong opposition. A top-level debate over the structures apparently erupted at the late March Central Committee plenum. Conservative Central Committee Secretary Tadeusz Grabski, indicating his disapproval, assailed Werblan for his recent statements backing new party "structures not always in accord with the statute" of the party. Werblan struck back at Grabski, defending his support for such structures. Reform-minded Krakow First Secretary Krystyn Dabrowa, himself head of the Central Committee's Organizational Department until early 1980, cautioned against attacks on such structures and urged leaders to build ties to the new units. Grabski expanded his attack at a 11 April local election conference in Krakow. According to the 14 April GAZETA KRAKOWSKA, he denounced efforts to promote horizontal structures and refusal of these units to recognize the legitimate authority of higher party organizations as "factionalism."

The controversy escalated following the April Torun forum, and the disagreement over horizontal structures became the hottest issue at the late April Central Committee plenum. Supporters of the movement aggravated the issue by sending observers to the plenum, who were then barred from the session by a Politburo decision.* At the plenum itself, horizontal structures were defended by Bialystok First Secretary Stefan Zawodzinski (a former subordinate of Kurowski), Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski (whose paper POLITYKA has presented the Torun movement sympathetically), Gdansk shipyards party secretary Jan Labecki, Werblan, Lukasiewicz, and Legnica worker Genowefa Maciejewska. Worker Zygmunt Wronski, promoted to Politburo member at the end of the plenum, went so far as to urge that the representatives of horizontal organizations be admitted as observers. Meanwhile, conservative writer Jerzy Putrament assailed Werblan for speaking at the Torun forum, Central Auditing Commission member Kazimierz Kakol declared it was wrong for high party representatives to address the forum and condemned the Torun organization because it was headed by someone expelled from the party, and worker Halina Zielinska declared horizontal structures "dangerous" to party unity.

The top leaders' position on the issue at present is undefined. Kania, in his opening report to the April plenum, praised the development of "various discussion commissions and groups" for "enlivening" the party but cautioned that such activity must not undermine traditional party structures. In his closing speech, he noted that differing views on the "grass-roots" movement had been expressed at the plenum but failed to give his own opinion, observing lamely that "it is not easy to speak on these matters."

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* The observers were informed of this decision on 29 April. The radio on the same day reported that the Torun consultative commission had protested the exclusion and that the home party organization of Torun First Secretary Najdowski had sent him a telex "instructing" him to formally propose to the plenum the admission of the observers.

NATO MODERNIZATION

USSR WARNS OF COUNTERMEASURES, REVISES ESTIMATE OF NATO ARMS

Moscow continues to stress the role of Western public opinion as well as early negotiations with Washington in its efforts to avert the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. In recent public statements, President Brezhnev has taken note of public resistance in Europe to the new missiles as he has warned bluntly of Soviet retaliatory measures in the event they are deployed. At the same time, preparations for practical negotiations on theater nuclear forces (TNF) may lie behind recent statements by Soviet spokesmen that appear to lower from 1,500 to just under 1,000 the number of Western systems Moscow insists are candidates for limitation.

In the wake of the 4-5 May NATO foreign ministers meeting in Rome, Soviet President Brezhnev has voiced a pessimistic assessment of the Reagan Administration's attitude toward East-West arms dialogue and responded with warnings of Soviet countermeasures to new arms deployments by the West. Speaking in broad terms in Kiev on 9 May and in greater detail in Tbilisi on the 22d, Brezhnev declared Moscow "ready" for talks to lower the level of medium-range strategic weapons in Europe but claimed to see NATO resistance to talks despite European public opposition to the U.S. missiles. In Tbilisi, Brezhnev charged that NATO's plan to deploy U.S. missiles was changing the situation in Europe "for the worse" and cautioned:

> In this case we will have to think about extra defense measures. If necessary, we shall find impressive means to safeguard our vital interests. And then the NATO planners should not complain.

Brezhnev's warnings renew the underlying emphasis on prospective countermeasures that has been present along with proposals for negotiations in Moscow's response to NATO's missile plan since the fall of 1979. During the intense Soviet lobbying effort against the plan in 1979, regime spokesmen emphasized that there would be a Soviet counteraction but were consistently ambiguous regarding details. A recent TASS commentary pegged to the Rome

NATO meeting included a similarly vague warning that the Soviet SS-20's now being deployed against West Europe "are not the limit of the USSR's technical possibilities."

ESTIMATE OF NATO SYSTEMS

Despite complaints that the West is not serious about TNF talks, Moscow appears to be preparing the groundwork for renewed negotiations. Since the 26th CPSU Congress in February and March, Soviet officials have alluded to a comprehensive study of the European military balance by Soviet "experts"--a study that may have been prompted by the results of the preliminary U.S.-Soviet discussions on TNF last fall. An authoritative "I. Aleksandrov" article in the 24 March PRAVDA said that specialists from the USSR Ministry of Defense had recently studied "all components" of the forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO military organizations and concluded that an equilibrium "continues to exist."

More recently, in a 16 May Soviet national television program, Central Committee International Information Department Chief Leonid Zamyatin seemed to be referring to the same or a similar study in offering what appeared to be a new set of Soviet figures for NATO medium-range systems subject to negotiation at the TNF talks. He asserted that his figures on the European balance were "authoritative" and came from "our military specialists."

Zamyatin reiterated Moscow's standard position that American forward-based systems in Europe should be included in any negotiations affecting the European medium-range balance and offered numbers to support Moscow's claim that Soviet and NATO medium-range capabilities are now "approximately equal." The "aggregate quantity of [NATO] means for delivering medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe," Zamyatin said, "amounts to 987 units, which corresponds approximately with the quantity available to the Soviet Union." If the United States deploys another 600 Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles, he said, U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union would be "approximately one and a half times."

Zamyatin did not offer a breakdown of the 987 figure into specific categories, but he did stress that the French strategic capability was included in the computation for the West and that "aircraft"--presumably the Backfire bomber--were included for the Soviet Union. Since Zamyatin's television appearance, other commentators have begun to use the new figures.

Zamyatin's calculations appear to differ in at least two respects from Soviet portrayals of the theater balance offered since the fall of 1979:*

+ Overall numbers. Moscow in 1979 claimed that there were 1,200 U.S. forward-based strategic systems alone in Europe, along with 300 British and French systems, amounting to a total of 1,500.

+ French, UK Systems. Moscow's earlier calculations appeared to distinguish between U.S. systems, which would be subject to immediate negotiations, and allied systems, which would be addressed at a "later" date. Zamyatin's discussion appeared to include the allied systems as an integral aspect of the balance.

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* Moscow's public statements on the European balance in the fall of 1979 and early 1980 are reviewed in the FBIS Special Memorandum FB 80-10029 of 13 August 1980, "Soviet Public Statements on U.S. Forward-Based Systems Since the June 1979 Vienna Summit."

CHINA-INDOCHINA

BEIJING, HANOI EXCHANGE CHARGES ABOUT CLASHES ON BORDER

> It is unclear what circumstances and motivations underlie the recent exchange of formal protests between Beijing and Hanoi over clashes along their border. Beijing was first to increase its attention to the border situation, but Hanoi seemed to welcome the opportunity to react quickly with its own media campaign. Each side charged that the other recently intensified military provocations to abet strategic goals in all of Southeast Asia. Beijing was late in leveling this charge, however, suggesting that the Chinese complaints were prompted by genuine concern about the deteriorating border situation and were not initially intended to serve the broader purpose of undermining Hanoi's relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors.

CHINESE PROTESTS Beijing's protests to Hanoi came in two PRC Foreign Ministry notes, one issued on 5 May to denounce alleged SRV violations since the beginning of this year and the other on 16 May to protest further Vietnamese violations since the note of the 5th. The two notes, China's first representations to Hanoi on the border issue since December last year, duplicated the level of authority and tenor of all previous Chinese protests to the Vietnamese since the 1979 punitive strike against northern Vietnam. The Foreign Ministry note of the 5th omitted the previously standard assertion that Hanoi must be held "totally responsible for all the consequences" arising from the incidents and instead posited Beijing's right to "demand compensation for all losses" incurred; but the note of the 16th restored the standard formula.

The two Chinese protests appear to be part of a calculated effort on Beijing's part to refocus attention on the Sino-Vietnamese border following a long period of media silence. Since the last Chinese protest to Hanoi in December, Chinese media are known to have carried only a single, brief XINHUA report, last March, on SRV violations of the border. This pattern was broken in the last week of April:

+ On 27 April XINHUA issued a report on Vietnamese border violations for the 10-day period of mid-April, followed by a report on the 10-day period at the end of April, released on 4 May. Ten-day surveys of alleged SRV violations of the border had been a standard feature in Chinese media until the Sino-Vietnamese bilateral negotiations closed in March 1980 but appeared only rarely thereafter.

- On 5 May the first Foreign Ministry note was publicized; it alleged there had been 241 Vietnamese violations since the beginning of this year, even though Beijing is not known to have reported any Vietnamese violations previously, except for the single XINHUA report in March.

- Since the 5th, XINHUA has issued frequent dispatches on new violations, including a report on the 7th that Chinese frontier guards had "annihilated" an invading force of 100 Vietnamese troops on the Yunnan-Vietnam border.

- The second Foreign Ministry note, on 16 May, protested various border incidents previously reported by XINHUA since the 5th. XINHUA carried another report on alleged Vietnamese violations on the 18th, and the same day, three weeks after Chinese media had begun to focus on the border, RENMIN RIBAO offered Beijing's first authoritative press commentary on the border tensions in a Commentator article, the first to address tensions on the Sino-Vietnamese border since the close of the Sino-Vietnamese talks last year.

VIETNAMESE PROTESTS

Hanoi departed from a previously well established pattern of low-key media attention to the border only after Beijing had made its first formal protest on 5 May, after which Vietnamese reporting escalated rapidly. Before the 5th, Vietnamese reporting on PRC border violations this year had been confined to VNA reports approximately every two weeks, and a communique issued in March by the SRV Committee to Investigate PRC War Crimes summarizing Chinese violations over the preceding three months. Hanoi's last formal protest over Chinese violations was an SRV Foreign Ministry note conveyed to the Chinese in November last year. Once China protested alleged Vietnamese violations on the 5th, however, Hanoi responded promptly and in kind:

- An SRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and a Foreign Ministry note, both publicized by VNA on the 6th, explicitly rebutted Beijing's protest of the previous day and cited a series of Chinese provocations on the border. Hanoi had not issued both a Foreign Ministry note and a spokesman's statement since March 1979.

- Hanoi media immediately began to carry reports more frequently on new Chinese provocations, and on the 7th the Vietnamese Communist Party paper, NHAN DAN, published its first commentary on the new border tensions.

- On 17 May the SRV Foreign Ministry released a second note, which explicitly rebutted the charges contained in the Chinese protest the day before. Hanoi media have continued to report new incidents on the border.

MOTIVATIONS Commentary on the border situation by each side has charged the other with stirring up new tensions to advance its expansionist goals throughout Southeast Asia:

+ RENMIN RIBAO's 18 May Commentator article asserted that Hanoi's provocations on the border were "by no means fortuitous and isolated incidents" but rather "a component of a well thought out Vietnamese plot to perpetuate its occupation of Kampuchea." It maintained that the incidents complemented new Hanoi efforts to paint a "Chinese threat" to Southeast Asia, to reinforce its military preparedness along the Kampuchean and Lao borders with Thailand, and to coordinate diplomatic activities with Moscow in the region. The article charged that Hanoi was attempting by such means to pressure the ASEAN states to drop attempts to implement the UN resolution calling for an international conference on Kampuchea in favor of Hanoi's own scheme for a regional conference legitimizing Vietnamese control in Phnom Penh. A 24 May Commentator article in the army paper JIEFANGJUN BAO leveled similar charges and sharply warned that Vietnamese authorities "must immediately stop their infringement of our territory and all their armed provocations. Otherwise, they will have to eat their own bitter fruit."

+ Hanoi similarly linked alleged Chinese provocations on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier to larger Beijing designs in the region. Both of the SRV Foreign Ministry notes maintained that the border incidents were intended by Beijing to complement other efforts to pressure the three Indochinese countries. Citing evidence of such pressure, the notes called attention to Beijing's refusal to reopen the Sino-Vietnamese talks or negotiate nonaggression treaties with Indochinese countries and to a PRC threat, purportedly conveyed by a high-ranking Chinese leader last month, of a "second lesson" against Vietnam. Like earlier comment, the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 18th linked Beijing's new provocations to its "intense diplomatic efforts" to promote an international conference on Kampuchea and its attempts to promote and arm resistance movements in Kampuchea and Laos.

Beijing has a demonstrable record of calling attention to clashes on the Sino-Vietnamese border to arouse international opposition to Hanoi's actions in Southeast Asia. This pattern was clear last year, when Beijing's two formal protests on the border linked Hanoi's actions, in the summer, to the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand and, in the fall, to the UN General Assembly debate on Kampuchea. The current Chinese attention to the border similarly may be calculated to blacken Hanoi's image and buttress China's statements of support for opposition to Vietnam in advance of ASEAN consultations next month. However, the evidence is not as clear as before. Neither of the recent PRC Foreign Ministry notes raised questions about Hanoi's larger regional intentions. The issues were linked only belatedly in the RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article on the 18th.

LAOS Evidently to complement Hanoi's assertions of a Chinese threat to Indochina and the region, Vientiane has alleged Chinese provocations on the Sino-Lao border. In a 14 May Lao Foreign Ministry aide-memoire, its first formal protest on the border situation since March 1979, Vientiane followed Hanoi's lead and charged that the provocations were related to Beijing's schemes to alter the situation in Kampuchea.

In reaction to Vientiane's allegations, Beijing on 20 May, apparently for the first time, accused Hanoi of violating the Lao-Chinese border. A XINHUA dispatch charged that "a group of Vietnamese armed personnel disguised as Lao soldiers" had intruded into Yunnan on the 18th and had been repelled by PRC border defense units. According to XINHUA, VPA units in Laos have "repeatedly carried out armed provocations" against the Chinese border in the past and have "stepped up" their activities since the beginning of this month.

PHNOM PENH Phnom Penh has also increased criticism of China, airing a flurry of reports accusing Beijing of shipping arms to the anti-Phnom Penh forces of Son Sann in late April and warning Thailand of the dangers of collusion with China. Although Hanoi and Vientiane both promptly took note of the reports of the Chinese arms supply to Son Sann, Phnom Penh ignored the issue until 10 May. A 16 May Phnom Penh radio commentary went beyond Kampuchea's stock warning that it would counter any acts violating Kampuchea's security and territorial integrity and implicitly warned that Thai complicity with China in supporting anti-Phnom Penh elements could prompt another cross-border incursion like the one last June. The commentary cautioned Thailand to remember that "when the time comes," Phnom Penh will crush the anti-Heng Samrin forces "at the root--where they are now hiding."

Phnom Penh first used language like this at the Indochinese foreign ministers conference last July, in an apparent attempt to justify its June incursion into Thailand. Since July Phnom Penh has used this warning twice, in August and in October, when a Phnom Penh radio commentary suggested that a preemptive strike against the anti-Phnom Penh forces in Thailand might be necessary to prevent future danger to Kampuchea. Consistent with past practice, Hanoi has not aired such explicit warnings about the possibility of another incursion, choosing instead to allow Phnom Penh once again to take the lead in warning Thailand.

USSR-MIDDLE EAST

BREZHNEV PRESSES CONFERENCE PROPOSAL DURING HUSAYN VISIT

Despite differences on various issues, Soviet President Brezhnev did gain qualified support from Jordanian King Husayn for an international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Reports on Husayn's visit to Moscow indicate that he did not back the Soviet proposal on the Persian Gulf, on which the two sides clearly had differing views; and Brezhnev's suggestion for resolving the Afghan situation was not mentioned publicly. Positions on Lebanon also differed: Brezhnev pledged support for the Syrian role, while Husayn avoided any mention of it.

MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE Brezhnev, in his dinner speech during Husayn's 26-27 May visit in Moscow, offered no further specifics on his February 1981 suggestion for an international conference on the Middle East. But by referring twice to "new" collective efforts and "new" talks, he suggested that he did not envisage a return to the short-lived Geneva forum that Moscow was still advocating at the time of Husayn's last visit in June 1976. Denying any Soviet "competition" with the United States in the region, Brezhnev asserted that the USSR does not claim any rights to Middle East resources or set itself up as "self-styled guardian" of countries of the area.

He declared that the Soviet Union wanted good relations with all countries in the Middle East and again suggested Soviet willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Israel "if it abandons the policy of seizing other people's lands." Brezhnev had earlier opened the door to restoration of relations with Israel, remarking in his 25th CPSU Congress speech, in February 1976, that the USSR favored the creation of conditions for development of relations with "all countries" in the Middle East and did not "have any prejudices against any of them."

TASS' selective account of Husayn's banquet speech represented the king as wholeheartedly endorsing the conference idea by omitting his qualifying remark that Jordan supports "every good call and initiative" aimed at reaching a Middle East settlement. Husayn's position is consistent with previous official Jordanian statements and press comment welcoming the Soviet or "any move" toward achieving a comprehensive peace. Husayn has been on record since at least 1977 as favoring Soviet participation in the peace process. In interviews this spring. he stressed the importance of a Soviet role and at the same time balanced approval of the Soviet plan with endorsement of a "European initiative."

LEBANON Soviet media treatment of Husayn's visit suggested substantial Soviet-Jordanian differences over the Syrian role in Lebanon--a reversal of their positions since the king's last visit in 1976, when Jordan was explicitly supportive of Syria's military intervention and the USSR was implicitly critical, deploring the damage to Arab unity. A TASS account of the initial round of current talks on the 26th indicated that Brezhnev had lectured Husayn on the "particular importance" of Arab unity, unsuccessfully seeking a softening in Amman's present hostility toward Damascus. TASS failed to mention Husayn's call in his dinner speech for a "Lebanese-Lebanese dialogue and a Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue"--he made no reference to Syria--to build up Lebanon's strength. In the communique, as reported by TASS, "it was stressed" that the USSR--but clearly not Jordan--would continue "firmly supporting Syria in its opposition to the Israeli aggression." The Soviet Union, the communique said, also intends to continue its support for the "legitimate Lebanese authorities" and the "pan-Arab peacekeeping forces" in Lebanon and to work for national concord in that country.

PERSIAN GULF, AFGHANISTAN In his banquet speech, Brezhnev recalled the whole "package of new constructive proposals" recently put forth by the Soviet Union but did not again discuss the Gulf and Afghan suggestions, as he had done in his speech in Tbilisi on 22 May. The Soviet-Jordanian communique, as reported by TASS on the 27th, registered support for two components of Brezhnev's Persian Gulf proposal without identifying them as such: opposition to foreign military bases in the area and to "any forms of interference from outside" in the affairs of Gulf states.

Moscow again indicated its suspicions of the Gulf Coordination Council when TASS failed to report Husayn's expression of support for the organization, just as it deleted remarks on the council from the speech by the visiting Kuwaiti foreign minister last month. (TASS suggested continuing Soviet skepticism about the council in a 27 May report on the first meeting of the group's "Supreme Council," implying that the organization would be subjected to U.S. influence through "its agents, the reactionary

Sultan Qabus of Oman, for one.") As for the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, Moscow found Husayn's remarks too sensitive for its professed neutrality and edited out his firm declaration of support for Iraq's "legitimate struggle to repulse Iran's aggression."

There was no indication that Brezhnev during the talks advanced his ideas on Afghanistan, which he had expounded at some length in his Tbilisi speech. In that speech Brezhnev repeated his call for an international political settlement to end the "undeclared war" and to provide "dependable guarantees" of noninterference. Brezhnev suggested, much as he had done in a May 1980 speech, that Soviet troops "could be withdrawn step by step"--in agreement with the Afghans--as such international agreements were "translated into reality." Although he did not mention the 14 May 1980 Afghan Government peace proposals--the subject of extensive Soviet comment on their first anniversary--Brezhnev's remarks in Tbilisi were entirely consistent with them.

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Polish plenum discussion of CPSU letter
- Reformist trend in Polish local elections
- Soviet reaction to Israeli attack on Iraq

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
                current date

POLAND-USSR

Polish leader Kania appears intent on continuing his increasingly precarious balancing act between growing Soviet pressures for orthodoxy and Polish party pressures for reform. In his keynote speech to the 11th PZPR plenum on 9 June, Kania accepted the main criticisms of a 5 June CPSU Central Committee letter to the Polish party while at the same time indicating his determination to continue the main directions of the PZPR's reformist course. The plenum is still in progress at this writing, and it is not yet known whether there will be changes in the party leadership.

The Soviet letter represents a major escalation in Moscow's warnings to the Polish regime but still appears to allow it time to bring the situation under control. The letter was apparently prompted in large part by Moscow's concern that the trends in local Polish elections foreshadow a takeover of the party by reformist elements--a concern that seems amply justified by election results thus far available.

KANIA ACCEPTS SOVIET LETTER, VOWS REFORM IN PLENUM SPEECH

SOVIET LETTER

The CPSU letter, broadcast by Warsaw on the 10th but not so far by Moscow, presents a bleak Soviet assessment of the current situation in Poland, stressing runaway party reform, lack of control over the media, threats to security services, and demonstrations of anti-Sovietism. As reported by Warsaw radio, the letter declares that "we cannot remain unconcerned about the mortal danger which now looms over the Polish people's revolutionary achievements." Poland's "enemies" have been "gaining control of one position after another," according to the letter, and now pose a threat to the "very existence of an independent Polish state." It says that Kania and Premier Jaruzelski have expressed agreement with Soviet concerns but that "no modifications have been made to the policy of concession and compromise." It expresses particular concern about "horizontal" party ties and the election of "opportunist" delegates to the July party congress, warning that there may be an attempt at the congress to "deal a decisive blow to the Marxist-Leninist forces." The letter ends on a note of tentative optimism, saying that "the party can and should find within itself the forces to reverse the course of events" but that this requires strengthening the will of the party--including "its leadership"--and mobilizing all "healthy forces."

The Soviet letter recalls a similar letter from the "Warsaw Five" leaders to the Czechoslovak party released on 17 July 1968, one month before the Warsaw Pact intervention. The "Warsaw Five" letter also expressed concern over efforts by "antisocialist" forces to gain control over the main levers of power in Czechoslovakia but was even more belligerent in tone, particularly in repeated efforts to justify a Soviet bloc interest in Czechoslovakia. While the recent letter notes at one point that the Polish situation threatens the socialist countries' joint security, the "Warsaw Five" letter served notice that "this is no longer your affair alone" but that of all of Czechoslovakia's allies and declared that the treaties with Czechoslovakia are based on "joint endeavors to defend socialism." The 1968 letter was also more blunt in stating that "the party is losing control" and announcing the situation was "completely unacceptable."

Some of the main themes of the CPSU's letter to the Polish party--its criticism of Polish party bodies, the mass media, and anti-Sovietism--appeared in Moscow media reports on Poland at about the time the letter was sent. A 5 June TASS dispatch, carried in PRAVDA the next day, criticized "the leadership of some party organizations" and "a number of mass media bodies" for their attacks on the mid-May hardline Katowice party forum declaration, a document the report described as "principled" and "Marxist-Leninist." It implicated party organizations at plants in Gdansk, Gdynia, Opole, and Wroclaw as well as some unspecified newspapers which "have long been attacking the PZPR from revisionist positions." Moscow also echoed warnings in the letter about "concessions" to antisocialists in a 6 June PRAVDA report on the release of dissident Moczulski. PRAVDA demonstrated growing concern over anti-Sovietism in Poland in a 4 June report on a bilateral friendship society meeting, in a replay of a hardline Bulgarian article on the 5th, and in the 6 June report on the Katowice forum.

KANIA SPEECH Apparently shaken by the severity of the Soviet letter, Kania seemed less wholehearted in his commitment to reform than in his last plenum report at the end of April, when he expressed strong agreement with the grassroots program for democratization taking place in the party. The breakdown of law and order--including anti-Soviet incidents--which had moved into the forefront of regime concern since the April plenum presumably accounts for Kania's more sober mood. He conceded that the Soviets were "fully justified" in expressing their concern over the development of events in Poland. He also conceded that the country's media were getting out of control, as the Soviets had charged. He also expressed agreement with the Soviet letter's portrayal of the Polish party as torn by divisions. Finally, he was at best lukewarm in defending the new "horizontal" party structures, warning that they should not be allowed to undermine the party's ideological and organizational principles.

Despite Kania's acceptance of the main Soviet criticisms, he insisted his regime's commitment to socialist renewal remained firm. This commitment, he promised, was not short term or tactical but a permanent policy, and he called on "realistic" forces in Solidarity and on the Catholic Church to join in this undertaking. In his most specific commitment in support of this promise, he declared that the scheduled mid-July timetable for the congress would be adhered to, a point of major symbolic significance since the congress is apparently recognized by all sides as a point of no return in the development of the Polish situation.

LOCAL ELECTIONS FORECAST MAJOR CHANGE IN PARTY LEADERSHIP

The results of local elections completed by the end of May furnish eloquent confirmation of the Soviet Central Committee's complaint that "antisocialist forces are setting the tone of the electoral campaign" for the party congress. The election results indicate widespread replacement of leaders at the local level and the choice of delegates to the July national congress who are eager to fight for reform and for top-level leadership changes. Further, there are signs that some delegates are organizing into blocs in order to oppose the Politburo more effectively both on policy matters and in election of leaders.

HEAVY TURNOVER By the end of May most primary party organizations, and factory and city party organizations had held their conferences, electing new local leaders and delegates to provincial conferences and, in some cases, to the national party congress.*

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* Delegates to the congress are being elected in two ways: at provincial party conferences and at party conferences at large industrial enterprises (or, occasionally, big schools), the latter method presumably being less susceptible to manipulation by party officials. Each delegate is to represent 1,700 party members, and any enterprise with at least half this number of party members is entitled to elect its own delegate. Of a total of about 1,950 delegates, according to the 27 May TRYBUNA LUDU, 348 will be elected at factories. This is a slightly smaller proportion than at the February 1980 party congress, where 294 of the roughly 1,800 delegates were elected at factory party conferences.

National and provincial press summaries and analyses of local-level election results as well as reports on individual election conferences indicate heavy turnover among elected officials. A 27 May TRYBUNA LUDU article stated that "more or less half" of the newly elected first secretaries and committee members of primary party organizations are "persons who were not in the leadership before." This figure does not reflect the full extent of the turnover, since many of those reelected won their positions during the "renewal" process which began last fall and are themselves still new.

Although some areas are experiencing relatively little upheaval, others are being shaken by the changes. The Lodz paper GLOS ROBOTNICZY for 3-5 April reported that 75 percent of the first secretaries were replaced as the result of elections at 300 local party organizations in Lodz. The 13 April GAZETA KRAKOWSKA reported that a local factory party organization in Podgorze had given a striking "negative assessment" of its leadership by failing to reelect any of its three incumbent secretaries even to its factory party committee. The paper's more detailed account on 14 April reported that the vote counting had lasted four hours because the election commission members could not believe the "stunning" results and kept recounting in order to see "if there were not some kind of error in their counting."

At a higher level, many city and provincial officials are failing to win election to their conferences. The 23-24 May TRYBUNA LUDU reported that 60 members and candidate members of the Bielsko-Biala provincial party committee--"including the whole leadership" of the province's capital city--had not been elected delegates to the city and province conferences. The 26 May GLOS WYBRZEZA reported that only 25 of Elblag Province's 131 committee members and candidate members had been elected delegates to the provincial conference. On 20 May a GLOS WYBRZEZA article noted that a "majority" of the members of the Gdansk province committee's executive committee and two of the five province secretaries had not yet been elected delegates to the provincial conference.

The influx of new leaders appears to be leading to a takeover of some organizations by Solidarity or other reformist or radical elements. In Elblag Province, according to the 25 May GLOS WYBRZEZA, half of the delegates elected to the provincial conference are members of Solidarity, as are 70 percent of the leaders of primary party organizations. The paper stated that "there are also cases where all members of the leadership and the first secretaries" belong to Solidarity. In Olsztyn, a young railroad dispatcher was elected first secretary of the large Olsztyn railroad party organization in a secret vote after he had assailed the party in harsh terms. According to the 29 April GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA, Mieczyslaw Pabian angrily asserted that "the party never has had the confidence of society," since it has "hidden" its history and failed to publish information about such things as "right nationalist deviations, the terror of the period of Stalinism," and past Polish plenums.

Opportunities for electing reformers have been increased not only by the new election rules, which provide for unlimited nominations from the floor and secret balloting, but also by the fact that candidates at times are required to spell out their positions on issues during election meetings. At the Krakow Lenin Steel Works, the largest factory party organization in the country, after eight candidates for the five positions as delegates to the congress had been nominated, proposals were made from the hall insisting that each candidate present his views. The 29 April TRYBUNA LUDU account of this election listed the candidates and reported what each one had said. The local account of this election, in the 29 April GAZETA KRAKOWSKA, noted that "each of the candidates for the congress had to earlier answer many questions from the hall, define how he personally views the need for changes in the party and building trust in its program, how he wants to represent the steel workers organization at the congress, and whether he will be able to defend that position."

Some areas and organizations are institutionalizing such discussions. They are holding two-stage election conferences, the first to nominate candidates and the second to vote on them, the interval between the conferences being used for public discussion of the candidates' qualifications and policy positions. Candidates have often engaged in "campaigning," answering detailed questions about their stands on issues, and even presenting personal platforms to appeal for votes. For example, the newly elected first secretary of the Wroclaw Polytechnic party committee described how he had won over six other candidates, each of whom had to present his "election program" and explain what he wanted to do. According to the account in the 28 April issue of the local paper GAZETA ROBOTNICZA, he added: "We were questioned sharply."

DELEGATE BLOCS At least as important as the turnover of local elected officials is the election of independent-minded delegates to the party congress. Statements in provincial papers indicate that some delegates are developing coordinated efforts to contest the Politburo on decisions over cadres and policies at the congress. These organizational efforts are emanating from the so-called horizontal party units, associations of local party organizations set up independently of higher party control to promote reform--a form of political action which conservative party leaders have denounced as "factionalism."

During May--as election of delegates moved into full swing--meetings of horizontal units, usually called "discussion forums," began calling on newly elected delegates to get together with fellow delegates from their province to work out common positions. The 22-24 and 25 May issues of GAZETA ZACHODNIA reported a session of the Poznan Forum for Political Thought, which called for delegates in each province to organize "forums of delegates" to prepare proposals on programs and cadres. The Poznan forum criticized the Program Assumptions and other documents worked out for the congress by the official Central Congress Commission, headed by Politburo member Stefan Olszowski. One of the speakers at the forum, according to the 21 May GLOS ROBOTNICZY, reminded his audience that about 300 delegates were to be elected directly at factory party conferences and that their "joint work" could have much effect.

The most unambiguous call to organize local blocs was sounded at a mid-May meeting of a new forum in Glogow, in Legnica Province. A delegate to that congress, assailing the Central Committee leadership, warned that the congress "may be manipulated" and that "we must locate ahead of time the entrenchments which must be blown up." According to the 18 May GAZETA ROBOTNICZA, he went on to call for the establishment of "horizontal structures" of delegates at the congress--in other words, local caucuses or voting blocs. They should, he said, work out the main lines of their speeches and "settle on candidates for the leadership." He claimed that the central leaders regarded the Glogow forum as a "faction" and stated that his own party organization had adopted a "vote of no confidence" in the Central Committee.

Reports in other local papers indicate that such classical political activities as formation of discussion groups or clubs of delegates have begun to appear elsewhere. GLOS ROBOTNICZY on 13 and 25 May reported meetings of a "forum of delegates" in Lodz aimed at developing common positions for the forthcoming congress. The same paper reported on 22 May that delegates had met with a secretary of the Lodz party committee, who obligingly provided them with advance schedules of the congress proceedings and directed the Lodz organizational department to give them any help they needed. The 21 May SZTANDAR LUDU carried an appeal by the "Group for Joint Work of Party Organizations of Lublin" for Lublin delegates to form a "club" to develop common views and programs and to promote candidates for posts of leaders and delegates. The liberal Krakow party committee and Gdansk precongress commission quickly endorsed the Poznan and Lodz initiatives, according to the 25 May GAZETA KRAKOWSKA and 19 May DZIENNIK BALTYCKI. The Glogow forum, mentioned above, represented 175 party organizations in five lower Silesian provinces, encompassing 30,000 party members.

USSR-MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW DENOUNCES ISRAELI RAID, MUTES SUPPORT FOR IRAQ

> Moscow's most authoritative attack on Israel's 7 June bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facility outside Baghdad came in a 9 June authorized TASS statement, a vehicle used by Moscow over the years to denounce Israeli actions against Arab states. Moscow has focused on the standard theme of alleged U.S. complicity in Tel Aviv's "crimes" and has revived the old accusation that Israel employs terrorism as a "state policy." Soviet comment has been cool toward Baghdad, offering no expressions of sympathy or pledges of support. Brezhnev failed to mention the attack in his 9 June dinner speech honoring the visiting Algerian president.

While TASS statements on similar Israeli actions in the past--such as the raids on Egyptian targets in 1968 and 1970--placed the blame primarily on Israel, the current statement held the United States equally responsible since it "arms the aggressor and gives it every support," including the planes used in the Baghdad raid. TASS observed that "American zealots of international justice" must believe that they and their "proteges" are above international law, and it rhetorically asked how the "champions of legality" in Washington would react if a similar operation were to be carried out to destroy Israeli nuclear installations.

In defense of Iraqi intentions, the TASS statement pointed out that Baghdad is a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that "all of its nuclear activities" are under the "control" of the International Atomic Energy Agency, while Israel "flatly refuses to accede to this treaty." On the same theme, a 9 June Tyssovskiy TASS commentary cited a Brazilian Foreign Ministry spokesman to the effect that the Iraqi nuclear facilities were under IAEA control and there "was no violation in the peaceful use of atomic materials." Moscow has avoided comment on French and Italian involvement in the Iraqi nuclear program.

Moscow--like Baghdad itself--has also avoided any reference to the damage caused by the raid. The TASS statement noted that the action had "the aim" of destroying "an atomic research center," while the initial TASS report on the incident pointed out without comment that the 8 June statement issued by Iraq's Revolution Command Council did not mention the consequences of the raid or the degree of the damage.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

BREZHNEV QUESTIONS U.S. ASSURANCES TO ALLIES ON ARMS TALKS

Seeking to muster Western opinion against Administration policy, Moscow is publicly belittling recent preliminary steps toward the opening of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. President Brezhnev used the occasion of a 9 June Kremlin dinner for the visiting Algerian president to question the sincerity of the Administration's recent pledge to begin negotiations on medium-range missiles in Europe by the end of the year. He also accused Washington of embarking on an "unprecedented" arms race. Meanwhile, Soviet media have ignored the preliminary contacts on European arms issues between U.S. State Department officials and representatives of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Brezhnev's recent statements addressing U.S. motives underscore Moscow's preoccupation with the battle for public opinion. The Administration's statements on the prospective European missile negotiations, Brezhnev claimed, are designed to "lull its allies and public opinion." He called the U.S. assurances "mere words." The Administration, Brezhnev said, has yet to take "a single real step" to continue the discussion on SALT or European theater arms and has instead found "pretexts" to delay the start of discussions.

A 10 June Moscow domestic radio commentary drew on Brezhnev's speech to buttress its insistence that there is no truth to recent reports in the U.S. and West European press that Washington intends to begin talks with the USSR. The commentary said the State Department had tried to "convince the public" that talks would start in the near future, but "this does not correspond to the truth in the least." Reports about the imminent initiation of talks, the commentary concluded, are apparently "designed to confuse the public of the West European states."

Moscow's public pessimism about U.S.-Soviet negotiations may be a function of its increasingly gloomy assessments of underlying U.S. intentions. Soviet commentary on U.S. policy has sharpened in the last few weeks. In an address in Kiev on 9 May, Brezhnev himself lumped the Reagan Administration with those "bourgeois" statesmen who give the highest priority to the quest for military superiority over the USSR but "tenth place" to negotiated solutions. Nonetheless, Moscow continues to profess eagerness for U.S.-Soviet arms dialogue "at any time."

USSR

CONFERENCES SIGNAL NEW STRESS ON IDEOLOGY, INTERNAL DISCIPLINE

A series of unusual conferences held in the Soviet Union recently appear to signal a new effort to reinforce traditional methods of party control at a time when turmoil in Poland and increasing tensions in international relations are posing new challenges to Soviet leaders. The conferences, which included a high-level ideology meeting addressed by Suslov and a conclave of top KGB officials attended by Brezhnev, seem to have been designed to draw attention to the importance of ideology and internal discipline as major props of communist society. As such they struck a note somewhat at odds with the current Soviet policy of stressing the party's support for workers' interests as a buffer against reformist movements from below and may reflect an effort by party conservatives to introduce a sharper accent on authority and control in domestic policy.

The ideology conference held in Moscow at the end of April differed from previous meetings of this kind in a number of respects. For one thing it was unusually protracted, lasting six days--four days longer than the last major ideology conference, held in October 1979. For another, although PRAVDA accounts of the sessions noted an unusually distinguished array of speakers, including Politburo members Gorbachev, Suslov, and Demichev and Central Committee Secretaries Dolgikh, Kapitonov, Rusakov, and Zimyanin, the only remarks published were short excerpts from Suslov's opening speech. In contrast, PRAVDA carried what appeared to be the full text of Suslov's remarks and reports on the speeches of other participants at the 1979 conference. One of the few substantive portions of Suslov's current speech which was published hinted at the hardline tone of the conference, complaining that the current international situation was subjecting Soviet citizens to increased hostile propaganda and that it would be "wrong to ignore its effect" on a "section" of the population.

The apparent concern of the ideology conference over the impact of alien ideas on the Soviet population has been reflected in several subsequent editorials. Striking a hardline tone, these editorials have sought to justify a campaign against divergent views within Soviet society by citing the recent increase in anti-Soviet propaganda from the West. A 27 April PRAVDA editorial on the ideology conference, for example, complained that these efforts were designed to "erode" the ideals of Soviet citizens. Similar concerns were expressed in an IZVESTIYA editorial the following day which also stressed the need for "increased vigilance" to counter their effect. In a message which appeared to be aimed at reformist ideas both in Poland and in the USSR, the lead editorial in a May issue of KOMMUNIST (No. 7) took an unusually intolerant stance against divergent views, calling for "mercilessly exposing false followers of socialism" who attack the system from within using the "acid of ideological and political 'pluralism.'"

The conclusions of the April ideology conference are apparently being disseminated through a series of major meetings around the country. Speaking at a special conference of trade union propagandists, reported in the 15 May TRUD, trade union chief Shibayev complained of the recent increase in "ideological sabotage" against the USSR and stressed the need for "heightened vigilance." A similar message was expressed by Estonian First Secretary Vayno at a republic meeting of ideology workers, reported in the 3 June SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA. In late May and early June similar conferences on ideology were held by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as by the Leningrad and Ukrainian party organizations, all attended by the top leaders of these organizations as well as by the head of the CPSU Central Committee's propaganda section, Ye. Tyazhelnikov. On 9 June PRAVDA reported that similar republic conferences had taken place in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Perhaps the most symbolic show of concern for internal security was Brezhnev's unprecedented attendance at a national conference of leading KGB officials. Although the cryptic report on 27 May PRAVDA provided no substantive details of this highly unusual meeting, circumstances suggest that it was related to the current campaign for increased vigilance. In addition to the fact that the KGB conference took place in the midst of the other recent sessions on ideology, heightened KGB concern over public morale was recently stressed by KGB Deputy Chairman Chebrikov. Writing in the April issue of the Komsomol's monthly journal MOLODOY KOMMUNIST, Chebrikov emphasized the current danger of hostile ideas and subversion from abroad and strongly urged that vigilance be stepped up to counter these dangers.

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this issue includes . . .

- Soviet publicity on new rift with Poland
- Polish leaders face electoral difficulties
- Soviet criticism of U.S. support for Israel

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

USSR-POLAND

Moscow has raised the stakes in its effort to hold back the democratization movement in Poland by going public in its disapproval of the performance of the Kania-Jaruzelski leadership. By publicizing its 5 June letter to the Polish leadership, Moscow has further committed its prestige to the effort to prevent a further erosion of communist party authority in Poland. In the meantime, results of local elections of delegates to the forthcoming Polish party congress indicate that current party leaders, particularly the more conservative ones, may be hard pressed even to gain election to the congress, much less keep their authority after the event.

SOVIET LETTER, FOLLOWUP PUBLICITY MARK NEW PUBLIC RIFT

Moscow has shown no signs of softening its attitude toward the Polish crisis in the wake of the failure of the 9-10 June party plenum to bring about the conservative change in the leadership that it evidently desired. By the same token, it has made no effort to persist in public attacks on the Polish leadership, apparently preferring to weigh the effects of its initiative on Polish policy before pursuing new efforts.

By sending a letter of such political sensitivity to the Polish leadership barely a month before the scheduled party congress, the Soviet leaders almost certainly recognized that they were inviting a showdown in the party that could not remain secret. Nevertheless, the belated publicity given the letter by Soviet media does not suggest that its primary purpose was to influence public opinion. Soviet media did not acknowledge the letter until TASS released the text on 11 June, after it had already been broadcast by Warsaw radio the preceding day. Moscow then publicized the letter widely: PRAVDA published it in full on the 12th, and the Soviet radio broadcast it in a number of languages. The public release of the letter has been accompanied by scant commentary in the Soviet media. This treatment contrasts with that accorded the "Warsaw Five" letter of 15 July 1968 to the Czechoslovak party. That letter was first made public by the Soviet media and was followed immediately by substantial media commentary as well as publicized "discussions" by lower level party bodies.

After publicizing the CPSU letter, Soviet media returned to their now standard practice of sketchy, highly selective coverage of Polish events. One message of these reports seems to be that the bleak assessment of the Polish situation contained in the letter is being acknowledged by Polish authorities. A 12 June TASS report, published in PRAVDA the next day, focused on aspects of the plenum resolution that reflected the Soviet criticism and ignored the document's reaffirmation of the pr[illegible]s of "socialist renewal." Similar treatment was given to Pr[illegible]er Jaruzelski's speech before the Sejm on 12 June. A 13 J[illegible] TASS report of the speech, published in PRAVDA on the 14th, [illegible]ed Jaruzelski's portrait of Poland's "aggravated" economic [illegible]nditions and his call for an end to "anti-Soviet" activities. But the report did not mention Jaruzelski's discussion of continued reforms in economic policy and ministerial organization. Soviet media have yet to report a 15 June speech by Kania before an election conference in Plock, in which the Polish leader displayed some confidence regarding the prospects for dealing successfully with the crisis.

HARDENING OF RHETORIC Whatever the intentions of the Soviets regarding further pressure on the Polish leadership, the CPSU letter has set precedents in rhetoric and protocol that may tend to further sour future relations between the two parties. Most notable was the failure of the CPSU letter to use the party title "comrade"--or any other courtesy title--in referring to Kania and Jaruzelski, an omission clearly intended to indicate that Moscow wished neither to regard the two leaders as party colleagues nor to accord them the honor due their offices. The CPSU letter also used a new formula for expressing the claim of the Soviet bloc countries to exercise a joint responsibility in sustaining an allied country facing a threat to its ideological integrity--the Brezhnev doctrine. In contrast with the last previous assertion of the doctrine--in the statement issued after Kania's 4 March meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow--the present formulation places greater emphasis on the strategic power aspects of the Soviet bloc claim. "The offensive by the hostile antisocialist forces . . .," the letter said, "threatens the interests of the whole of our community, its cohesion, its integrity and the security of borders. Yes, our common security."

LEADERS FACE PROBLEMS IN GAINING ELECTION TO CONGRESS

Most of the delegates to the July party congress are being elected in contests in their home primary party organizations, but almost all top leaders have chosen to follow a less risky route to election. So far only two Politburo members--liberals Roman Ney and Tadeusz Fiszbach--have run in their local party organizations; the others are looking for safe local constituencies or are counting on using a loophole in the election rules to gain election at the more easily controlled province conference level. Even these maneuvers may yet fail in some cases, since local electors, even at province conferences, are proving highly unaccommodating.

The new election rules, together with various additional procedures initiated from below, are raising significant obstacles for all candidates, including top leaders. There has been widespread insistence that candidates first be elected by their home party organizations as delegates to city or province conferences. The new election rules require that province conferences choose congress delegates from among such locally elected conference delegates; they also specify that candidates defeated at one conference cannot run for election anywhere else. The rules allow only one easier route: as a special exception, a conference can override the rule on initial local election and elect individual outsiders as delegates to the congress.

The possibility that Politburo members might be defeated at the local level and thus be eliminated from the leadership was broached by First Secretary Kania himself in his closing speech to the 9-10 June plenum. He complained of local "obstacles" to the election of central leaders as delegates and urged that the present members of the Politburo and Secretariat be permitted to attend the congress as delegates at least. Let the congress decide their fate, he urged, rather than just their local party organizations.

With these dangers clearly in mind, most Politburo members have determined not to risk running for delegate in their local party organizations. Even First Secretary Kania and organizational Secretary Barcikowski have appeared unsure of their home party organizations, since they have chosen to run in other party organizations. Although Kania is a member of a party organization at a petrochemical plant in Plock Province, he was elected a congress delegate at the 14 June Krakow Province conference, bypassing the local level. According to a 14 June radio account of the election, he received the "greatest number of votes of all elected delegates," winning 365 of the 396 valid votes. Barcikowski, in a surprise maneuver in mid May, was admitted to membership in a basic party organization in the Szczecin shipyard, which then elected him a delegate to the Szczecin Province party conference. At the province conference some challenged this method of bringing in an outsider, but the conference finally decided to include him on its list of delegates, according to accounts in a 30 May Warsaw domestic broadcast and the 1 June TRYBUNA LUDU.

So far only the liberal members of the top leadership have successfully begun at the bottom. As Politburo candidate member Roman Ney stated in the 21 May GAZETA KRAKOWSKA, "only comrade Fiszbach and myself" among the top leaders have accepted the new procedure. Ney was elected a delegate to the Krakow Province conference at a district conference reported in the 21 May GAZETA KRAKOWSKA; and on 6 June, according to a radio report, he was elected a congress delegate from the Krakow mining academy, which he had headed until late last year. Politburo candidate member and Gdansk First Secretary Tadeusz Fiszbach was a delegate to the Gdynia city conference, according to the 18 May DZIENNIK BALTYCKI, and was elected a congress delegate at the 7 June Gdansk Province conference, according to a radio report.

Two other liberals just below the Politburo level have followed this route successfully. Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski was elected a delegate to the Krakow Province conference at a district conference in Nowa Huta, where, according to the 18 May GAZETA KRAKOWSKA, he received more votes than any of the other 40 delegates elected. He was elected a congress delegate at the 14 June province conference. Recently elected Central Committee Secretary Kazimierz Cypryniak--former first secretary of the liberal Szczecin party organization--was elected a congress delegate at a local party organization conference in Szczecin, receiving 85 of 97 votes, according to the 30-31 May TRYBUNA LUDU.

Although most Politburo members will apparently follow Kania's example and try to be added to election lists by organizations other than their home constituencies, they may find that such maneuvers are not easy to bring off. The 25 May GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA reported that the Central Committee's Organizational Department had asked the

Olsztyn city conference to elect six central officials--including Central Committee Secretariat member Stanislaw Gabrielski--delegates to the province conference, so that the province conference could elect them to the congress. On 22 May the Olsztyn city delegates refused, objecting to surrendering six of their seats to outsiders and insisting that everyone follow the same rules in winning election to the congress.

Moreover, the province conferences themselves may prove unruly: four of the eight province conferences held so far--in Wloclawek, Olsztyn, Opole and Leszno--have voted their first secretaries out of office. One Politburo member--President Jablonski--may have found the only sure solution to the problem by announcing at the 4 June Olsztyn Province conference that he would not even run for delegate. A radio report the same day explained, perhaps unnecessarily, that Jablonski saw no future position for himself in the party.

USSR-MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW HITS U.S. SUPPORT OF ISRAEL, PUSHES CONFERENCE PROPOSAL

Moscow has taken advantage of Israel's 7 June attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor to mount a propaganda assault on Washington's ties with Tel Aviv. Comment not only has repeated standard accusations that the United States provides Israel with everything from arms to "diplomatic cover," but has charged that the Israeli raid was made with U.S. foreknowledge, or at least with its "practical encouragement." There are no indications, despite visits of Syrian and Iraqi delegations to the USSR, that Moscow has come up with any new initiatives to take advantage of recent developments in the Middle East to strengthen its own position in the region.

U.S. ATTITUDE, UN DEBATE

The bulk of Moscow's considerable comment has presented the United States as "hypocritically" opposing international terrorism while giving Israel only a mild slap on the wrist and failing to follow up with any "real action." Only IZVESTIYA's Bovin suggested some difficulties posed for Washington by the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor. In a characteristically realistic observation on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable on the 14th, Bovin remarked that the Israeli raid was "in a certain sense a challenge to the Reagan government" because it made U.S. efforts to continue the Camp David peace process more difficult.

Moscow promptly seized on President Reagan's 16 June press conference remarks that Israel had reason for concern and that "it is difficult for me to envisage Israel as being a threat to its neighbors." The initial TASS report on the 17th accused the President of "virtually taking into his protection the Israeli aggressors, who committed a criminal act of international terror" against Iraq. Asking rhetorically whether "blasphemy or hypocrisy" predominated in the President's remarks, TASS asserted that it was Israel that for years had been the source of tension in the Middle East. A fuller TASS account of the press conference described President Reagan as "apparently nonplussed" when he responded to a question about the appropriateness of Israel's refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by saying he had not given that question much thought.

Soviet UN delegate Troyanovskiy, in his 15 June speech at the UN Security Council debate on the Israeli raid, echoed earlier Soviet skepticism about U.S. motives in suspending the delivery to Israel of four F-16 fighter-bombers. As reported by TASS, he asked what this decision was worth when Administration spokesmen had indicated that the suspension did not cover other military equipment. While Troyanovskiy routinely branded the Israeli action a direct act of aggression against Iraq and an example of "international terrorism," he did not, according to the TASS account, spell out any measures the Council should take.

PRAVDA on the 14th, reporting Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi's speech at the session, noted without comment his call for "compulsory sanctions" against Israel and cited an unidentified American spokesman as having "threatened" a U.S. veto if the Council suggested sanctions. Since the 1967 Middle East war Moscow has generally shied away from explicit endorsement of sanctions against Israel, merely reporting the issue when it has been raised at the United Nations.

USSR CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, IRAQ

The Soviet Union's seeming inability to capitalize on the situation with fresh ideas of its own is suggested by its focus on Brezhnev's February proposal for an international conference to work out a comprehensive settlement of Middle East problems. PRAVDA's widely broadcast 14 June editorial illustrates Moscow's single-minded insistence on an overall solution under some sort of international auspices. The editorial updated, as appropriate, PRAVDA's last editorial on the Arab-Israeli question, in July 1976. It followed that editorial's format but substituted Brezhnev's new call for an international conference for the 1976 appeal for reactivation of the Geneva conference forum. The current editorial echoed the earlier one in blaming Israel for the crisis in Lebanon. In addition, it condemned in passing Israel's "blackmail" of Syria, bombing of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and "piratical attack" on Iraq's "nuclear research center."

Reporting on a Syrian parliamentary delegation's recent talks in Moscow, TASS on 15 June cited Supreme Soviet Presidium Vice President Kuznetsov as hailing the two countries' friendship and cooperation treaty in the context of "versatile" bilateral relations--with no indication that Lebanon was specifically addressed. Few details are available on the current visit to Moscow of an Iraqi delegation led by First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan; Baghdad has merely reported that bilateral relations and "political issues" would be discussed, and that Ramadan expressed hope that the visit would achieve "serious steps" in developing relations.

CHINA-SOUTH ASIA

PREMIER'S VISIT FURTHERS BEIJING'S ANTI-SOVIET GOALS

> Premier Zhao Ziyang's recent visit to Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh reflected renewed Chinese determination to strengthen its position in South Asia and to encourage the nations of the region to overcome their differences and unite to resist Soviet inroads in Asia. Beijing is attempting to maintain its traditionally close ties with Pakistan while resuming efforts to establish good relations with India. China apparently calculates that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan makes such a move more urgent and that the current climate is somewhat more favorable for its success.

Zhao's visit to South Asia--the first by a Chinese Premier since 1966--did not result in any new agreements or surprising departures from the general line of Chinese diplomacy in the region, but it underscored Beijing's determination to keep Soviet and Vietnamese activities in Asia at the forefront of international attention. Zhao's statements during the 1-8 June trip emphasized repeatedly that South Asia is part of the frontline against Soviet global expansionism, and the XINHUA account of his 1 June banquet speech in Islamabad quoted him as saying that "at present, the situation in South Asia is developing in a direction favorable to the people in the region and unfavorable to the hegemonists."

After Zhao's return to Beijing, both he and Chinese Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping amplified the importance China attaches to the region in remarks to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, reported by XINHUA. Deng, after condemning the Israeli air strike against Iraq's nuclear reactor, declared that Kampuchea and Afghanistan are "the two major hot spots in the present-day world," and that "no matter what new problems emerge on the international scene, the issues of Kampuchea and Afghanistan must not be put aside." Deng's comments are reminiscent of statements he made to visitors to China in April urging that the Polish situation not be allowed to overshadow events in Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

Zhao's visit served to cement old ties in the region at a time when Beijing is renewing efforts, begun in 1978, to improve Sino-Indian relations. He clearly indicated in a 7 June press conference in

Katmandu, reported by XINHUA, that Beijing's overriding interest in South Asia is to foster cooperation and a resolution of regional disputes in the face of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. The development of relations of friendship and cooperation in the region, he maintained, would be in the interests of peace and stability as well as in the "cause against hegemonism."

SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN AND AFGHAN REBELS

Zhao's visit to Pakistan was carefully orchestrated to stress the importance of Beijing's bilateral ties with Islamabad while demonstrating increased Chinese responsiveness to Indian concerns. In his 1 June banquet toast, Zhao repeated the standard assurance that the Chinese Government and people "firmly support" Pakistan's "just struggle to oppose foreign aggression and interference." He went on to make a rare public reference to Beijing's military aid to Pakistan--the second at this high level since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--during a 3 June news conference, but he used terms intended to allay Indian suspicions of collusion against its interests. He said that since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a "grave military threat" to Pakistan, China "fully understands" Pakistan's efforts to upgrade national defense capabilities and "will give whatever energetic support it can to these efforts."

During the news conference, Zhao further justified Chinese military support to other countries in general by claiming that the invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet support for Vietnamese involvement in Kampuchea were "important component parts" of a Soviet global strategy which must be opposed with energetic means. He stated, "We have always rendered energetic political and moral support to the countries and peoples that are subjected to hegemonist aggression and expansion and given them material and other assistance within our means."

The strength of Chinese support for anti-Soviet forces was underscored in Zhao's dramatic tour of an Afghan refugee camp near the border on 2 June. In a gesture designed to suggest Beijing's material and political support for the Afghan resistance without substantiating Soviet charges that Beijing is arming and training the rebels, Zhao met with refugee leaders, strongly denounced the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and praised the Afghan struggle. He expressed confidence that the refugees would be able to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan and pledged that the Chinese Government and people would "resolutely stand on the side of the Afghan people and support your just struggle." Zhao then presented a check for 500,000 yuan to Pakistani President Ziaul Haq for his Afghan refugee relief fund.

BEIJING'S APPROACH TO NEW DELHI

The importance of Zhao's trip in setting the stage for a new approach to India was made clear by Zhao's repeated calls for improved Sino-Indian relations. Zhao disclosed in Pakistan on 3 June that Foreign Minister Huang Hua would soon visit India; the trip had originally been planned for the fall of 1980 but had been postponed by the Chinese due to India's recognition of the Phnom Penh government of Heng Samrin. XINHUA has since announced that Huang Hua's visit will begin on 26 June and will be followed by a visit to Sri Lanka beginning 30 June. Reaffirming the approach for improving Sino-Indian relations outlined by Deng to a visiting Indian journalist in June 1980, Zhao called on 3 June for a resolution of problems "step by step" through friendly consultation. And in Nepal on 7 June he said that a "package solution to the boundary question . . . is possible so long as both sides agree to work in the spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation."*

Beijing's desire to promote a more favorable climate for improving Sino-Indian ties was also reflected in Zhao's treatment of the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Beijing has customarily endorsed the Pakistani position, but in his 1 June speech in Rawalpindi, Zhao apparently did not do so. Party Chairman Hua Guofeng had similarly omitted the endorsement in his toast for visiting President Zia in Beijing in May of last year, at a time when Beijing was pushing for closer ties with New Delhi.** After India's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime had soured the earlier Chinese overture, Beijing returned to its customary stance, as evidenced by Huang Hua's statement of support for Pakistan's position on Kashmir last December at a banquet for visiting Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi.

Beijing's renewed overture to India apparently stems from its belief that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created an opportunity to woo India from its Soviet ally. Beijing has generally cast New Delhi's statements on Afghanistan in a favorable light. Last December Chinese reportage of President Brezhnev's visit to India, including a RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article on the 13th, stated that India had not acquiesced in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A 4 June GUANGMING RIBAO article by Liu Cun, written in conjunction with the Zhao visit, favorably cited India's opposition to Soviet troops in Afghanistan and noted that Prime Minister Gandhi had demanded foreign troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in a joint communique during a recent visit to Kuwait.

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* Deng's statements on the border problem are covered in the TRENDS of 9 July 1980, pages 11-13.

** Zia's visit to China is covered in the TRENDS of 21 May 1980, pages 11-13.

Sino-Indian relations are still complicated by Beijing's distress over New Delhi's recognition of the Soviet-backed Phnom Penh government of Heng Samrin. Beijing has pointed to signs of a more positive Indian stance on this issue, however, noting in February this year, for example, that India did not support Soviet and Vietnamese efforts to gain recognition for the Heng Samrin regime at the New Delhi nonaligned meeting. Nevertheless, there are still problems on this issue. As recently as 24 May, for example, a RENMIN RIBAO article by Ya Zhou attacked a statement by India's Secretary to the Foreign Ministry Gonsalves which blamed China for the problems in Kampuchea and the tension in Southeast Asia. The article said that Gonsalves' remarks were "untimely" and "will not help to improve Sino-Indian relations."

AFGHANISTAN

KARMAL APPEALS TO MUSLIMS, MINORITIES, BUT NOT TO PARTY RIVALS

> In a continuing effort to generate support for his Soviet-backed regime, Afghan President Babrak Karmal has reshuffled his government and the leading organs of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), established a new ministry to work with the increasingly important nationality and tribal groups in the countryside, and convened the long-promised constituent congress of the National Fatherland Front (NFF). In each case, Karmal sought to address the fundamental problem of his dominant PDPA Parcham faction--its almost total lack of ties to and support from nonurban groups in the population--by appealing directly to Muslims and national minorities rather than by seeking to repair the split with his Khalki faction rivals, who have deeper roots in rural areas.

GOVERNMENT AND PARTY CHANGES

Changes in the leading organs of the Afghan Government and PDPA had been expected at least since Babrak Karmal's announcement on the third anniversary of the April 1978 revolution that he wanted to relinquish the premiership and make the Kabul regime more responsive to the will of the people. But the personnel changes announced 11 June following the joint meeting of the Afghan Revolutionary Council and the PDPA Central Committee suggest no clear shift in political direction. They resulted in neither the purge of Khalki leaders, which Karmal may have wanted, nor the incorporation of more Khalkis into the leadership, which the Soviets appear to have desired. On the one hand, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, a longtime Parchamite and Karmal aide, became prime minister; on the other, a number of Khalkis--including Mohammad Aslam Watanjar and Saleh Mohammad Ziray--were promoted.

NEW APPROACH TO NATIONALITIES

Since the Soviet invasion in December 1979, the Kabul government has given increasing attention to Muslims and to national and tribal groups in Afghanistan. Meetings have been held with leaders of these groups on a regular basis, assurances of respect for Islam and tribal customs have repeatedly been given, and efforts have been made to develop literary languages for those groups that lack them.

The Kabul regime seems to be pursuing a policy designed to break the traditional Pushtun dominance of the Afghan state by promoting the identities of other national groups and then integrating them into the political system. This approach is very similar to the one pursued by Moscow in Russia during the first years of Soviet power. The recently announced Afghan Ministry of Nationalities has a structure and goals similar to those of the Soviet Commissariat of Nationality Affairs (NARKOMNATS), which existed between 1917 and 1923. By a 28 May decision of the Afghan Revolutionary Council, this ministry will replace the largely defunct Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs. It will have its own journal, receive priority funding from the government, and be the first Parchamite-dominated institution to attempt to penetrate the nationality and tribal groups.

THE NFF CONGRESS

Although widely billed by Kabul as a "jirgah"--a traditional Pushtun tribal council that earlier Afghan regimes convened to ratify important decisions and to lend legitimacy to new governments--the one-day constituent congress of the NFF on 15 June proved little more than a slightly broader replay of a series of meetings Karmal and other leaders have had with various national and tribal groups during the past two years. The 940 representatives of the PDPA, social organizations, national and patriotic forces, tribes, and nationalities heard readings from the Koran and a speech by Karmal and adopted a constitution calling for a congress only once every five years. The congress also issued a "Message to the People of the World," in which the NFF reiterated Kabul's willingness to talk to Pakistan and Iran and again stressed that "the question of the withdrawal of the limited Soviet military contingents could be solved at the side of these political solutions--and it ought to be solved."

Leaders of the Afghan resistance movements in Pakistan have moved to preempt Kabul's claim that the NFF congress constitutes a jirgah, which is a powerful symbol of national unity for most Afghans. In an announcement appearing in the 3 June issue of the Karachi paper DAWN, these leaders said they would hold their own "representative" grand jirgah within three months as a prelude to the formation of an Afghan government in exile. Interestingly, they are following Kabul's lead in calling for representation of the entire country and not of the Pushtuns alone, as has sometimes been the case in the past. Thus Kabul's attempt to use an important national symbol, and to expand its meaning by increasing its membership, may have the ironic effect of unifying its opponents more than its allies.

The notion of an Afghan NFF has a long history. It grew out of Soviet efforts--such as the creation of committees for the defense of the revolution--to expand the PDPA's political base and to enhance the legitimacy of the Kabul regime. In July 1979 Moscow reported that the PDPA had decided to establish a "united national front" of all "progressive public and political forces." Following the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Moscow noted that Karmal had promised to create such a front. And in July 1980 Moscow reported that the PDPA Central Committee had resolved to form a "United National Fatherland Front." There is no indication, however, that the Afghans themselves did anything during this period to implement these Moscow-announced decisions. But on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion, Karmal publicly called for the creation of the NFF and announced the formation of a high-level organizing committee. This group was to lay the groundwork for the NFF and to convene a constituent congress by March 1981 or shortly thereafter. It did not meet this goal, and little was said about its activities prior to a 9 June session at which the NFF draft constitution was read and approved.

BRIEF

KOREA: North Rejects Summit Meeting With Chon Tu-hwan

North Korea has again made it clear that it regards South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan as an unfit partner for dialogue on reunification, an image reflected with increasing stridency in Pyongyang media in recent months. In rejecting Chon's 5 June call for a meeting between him and DPRK President Kim Il-song, the North attacked Chon more directly than it had in January when he first called for a North-South summit meeting. The North's response to Chon's latest offer, contained in a 10 June editorial article in the party newspaper NODONG SINMUN, called for Chon's overthrow and execution and the dismantling of his regime. The editorial article also indicated that the North would consider resuming a dialogue on reunification only after the Chon regime had been ousted and replaced by "a democratic government desiring reunification." In responding to the Chon proposal in January, North Korean party Presidium member Kim Il had not voiced such conditions, rather calling on Chon to demonstrate his sincerity on reunification. The January response had also stated that the North was ready to meet "with anyone who does not rely on outside forces or seek division, fascism, anticommunism, and confrontation in South Korea," thus implicitly leaving the door ajar to the resumption of talks with the ROK while Chon is in power, a possibility not suggested in the NODONG SINMUN editorial article.

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- Supreme Soviet appeal for arms talks
- Renewed Moscow pressure on Warsaw
- Setbacks for Polish conservatives

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

- + TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

- + SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

- + SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

- + TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

USSR SUPREME SOVIET SESSION

MOSCOW DEFENDS BREZHNEV ARMS PROPOSALS, APPEALS FOR TALKS

Evidently pessimistic about the prospects for arms negotiations with the Reagan Administration, Moscow is stepping up its effort to court international public opinion on arms control issues. The 23 June USSR Supreme Soviet appeal to the "peoples and parliaments" of the world for a resumption of arms talks caps earlier signs of this shift in Soviet tactics. The appeal reaffirms the underlying Brezhnev strategy of countering hardening arms policies in the United States by publicly stressing Moscow's desire for arms limitation negotiations. But some recent signs suggest that the Soviet leadership is sensitive to sentiment within the regime dissatisfied with that strategy and desirous of a more forceful response.

The widely publicized appeal for arms talks was the centerpiece of a 23 June session in Moscow of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In brief introductory remarks, Brezhnev stressed twin themes that have marked his speeches since his proposals for East-West dialogue at the February congress failed to elicit a measurable Western response. He warned that the international situation was becoming "more dangerous" as a result of recent trends in U.S. and Western policy but maintained that broad sections of Western society were resisting this trend. The appeal itself--read by Brezhnev at the session--reaffirms Soviet readiness to renew East-West arms negotiations and warns of the destructive consequences of nuclear war. It calls on "the legislative bodies of all countries" to "speak up in favor of negotiations" to halt the arms race--"honest and equal negotiations" without preconditions or "attempts at dictation."

FOREIGN, DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS The Supreme Soviet appeal signals the increasing attention Moscow is paying to public sentiment against nuclear weapons in the West as a consequence of its declining expectations about the defense and arms control policies of President Reagan and FRG Chancellor Schmidt.* But the appeal could also be responsive to domestic dissatisfaction with the regime's hitherto low-key public response to the new directions in U.S. foreign policy and what Soviet leaders have called an increasingly "dangerous" foreign environment.

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* Moscow's views of the Schmidt and Reagan Administrations are discussed in the TRENDS of 3 June 1981, pages 4-5, and 10 June 1981, page 9.

No Soviet leader has openly questioned the Brezhnev public strategy of pressing even harder for a resumption of arms talks, but a note of defensiveness has marked recent statements by the Soviet president and his spokesmen about the Brezhnev foreign policy program. Brezhnev insisted to the Supreme Soviet session that international developments since the congress "have reaffirmed with new vigor the correctness" of the proposals in the Brezhnev program and that the Soviet leadership is working "with determination" to implement them. In a speech in Georgia on 22 May, Brezhnev appeared even more adamant: the congress proposals "are doing their job, clearing the way to serious political dialogue," he stated, and "none of the themes suggested by us for discussion has lost any of its significance." Repeating Brezhnev's Georgia remarks on a 14 June national radio program, Central Committee official Nikolay Shishlin acknowledged that the congress proposals had achieved no "outstanding results" thus far but maintained that they had to be viewed over the long term, not "a single month or a single year."

The Supreme Soviet session itself could be interpreted as an effort to reinforce sagging support in the regime for Brezhnev's strategy for countering the Reagan Administration. In addition to the appeal, the session featured ringing endorsements of Brezhnev's foreign policy stewardship by Ukrainian party leader Shcherbitskiy and his Belorussian counterpart, Kisilev. Shcherbitskiy assured the session that "it is lucky for our people and for mankind that at such a complicated and troubled time it is precisely Leonid Brezhnev . . . who is leading our party and state."

PREVIOUS APPEALS TO THE WESTERN PUBLIC

Propagandistic "appeals" to Western opinion have been a traditional device of Soviet policy when substantive arms control negotiations have stalled. The current appeal is reminiscent of Moscow's tactics during its 1977-78 campaign against enhanced radiation weapons--the so-called neutron bomb--when similar entreaties to European public sentiment were issued by Soviet-inspired front groups such as the World Peace Council. But the new appeal for negotiations is the first issued at such an authoritative level since a Supreme Soviet appeal in January 1960 sought to rally support for continuing talks between the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France on limiting the size of each state's armed forces. That appeal, unlike the present one, included a unilateral Soviet gesture--a reduction in the Soviet armed forces of 1.2 million men.

SUPREME SOVIET SESSION NOT PRECEDED BY USUAL PLENUM

The Politburo's apparent decision not to hold the usual Central Committee plenum on the eve of the Supreme Soviet session that ended 24 June has aroused the curiosity of Western observers. Such anomalies in the timing of plenums are not unprecedented. While there are no exact analogies to the current situation, the historical cases listed below illustrate significant variation in the practice of holding pre-Supreme Soviet plenums. In most instances the variations could be clearly linked to leadership politics or policy issues, but the pattern is not consistent.

+ In December 1960 a previously announced plenum on the eve of a Supreme Soviet session was postponed three days before it was scheduled to convene. When it did meet several weeks later it ordered a major purge of agricultural leaders.

+ On six occasions since 1965 the spring plenum was not held on the eve of a Supreme Soviet session but met anywhere from weeks to months earlier. In four of these cases the plenums carried out leadership changes, and in the other two--in 1968 and 1969--they were concerned with critical international policy issues.

+ In 1971 and 1976, the years of the last two congresses, no plenums or Supreme Soviet sessions were held in the spring. As was the case this year, plenums were held earlier in the year immediately before and at the close of the congresses, thus meeting the statutory regulations regarding the convocation of at least two plenums a year.

POLAND

Moscow has renewed its public pressure on the Warsaw regime, once again committing its prestige to the demand for a reversal of the regime's policy of conciliating the democratization movement. Chief media spokesman Leonid Zamyatin in a television statement on 20 June issued the Soviet Union's most authoritative demand for reassertion of party authority since the 5 June CPSU letter. Meanwhile, conservative forces in Poland have shown renewed activity, although they have been unsuccessful in turning the political tide. Among their more conspicuous failures have been the lack of positive public reaction to the Katowice forum, the unsuccessful attack on Kania and his allies at the June plenum, and the evident reformist trends in the current elections of local party officials and of delegates to the party congress.

MOSCOW RENEWS PRESSURE ON WARSAW IN WAKE OF CPSU LETTER

In Moscow's first authoritative comment on the Polish events since its release of the CPSU letter on 11 June, Soviet party spokesman Leonid Zamyatin has reinforced Moscow's public pressure on the Warsaw regime. Speaking over Moscow television on the 20th, Zamyatin reasserted the skepticism expressed in the letter about the Polish leadership's competence and resolve, heaping scorn on the regime's concessions to Solidarity and its inability to bring the situation under control. Referring to the resolution of the latest Polish party plenum acknowledging the CPSU criticism, he implied that words were no longer enough, declaring that "the time is now ripe for active measures to really lead Poland out of a catastrophic situation." He also reiterated concerns expressed in the letter about Soviet bloc security interests--a theme underscored by Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov in a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article the next day.

Zamyatin was unusually explicit in treating issues affecting some individual Polish leaders, particularly those whose views might find support in Moscow. For example, he expressed dismay that Politburo member Wronski had thus far not been elected as a delegate to the party congress by his home base (mistakenly identifying it as a plant in Gdansk rather than Warsaw), attributing this circumstance to controversy over Wronski's past attacks on Solidarity. Zamyatin also supported a complaint voiced at the last plenum by Grabski, a Politburo hardliner and outspoken Kania critic, when he asserted that Rural Solidarity had been registered without Politburo approval. Zamyatin's thinly veiled criticism of Kania's performance is consistent with the CPSU letter and with Moscow's conspicuous failure to report Kania's plenum speech--a break with standard practice that dramatizes the extent of Moscow's loss of confidence in the Polish leader.

The toughness of Zamyatin's remarks is the more noteworthy in light of earlier statements in which, as chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department, he has seemed to accurately reflect prevailing Soviet policies. His 10 December denial that Soviet troops had crossed the Polish border seemed calculated to defuse alarm over Soviet intentions caused by a provocative TASS report. More recently, in a Moscow television talk on 18 April, he appeared to reflect the moderate line taken by Brezhnev at the recent Czechoslovak party congress when he expressed confidence in the Polish communists and said the Polish leadership was "doing everything possible."

CONSERVATIVES SHUN IDENTIFICATION WITH KATOWICE FORUM

As a symbol of political affiliation, the Katowice Party Forum appears to have become a leper's sign in contemporary Poland. Organized very quietly in mid-May, the forum evidently had pretentions of becoming a rallying point for all who wished to turn back the "renewal" movement and restore the communist party to its traditional dominant role in Polish society. While the Soviet press noted the emergence of the forum and reported favorably on its criticism of the Kania regime, the Polish press reacted with reserve and even skepticism. Investigative reporting on the forum by liberal Polish newspapers suggests that it acted independently of Politburo conservatives, who now appear indecisive about whether to defend it or to join in the chorus of criticism.

INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING

The forum's relationship to leading conservatives was subjected to detailed examination in investigative reports appearing in 1 June issues of local papers in several provinces. Gdansk's GLOS WYBRZEZA sent its own team of reporters to Katowice to locate and interview the leaders of the forum, while Krakow's GAZETA KRAKOWSKA and Opole's TRYBUNA OPOLSKA ran long articles based on a report by Jan Lazar, editor of the Katowice paper DZIENNIK ZACHODNI, which had been the first to publish the forum's resolutions. The newspaper accounts indicate that the forum began as an informal group on 10 December and first organized formally as a forum on 15 May, at a meeting attended by 60 people. The key organizer, 52-year-old Wsiewolod Wolczew, a teacher of theory of politics at a Katowice institute, is the Russian-born son of a Bulgarian communist who had emigrated to the USSR.

The investigative reports indicate that the forum had some difficulty getting even local media to publish the controversial statements it adopted at its 15 May meeting. Initially only one local paper--DZIENNIK ZACHODNI--agreed to print the group's declaration, but the forum eventually enlisted the support of the province committee's propaganda secretary, who persuaded the province party organ TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA to publish the forum's statements. The accounts also revealed that sympathizers from Warsaw brought the resolutions to the Central Committee, after which they went to the Polish Press Agency and then to various papers.

LINKS WITH HARDLINERS

The forum organizers apparently counted on support from conservative Politburo members Grabski, Olszowski, and Zabinski but instead found them chary of associating with it. The forum's founder told investigative reporters that he had immediately informed Grabski and Olszowski when the forum was formally established in May and had sought help and sponsorship from the Katowice leadership, headed by Zabinski. None of these leaders, however, has acknowledged any responsibility for the forum. Olszowski, in a speech reported in the 1 June GAZETA POMORSKA, distanced himself from the forum by criticizing it for attacking the Politburo from "dogmatic positions." Grabski has neither attacked nor defended the forum directly, but at the June plenum he denied that the Politburo had criticized or even discussed it.

For Katowice leader Zabinski the forum has been a matter of acute political embarrassment. Although he attended the forum's first meeting in December, according to the founder, and has allowed a number of province party committee officials to join the group's leadership, he has avoided giving it an official imprimatur. When the Katowice paper eventually published the group's resolutions, on 29 May, it carried an announcement from Katowice party leaders disclaiming responsibility for the forum and a note from the editors denouncing the forum's resolutions as "not corresponding to the spirit of socialist renewal." Katowice officials refused to talk to GLOS WYBRZEZA reporters about the forum, saying that they did not even know who the members were. At the June plenum, according to the 10 June TRYBUNA LUDU, Zabinski said that he did not agree with the "arbitrary style" of the forum's statement but that he could not "totally condemn its ideological content."

Most embarrassed is Katowice miner and Politburo member Gerard Gabrys, whom TASS on 1 June identified as leader of the forum. According to the investigative reports in the Polish press, he was elected chairman of the forum's council at its 15 May meeting and is treated by forum members as their leader. The forum's founder, Wolczew, told the GLOS WYBRZEZA reporters that Gabrys had intended to preside at a 28 May forum meeting and to take the forum's resolutions to the Central Committee but that he had been unable to do either because he had been sent off as a member of a delegation to West Germany.

As soon as the forum's statements began to be published, however, Gabrys backed off. When reporters caught him at a 26 May election meeting, according to one account, he denied that he had attended the 15 May meeting and insisted that he "could not be linked" with the forum's statements. Gabrys reiterated his denial in a 4 June TRYBUNA LUDU statement. He had not attended any of the forum's meetings, he said, nor had he agreed to be its chairman.

The present status of the forum is ambiguous. The 3 June TRYBUNA LUDU reported that the Politburo had criticized the forum's statements as "extreme." The forum responded, according to a statement in the 5 June issue of the paper, by promising to suspend further meetings until it received Politburo sanction. Zabinski at the June plenum strongly implied that the forum had been brought under control when he praised it for obeying the Politburo's wishes. However, following the June plenum, at which high-level conservatives openly attacked Kania's leadership, there were renewed signs of activity by the forum. Warsaw television on 22 June reported a new forum statement assailing the group's foes and the press campaign against it and promising to rejoin the precongress political debates.

LIBERAL PRESS CHIEF KLASA TARGETED BY PARTY HARDLINERS

Liberal press chief Jozef Klasa has emerged as a center of controversy at the recent plenum because of his identification with relaxed press controls and his personal allegiance to party leader Kania. The 5 June CPSU letter criticizing the laxness of the Polish press set the stage for sharp personal attacks on Klasa at the plenum by Politburo hardliner Grabski. Earlier Klasa had been subjected to indirect pressure by his nominal superior, ideological Secretary Olszowski, who has been campaigning for a reimposition of stricter controls on the press. Despite the mounting pressures against him, Klasa may be protected by the fact that Kania needs him in his present position in order to block any ambitions Olszowski may have to expand his control over the media.

In his denunciation of Klasa at the plenum, Grabski revealed that he had made similar attacks on the press chief before, indicating that Klasa had long been a target of conservative enmity within the party. Grabski stated that since February he had three times asked for Klasa's dismissal as head of the Central Committee's Press, Radio, and Television Department. He condemned Klasa as the one responsible for "allowing, tolerating, and even instigating attacks on the party and its activists." Klasa himself complained of a campaign of vilification directed against him in the party, dramatizing his complaint with an offer to resign.

BACKGROUND ON KLASA Perhaps the most liberal among top media supervisors, Klasa was one of the first new officials brought in when Kania became first secretary last September. In a 24-26 April GAZETA KRAKOWSKA interview, Klasa flatly stated that the only reason he had agreed to return to party work in September was that Kania, who had personally asked him to take the job, had pledged that as long as he remained first secretary he would not allow force to be used against the workers to resolve disputes. Klasa's outspokenness and independence as Krakow first secretary in the 1970's had repeatedly angered Central Committee First Secretary Gierek, who finally ousted him and sent him off to Mexico as ambassador from 1975 to 1980. (Klasa describes some of his run-ins with Gierek in interviews in the 22 and 23 April GAZETA KRAKOWSKA.)

As press chief, Klasa has made it clear that he believes the media should be independent, objective sources of information both for average citizens and for leaders, not propaganda tools of the regime. In a 25 May GAZETA KRAKOWSKA interview, he spoke of developing a press that would help democratize the party and government so that leadership of the party would not be "exercised in an arbitrary way."

CONTROVERSY OVER GAZETA KRAKOWSKA

It is not accidental that the showcase example of Poland's independent press is to be found in Klasa's old bailiwick of Krakow. Shortly after the renewal began, 42-year-old film-maker Maciej Szumowski became GAZETA KRAKOWSKA chief editor and soon turned the paper into a symbol of independence and initiative. He angered conservatives in particular by publishing a critical account of the March police beating of demonstrators in Bydgoszcz that contradicted and discredited the official version. In a 14 May interview in the Wroclaw paper GAZETA ROBOTNICZA, Szumowski acknowledged that his paper had been attacked in Warsaw for its "dubious liberties" and for being "dominated by Solidarity," but he defended and even boasted of his reporting on the Bydgoszcz affair. "The authorities must come to understand," he said, that the "era" of newspapers' "dependence on one or two officials" has ended.

Klasa's independent stance has been the more notable in that his immediate supervisor, conservative Central Committee ideology Secretary Stefan Olszowski, has been strenuously arguing for tighter controls over the media--for example, at the March and April plenums. At the latter plenum he asserted that "freedom of speech" had exceeded "sensible bounds," and in an early April speech he specifically attacked GAZETA KRAKOWSKA. In a local question-and-answer session reported in the 22-24 May GAZETA KRAKOWSKA, Olszowski denied having directly accused GAZETA KRAKOWSKA of exercising "dubious liberties" but acknowledged that he had "reservations about GAZETA KRAKOWSKA's line." He added "jokingly" that the paper had become "in a certain sense the newspaper of the Metropolitan [Krakow] Curia." Hostile Krakow questioners asked Olszowski on what grounds "he takes upon himself the right to function as 'supercensor.'"

Klasa and the Krakow paper have a number of vocal allies in their conflict with the hardliners. In the 21 May GAZETA KRAKOWSKA, Politburo candidate member and Central Committee Secretary Roman Ney, a moderate, revealed that he and liberal Krakow First Secretary Krystyn Dabrowa had been "investing very much time and energy in protecting GAZETA KRAKOWSKA," which was being criticized "not only by central authorities but also by part of the aktiv in neighboring provinces, which see it as a hotbed of evil." In a 16 April GAZETA KRAKOWSKA interview, liberal Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski characterized the paper as leading the way for other Polish papers.

Although Klasa tendered his resignation at the plenum, there has been no indication that it was acted on. He was still identified in his post in the 15 June TRYBUNA LUDU. Meanwhile, Klasa retains support among liberals and in the press and is already assured a seat at the July party congress. His loyal home party organization of Krakow recently elected him--as well as Kania, Ney, Dabrowa, Rakowski, and editor Szumowski--a delegate to the congress.

INCUMBENTS FARE BADLY IN POLISH PARTY ELECTIONS

With about half of Poland's province party conferences held, it is clear that the elections are going badly for the party establishment. The provincial-level conferences, which elect both delegates to the July congress and leaders of the province committees, are scheduled to end in late June. The party rank and file, evidently dominated by an antiestablishment mood, is largely excluding incumbent officials from the election slates, and it appears that very few of the present central party and government officials will be at the July congress. It is not yet clear how extensively the top party leaders will be affected by this grass-roots "purge"--all the liberal or moderate Politburo members have been elected as delegates, but the fate of some conservatives has not been decided. In elections to province party leadership posts, conservative first secretaries are also having much more difficulty getting reelected than are liberal first secretaries.

DELEGATES TO CONGRESS

Central party and government officials are facing serious handicaps in winning election to the congress. Delegates from the capital will be severely limited, since the Warsaw party organization will have only about 110-120 delegate slots. Running for delegate from some "safe" constituency will also be difficult, as some provinces are adopting resolutions banning outsiders. Some conferences have already rejected requests to make exceptions for so-called central candidates. For example, according to the 1 June GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA, the Olsztyn conference rejected the recommendation of the Main Political Administration and a local military party organization to let Brigadier General Zdzislaw Ostrowski run for delegate. At the June plenum one speaker--Zbigniew Glowacki--referred to this electoral dilemma, complaining that "members of the central leadership" should not be "petitioners running from conference to conference" looking for someone "kind enough to nominate them."

Those being elected delegates appear to be first of all low-level party secretaries, white-collar workers, and technicians of one kind or another. There have been widespread complaints that the number of blue-collar workers among delegates is too small. But many secretaries of factory party committees are recently promoted workers and may fairly be regarded as worker delegates.

The complete lists of delegates published so far from the first five conferences--in Gdansk, Szczecin, Wloclawek, Bialystok, and Olsztyn--show the largest contingents to be local party secretaries, workers, and private farmers. The makeup varies by province. In rural Wloclawek 10 of the 24 delegates are farmers, while in industrial provinces the largest groups are local party secretaries and workers: of Szczecin's 47 delegates, there are 17 secretaries and 12 workers; of Gdansk's 62 delegates, there are 12 secretaries and 11 workers. All the provincial elections show an antiofficial bias, however. The 194 delegates from these five provinces include only two central officials--Central Committee Secretaries Barcikowski and Cypryniak.

Among members of the Politburo and Secretariat, all liberals and moderates have won delegate seats; and so has conservative Grabski. Hardliner Zabinski has won election to his Katowice Province conference, where he can be elected a congress delegate. There has still been no word about where and when Olszowski will run. Leaders elected as delegates so far are identified below by asterisks:

Politburo Members

*Kania
*Jaruzelski
*Barcikowski
*Jagielski
Jablonski
*Moczar
*Grabski
Olszowski
Zabinski
Gabrys
Wronski

Politburo Candidate Members

*Fiszbach
Kruk
Masny
*Ney
Waszczuk

Secretaries

*Kania
*Barcikowski
*Grabski
Olszowski
Waszczuk
*Ney
*Kurowski
*Cypryniak

Secretariat Member

*Gabrielski

PROVINCE FIRST SECRETARIES

Another striking feature of the elections has been the heavy turnover among the country's 49 province first secretaries. Of 21 already elected, 10 are new. With more than half of the first secretaries already replaced since the renewal began last August, the election is compounding the existing turmoil. The turnover is not totally indiscriminate, however. Those who became first secretaries after August last year have had much more success than holdovers from the Gierek era.

In 11 of the 21 elections held so far, the first secretaries were named after August, and of these, eight were reelected. In contrast, seven of the 10 who were holdovers were defeated. No clear liberals were ousted, and only one clear conservative--Ostroleka First Secretary Szablak, who openly attacked Kania at the June plenum--has been reelected. Among those defeated is Opole First Secretary Masny, who was promoted to Politburo candidate member just last April. At a local meeting reported in the 18 May TRYBUNA OPOLSKA, Masny bitterly complained of hostile rumors about him.

CHINA-BURMA

BURMESE COMMUNIST PARTY SEEKS NEGOTIATED END TO CIVIL WAR

> The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) has announced its desire to negotiate an end to its 35-year war against the central government and has blamed the Ne Win regime for the recent breakdown of secret talks--the first known to have been held between the two sides since 1963. Although the talks were probably encouraged by China, Beijing has not so far reported or commented on them.

The BCP position was revealed in an official party statement and a separate statement by party chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin on 14 June, both broadcast by the PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of People's Burma (VOPB) in response to a 14 May disclosure by Ne Win that his government had concluded secret negotiations with the insurgent party. The communist statements alleged that at two meetings held since last fall the party's negotiators had made several concessions in an effort to achieve a settlement, but that the government side had unilaterally suspended the talks before the concessions could be discussed. Asserting that the Ne Win government planned "unilaterally to destroy the talks" by "demanding the impossible," the BCP statement nevertheless stated that "the BCP is prepared to resume the negotiations in the future if the opportunity arises."

The talks apparently broke down over the questions of legitimacy for the BCP and of autonomy for communist base areas and military forces. Ne Win charged that the BCP had made unacceptable demands for official recognition of the party's right to exist, to retain its army, and to rule its base area. The BCP statement said the party wanted recognition of its base area as an autonomous region; acceptance of its People's Army as a military unit under the State Defense Council, which would have BCP representation; and a government "hands-off" policy toward BCP affairs. To ensure that its position would not be misconstrued as surrender, the BCP declared that it would "resolutely and militarily continue to defend and attack in defensive warfare to protect the base areas and the people."

The clandestine radio's publicity for the statements by the BCP and its chairman represent the first public signal from the insurgents that a negotiated settlement might be possible--a substantial departure from the previous party line calling for armed struggle against the government. A VOPB commentary on 29 March, on the 33d anniversary of the military clash that started the BCP-led armed struggle against the government, typified the earlier line in saying conditions were favorable for "expansion into new regions." In contrast, the present statements said that the BCP, after "giving due consideration to the conditions at home and abroad," would struggle to "grasp" the "three banners"--ending the civil war and building peace in the country, democracy, and national unity.

The BCP's decision to pursue talks with the government--the first since abortive talks in 1963--suggests it is in a weakened position due to increased pressure from the government. Both the Ne Win and BCP accounts of the talks said they were proposed by the BCP after an amnesty extended by the government from May to August 1980 had expired. Since then, government reports of defections and a series of VOPB denunciations of the amnesty and of those who surrendered to the government in July and August have suggested that the BCP's base has eroded. A VOPB editorial marking the 41st anniversary of the BCP apparently alluded on 15 August 1980 to this problem when it observed that the party must "cleanse itself of left and right opportunism."

The talks were likely encouraged by Beijing as part of its increased efforts to promote state-to-state ties with Southeast Asian countries in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Responding to lingering suspicion in Southeast Asia of China's long-term intentions because of its support for insurgent parties, Beijing has gradually played down its ties with these parties since 1978. Beijing media have given the BCP no publicity since October 1979, when RENMIN RIBAO reported a BCP congratulatory message on PRC National Day. But the issue of CCP-BCP ties may be assumed to have come up during Ne Win's visit to China last October and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang's reciprocal visit to Burma in January of this year. The 14 June BCP statement reflected Beijing's line when, in explaining the party's decision to call for negotiations, it asserted that the Soviet and Vietnamese threat required all people to "join hands" to "staunchly oppose imperialism and hegemonism and to maintain and safeguard peace and stability in Southeast Asia as well as world peace."

BACKGROUND Any Chinese effort now to promote a modus vivendi between Ne Win and the BCP would face difficulties reminiscent of the situation in 1963. At that time some Chinese leaders appeared to believe that the new Ne Win government was the type of noncommunist regime with which Beijing could do business. And Beijing exhibited particular eagerness to improve ties with Burma in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. Chinese President Liu Shaoqi made an extended visit to Burma in April 1963; in May, BCP leaders resident in Beijing traveled to Burma to join in indigenous BCP efforts to reach a settlement with Ne Win. The talks broke down in the fall due to BCP demands for autonomy and because growing disagreement within the Chinese leadership prevented Beijing from taking a united position on the Burma issue. During the Cultural Revolution, Liu was publicly accused of abandoning the Burmese communists in favor of Ne Win's socialist program. Support for insurgent armed struggle became the hallmark of the radical Maoist foreign policy. Beijing's options in dealing with the present situation continue to be limited by the BCP's autonomy.

IRAN-USSR

MOSCOW CAUTIOUS ON BANI-SADR DISMISSAL, IRANIAN UNREST

Moscow has thus far confined itself to largely factual reporting on the political demise of former Iranian President Bani-Sadr, who was dismissed by Ayatollah Khomeyni on 22 June after the Majlis had declared him "politically incompetent." In contrast to the reticence of the official Soviet media, the Baku-based clandestine radio "National Voice of Iran" (NVOI), which consistently sides with the Islamic fundamentalists, has become increasingly critical of Bani-Sadr.

SOVIET MEDIA Recent Moscow comment on the "grave and confused" political situation in Iran has been sparse and bland. Before Bani-Sadr's dismissal, for example, a broadcast in Persian on the 16th took note of the "struggle" between Islamic Republican Party (IRP) supporters and "so-called liberals" led by Bani-Sadr but avoided mentioning the concerted IRP campaign against the former president. The radio commentary dwelt instead on purported threats to the Islamic regime posed by former Prime Minister Bakhtiar and the United States.

More than a week before Bani-Sadr's dismissal, IZVESTIYA's characteristically outspoken Aleksandr Bovin had offered Moscow's sole assessment of the developing political crisis, in the vein of his analysis of Iran's ills in the fall of 1978, before the shah's departure from Iran. In a 13 June commentary broadcast only in Moscow's domestic service, Bovin criticized Iran's "religious leadership" for the "chaos" in the country and indirectly praised the now-deposed president for trying to solve Iran's problems from "pragmatic positions." Iran's clergy, Bovin observed sarcastically, is no doubt "well acquainted with the Koran," but the country's economic and political problems are "evidently outside the limits of their understanding." Bovin did not go so far as to predict Bani-Sadr's dismissal, concluding only that the struggle between the clerical faction and the president's followers had apparently "ended for now" in the clerics' favor.

CLANDESTINE RADIO National Voice of Iran has continued to parrot the views of Khomeyni and the Islamic fundamentalists and repeatedly condemned Iran's "compromising liberals" for allegedly selling out their country's interests to the United States. NVOI's association of Bani-Sadr with the "liberals" became progressively more explicit as his political fortunes waned, evolving from assertions that Bani-Sadr was being duped by former Prime Minister Bazargan and other liberals to characterizations of the former president as the protector of the liberal group. But NVOI has found it difficult to identify with the Islamic fundamentalists while simultaneously protesting the fundamentalists' suppression of the communist Tudeh Party newspaper MARDOM and their assaults on leftists. An 8 June NVOI commentary, for instance, expressed approval of the closure of Bazargan's and Bani-Sadr's newspapers but called the ban on MARDOM "incomprehensible" to the Iranian "people."

BRIEFS

USSR-U.S.: Soviet Media on U.S. "Spy" Stations in China

Moscow is treating recent Western press reports of joint Sino-U.S. electronic intelligence monitoring stations in China as a minor propaganda opportunity rather than as a major bilateral issue. Three TASS dispatches and a few broadcasts to foreign audiences have publicized Western accounts of the Sino-U.S. cooperative intelligence arrangement and have reported "embarrassment" in both capitals over the public disclosures. Soviet media have been alleging since at least January 1980 that such an arrangement exists. Commentaries on former U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown's visit to Beijing that month asserted that the two sides had negotiated a secret agreement to establish monitoring stations. Commentaries since then have occasionally cited Western reports of Sino-U.S. "spy nests" as evidence of the two countries' growing military cooperation.

Soviet reports on alleged Sino-U.S. monitoring stations have generally described their purpose as "monitoring the launchings of Soviet rockets" or "collecting information about the Soviet Union." On rare occasions, they have alluded to the SALT monitoring function such stations might have. But Soviet media have avoided the issue of whether third country facilities are properly included in the "national technical means" of verification provided for by existing U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control agreements.

CHINA-MALAYSIA: New Insurgent Party

Beijing continues to give significant political and moral support to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), despite longtime pressure from the Malaysian Government to cease. The PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR) on 11 June carried the manifesto of a Malay National Unity Party (MNRPM), said to have been newly formed on 24 May. The party was identified as the successor to the Malaya Nationalist Party, which apparently has been moribund for years. The new party is an important addition to a long list of MCP antigovernment front organizations for which the clandestine VOMR speaks. The manifesto said that the new party would appeal to "communists, socialists, nationalists, and religious figures," but it also made it clear that the formation of the MNRPM is a major initiative by the MCP to expand its influence among ethnic groups--especially Malay--outside its traditional Chinese base. The party will be headed by Abdullah C.D., one of the few prominent Malay members of the MCP Central Committee. The party's program sets forth as highest priority the effort to "unite all the Malays," to "arouse them to fight in defense of the destiny of our fatherland and people," and to "set up a national democratic coalition government." The manifesto's endorsement of "armed struggle" and of the activities of the Malayan National Liberation Army, the military arm of the MCP, revives a theme that has been muted in VOMR antigovernment statements for a number of months. The formation of the new party and revival of the "armed struggle" theme will fuel the Malaysian Government's concern about Beijing's intentions in the region.

The Voice of the Malayan Revolution is on the air a total of eight and a half hours daily in Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, English, and Chinese dialects. No change has been observed in VOMR's schedule as of this writing.

AFGHANISTAN: Party Factionalism at Fatherland Front Congress

The continuing feud between the Parcham and Khalki factions of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was apparent at the founding congress of the National Fatherland Front (NFF) on 15 June. In their speeches to the congress, leaders of the two factions took markedly different positions on the nature of the Afghan regime and its social base. Delivering the major address, Afghan President Babrak Karmal, leader of the now dominant Parcham faction, appealed for support from Muslims and the "broadest" social strata, called for "national and patriotic" unity, and went out of his way to criticize the regime of Hafizollah Amin, the Khalki president overthrown in December 1979. NFF Chairman Saleh Mohammad Ziray, a leader of the Khalki faction, took a more narrowly Marxist doctrinaire approach. He asserted that the current Afghan regime "rests on the unity of the workers and peasants classes," showed little interest in seeking support from other social groups, and devoted only one paragraph in his long speech to Afghanistan's Muslims--the only point at which his speech was interrupted by applause.

A 16 June PRAVDA account of the congress clearly backed Karmal's position. PRAVDA highlighted his remarks on the "broad" social base of the revolution and merely reported Ziray's discussion of organizational questions. Despite the feuding, there have been two recent indications that the Karmal government intends to make active use of the National Fatherland Front--if only as a propaganda tool: the NFF council resolution on Kabul's latest amnesty program has been widely publicized in Kabul media, and NFF Chairman Ziray is included in the Karmal delegation now visiting Czechoslovakia.

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- USSR on arms sales to China
- Moscow on Nordic nuclear-free zone

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

USSR-U.S.-CHINA

USSR REPLY TO U.S.-CHINA ARMS SALES TIED TO SUBSEQUENT STEPS

Moscow has condemned the U.S. decision to sell arms to China as a hostile step but has also raised questions about the staying power of the Sino-U.S. relationship. An authoritative 27 June "I. Aleksandrov" PRAVDA article, in the spirit of current Soviet propaganda on the United States, characterized the decision as a "dangerous new stage" in the Sino-U.S. relationship. At the same time, the Aleksandrov article and remarks by a senior Central Committee official have made it clear that Moscow's reply will depend on any specific steps that follow the policy decision. Commentary from two Soviet spokesmen on a national television program broadcast the same day the Aleksandrov article appeared underscored the opposition that Moscow professes to see in both countries to the expansion of military ties.*

While describing U.S. and Chinese intentions in characteristically hyperbolic terms, the I. Aleksandrov article kept Moscow's options open by painting a guarded picture of the immediate implications for the USSR. The Soviet reaction, the article said, will include "such measures as are dictated by the situation as it evolves." This phraseology echoed remarks made on Soviet television a week earlier by Central Committee department chief Leonid Zamyatin, who claimed that Moscow's response would "take into consideration the processes that follow, if any do follow," Secretary Haig's discussions in Beijing.

The I. Aleksandrov article did warn that expanding Sino-U.S. military ties could affect Soviet-U.S. as well as Sino-Soviet relations, but it stopped short of raising specific issues. In the wake of White House national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's visit to Beijing in May 1978, a turning point in the Soviet view of the relationship, Moscow had warned in an authoritative press statement that U.S. alignment with China against the USSR would "rule out the possibility" of Soviet-U.S. cooperation on arms control.

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* Moscow has traditionally used PRAVDA articles over the I. Aleksandrov pseudonym to give a cachet of stature and authority to press statements of the official line on current events. Most I. Aleksandrov articles have been on China and Sino-Soviet relations. Domestic television programs, on the other hand, are often a forum for relatively candid discussions by Soviet officials of the factors underlying current events.

STABILITY OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS QUESTIONED

Doubts about the long-term stability of the Sino-U.S. relationship may be encouraging Moscow to keep its options open in responding to the decision on arms sales. The I. Aleksandrov article itself made a pointed reference to continuing contradictions in the bilateral relationship, asserting that the two sides are "far from being of the same mind" in their global strategy.

Commentary for the domestic audience on the 27 June "Studio Nine" international affairs discussion program expanded on this point, finding cause in the internal politics of both countries to doubt the durability of Sino-U.S. strategic ties. Nikolay Shishlin, the head of a group of consultants to a Central Committee department, described Washington and Beijing as seeking to forge an anti-Soviet alliance, but he questioned whether their aspirations "will turn out as planned." The "nearly explosive" social and economic situation in China, he said, suggests that some officials are questioning current policies not only toward domestic problems but also toward relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Veteran U.S. watcher Valentin Zorin, who hosts the program, agreed, stating that in Washington too there was concern about the direction of U.S. policy toward China. On his recent trip to Washington, Zorin reported he found "extremely influential political figures, ideologues, and specialists on international affairs" wondering whether a "strong China" was advantageous for the United States.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW EASES OPPOSITION TO ROLE IN NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

> Soviet President Brezhnev has softened Moscow's longstanding opposition to Soviet participation in any northern European nuclear-free zone. Brezhnev's statement to the Finnish Social Democratic Party organ SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI, published in PRAVDA on 27 June, is clearly an effort to appear responsive to renewed discussion in Scandinavia of the Nordic nuclear-free zone concept. Initial followup commentary in Soviet media also suggests Moscow will use the proposal to make invidious comparisons between its European arms policies and those of the Reagan Administration.

Brezhnev was ambiguous about which provisions of a nuclear-free zone agreement might apply to the USSR. He repeated the USSR's willingness to give formal guarantees that it would not use nuclear weapons against participants in such a zone but then went further, nominally in response to a question about Soviet readiness to assume "additional obligations" to promote efforts to reach agreement. The USSR, Brezhnev said, "does not preclude the possibility of considering the question of some other measures applying to our own territory in the region adjoining the nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe."

While carefully phrased, Brezhnev's statement signals a significant departure from Moscow's traditional embrace of Finnish President Kekkonen's 1963 Nordic nuclear-free zone plan, which excluded Soviet territory from any restrictions. As recently as mid-April, Soviet media were dismissing out of hand any suggestion that a Nordic nuclear-free zone could extend to Soviet territory, arguing that such a step would damage Moscow's position within the broader global nuclear balance.

Brezhnev's shift regarding Soviet participation seems calculated in part to curry favor with Scandinavian governments, several of which have recently made official declarations of interest in the concept of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Even before the Brezhnev interview, Soviet media had taken note of the renewed Scandinavian interest and sought propaganda mileage from U.S. expressions of opposition to the plan. IZVESTIYA on the 13th played up what it portrayed as diverging Nordic and U.S. views on the issue.

Washington, IZVESTIYA argued, fears that movement toward a nuclear-free zone would undermine its own plans to build up NATO's nuclear forces in northern Europe. Following Brezhnev's remarks, PRAVDA carried reports claiming that the new Soviet stance had been welcomed by European leaders as "fresh evidence" of Moscow's interest in strengthening peace.

SOVIET MILITARY USES WAR ANNIVERSARY TO STRESS CURRENT THREAT

> Soviet military leaders have used the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Nazi invasion to stress the hostility of the new U.S. Administration and the seriousness of the foreign threat now facing the USSR. They have routinely affirmed the Soviet Union's commitment to the struggle for peace while vigorously drawing attention to the Soviet readiness to meet any Western challenge in kind. Their efforts to draw parallels between the current situation and the eve of the World War II invasion could reflect military lobbying for a more assertive regime response to the Reagan Administration's policies and a tougher stand on Poland.

The military warnings came in the context of largely routine anniversary articles faithfully reflecting basic Soviet positions on the destructiveness of war and the overriding importance of the struggle for peace. But echoing language used by Brezhnev in issuing similar warnings in recent months, two senior military officers have made it clear that the Soviet Union intends to respond to any expansion of Western arms programs with appropriate countermeasures. Defense Minister Ustinov in a 22 June PRAVDA article warned that "it would be naive" to think the USSR "would allow anyone to upset the balance of military-strategic forces existing in the world." Asserting that the Soviet Union neither was nor is an "advocate" of the arms race, Ustinov nonetheless emphasized that "if we are forced to do so, we will match any challenge and match it effectively." Warsaw Pact commander Kulikov, writing in the previous day's KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, made much the same point. Stating that the USSR had learned from the past war the importance of "even temporary enemy superiority," he declared that the Soviet Union "will not allow potential enemies to gain the upper hand in any kind of arms or equipment."

These remarks are in keeping with a recent stiffening of the Soviet attitude toward U.S. foreign policy, foreshadowed in Brezhnev's V-E Day remarks and expounded more fully in a 16 May television statement by media chief Zamyatin.* They are also consistent with the Soviet Union's often stated position that it would not allow potential adversaries to achieve military superiority over the USSR. Typical in this regard was Brezhnev's statement to the 26th CPSU Congress in February that the Soviet Union sought no superiority for itself and that it would be "absolutely futile" for others to aspire to it. On three other recent occasions, he has alluded to the Soviet intent to answer any Western military buildup with measures of its own.

+ On 9 May he stressed that "if we need to, we will find a rapid and effective response to any challenge by bellicose imperialism."

+ On 22 May he warned that deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe would force the Soviet leadership to "think about extra defense measures" and to "find impressive means to safeguard" its vital interests.

+ On 12 June he again stressed that the USSR would "react rapidly and effectively to any challenge" infringing on its security or upsetting the existing military-strategic balance.

Ustinov and Kulikov also used the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Nazi attack to point up the danger of the current international situation, intimating that it is reminiscent of the eve of World War II. Ustinov placed special emphasis in this regard on U.S. plans to upgrade NATO's nuclear missile capability, calling them "an extreme threat to world peace" and asserting that the deployment of such weapons in the FRG "may once again make West German territory the tinderbox for yet another devastating war." Each also compared American assertions of a "Soviet military threat" to the anti-Soviet propaganda used to justify the 1941 German invasion. While such allegations can be interpreted as simply responding in kind to highly critical remarks of American leaders, they may also be intended to signal misgivings about the regime's apparent determination to show restraint on current East-West issues. That the Polish situation ranks high among the issues on which the military would prefer a more uncompromising regime stand is strongly suggested by the Kulikov article.

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* See FBIS TRENDS of 20 May 1981, pp. 1-2.

USSR-POLAND

Moscow has shown signs of renewed restraint toward Poland in recent days, following its stiff warnings delivered in a 5 June CPSU letter and a 20 June statement by party spokesman Zamyatin. In a cluster of statements and declarations--all directed at specific foreign or domestic audiences, and thus far not published in the central press--Soviet media have indicated that the Soviet Union has softened its attitude toward the Polish leadership and now seems resigned to maintaining a wait-and-see posture until after the party congress. In Poland itself, the elections appear to have strengthened Kania by providing places for most of the current leadership at the party congress, as he had asked, while ensuring an eventual renewal of the party through a sweeping turnover of lower level officials.

MOSCOW SHOWS RENEWED RESTRAINT, DENIES SUPPORT FOR FACTIONS

Two of Moscow's most prominent foreign affairs spokesmen--commentator Valentin Zorin and Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's International Department Vadim Zagladin--have recently signaled a softening in Moscow's heretofore demanding attitude toward the Polish leadership. In a statement carried by Budapest radio on 23 June, but not in Soviet media, Zorin warned that the Polish situation is "serious" and not just an internal affair. But he also asserted that the Soviet leaders and their Warsaw Pact allies had expressed confidence in recent months that the Polish party could resolve the crisis. Zagladin offered similar assurances for Soviet audiences in a Moscow television broadcast four days later, on the 27th. While warning against the exploitation of the Polish renewal process for "counterrevolutionary" aims, Zagladin scored as "absolutely incorrect" assertions that Moscow is intolerant of reformist changes in Poland and that "there are some conservative forces there which we are supporting." He added that these issues were "first of all, the business of the Polish comrades."

A more unusual profession of Soviet confidence in the Polish regime and an indignant denial of Soviet interference in the crisis came in a letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Japanese Communist Party about the Polish situation. The letter upbraided the JCP for a telegram it had sent to Moscow protesting Soviet pressure on Poland. Accusing the JCP of distorting Soviet policy and contradicting norms of party relations, the letter declared that the CPSU "is still providing" moral and political support to the Polish leadership and that this support "is not in the form of unilateral support to any particular groups" but through proper channels. The letter was all the more striking in that its release by Moscow--over Moscow radio's Japanese service on the 27th but not in the Soviet press--came a full 17 days after the Japanese telegram had been sent.

Moscow's announcement on 28 June that Gromyko would pay a "short, friendly" visit to Poland in early July seems to be further evidence of Moscow's intention to let the congress take place while it attempts to influence its outcome by political means. Gromyko visits to East European countries in recent years--occurring about once a year--have usually been routine but have sometimes been connected with critical issues. For instance, his visit to Poland in the fall of 1974 was apparently designed to coordinate views in advance of then party chief Gierek's visit to Washington a week later, the first by an East European party leader other than Romania's Ceausescu. Gromyko also led a Soviet party delegation to Bucharest in October 1978 for "frank" talks, apparently about the landmark visit to Romania two months earlier by Chinese leader Hua Guofeng. As a potential symbol of Soviet pressure, the upcoming Gromyko visit falls short of CPSU Politburo member Suslov's unannounced visit to Warsaw in April, to say nothing of the gatherings held several weeks before the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. On that earlier occasion, all the Soviet Politburo members met with their CPCZ counterparts in a Czechoslovak border town; that was followed several days later by a conclave of Soviet bloc party chiefs in Bratislava.

LOSSES AMONG LEADERS IN ELECTION OF POLISH CONGRESS DELEGATES

Results from province election conferences now drawing to a close indicate that all top leaders have managed to win election as delegates to the July party congress but that some secondary Politburo members and many Central Committee members have gone down to defeat. Among those not elected delegates to the congress are the two workers on the Politburo--Gerard Gabrys and Zygmunt Wronski--and two of the five candidate members. The elections are cutting a wider swath in the membership of Central Committee: Complete results from 21 of the 49 provinces show that almost 65 percent of the Central Committee representatives from these provinces have not been elected delegates.

LEADERS ELECTED, DEFEATED

The reelection of almost all Politburo members is clearly a victory for First Secretary Kania, who pleaded at the June plenum that the present Politburo be elected to the congress to reassure the Soviets that the elections would not mean a complete purge of conservatives. Kania has even gone so far as to aid some conservatives in their bids for election. For example, both he and Premier Jaruzelski went to the 25 June Katowice conference to demonstrate support for hardline Politburo member and Katowice First Secretary Andrzej Zabinski, whom Kania lauded before the local delegates, even though he clearly opposed him on philosophical and political grounds.

Those who were in effect eliminated from the Politburo in this initial stage--since they did not win seats at the congress--are largely secondary figures; in fact three of the four had only been added to the leadership at the late April plenum. Gabrys, who came under fire for an alleged link with the hardline Katowice Forum, and Wronski, who had been engaged in controversy with Solidarity, were not elected delegates from their home party organizations, results confirmed by a 29 June PAP broadcast. The two retiring Politburo candidate members--Central Committee culture Secretary Jerzy Waszczuk and Opole First Secretary Jozef Masny--have been targets of occasional local criticism. Waszczuk was defeated in a bid for election at the Chelm Province conference, according to the 19 June TRYBUNA LUDU, while Masny did not run for reelection as local first secretary and was not included in the list of delegates elected in Opole.

The following chart identifies those leaders who have been elected delegates and the provinces that elected them:

POLITBURO

Kania (Krakow)
Jaruzelski (Warsaw Military District)
Jablonski (Tarnow)*
Jagielski (Elblag)
Barcikowski (Szczecin)
Olszowski (Warsaw)
Grabski (Konin)
Moczar (Kielce)
Zabinski (Katowice)
Wronski (defeated in Warsaw)
Gabrys (defeated in Katowice)

Candidate Members:

Ney (Krakow)
Fiszbach (Gdansk)
Kruk (Lublin)
Masny (retired in Opole)
Waszczuk (defeated in Chelm)

SECRETARIAT

Kania (Krakow)
Barcikowski (Szczecin)
Olszowski (Warsaw)
Grabski (Konin)
Ney (Krakow)
Waszczuk (defeated in Chelm)
Kurowski (Ciechanow)
Cypryniak (Szczecin)

Member:

Gabrielski (Lomza)

* President Jablonski had initially announced his intention of retiring, declaring according to the 1 June GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA that he had "asked the Central Committee Secretariat not to nominate him at any conference as a candidate for central bodies." However, when the Tarnow conference later offered him nomination as delegate, according to a 20 June Warsaw domestic broadcast, he professed surprise but allowed himself to be elected after all.

Although candidates for delegate were supposed to begin by running in their own home party organization, almost all Politburo members selected other areas, apparently as safer constituencies or because of other political considerations. Central Committee Secretary Barcikowski, who belongs to a party organization at a Krakow steelworks, declined his home party organization's nomination and chose instead to run in the Szczecin shipyards, where he had signed the historic August settlement. Questioned about this in the 1 June KURIER SZCZECINSKI, he explained that he felt an "emotional tie" to Szczecin because of the momentous events of August 1980 when "we jointly arrived at a platform of understanding at that difficult time." Judging from articles in the 30 April GAZETA KRAKOWSKA, Barcikowski's support in his home area may not have been firm. During an April visit, members of his party organization questioned him sharply about controversial cadre decisions made while he was Krakow first secretary, from 1977 to 1980, and he had to issue a detailed statement defending himself. In an apparent effort to boost Barcikowski, the paper also carried a statement by well-known reform leader Jan Labecki, Gdansk shipyards party secretary, endorsing Barcikowski.

Deputy Premier Jagielski also traded on his role in the early days of the crisis to win election in one of the radical northern provinces. According to the 13-14 June TRYBUNA LUDU, the conference in Elblag, which neighbors Gdansk, nominated Deputy Premier Jagielski for delegate because of the "high authority" that he had won during the August negotiations in Gdansk.

While Waszczuk and some others have been eliminated by local defeats, at least one leader overcame this and evaded the election rule forbidding defeated candidates from running again. According to the 19 June TRYBUNA LUDU, Politburo candidate member Wladyslaw Kruk was defeated in his bid to be elected delegate to the Lublin Province conference. Although this should have ended his chances, a 28 June Warsaw radio account of the Lublin Province conference reported that he had been elected province first secretary and congress delegate, apparently having been granted a special exception from the rules.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE TURNOVER

While most of the Politburo members have survived the elections, it appears certain that there will be heavy losses among Central Committee members. This is clear from the complete lists of delegates from 21 of Poland's 49 provinces that have appeared so far in TRYBUNA LUDU. These 21 provinces have 37 members and candidate members on the present Central Committee, and the lists show that 24 of the 37--almost 65 percent--were not elected delegates and hence will lose their committee seats.

The delegates elected to the congress include few officials, which may foreshadow a different role for the future Central Committee. Some provinces--such as Chelm and Wloclawek--have not even elected their province first secretaries as delegates, while other first secretaries who are delegates may not be elected to the Central Committee at the congress. This may help bring about a change being urged by some workers and party officials--notably Central Committee Secretary Roman Ney--to make the Central Committee a body representing the social composition of the party rather than a collection of important officials and executives. In a 2 April SZTANDAR MLODYCH interview, Ney urged that the Central Committee be made up of farmers, workers, and other nonofficials, rather than of province first secretaries and central government and party officials. These dignitaries, Ney suggested, should participate in plenums only as "invited guests."

CHINA-INDIA

HUANG HUA VISIT MARKS PROGRESS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to India--the first by a high-ranking Chinese official since Zhou Enlai's 1960 visit--has resulted in agreement to expand trade and exchanges and at the same time to renew efforts to resolve the border problem. The positive tone of Chinese media treatment of the trip and Prime Minister Gandhi's acceptance of an invitation to visit China indicate that in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan both parties have come to see a need for improving their relations despite persisting differences.

A gradual improvement in Sino-Indian relations over the past two years, as evidenced by several high-level contacts and expanded trade and exchanges, has been capped by agreement during Huang Hua's 26-30 June visit to undertake new programs to improve relations in a wide variety of fields and simultaneously renew discussions on the border issue. The new approach to bilateral relations suggests that Beijing is taking advantage of a shift in New Delhi's insistence prior to Gandhi's January 1980 election that resolution of the border problem precede improvements in other spheres. The agreement was announced on 28 June, according to XINHUA reports, in an Indian Government statement and by Huang Hua during a press conference on the eve of his departure, although agreement "that the border question should not be an obstacle to the further development of relations" had been reported earlier by XINHUA, after the second day of talks between foreign ministers. According to Huang Hua in his press conference, the two sides will promote cultural and scientific and technical exchanges, expansion of trade, and increased exchanges of personnel. The Indian Government statement, according to XINHUA, mentioned annual exchanges in these areas.

XINHUA's coverage of the Huang visit consistently stressed the "friendly" atmosphere and pointed to areas of agreement, citing both Huang and his host, Foreign Minister Rao, as saying that differences could be reduced as both sides look toward the future. XINHUA termed the Huang-Rao talks "fruitful, positive, and forward looking." Huang Hua also met with other Indian officials, including President Reddy and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. XINHUA's treatment of the Huang-Gandhi meeting was quite upbeat, stressing the traditional friendship between the two countries and past encouragement and support given each other "in the arduous days of struggles for independence and liberation." Lending a further positive note to the visit, both Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Rao accepted invitations to visit China, and Huang announced that China would make temporary arrangements for travel by Indian pilgrims to Tibet and would be willing to negotiate permanent arrangements.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES Public statements during Huang's visit strongly suggested that both China and India have been propelled by the unstable situation in South Asia to seek greater accommodation in their relationship, despite obvious continuing differences, particularly on Kampuchea.* China has pushed for closer ties with India in hopes of countering Soviet influence in the region, at a time when India has sought to refurbish its nonaligned image. This mutuality of interest was evident in the banquet speeches as reported by XINHUA on 26 June. Huang avoided direct allusion to the Soviet Union, in deference to his hosts' sensitivities, but he expressed the hope that in an increasingly tense international situation, China and India could improve their relations and that "our neighbors will live in amity, treat one another on an equal footing, enhance their mutual understanding, and strengthen their unity in a concerted effort to oppose aggression and interference from outside and safeguard peace in Asia and the world as a whole." Rao suggested in his banquet speech that part of India's motivation for improving relations with China was "the increase of outside presences in our neighborhood." He expressed India's desire to eliminate all causes of tension, "including those caused by the actions of outside powers." Rao also asserted in a two-edged message to Moscow that "India's friendship with any one country is never at the cost of friendship with any other." Stressing India's commitment to nonalignment and to regional stability and cooperation, he added, "We attached the highest importance to improvement of relations with our neighbors."

BORDER PROBLEM While Beijing is apparently willing to begin discussions with India fairly soon, by October according to Indian press accounts, there is no evidence that either side has substantially modified its position on the border question since the October 1962 border war. Zhou Enlai's

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* China's views on India's position on Afghanistan and Kampuchea are discussed in the TRENDS of 17 June 1981, pages 8-11.

November 1962 letter reiterating Beijing's 23 October 1962 government statement was published by Beijing in 1973, and it has continued to figure in the statements of other Chinese leaders up to the present. Last year Deng Xiaoping called directly for a "package solution" that had been implicit in China's approach--that is, Indian concessions in the western sector and Chinese concessons in the east--in arriving at a solution to the border issue; Premier Zhao Ziyang reiterated this approach during his visit to South Asian countries this June. In his 29 June press conference, Huang referred again to this position when he said both sides should approach the border question on the basis of "an equal footing, mutual understanding, and mutual concessions" so that a "fair and reasonable overall settlement" of the problem could be achieved.

In fact, several points of discrepancy between the two sides' versions of their agreement during the visit point to continuing difficulty in resolving their border dispute. XINHUA cited Huang as saying in his news conference that China had proposed that the two sides "should maintain the status quo on the borders and maintain the tranquility in the border areas" and that the two sides shared "identical views in this respect." Yet in XINHUA's account, the Indian Government statement of 29 June did not mention any agreement regarding this issue, which had been a source of disagreement in the past. At the same time, the Indian Government statement, as reported by XINHUA, said that both sides agreed that since the boundary was the "major question" between them "it is necessary to arrive at a settlement at an early date." While Huang that day did say that the two sides agreed that officials would "further explore ways and means for the settlement of the border issue . . . at an appropriate time," he gave no suggestion that this was an urgent priority.

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